Linux cryptographic layer development
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From: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
To: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 09/10] crypto: safexcel - Rework cleanup of sensitive structs in safexcel_aead_setkey
Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2026 10:43:24 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <b2034bb2-6085-4fb8-9704-ecbac10c8fe8@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <anWPtWKdJFUoe2Pq@kwain>

On 07/08/2026 10.02, Antoine Tenart wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 07, 2026 at 09:40:58AM +0200, Antoine Tenart wrote:
>> On Fri, Aug 07, 2026 at 09:06:36AM +0200, Thomas Huth wrote:
>>> From: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
>>>
>>> The crypto_authenc_keys structure only contains pointers to keys, but not
>>> the key data itself. So explicitly clearing the structure at the end of
>>> safexcel_aead_setkey() is not really necessary, see Eric's recommendation
>>> here:
>>>
>>>   https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20260804185402.GD2904385@google.com/
>>>
>>> On the other hand, the crypto_aes_ctx might contain sensitive information,
>>> so this structure should be cleaned up at the end instead. Do this
>>> now via the new __cleanup(aes_zeroize_ctx) marker.
>>>
>>> Since __cleanup() and gotos should not be mixed in the same function,
>>> replace the gotos with early return statements, which is fine now that
>>> we dropped the memzero_explicit(&keys, sizeof(keys)) at the end.
>>>
>>> Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
>>> Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
>>
>> Reviewed-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
> 
> Actually I think we could do better here:
> 
> The AES key is expanded in safexcel_aead_setkey using aes_expandkey but
> the result (the aes variable) is discarded and never used. This seems a
> waste of CPU cycles for doing a validity check on the input key, which
> can be replaced by a simple aes_check_keylen.
> 
> The same applies to the EIP93 patch for both chunks.
You're right, using aes_check_keylen sounds like the better idea here. 
Thanks for the hint! I'll update it in v5...

  Thomas


  reply	other threads:[~2026-08-10  8:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-07  7:06 [PATCH v4 00/10] crypto: Provide a function for zeroizing crypto_aes_ctx Thomas Huth
2026-08-07  7:06 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] crypto: Provide a wrapper " Thomas Huth
2026-08-07  7:06 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] crypto: aspeed - clear the crypto_aes_ctx when done Thomas Huth
2026-08-07  7:06 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] crypto: inside-secure/eip93 " Thomas Huth
2026-08-07  7:06 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] crypto: padlock-aes " Thomas Huth
2026-08-07  7:06 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] crypto: sa2ul " Thomas Huth
2026-08-07  7:06 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] crypto: arm/aes-neonbs " Thomas Huth
2026-08-07  7:06 ` [PATCH v4 07/10] crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs " Thomas Huth
2026-08-07  7:06 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] crypto: qat - zeroize crypto_aes_ctx with __cleanup(aes_zeroize_ctx) Thomas Huth
2026-08-07  7:06 ` [PATCH v4 09/10] crypto: safexcel - Rework cleanup of sensitive structs in safexcel_aead_setkey Thomas Huth
2026-08-07  7:40   ` Antoine Tenart
2026-08-07  8:02     ` Antoine Tenart
2026-08-10  8:43       ` Thomas Huth [this message]
2026-08-07  7:06 ` [PATCH v4 10/10] crypto: safexcel - zeroize crypto_aes_ctx with __cleanup(aes_zeroize_ctx) Thomas Huth

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