linux-crypto.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Roxana Bradescu <roxabee@chromium.org>,
	Adam Langley <agl@google.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	"Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: enable Data Operand Independent Timing Mode
Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 10:07:57 +0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y9CdDUudjeczrOWz@debian.me> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230125012801.362496-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3355 bytes --]

On Tue, Jan 24, 2023 at 05:28:01PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +
> +DODT - Data Operand Dependent Timing
> +====================================
> +
> +Data Operand Dependent Timing (DODT) is a CPU vulnerability that makes the
> +execution times of instructions depend on the values of the data operated on.
> +
> +This vulnerability potentially enables side-channel attacks on data, including
> +cryptographic keys.  Most cryptography algorithms require that a variety of
> +instructions be constant-time in order to prevent side-channel attacks.
> +
> +Affected CPUs
> +-------------
> +
> +This vulnerability affects Intel Core family processors based on the Ice Lake
> +and later microarchitectures, and Intel Atom family processors based on the
> +Gracemont and later microarchitectures.  For more information, see Intel's
> +documentation [1]_.
> +
> +Mitigation
> +----------
> +
> +Mitigation of this vulnerability involves setting a Model Specific Register
> +(MSR) bit to enable Data Operand Independent Timing Mode (DOITM).
> +
> +By the default, the kernel does this on all CPUs.  This mitigation is global, so
> +it applies to both the kernel and userspace.
> +
> +This mitigation can be disabled by adding ``doitm=off`` to the kernel command
> +line.  It's also one of the mitigations that can be disabled by
> +``mitigations=off``.
> +
> +References
> +----------
> +.. [1] Data Operand Independent Timing Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) Guidance
> +   https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/best-practices/data-operand-independent-timing-isa-guidance.html
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
> index 4df436e7c4177..cd962f9634dad 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
> @@ -18,3 +18,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
>     core-scheduling.rst
>     l1d_flush.rst
>     processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
> +   dodt.rst
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index 6cfa6e3996cf7..a6a872c4365e6 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -1119,6 +1119,12 @@
>  			The filter can be disabled or changed to another
>  			driver later using sysfs.
>  
> +	doitm=off	[X86,INTEL] Disable the use of Data Operand Independent
> +			Timing Mode (DOITM).  I.e., disable the mitigation for
> +			the Data Operand Dependent Timing (DODT) CPU
> +			vulnerability.  For details, see
> +			Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/dodt.rst
> +
>  	driver_async_probe=  [KNL]
>  			List of driver names to be probed asynchronously. *
>  			matches with all driver names. If * is specified, the
> @@ -3259,6 +3265,7 @@
>  					       no_uaccess_flush [PPC]
>  					       mmio_stale_data=off [X86]
>  					       retbleed=off [X86]
> +					       doitm=off [X86,INTEL]
>  
>  				Exceptions:
>  					       This does not have any effect on
 
The doc LGTM, thanks!

Reviewed-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>

-- 
An old man doll... just what I always wanted! - Clara

[-- Attachment #2: signature.asc --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 228 bytes --]

  reply	other threads:[~2023-01-25  3:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-01-25  1:28 [PATCH] x86: enable Data Operand Independent Timing Mode Eric Biggers
2023-01-25  3:07 ` Bagas Sanjaya [this message]
2023-01-25 15:29 ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-25 16:15   ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-25 16:22   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2023-01-25 16:45     ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-26 10:20       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2023-01-26 13:52   ` Jann Horn
2023-01-26 16:40     ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-26 17:52       ` Jann Horn
2023-01-26 19:12         ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-26 22:37           ` Eric Biggers
2023-01-26 23:58             ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-31 22:48               ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-01  6:54                 ` Eric Biggers
2023-02-01 18:09                   ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-01 22:33                     ` Josh Triplett
2023-02-03 16:25                     ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-03 18:25 ` Dave Hansen
2023-03-03  3:32   ` Roxana Bradescu

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=Y9CdDUudjeczrOWz@debian.me \
    --to=bagasdotme@gmail.com \
    --cc=Jason@zx2c4.com \
    --cc=agl@google.com \
    --cc=ardb@kernel.org \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=ebiggers@kernel.org \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=roxabee@chromium.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).