From: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
linux-sunxi@lists.linux.dev,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@kernel.org>,
Jernej Skrabec <jernej.skrabec@gmail.com>,
Samuel Holland <samuel@sholland.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] crypto: sun4i-ss - Remove insecure and unused rng_alg
Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 17:08:13 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ah2gXTMxfH-ux_J2@Red> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260529193648.18172-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>
Le Fri, May 29, 2026 at 12:36:48PM -0700, Eric Biggers a écrit :
> Remove sun4i_ss_rng, as it is insecure and unused:
>
> - It has multiple vulnerabilities. sun4i_ss_prng_seed() is missing
> locking and has a buffer overflow. sun4i_ss_prng_generate() fails to
> fill the entire buffer with cryptographic random bytes, because it
> rounds the destination length down and also doesn't actually wait for
> the hardware to be ready before pulling bytes from it.
>
> - No user of this code is known. It's usable only theoretically via the
> "rng" algorithm type of AF_ALG. But userspace actually just uses the
> actual Linux RNG (/dev/random etc) instead. And rng_algs don't
> contribute entropy to the actual Linux RNG either. (This may have
> been confused with hwrng, which does contribute entropy.)
>
> Fixes: b8ae5c7387ad ("crypto: sun4i-ss - support the Security System PRNG")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
> ---
Acked-by: Corentin LABBE <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-01 15:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-29 19:36 [PATCH] crypto: sun4i-ss - Remove insecure and unused rng_alg Eric Biggers
[not found] ` <20260529195725.5C7B91F00898@smtp.kernel.org>
2026-05-29 20:54 ` Eric Biggers
2026-06-01 15:08 ` Corentin Labbe [this message]
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-06-01 9:19 Tianchu Chen
2026-06-01 15:54 ` Eric Biggers
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