From: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>
To: Vadim Fedorenko <vadim.fedorenko@linux.dev>,
Vadim Fedorenko <vadfed@meta.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, Victor Stewart <v@nametag.social>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Mykola Lysenko <mykolal@fb.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 1/3] bpf: make common crypto API for TC/XDP programs
Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2024 14:34:49 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cec469f4-2fd0-479a-8919-0d5578687fb2@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a682b902-37a2-4d43-8f39-56ca213f6663@linux.dev>
On 1/25/24 3:19 AM, Vadim Fedorenko wrote:
> On 25/01/2024 01:10, Martin KaFai Lau wrote:
>> On 1/15/24 2:08 PM, Vadim Fedorenko wrote:
>>> +static int bpf_crypto_crypt(const struct bpf_crypto_ctx *ctx,
>>> + const struct bpf_dynptr_kern *src,
>>> + struct bpf_dynptr_kern *dst,
>>> + const struct bpf_dynptr_kern *siv,
>>> + bool decrypt)
>>> +{
>>> + u32 src_len, dst_len, siv_len;
>>> + const u8 *psrc;
>>> + u8 *pdst, *piv;
>>> + int err;
>>> +
>>> + if (ctx->type->get_flags(ctx->tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
>>
>> nit. Does the indirect call get_flags() return different values?
>> Should it be rejected earlier, e.g. in bpf_crypto_ctx_create()?
>
> Well, that is the common pattern in crypto subsys to check flags.
> But after looking at it second time, I think I have to refactor this
> part. CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY is set during tfm creation if algo requires
> the key. And it's freed when the key setup is successful. As there is no
> way bpf programs can modify tfm directly we can move this check to
> bpf_crypto_ctx_create() to key setup part and avoid indirect call in this place.
>>
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> +
>>> + if (__bpf_dynptr_is_rdonly(dst))
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> +
>>> + siv_len = __bpf_dynptr_size(siv);
>>> + src_len = __bpf_dynptr_size(src);
>>> + dst_len = __bpf_dynptr_size(dst);
>>> + if (!src_len || !dst_len)
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> +
>>> + if (siv_len != (ctx->type->ivsize(ctx->tfm) +
>>> ctx->type->statesize(ctx->tfm)))
>>
>> Same here, two indirect calls per en/decrypt kfunc call. Does the return value
>> change?
>
> I have to check the size of IV provided by the caller, and then to avoid
> indirect calls I have to store these values somewhere in ctx. It gives a
> direct access to these values to bpf programs, which can potentially
> abuse them. Not sure if it's good to open such opportunity.
I don't think it makes any difference considering tfm has already been
accessible in ctx->tfm. A noob question, what secret is in the siv len?
btw, unrelated, based on the selftest in patch 3, is it supporting any siv_len >
0 for now?
>
>>
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> +
>>> + psrc = __bpf_dynptr_data(src, src_len);
>>> + if (!psrc)
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> + pdst = __bpf_dynptr_data_rw(dst, dst_len);
>>> + if (!pdst)
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> +
>>> + piv = siv_len ? __bpf_dynptr_data_rw(siv, siv_len) : NULL;
>>> + if (siv_len && !piv)
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> +
>>> + err = decrypt ? ctx->type->decrypt(ctx->tfm, psrc, pdst, src_len, piv)
>>> + : ctx->type->encrypt(ctx->tfm, psrc, pdst, src_len, piv);
>>> +
>>> + return err;
>>> +}
>>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-25 22:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-15 22:08 [PATCH bpf-next v8 1/3] bpf: make common crypto API for TC/XDP programs Vadim Fedorenko
2024-01-15 22:08 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 2/3] bpf: crypto: add skcipher to bpf crypto Vadim Fedorenko
2024-01-25 1:14 ` Martin KaFai Lau
2024-01-25 9:24 ` Herbert Xu
2024-01-15 22:08 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 3/3] selftests: bpf: crypto skcipher algo selftests Vadim Fedorenko
2024-01-25 1:26 ` Martin KaFai Lau
2024-02-21 8:43 ` Jakub Sitnicki
2024-02-21 9:19 ` Jakub Sitnicki
2024-01-23 17:51 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 1/3] bpf: make common crypto API for TC/XDP programs Vadim Fedorenko
2024-01-24 0:12 ` Martin KaFai Lau
2024-01-25 1:10 ` Martin KaFai Lau
2024-01-25 11:19 ` Vadim Fedorenko
2024-01-25 22:34 ` Martin KaFai Lau [this message]
2024-01-26 10:30 ` Vadim Fedorenko
2024-01-26 17:38 ` Vadim Fedorenko
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