From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 016F4C433F5 for ; Tue, 8 Feb 2022 06:48:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S236745AbiBHGsi (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Feb 2022 01:48:38 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:43910 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1347792AbiBHGsi (ORCPT ); Tue, 8 Feb 2022 01:48:38 -0500 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4641:c500::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D00E4C0401F2; Mon, 7 Feb 2022 22:48:37 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6DD1B61605; Tue, 8 Feb 2022 06:48:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B6AA8C004E1; Tue, 8 Feb 2022 06:48:36 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1644302916; bh=dqtHfl1ZlQ/aqoV7BiXslJfNRbt2e+V2Yl0qeT7NtOM=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=SGulEKnyIsffiHFhbNnmjUaC1uCHs1YCXWqZK5OKECUr4pFRLFrn+cgZgM255v9aQ LyWgspTr/kg9HxCIRJ+jTa77jHyEILJL7N3j9ncm0auVMX8KAcsLBsoc9532Bukjoo ve/MfkoPUgRin8P0ut/w0bh3k9INnWQn5uZ6fT4KQ7r8ij8ygiJLZDX5fwY5yRH1Ir A0S1m9+nog8J5mAesuf9aTiYlXKSe64L+YFVca313xMRN4gao6oDmbeokzG2zxjWgS zsTK2+wN7cLWwZSTxE4Igl2/GC6T4tNdnStxc8f4Stm7jpLEKIT5otpvVv9/0ZvL9k w9sBKpLvfytPQ== Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2022 22:48:35 -0800 From: Eric Biggers To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/5] random: use computational hash for entropy extraction, and related fixes Message-ID: References: <20220205160118.252698-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20220205160118.252698-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org On Sat, Feb 05, 2022 at 05:01:13PM +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > The bulk of the motivation for this and description of crypto > vulnerabilities is in the first patch of this series. The following > three patches then fix up entropy accounting for the new model. The last > patch fixes a minor code safety issue. > > This v3 fixes comments and commit message wording, simplifies a bit of > code in a cmpxchg loop, and adjusts semantics around the poll write > wakeup threshold. > > Jason A. Donenfeld (5): > random: use computational hash for entropy extraction > random: simplify entropy debiting > random: use linear min-entropy accumulation crediting > random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction > random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe > > drivers/char/random.c | 501 ++++++---------------------------- > include/trace/events/random.h | 30 +- > 2 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 444 deletions(-) Looks good, thanks! You can add for the series: Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers - Eric