From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 0/3]
Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 02:43:22 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ahONGtGQkrOYlunW@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260524051519.3708075-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
On Sun, May 24, 2026 at 08:15:11AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> This series introduces key type for operating with asymmetric keys using
> a TPM2 chip.
This would deserve more explanation but the original trait was to
implement TPM2 parts of:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-woodhouse-cert-best-practice/00/
What motivated me to reiterate are actually these coding agents and how
all secrets are sprayed across the home directory. So, besides iwd one
could use this feature to provide per-session cryptography for coding
agents.
There's a lot to do with security and coding agents as we have literally
moved to an era where we host indeterministically rogues software in our
development workstations.
There's other questions too that we need to eventually answer like for
instace, how to deal with persistent agent memory stored at the
computer's hard drive?
The irony here is that LLM is really neither rogue nor a lier. It is
just a text predictor optimizing for maximum reward and those
descriptions are just human interpretations of the output text. It
understand neither evil, lying nor quality for that matter ;-)
BR, Jarkko
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-24 23:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-24 5:15 [PATCH v8 0/3] Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-24 5:15 ` [PATCH v8 1/3] lib/asn1_encoder: Add asn1_encode_integer_bytes() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-24 5:15 ` [PATCH v8 2/3] crypto: Migrate TPMKey ASN.1 objects from trusted-keys Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-24 5:15 ` [PATCH v8 3/3] keys: asymmetric: tpm2_asymmetric Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-24 5:20 ` [PATCH v8 0/3] Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-24 23:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-24 23:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
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