Re: [PATCH RFC v1 5/6] efi: efivarfs: prohibit reading random seed variables

[James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>]

On Wed, 2022-11-16 at 21:08 +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 16, 2022 at 8:42 PM James Bottomley
> <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com> wrote:
> > It would be nice if they could be boot services only ... then they
> > disappear naturally, but that would mean the rng would have to
> > initialize and save in the EFI stub before ExitBootServices, which
> > doesn't seem practical.
> 
> That would be nice, but the whole idea is it gets updated by Linux's
> RNG, so that won't work. `boot|runtime` it is, then.

But then you can't use the only security mechanism we have in EFI
(keeping sensitive information in BS only variables which can only be
accessed by EFI signed entities).  If you can't take advantage of that
then there's no security point in placing the seed in EFI and you might
as well simply write it to a file.

Artificially trying to hide the variables from efivarfs has no real
security value either, as I think you can appreciate if you try the
thought experiment of trying to get a VFS modification to hide the
random seed file past Al ... I'll get the thought experiment popcorn.

James