From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: "Eric Snowberg" <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
"Mimi Zohar" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"David Woodhouse" <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
"herbert@gondor.apana.org.au" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"davem@davemloft.net" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Ard Biesheuvel" <ardb@kernel.org>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Roberto Sassu" <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
"Dmitry Kasatkin" <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"casey@schaufler-ca.com" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Stefan Berger" <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>,
"ebiggers@kernel.org" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"open list" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2025 02:29:13 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Z8ea2TRPS6uMgXxG@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhQC_bqZAFiABMUhTO6jTUFgHB8vjpb6-Eo7SA-2-5xfuQ@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Mar 04, 2025 at 07:25:13PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 4, 2025 at 5:25 PM Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 03, 2025 at 05:40:54PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 12:52 PM Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> wrote:
> > > > > On Feb 28, 2025, at 9:14 AM, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
> > > > > On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 9:09 AM Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> > > > >> On Thu, 2025-02-27 at 17:22 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > > >>>
> > > > >>> I'd still also like to see some discussion about moving towards the
> > > > >>> addition of keyrings oriented towards usage instead of limiting
> > > > >>> ourselves to keyrings that are oriented on the source of the keys.
> > > > >>> Perhaps I'm missing some important detail which makes this
> > > > >>> impractical, but it seems like an obvious improvement to me and would
> > > > >>> go a long way towards solving some of the problems that we typically
> > > > >>> see with kernel keys.
> > > >
> > > > The intent is not to limit ourselves to the source of the key. The main
> > > > point of Clavis is to allow the end-user to determine what kernel keys
> > > > they want to trust and for what purpose, irrespective of the originating
> > > > source (.builtin_trusted, .secondary, .machine, or .platform). If we could
> > > > go back in time, individual keyrings could be created that are oriented
> > > > toward usage. The idea for introducing Clavis is to bridge what we
> > > > have today with kernel keys and allow them to be usage based.
> > >
> > > While it is unlikely that the current well known keyrings could be
> > > removed, I see no reason why new usage oriented keyrings could not be
> > > introduced. We've seen far more significant shifts in the kernel over
> > > the years.
> >
> > Could we implement such change in a way that these new imaginary
> > (at this point) usage oriented keyrings would be used to create
> > the "legacy" keyrings?
>
> I think it would be easier for them to coexist so that one could have
> an easier migration. It's possible that even once everything was
> migrated to the new usage oriented keyrings it would still make sense
> to keep the existing keyrings in place and always link keys from there
> to the newer usage keyrings.
OK, so here I agree and disagree:
1. It probably does not port everything.
2. Still, we need to be sure that "can be done" condition is satisfied
for the sake of robustness.
>
> --
> paul-moore.com
>
BR, Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-03-05 0:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 94+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-17 15:55 [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/13] certs: Remove CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING check Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 16:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 16:50 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-12-23 13:21 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:15 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/13] certs: Introduce ability to link to a system key Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 16:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 16:53 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-12-23 16:11 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/13] clavis: Introduce a new system keyring called clavis Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 16:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 20:34 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 21:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-12-24 0:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:27 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-01-05 11:43 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/13] keys: Add new verification type (VERIFYING_CLAVIS_SIGNATURE) Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 19:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 21:42 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 21:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-12-24 0:17 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:28 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/13] clavis: Introduce a new key type called clavis_key_acl Eric Snowberg
2024-10-18 5:21 ` Ben Boeckel
2024-10-18 15:42 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-18 16:55 ` Ben Boeckel
2024-10-18 21:55 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/13] clavis: Populate clavis keyring acl with kernel module signature Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 19:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/13] keys: Add ability to track intended usage of the public key Eric Snowberg
2025-02-06 20:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-02-07 23:09 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-02-12 12:42 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/13] clavis: Introduce new LSM called clavis Eric Snowberg
2024-10-23 2:25 ` sergeh
2024-10-23 19:25 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-24 19:57 ` sergeh
2024-12-24 17:43 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:32 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-01-05 12:59 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/13] clavis: Allow user to define acl at build time Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/13] efi: Make clavis boot param persist across kexec Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/13] clavis: Prevent boot param change during kexec Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/13] clavis: Add function redirection for Kunit support Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/13] clavis: " Eric Snowberg
2024-12-24 1:11 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-12-23 12:09 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:14 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-01-04 4:48 ` Paul Moore
2025-01-06 3:40 ` Paul Moore
2025-01-06 17:15 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-02-27 20:41 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-02-27 22:22 ` Paul Moore
2025-02-28 14:08 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-02-28 16:14 ` Paul Moore
2025-02-28 17:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-03 22:38 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-04 12:53 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-05 0:19 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-05 1:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-05 2:09 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-05 2:20 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-05 2:24 ` Paul Moore
2025-02-28 17:51 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-03 22:40 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-04 14:46 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-05 0:23 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-05 21:29 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-06 1:12 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-06 22:28 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-07 2:46 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-20 16:24 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-20 21:36 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-21 16:37 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 18:57 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-21 21:20 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 22:13 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-21 22:56 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-22 2:00 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-21 17:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-21 19:05 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-20 22:40 ` James Bottomley
2025-03-21 16:40 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 16:55 ` James Bottomley
2025-03-21 20:15 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 20:53 ` James Bottomley
2025-03-24 17:44 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 17:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-04 22:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-05 0:25 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-05 0:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2025-03-01 2:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-01 2:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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