From: sergeh@kernel.org
To: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: "open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
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"Ard Biesheuvel" <ardb@kernel.org>,
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"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
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"Mimi Zohar" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
"Roberto Sassu" <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
"Dmitry Kasatkin" <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
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"open list" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
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<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 08/13] clavis: Introduce new LSM called clavis
Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2024 19:57:21 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZxqmoV-izscjbovh@lei> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <F911D28D-F8EC-4773-8143-2B4E207DA202@oracle.com>
On Wed, Oct 23, 2024 at 07:25:21PM +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > On Oct 22, 2024, at 8:25 PM, sergeh@kernel.org wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, Oct 17, 2024 at 09:55:11AM -0600, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> >>
> >> +The Clavis LSM contains a system keyring call .clavis. It contains a single
> >
> > s/call/called/
>
> I will change that, thanks.
>
> >> +asymmetric key that is used to validate anything added to it. This key can
> >> +be added during boot and must be a preexisting system kernel key. If the
> >> +``clavis=`` boot parameter is not used, any asymmetric key the user owns
> >
> > Who is "the user", and precisely what does "owns' mean here? Is it just
> > restating that it must be a key already in one of the builtin or secondary
> > or platform keyrings?
>
> In the case where Clavis was not provided a key id during boot, root can
> add a single public key to the .clavis keyring anytime afterwards. This
> key does not need to be in any of the system keyrings. Once the key is
> added, the Clavis LSM is enabled. The root user must also own the private
> key, since this is required to do the ACL signing. I will try to clarify this better
Ooh, I see. Own it as in be able to sign things with it. Of course. Thanks.
> in the documentation.
>
> I wouldn't expect this to be the typical way Clavis would be used. I would
Right, I wasn't asking because I would want to use it that way, but
because it feels potentially dangerous :)
> also be interested in any feedback if enabling the Clavis LSM this way
> following boot should be removed. If this were removed, Clavis could
> only be enabled when using the boot parameter.
Yeah I don't know enough to give good guidance here. I do worry about
UKIs enforcing only the built-in signed kernel command line and so preventing
a user from appending their own clavis= entry. Not knowing how this
will end up getting deployed, I'm not sure which is the more important
issue.
> > And this is done by simply loading it into the clavis keyring, right?
>
> Correct.
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-24 19:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 94+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-17 15:55 [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/13] certs: Remove CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING check Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 16:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 16:50 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-12-23 13:21 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:15 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/13] certs: Introduce ability to link to a system key Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 16:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 16:53 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-12-23 16:11 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/13] clavis: Introduce a new system keyring called clavis Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 16:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 20:34 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 21:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-12-24 0:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:27 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-01-05 11:43 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/13] keys: Add new verification type (VERIFYING_CLAVIS_SIGNATURE) Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 19:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 21:42 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 21:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-12-24 0:17 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:28 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/13] clavis: Introduce a new key type called clavis_key_acl Eric Snowberg
2024-10-18 5:21 ` Ben Boeckel
2024-10-18 15:42 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-18 16:55 ` Ben Boeckel
2024-10-18 21:55 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/13] clavis: Populate clavis keyring acl with kernel module signature Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 19:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/13] keys: Add ability to track intended usage of the public key Eric Snowberg
2025-02-06 20:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-02-07 23:09 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-02-12 12:42 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/13] clavis: Introduce new LSM called clavis Eric Snowberg
2024-10-23 2:25 ` sergeh
2024-10-23 19:25 ` Eric Snowberg
2024-10-24 19:57 ` sergeh [this message]
2024-12-24 17:43 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:32 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-01-05 12:59 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/13] clavis: Allow user to define acl at build time Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/13] efi: Make clavis boot param persist across kexec Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/13] clavis: Prevent boot param change during kexec Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/13] clavis: Add function redirection for Kunit support Eric Snowberg
2024-10-17 15:55 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/13] clavis: " Eric Snowberg
2024-12-24 1:11 ` Mimi Zohar
2024-12-23 12:09 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM Mimi Zohar
2025-01-03 23:14 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-01-04 4:48 ` Paul Moore
2025-01-06 3:40 ` Paul Moore
2025-01-06 17:15 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-02-27 20:41 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-02-27 22:22 ` Paul Moore
2025-02-28 14:08 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-02-28 16:14 ` Paul Moore
2025-02-28 17:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-03 22:38 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-04 12:53 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-05 0:19 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-05 1:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-05 2:09 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-05 2:20 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-05 2:24 ` Paul Moore
2025-02-28 17:51 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-03 22:40 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-04 14:46 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-05 0:23 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-05 21:29 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-06 1:12 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-06 22:28 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-07 2:46 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-20 16:24 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-20 21:36 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-21 16:37 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 18:57 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-21 21:20 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 22:13 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-21 22:56 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-22 2:00 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-21 17:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-21 19:05 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-20 22:40 ` James Bottomley
2025-03-21 16:40 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 16:55 ` James Bottomley
2025-03-21 20:15 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 20:53 ` James Bottomley
2025-03-24 17:44 ` Eric Snowberg
2025-03-21 17:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-04 22:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-05 0:25 ` Paul Moore
2025-03-05 0:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-01 2:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-01 2:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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