* [PATCH 18/18] Hibernate: notify bootloader regenerate key-pair for snapshot verification
From: Lee, Chun-Yi @ 2013-08-22 11:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm, linux-crypto,
opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, Josh Boyer,
Vojtech Pavlik, Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina,
Rusty Russell, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin,
Michal Marek, Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal, Lee, Chun-Yi
In-Reply-To: <1377169317-5959-1-git-send-email-jlee@suse.com>
This patch introduced SNAPSHOT_REGEN_KEYS kernel config, enable this
option let kernel notify booloader (e.g. shim) to regenerate key-pair of
snapshot verification for each hibernate.
Kernel loaded S4 sign key in efi stub, so the private key forward from
efi bootloader to kernel in UEFI secure environment. Regenerate key-pair
for each hibernate will gain more security but it hurt the lifetime of
EFI flash memory.
Kernel write an non-volatile runtime efi variable, the name is
GenS4Key-fe141863-c070-478e-b8a3-878a5dc9ef21, to notify efi bootloader
regenerate key-pair for next hibernate cycle.
Userland hibernate tool can write GenS4Key at runtime, kernel will
respect the value but not overwrite it when S4. This mechanism let
userland tool can also notify bootloader to regenerate key-pair through
GenS4Key flag.
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
---
kernel/power/Kconfig | 15 +++++++++++++++
kernel/power/hibernate_keys.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/power/power.h | 2 ++
kernel/power/snapshot.c | 3 +++
4 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/power/Kconfig b/kernel/power/Kconfig
index 79b34fa..63bda98 100644
--- a/kernel/power/Kconfig
+++ b/kernel/power/Kconfig
@@ -78,6 +78,21 @@ config SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION
dependent on UEFI environment. EFI bootloader should generate the
key-pair.
+config SNAPSHOT_REGEN_KEYS
+ bool "Regenerate key-pair for each snapshot verification"
+ depends on SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION
+ help
+ Enabled this option let kernel notify booloader (e.g. shim) to
+ regenerate key-pair of snapshot verification for each hibernate.
+ Linux kernel write an non-volatile runtime EFI variable, the name
+ is GenS4Key-fe141863-c070-478e-b8a3-878a5dc9ef21, to notify EFI
+ bootloader regenerate key-pair for next hibernate cycle.
+
+ Userland hibernate tool can write GenS4Key at runtime then kernel
+ will respect the value but not overwrite it when S4. This mechanism
+ let userland tool can also notify bootloader to regenerate key-pair
+ through GenS4Key flag.
+
choice
prompt "Which hash algorithm should snapshot be signed with?"
depends on SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION
diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate_keys.c b/kernel/power/hibernate_keys.c
index 1bc5976..60d3e73 100644
--- a/kernel/power/hibernate_keys.c
+++ b/kernel/power/hibernate_keys.c
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
#include "power.h"
+static efi_char16_t efi_gens4key_name[9] = { 'G', 'e', 'n', 'S', '4', 'K', 'e', 'y', 0 };
+
static void *skey_data;
static void *skey_data_buf;
static unsigned long skey_dsize;
@@ -273,6 +275,42 @@ size_t get_key_length(const struct key *key)
return len;
}
+void set_key_regen_flag(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_REGEN_KEYS
+ unsigned long datasize;
+ u8 gens4key;
+ efi_status_t status;
+
+ /* existing flag may set by userland, respect but not overwrite it */
+ datasize = 0;
+ status = efi.get_variable(efi_gens4key_name, &EFI_HIBERNATE_GUID,
+ NULL, &datasize, NULL);
+ if (status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)
+ return;
+
+ /* set flag of key-pair regeneration */
+ gens4key = 1;
+ status = efi.set_variable(efi_gens4key_name, &EFI_HIBERNATE_GUID,
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE |
+ EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
+ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
+ 1, (void *)&gens4key);
+ if (status)
+ pr_err("PM: Set GenS4Key flag fail: 0x%lx\n", status);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void clean_key_regen_flag(void)
+{
+ /* clean flag of key-pair regeneration */
+ efi.set_variable(efi_gens4key_name, &EFI_HIBERNATE_GUID,
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE |
+ EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
+ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
+ 0, NULL);
+}
+
static int __init init_sign_key_data(void)
{
skey_data = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -283,6 +321,7 @@ static int __init init_sign_key_data(void)
efi_erase_s4_skey_data();
pr_info("PM: Load s4 sign key from EFI\n");
}
+ clean_key_regen_flag();
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/power/power.h b/kernel/power/power.h
index 84e0b06..3fcde36 100644
--- a/kernel/power/power.h
+++ b/kernel/power/power.h
@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ extern void restore_sign_key_data(void);
extern bool swsusp_page_is_sign_key(struct page *page);
extern unsigned long get_skey_data_buf_pfn(void);
extern void clone_skey_data(void *page_addr);
+extern void set_key_regen_flag(void);
#else /* !CONFIG_SUSPEND */
static inline void restore_sign_key_data(void) {}
static inline bool swsusp_page_is_sign_key(struct page *page)
@@ -191,6 +192,7 @@ static inline unsigned long get_skey_data_buf_pfn(void)
{
return 0;
}
+static inline void set_key_regen_flag(void) {}
#endif /* !CONFIG_SNAPSHOT_VERIFICATION */
/* kernel/power/block_io.c */
diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
index f02e351..12174ff 100644
--- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c
+++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
@@ -1769,6 +1769,9 @@ asmlinkage int swsusp_save(void)
printk(KERN_INFO "PM: Hibernation image created (%d pages copied)\n",
nr_pages);
+ /* set regenerate key flag */
+ set_key_regen_flag();
+
return 0;
}
--
1.6.4.2
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 03/18] asymmetric keys: separate the length checking of octet string from RSA_I2OSP
From: Lee, Chun-Yi @ 2013-08-22 11:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm, linux-crypto,
opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, Josh Boyer,
Vojtech Pavlik, Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina,
Rusty Russell, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin,
Michal Marek, Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal, Lee, Chun-Yi
In-Reply-To: <1377169317-5959-1-git-send-email-jlee@suse.com>
Due to RSA_I2OSP is not only used by signature verification path but also used
in signature generation path. So, separate the length checking of octet string
because it's not for generate 0x00 0x01 leading string when used in signature
generation.
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c
index 6996ff7..c26ae77 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c
@@ -121,12 +121,30 @@ static int RSAVP1(const struct public_key *key, MPI s, MPI *_m)
/*
* Integer to Octet String conversion [RFC3447 sec 4.1]
*/
-static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **_X)
+static int _RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, unsigned *X_size, u8 **_X)
{
- unsigned X_size, x_size;
int X_sign;
u8 *X;
+ X = mpi_get_buffer(x, X_size, &X_sign);
+ if (!X)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (X_sign < 0) {
+ kfree(X);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ *_X = X;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **_X)
+{
+ unsigned x_size;
+ unsigned X_size;
+ u8 *X = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
/* Make sure the string is the right length. The number should begin
* with { 0x00, 0x01, ... } so we have to account for 15 leading zero
* bits not being reported by MPI.
@@ -136,13 +154,10 @@ static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **_X)
if (x_size != xLen * 8 - 15)
return -ERANGE;
- X = mpi_get_buffer(x, &X_size, &X_sign);
- if (!X)
- return -ENOMEM;
- if (X_sign < 0) {
- kfree(X);
- return -EBADMSG;
- }
+ ret = _RSA_I2OSP(x, &X_size, &X);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
if (X_size != xLen - 1) {
kfree(X);
return -EBADMSG;
--
1.6.4.2
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH v2] kernel/padata.c: share code between CPU_ONLINE and CPU_DOWN_FAILED, same to CPU_DOWN_PREPARE and CPU_UP_CANCELED
From: Chen Gang @ 2013-08-23 3:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steffen Klassert; +Cc: linux-crypto, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <5215B319.3020908@asianux.com>
On 08/22/2013 02:43 PM, Chen Gang wrote:
> Share code between CPU_ONLINE and CPU_DOWN_FAILED, same to
> CPU_DOWN_PREPARE and CPU_UP_CANCELED.
>
> It will fix 2 bugs:
>
> "not check the return value of __padata_remove_cpu() and __padata_add_cpu()".
> "need add 'break' between CPU_UP_CANCELED and CPU_DOWN_FAILED".
>
Do we need more details descriptions ?
If so, could Steffen give more expert details information ?
Thanks.
>
> Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com>
> ---
> kernel/padata.c | 20 ++++----------------
> 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/padata.c b/kernel/padata.c
> index 072f4ee..2f0037a 100644
> --- a/kernel/padata.c
> +++ b/kernel/padata.c
> @@ -846,6 +846,8 @@ static int padata_cpu_callback(struct notifier_block *nfb,
> switch (action) {
> case CPU_ONLINE:
> case CPU_ONLINE_FROZEN:
> + case CPU_DOWN_FAILED:
> + case CPU_DOWN_FAILED_FROZEN:
> if (!pinst_has_cpu(pinst, cpu))
> break;
> mutex_lock(&pinst->lock);
> @@ -857,6 +859,8 @@ static int padata_cpu_callback(struct notifier_block *nfb,
>
> case CPU_DOWN_PREPARE:
> case CPU_DOWN_PREPARE_FROZEN:
> + case CPU_UP_CANCELED:
> + case CPU_UP_CANCELED_FROZEN:
> if (!pinst_has_cpu(pinst, cpu))
> break;
> mutex_lock(&pinst->lock);
> @@ -865,22 +869,6 @@ static int padata_cpu_callback(struct notifier_block *nfb,
> if (err)
> return notifier_from_errno(err);
> break;
> -
> - case CPU_UP_CANCELED:
> - case CPU_UP_CANCELED_FROZEN:
> - if (!pinst_has_cpu(pinst, cpu))
> - break;
> - mutex_lock(&pinst->lock);
> - __padata_remove_cpu(pinst, cpu);
> - mutex_unlock(&pinst->lock);
> -
> - case CPU_DOWN_FAILED:
> - case CPU_DOWN_FAILED_FROZEN:
> - if (!pinst_has_cpu(pinst, cpu))
> - break;
> - mutex_lock(&pinst->lock);
> - __padata_add_cpu(pinst, cpu);
> - mutex_unlock(&pinst->lock);
> }
>
> return NOTIFY_OK;
>
--
Chen Gang
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] kernel/padata.c: share code between CPU_ONLINE and CPU_DOWN_FAILED, same to CPU_DOWN_PREPARE and CPU_UP_CANCELED
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2013-08-23 10:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chen Gang, Herbert Xu; +Cc: linux-crypto, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <5215B319.3020908@asianux.com>
On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 02:43:37PM +0800, Chen Gang wrote:
> Share code between CPU_ONLINE and CPU_DOWN_FAILED, same to
> CPU_DOWN_PREPARE and CPU_UP_CANCELED.
>
> It will fix 2 bugs:
>
> "not check the return value of __padata_remove_cpu() and __padata_add_cpu()".
> "need add 'break' between CPU_UP_CANCELED and CPU_DOWN_FAILED".
>
>
> Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com>
This looks ok to me, Herbert can you take this one?
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] kernel/padata.c: share code between CPU_ONLINE and CPU_DOWN_FAILED, same to CPU_DOWN_PREPARE and CPU_UP_CANCELED
From: Herbert Xu @ 2013-08-23 10:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steffen Klassert; +Cc: Chen Gang, linux-crypto, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <20130823104448.GI26773@secunet.com>
On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 12:44:48PM +0200, Steffen Klassert wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 02:43:37PM +0800, Chen Gang wrote:
> > Share code between CPU_ONLINE and CPU_DOWN_FAILED, same to
> > CPU_DOWN_PREPARE and CPU_UP_CANCELED.
> >
> > It will fix 2 bugs:
> >
> > "not check the return value of __padata_remove_cpu() and __padata_add_cpu()".
> > "need add 'break' between CPU_UP_CANCELED and CPU_DOWN_FAILED".
> >
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com>
>
> This looks ok to me, Herbert can you take this one?
Sure.
Thanks,
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH] kernel/padata.c: Register hotcpu notifier after initialization
From: Richard Weinberger @ 2013-08-23 11:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: steffen.klassert
Cc: linux-crypto, linux-kernel, herbert, gang.chen,
Richard Weinberger
padata_cpu_callback() takes pinst->lock, to avoid taking
an uninitialized lock, register the notifier after it's
initialization.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
---
kernel/padata.c | 12 ++++++------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/padata.c b/kernel/padata.c
index 072f4ee..8e1bf9d 100644
--- a/kernel/padata.c
+++ b/kernel/padata.c
@@ -1086,18 +1086,18 @@ struct padata_instance *padata_alloc(struct workqueue_struct *wq,
pinst->flags = 0;
-#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
- pinst->cpu_notifier.notifier_call = padata_cpu_callback;
- pinst->cpu_notifier.priority = 0;
- register_hotcpu_notifier(&pinst->cpu_notifier);
-#endif
-
put_online_cpus();
BLOCKING_INIT_NOTIFIER_HEAD(&pinst->cpumask_change_notifier);
kobject_init(&pinst->kobj, &padata_attr_type);
mutex_init(&pinst->lock);
+#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
+ pinst->cpu_notifier.notifier_call = padata_cpu_callback;
+ pinst->cpu_notifier.priority = 0;
+ register_hotcpu_notifier(&pinst->cpu_notifier);
+#endif
+
return pinst;
err_free_masks:
--
1.8.3.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* RE:
From: Ruiz, Irma @ 2013-08-23 10:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ruiz, Irma
In-Reply-To: <B719EF0A9FB7A247B5147CD67A83E60E011FEB76D1@EXCH10-MB3.paterson.k12.nj.us>
________________________________
From: Ruiz, Irma
Sent: Friday, August 23, 2013 6:40 AM
To: Ruiz, Irma
Subject:
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^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 00/10] Series of fixes for NX driver
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-23 20:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: Marcelo Cerri, linuxppc-dev, linux-kernel, linux-crypto
This series of patches contains fixes in several algorithms implemented
by the NX driver. The patches can be separated in three different
categories:
- Changes to split the data in several hyper calls to respect the
limits of data that the co-processador can handle. This affects
all AES modes.
- Fixes in how the driver handle zero length messages. This affects
XCBC and GCM.
- Fixes for SHA-2 when chunks bigger than the block size are provided.
Fionnuala Gunter (2):
crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-XCBC
crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-CCM
Marcelo Cerri (8):
crypto: nx - add offset to nx_build_sg_lists()
crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-ECB
crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-CBC
crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-CTR
crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-GCM
crypto: nx - fix XCBC for zero length messages
crypto: nx - fix GCM for zero length messages
crypto: nx - fix SHA-2 for chunks bigger than block size
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-cbc.c | 50 ++++---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c | 297 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c | 50 ++++---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ecb.c | 48 ++++---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c | 292 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-xcbc.c | 191 +++++++++++++++++++-------
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha256.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha512.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c | 9 +-
drivers/crypto/nx/nx.h | 2 +-
10 files changed, 683 insertions(+), 260 deletions(-)
--
1.7.12
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 01/10] crypto: nx - add offset to nx_build_sg_lists()
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-23 20:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: Marcelo Cerri, linuxppc-dev, linux-kernel, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <1377288074-18998-1-git-send-email-mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch includes one more parameter to nx_build_sg_lists() to skip
the given number of bytes from beginning of each sg list.
This is needed in order to implement the fixes for the AES modes to make
them able to process larger chunks of data.
Reviewed-by: Joy Latten <jmlatten@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-cbc.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c | 4 ++--
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ecb.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c | 9 +++++++--
drivers/crypto/nx/nx.h | 2 +-
7 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-cbc.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-cbc.c
index 9310982..f334a60 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-cbc.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-cbc.c
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static int cbc_aes_nx_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
else
NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, nbytes,
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, nbytes, 0,
csbcpb->cpb.aes_cbc.iv);
if (rc)
goto out;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c
index 39d4224..666a35b 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static int ccm_nx_decrypt(struct aead_request *req,
if (rc)
goto out;
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, req->dst, req->src, nbytes,
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, req->dst, req->src, nbytes, 0,
csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.iv_or_ctr);
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static int ccm_nx_encrypt(struct aead_request *req,
if (rc)
goto out;
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, req->dst, req->src, nbytes,
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, req->dst, req->src, nbytes, 0,
csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.iv_or_ctr);
if (rc)
goto out;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c
index 762611b..80dee8d 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static int ctr_aes_nx_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
goto out;
}
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, nbytes,
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, nbytes, 0,
csbcpb->cpb.aes_ctr.iv);
if (rc)
goto out;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ecb.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ecb.c
index 77dbe08..fe0d803 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ecb.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ecb.c
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static int ecb_aes_nx_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
else
NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, nbytes, NULL);
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, nbytes, 0, NULL);
if (rc)
goto out;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c
index 74feee1..c2d6f76 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static int gcm_aes_nx_crypt(struct aead_request *req, int enc)
csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.bit_length_data = nbytes * 8;
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, &desc, req->dst, req->src, nbytes,
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, &desc, req->dst, req->src, nbytes, 0,
csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.iv_or_cnt);
if (rc)
goto out;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c
index bdf4990..5533fe3 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c
@@ -211,6 +211,8 @@ struct nx_sg *nx_walk_and_build(struct nx_sg *nx_dst,
* @dst: destination scatterlist
* @src: source scatterlist
* @nbytes: length of data described in the scatterlists
+ * @offset: number of bytes to fast-forward past at the beginning of
+ * scatterlists.
* @iv: destination for the iv data, if the algorithm requires it
*
* This is common code shared by all the AES algorithms. It uses the block
@@ -222,6 +224,7 @@ int nx_build_sg_lists(struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx,
struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes,
+ unsigned int offset,
u8 *iv)
{
struct nx_sg *nx_insg = nx_ctx->in_sg;
@@ -230,8 +233,10 @@ int nx_build_sg_lists(struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx,
if (iv)
memcpy(iv, desc->info, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- nx_insg = nx_walk_and_build(nx_insg, nx_ctx->ap->sglen, src, 0, nbytes);
- nx_outsg = nx_walk_and_build(nx_outsg, nx_ctx->ap->sglen, dst, 0, nbytes);
+ nx_insg = nx_walk_and_build(nx_insg, nx_ctx->ap->sglen, src,
+ offset, nbytes);
+ nx_outsg = nx_walk_and_build(nx_outsg, nx_ctx->ap->sglen, dst,
+ offset, nbytes);
/* these lengths should be negative, which will indicate to phyp that
* the input and output parameters are scatterlists, not linear
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.h b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.h
index 14bb97f..befda07 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.h
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ int nx_hcall_sync(struct nx_crypto_ctx *ctx, struct vio_pfo_op *op,
struct nx_sg *nx_build_sg_list(struct nx_sg *, u8 *, unsigned int, u32);
int nx_build_sg_lists(struct nx_crypto_ctx *, struct blkcipher_desc *,
struct scatterlist *, struct scatterlist *, unsigned int,
- u8 *);
+ unsigned int, u8 *);
struct nx_sg *nx_walk_and_build(struct nx_sg *, unsigned int,
struct scatterlist *, unsigned int,
unsigned int);
--
1.7.12
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 02/10] crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-ECB
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-23 20:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, linuxppc-dev, Marcelo Cerri
In-Reply-To: <1377288074-18998-1-git-send-email-mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch updates the nx-aes-ecb implementation to perform several
hyper calls if needed in order to always respect the length limits for
scatter/gather lists.
Two different limits are considered:
- "ibm,max-sg-len": maximum number of bytes of each scatter/gather
list.
- "ibm,max-sync-cop":
- The total number of bytes that a scatter/gather list can hold.
- The maximum number of elements that a scatter/gather list can have.
Reviewed-by: Joy Latten <jmlatten@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ecb.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ecb.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ecb.c
index fe0d803..85a8d23 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ecb.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ecb.c
@@ -71,37 +71,49 @@ static int ecb_aes_nx_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct nx_csbcpb *csbcpb = nx_ctx->csbcpb;
unsigned long irq_flags;
+ unsigned int processed = 0, to_process;
+ u32 max_sg_len;
int rc;
spin_lock_irqsave(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
- if (nbytes > nx_ctx->ap->databytelen) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ max_sg_len = min_t(u32, nx_driver.of.max_sg_len/sizeof(struct nx_sg),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
if (enc)
NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
else
NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, nbytes, 0, NULL);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ do {
+ to_process = min_t(u64, nbytes - processed,
+ nx_ctx->ap->databytelen);
+ to_process = min_t(u64, to_process,
+ NX_PAGE_SIZE * (max_sg_len - 1));
+ to_process = to_process & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
- if (!nx_ctx->op.inlen || !nx_ctx->op.outlen) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, to_process,
+ processed, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
- rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
- desc->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ if (!nx_ctx->op.inlen || !nx_ctx->op.outlen) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ desc->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+ atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
+ &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+
+ processed += to_process;
+ } while (processed < nbytes);
- atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
- atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
- &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
return rc;
--
1.7.12
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 03/10] crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-CBC
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-23 20:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, linuxppc-dev, Marcelo Cerri
In-Reply-To: <1377288074-18998-1-git-send-email-mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch updates the nx-aes-cbc implementation to perform several
hyper calls if needed in order to always respect the length limits for
scatter/gather lists.
Two different limits are considered:
- "ibm,max-sg-len": maximum number of bytes of each scatter/gather
list.
- "ibm,max-sync-cop":
- The total number of bytes that a scatter/gather list can hold.
- The maximum number of elements that a scatter/gather list can have.
Reviewed-by: Joy Latten <jmlatten@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-cbc.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-cbc.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-cbc.c
index f334a60..fa37df1 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-cbc.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-cbc.c
@@ -71,40 +71,50 @@ static int cbc_aes_nx_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct nx_csbcpb *csbcpb = nx_ctx->csbcpb;
unsigned long irq_flags;
+ unsigned int processed = 0, to_process;
+ u32 max_sg_len;
int rc;
spin_lock_irqsave(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
- if (nbytes > nx_ctx->ap->databytelen) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ max_sg_len = min_t(u32, nx_driver.of.max_sg_len/sizeof(struct nx_sg),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
if (enc)
NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
else
NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, nbytes, 0,
- csbcpb->cpb.aes_cbc.iv);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ do {
+ to_process = min_t(u64, nbytes - processed,
+ nx_ctx->ap->databytelen);
+ to_process = min_t(u64, to_process,
+ NX_PAGE_SIZE * (max_sg_len - 1));
+ to_process = to_process & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
- if (!nx_ctx->op.inlen || !nx_ctx->op.outlen) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, to_process,
+ processed, csbcpb->cpb.aes_cbc.iv);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
- rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
- desc->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ if (!nx_ctx->op.inlen || !nx_ctx->op.outlen) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
- memcpy(desc->info, csbcpb->cpb.aes_cbc.cv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ desc->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
- atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
- atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
- &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+ memcpy(desc->info, csbcpb->cpb.aes_cbc.cv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+ atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
+ &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+
+ processed += to_process;
+ } while (processed < nbytes);
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
return rc;
--
1.7.12
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 04/10] crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-CTR
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-23 20:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, linuxppc-dev, Marcelo Cerri
In-Reply-To: <1377288074-18998-1-git-send-email-mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch updates the nx-aes-ctr implementation to perform several
hyper calls if needed in order to always respect the length limits for
scatter/gather lists.
Two different limits are considered:
- "ibm,max-sg-len": maximum number of bytes of each scatter/gather
list.
- "ibm,max-sync-cop":
- The total number of bytes that a scatter/gather list can hold.
- The maximum number of elements that a scatter/gather list can have.
Reviewed-by: Joy Latten <jmlatten@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c
index 80dee8d..a37d009 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c
@@ -89,33 +89,45 @@ static int ctr_aes_nx_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct nx_csbcpb *csbcpb = nx_ctx->csbcpb;
unsigned long irq_flags;
+ unsigned int processed = 0, to_process;
+ u32 max_sg_len;
int rc;
spin_lock_irqsave(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
- if (nbytes > nx_ctx->ap->databytelen) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ max_sg_len = min_t(u32, nx_driver.of.max_sg_len/sizeof(struct nx_sg),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, nbytes, 0,
- csbcpb->cpb.aes_ctr.iv);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ do {
+ to_process = min_t(u64, nbytes - processed,
+ nx_ctx->ap->databytelen);
+ to_process = min_t(u64, to_process,
+ NX_PAGE_SIZE * (max_sg_len - 1));
+ to_process = to_process & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
- if (!nx_ctx->op.inlen || !nx_ctx->op.outlen) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, to_process,
+ processed, csbcpb->cpb.aes_ctr.iv);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
- rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
- desc->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ if (!nx_ctx->op.inlen || !nx_ctx->op.outlen) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
- atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
- atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
- &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ desc->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ memcpy(desc->info, csbcpb->cpb.aes_cbc.cv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+ atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
+ &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+
+ processed += to_process;
+ } while (processed < nbytes);
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
return rc;
--
1.7.12
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 06/10] crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-XCBC
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-23 20:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, linuxppc-dev, Fionnuala Gunter
In-Reply-To: <1377288074-18998-1-git-send-email-mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
From: Fionnuala Gunter <fin@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch updates the NX driver to perform several hyper calls when necessary
so that the length limits of scatter/gather lists are respected.
Reviewed-by: Joy Latten <jmlatten@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Fionnuala Gunter <fin@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-xcbc.c | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-xcbc.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-xcbc.c
index 658da0f..1a5d9e3 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-xcbc.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-xcbc.c
@@ -88,78 +88,97 @@ static int nx_xcbc_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(&desc->tfm->base);
struct nx_csbcpb *csbcpb = nx_ctx->csbcpb;
struct nx_sg *in_sg;
- u32 to_process, leftover;
+ u32 to_process, leftover, total;
+ u32 max_sg_len;
unsigned long irq_flags;
int rc = 0;
spin_lock_irqsave(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
- if (NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) & NX_FDM_CONTINUATION) {
- /* we've hit the nx chip previously and we're updating again,
- * so copy over the partial digest */
- memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_xcbc.cv,
- csbcpb->cpb.aes_xcbc.out_cv_mac, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- }
+
+ total = sctx->count + len;
/* 2 cases for total data len:
* 1: <= AES_BLOCK_SIZE: copy into state, return 0
* 2: > AES_BLOCK_SIZE: process X blocks, copy in leftover
*/
- if (len + sctx->count <= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ if (total <= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
memcpy(sctx->buffer + sctx->count, data, len);
sctx->count += len;
goto out;
}
- /* to_process: the AES_BLOCK_SIZE data chunk to process in this
- * update */
- to_process = (sctx->count + len) & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
- leftover = (sctx->count + len) & (AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+ in_sg = nx_ctx->in_sg;
+ max_sg_len = min_t(u32, nx_driver.of.max_sg_len/sizeof(struct nx_sg),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
- /* the hardware will not accept a 0 byte operation for this algorithm
- * and the operation MUST be finalized to be correct. So if we happen
- * to get an update that falls on a block sized boundary, we must
- * save off the last block to finalize with later. */
- if (!leftover) {
- to_process -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
- leftover = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
- }
+ do {
- if (sctx->count) {
- in_sg = nx_build_sg_list(nx_ctx->in_sg, sctx->buffer,
- sctx->count, nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
- in_sg = nx_build_sg_list(in_sg, (u8 *)data,
- to_process - sctx->count,
- nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
- nx_ctx->op.inlen = (nx_ctx->in_sg - in_sg) *
- sizeof(struct nx_sg);
- } else {
- in_sg = nx_build_sg_list(nx_ctx->in_sg, (u8 *)data, to_process,
- nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
+ /* to_process: the AES_BLOCK_SIZE data chunk to process in this
+ * update */
+ to_process = min_t(u64, total, nx_ctx->ap->databytelen);
+ to_process = min_t(u64, to_process,
+ NX_PAGE_SIZE * (max_sg_len - 1));
+ to_process = to_process & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+ leftover = total - to_process;
+
+ /* the hardware will not accept a 0 byte operation for this
+ * algorithm and the operation MUST be finalized to be correct.
+ * So if we happen to get an update that falls on a block sized
+ * boundary, we must save off the last block to finalize with
+ * later. */
+ if (!leftover) {
+ to_process -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ leftover = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ if (sctx->count) {
+ in_sg = nx_build_sg_list(nx_ctx->in_sg,
+ (u8 *) sctx->buffer,
+ sctx->count,
+ max_sg_len);
+ }
+ in_sg = nx_build_sg_list(in_sg,
+ (u8 *) data,
+ to_process - sctx->count,
+ max_sg_len);
nx_ctx->op.inlen = (nx_ctx->in_sg - in_sg) *
sizeof(struct nx_sg);
- }
- NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+ /* we've hit the nx chip previously and we're updating again,
+ * so copy over the partial digest */
+ if (NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) & NX_FDM_CONTINUATION) {
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_xcbc.cv,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_xcbc.out_cv_mac,
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ }
- if (!nx_ctx->op.inlen || !nx_ctx->op.outlen) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+ if (!nx_ctx->op.inlen || !nx_ctx->op.outlen) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
- rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
desc->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
- atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+
+ /* everything after the first update is continuation */
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
+
+ total -= to_process;
+ data += to_process - sctx->count;
+ sctx->count = 0;
+ in_sg = nx_ctx->in_sg;
+ } while (leftover > AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
/* copy the leftover back into the state struct */
- memcpy(sctx->buffer, data + len - leftover, leftover);
+ memcpy(sctx->buffer, data, leftover);
sctx->count = leftover;
- /* everything after the first update is continuation */
- NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
return rc;
--
1.7.12
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 07/10] crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-CCM
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-23 20:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, linuxppc-dev, Fionnuala Gunter,
Joy Latten
In-Reply-To: <1377288074-18998-1-git-send-email-mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
From: Fionnuala Gunter <fin@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch updates the NX driver to perform several hyper calls when necessary
so that the length limits of scatter/gather lists are respected.
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <jmlatten@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Fionnuala Gunter <fin@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c | 297 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 215 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c
index 666a35b..5ecd4c2 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c
@@ -179,13 +179,26 @@ static int generate_pat(u8 *iv,
struct nx_sg *nx_insg = nx_ctx->in_sg;
struct nx_sg *nx_outsg = nx_ctx->out_sg;
unsigned int iauth_len = 0;
- struct vio_pfo_op *op = NULL;
u8 tmp[16], *b1 = NULL, *b0 = NULL, *result = NULL;
int rc;
/* zero the ctr value */
memset(iv + 15 - iv[0], 0, iv[0] + 1);
+ /* page 78 of nx_wb.pdf has,
+ * Note: RFC3610 allows the AAD data to be up to 2^64 -1 bytes
+ * in length. If a full message is used, the AES CCA implementation
+ * restricts the maximum AAD length to 2^32 -1 bytes.
+ * If partial messages are used, the implementation supports
+ * 2^64 -1 bytes maximum AAD length.
+ *
+ * However, in the cryptoapi's aead_request structure,
+ * assoclen is an unsigned int, thus it cannot hold a length
+ * value greater than 2^32 - 1.
+ * Thus the AAD is further constrained by this and is never
+ * greater than 2^32.
+ */
+
if (!req->assoclen) {
b0 = nx_ctx->csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.in_pat_or_b0;
} else if (req->assoclen <= 14) {
@@ -195,7 +208,46 @@ static int generate_pat(u8 *iv,
b0 = nx_ctx->csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.in_pat_or_b0;
b1 = nx_ctx->priv.ccm.iauth_tag;
iauth_len = req->assoclen;
+ } else if (req->assoclen <= 65280) {
+ /* if associated data is less than (2^16 - 2^8), we construct
+ * B1 differently and feed in the associated data to a CCA
+ * operation */
+ b0 = nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_cca.b0;
+ b1 = nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_cca.b1;
+ iauth_len = 14;
+ } else {
+ b0 = nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_cca.b0;
+ b1 = nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_cca.b1;
+ iauth_len = 10;
+ }
+ /* generate B0 */
+ rc = generate_b0(iv, req->assoclen, authsize, nbytes, b0);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* generate B1:
+ * add control info for associated data
+ * RFC 3610 and NIST Special Publication 800-38C
+ */
+ if (b1) {
+ memset(b1, 0, 16);
+ if (req->assoclen <= 65280) {
+ *(u16 *)b1 = (u16)req->assoclen;
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b1 + 2, req->assoc, 0,
+ iauth_len, SCATTERWALK_FROM_SG);
+ } else {
+ *(u16 *)b1 = (u16)(0xfffe);
+ *(u32 *)&b1[2] = (u32)req->assoclen;
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b1 + 6, req->assoc, 0,
+ iauth_len, SCATTERWALK_FROM_SG);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* now copy any remaining AAD to scatterlist and call nx... */
+ if (!req->assoclen) {
+ return rc;
+ } else if (req->assoclen <= 14) {
nx_insg = nx_build_sg_list(nx_insg, b1, 16, nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
nx_outsg = nx_build_sg_list(nx_outsg, tmp, 16,
nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
@@ -210,56 +262,74 @@ static int generate_pat(u8 *iv,
NX_CPB_FDM(nx_ctx->csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
NX_CPB_FDM(nx_ctx->csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
- op = &nx_ctx->op;
result = nx_ctx->csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.out_pat_or_mac;
- } else if (req->assoclen <= 65280) {
- /* if associated data is less than (2^16 - 2^8), we construct
- * B1 differently and feed in the associated data to a CCA
- * operation */
- b0 = nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_cca.b0;
- b1 = nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_cca.b1;
- iauth_len = 14;
-
- /* remaining assoc data must have scatterlist built for it */
- nx_insg = nx_walk_and_build(nx_insg, nx_ctx->ap->sglen,
- req->assoc, iauth_len,
- req->assoclen - iauth_len);
- nx_ctx->op_aead.inlen = (nx_ctx->in_sg - nx_insg) *
+
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+ atomic64_add(req->assoclen, &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+
+ } else {
+ u32 max_sg_len;
+ unsigned int processed = 0, to_process;
+
+ /* page_limit: number of sg entries that fit on one page */
+ max_sg_len = min_t(u32,
+ nx_driver.of.max_sg_len/sizeof(struct nx_sg),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
+
+ processed += iauth_len;
+
+ do {
+ to_process = min_t(u32, req->assoclen - processed,
+ nx_ctx->ap->databytelen);
+ to_process = min_t(u64, to_process,
+ NX_PAGE_SIZE * (max_sg_len - 1));
+
+ if ((to_process + processed) < req->assoclen) {
+ NX_CPB_FDM(nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead) |=
+ NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+ } else {
+ NX_CPB_FDM(nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead) &=
+ ~NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+ }
+
+ nx_insg = nx_walk_and_build(nx_ctx->in_sg,
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen,
+ req->assoc, processed,
+ to_process);
+
+ nx_ctx->op_aead.inlen = (nx_ctx->in_sg - nx_insg) *
sizeof(struct nx_sg);
- op = &nx_ctx->op_aead;
+ result = nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_cca.out_pat_or_b0;
+
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op_aead,
+ req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ memcpy(nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_cca.b0,
+ nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_cca.out_pat_or_b0,
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ NX_CPB_FDM(nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead) |= NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
+
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+ atomic64_add(req->assoclen,
+ &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+
+ processed += to_process;
+ } while (processed < req->assoclen);
+
result = nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_cca.out_pat_or_b0;
- } else {
- /* if associated data is less than (2^32), we construct B1
- * differently yet again and feed in the associated data to a
- * CCA operation */
- pr_err("associated data len is %u bytes (returning -EINVAL)\n",
- req->assoclen);
- rc = -EINVAL;
}
- rc = generate_b0(iv, req->assoclen, authsize, nbytes, b0);
- if (rc)
- goto done;
+ memcpy(out, result, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- if (b1) {
- memset(b1, 0, 16);
- *(u16 *)b1 = (u16)req->assoclen;
-
- scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b1 + 2, req->assoc, 0,
- iauth_len, SCATTERWALK_FROM_SG);
-
- rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, op,
- req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
- if (rc)
- goto done;
-
- atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
- atomic64_add(req->assoclen, &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
-
- memcpy(out, result, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- }
-done:
return rc;
}
@@ -272,15 +342,12 @@ static int ccm_nx_decrypt(struct aead_request *req,
unsigned int authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(crypto_aead_reqtfm(req));
struct nx_ccm_priv *priv = &nx_ctx->priv.ccm;
unsigned long irq_flags;
+ unsigned int processed = 0, to_process;
+ u32 max_sg_len;
int rc = -1;
spin_lock_irqsave(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
- if (nbytes > nx_ctx->ap->databytelen) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
nbytes -= authsize;
/* copy out the auth tag to compare with later */
@@ -293,22 +360,56 @@ static int ccm_nx_decrypt(struct aead_request *req,
if (rc)
goto out;
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, req->dst, req->src, nbytes, 0,
- csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.iv_or_ctr);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ /* page_limit: number of sg entries that fit on one page */
+ max_sg_len = min_t(u32, nx_driver.of.max_sg_len/sizeof(struct nx_sg),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
- NX_CPB_FDM(nx_ctx->csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
- NX_CPB_FDM(nx_ctx->csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+ do {
- rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ /* to_process: the AES_BLOCK_SIZE data chunk to process in this
+ * update. This value is bound by sg list limits.
+ */
+ to_process = min_t(u64, nbytes - processed,
+ nx_ctx->ap->databytelen);
+ to_process = min_t(u64, to_process,
+ NX_PAGE_SIZE * (max_sg_len - 1));
+
+ if ((to_process + processed) < nbytes)
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+ else
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+
+ NX_CPB_FDM(nx_ctx->csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
+
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, req->dst, req->src,
+ to_process, processed,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.iv_or_ctr);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
- atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
- atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
- &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+ /* for partial completion, copy following for next
+ * entry into loop...
+ */
+ memcpy(desc->info, csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.out_ctr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.in_pat_or_b0,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.out_pat_or_mac, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.in_s0,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.out_s0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
+
+ /* update stats */
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+ atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
+ &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+
+ processed += to_process;
+ } while (processed < nbytes);
rc = memcmp(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.out_pat_or_mac, priv->oauth_tag,
authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
@@ -325,41 +426,73 @@ static int ccm_nx_encrypt(struct aead_request *req,
unsigned int nbytes = req->cryptlen;
unsigned int authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(crypto_aead_reqtfm(req));
unsigned long irq_flags;
+ unsigned int processed = 0, to_process;
+ u32 max_sg_len;
int rc = -1;
spin_lock_irqsave(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
- if (nbytes > nx_ctx->ap->databytelen) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
rc = generate_pat(desc->info, req, nx_ctx, authsize, nbytes,
csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.in_pat_or_b0);
if (rc)
goto out;
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, req->dst, req->src, nbytes, 0,
- csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.iv_or_ctr);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
-
- NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
- NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
-
- rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
- req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
-
- atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
- atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
- &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+ /* page_limit: number of sg entries that fit on one page */
+ max_sg_len = min_t(u32, nx_driver.of.max_sg_len/sizeof(struct nx_sg),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
+
+ do {
+ /* to process: the AES_BLOCK_SIZE data chunk to process in this
+ * update. This value is bound by sg list limits.
+ */
+ to_process = min_t(u64, nbytes - processed,
+ nx_ctx->ap->databytelen);
+ to_process = min_t(u64, to_process,
+ NX_PAGE_SIZE * (max_sg_len - 1));
+
+ if ((to_process + processed) < nbytes)
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+ else
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
+
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, req->dst, req->src,
+ to_process, processed,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.iv_or_ctr);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* for partial completion, copy following for next
+ * entry into loop...
+ */
+ memcpy(desc->info, csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.out_ctr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.in_pat_or_b0,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.out_pat_or_mac, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.in_s0,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.out_s0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
+
+ /* update stats */
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+ atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
+ &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+
+ processed += to_process;
+
+ } while (processed < nbytes);
/* copy out the auth tag */
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.out_pat_or_mac,
req->dst, nbytes, authsize,
SCATTERWALK_TO_SG);
+
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
return rc;
--
1.7.12
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 09/10] crypto: nx - fix GCM for zero length messages
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-23 20:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, linuxppc-dev, Marcelo Cerri
In-Reply-To: <1377288074-18998-1-git-send-email-mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The NX CGM implementation doesn't support zero length messages and the
current implementation has two flaws:
- When the input data length is zero, it ignores the associated data.
- Even when both lengths are zero, it uses the Crypto API to encrypt a
zeroed block using ctr(aes) and because of this it allocates a new
transformation and sets the key for this new tfm. Both operations are
intended to be used only in user context, while the cryptographic
operations can be called in both user and softirq contexts.
This patch replaces the nested Crypto API use and adds two special
cases:
- When input data and associated data lengths are zero: it uses NX ECB
mode to emulate the encryption of a zeroed block using ctr(aes).
- When input data is zero and associated data is available: it uses NX
GMAC mode to calculate the associated data MAC.
Reviewed-by: Joy Latten <jmlatten@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c | 132 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 112 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c
index 9e89bdf..025d9a8 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c
@@ -187,40 +187,125 @@ static int nx_gca(struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx,
return rc;
}
+static int gmac(struct aead_request *req, struct blkcipher_desc *desc)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(req->base.tfm);
+ struct nx_csbcpb *csbcpb = nx_ctx->csbcpb;
+ struct nx_sg *nx_sg;
+ unsigned int nbytes = req->assoclen;
+ unsigned int processed = 0, to_process;
+ u32 max_sg_len;
+
+ /* Set GMAC mode */
+ csbcpb->cpb.hdr.mode = NX_MODE_AES_GMAC;
+
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
+
+ /* page_limit: number of sg entries that fit on one page */
+ max_sg_len = min_t(u32, nx_driver.of.max_sg_len/sizeof(struct nx_sg),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
+
+ /* Copy IV */
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.iv_or_cnt, desc->info, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ do {
+ /*
+ * to_process: the data chunk to process in this update.
+ * This value is bound by sg list limits.
+ */
+ to_process = min_t(u64, nbytes - processed,
+ nx_ctx->ap->databytelen);
+ to_process = min_t(u64, to_process,
+ NX_PAGE_SIZE * (max_sg_len - 1));
+
+ if ((to_process + processed) < nbytes)
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+ else
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+
+ nx_sg = nx_walk_and_build(nx_ctx->in_sg, nx_ctx->ap->sglen,
+ req->assoc, processed, to_process);
+ nx_ctx->op.inlen = (nx_ctx->in_sg - nx_sg)
+ * sizeof(struct nx_sg);
+
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.bit_length_data = 0;
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.bit_length_aad = 8 * nbytes;
+
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.in_pat_or_aad,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.out_pat_or_mac, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.in_s0,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.out_s0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
+
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+ atomic64_add(req->assoclen, &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+
+ processed += to_process;
+ } while (processed < nbytes);
+
+out:
+ /* Restore GCM mode */
+ csbcpb->cpb.hdr.mode = NX_MODE_AES_GCM;
+ return rc;
+}
+
static int gcm_empty(struct aead_request *req, struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
int enc)
{
int rc;
struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(req->base.tfm);
struct nx_csbcpb *csbcpb = nx_ctx->csbcpb;
+ char out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ struct nx_sg *in_sg, *out_sg;
/* For scenarios where the input message is zero length, AES CTR mode
* may be used. Set the source data to be a single block (16B) of all
* zeros, and set the input IV value to be the same as the GMAC IV
* value. - nx_wb 4.8.1.3 */
- char src[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = {};
- struct scatterlist sg;
- desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ctr(aes)", 0, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- crypto_blkcipher_setkey(desc->tfm, csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.key,
- NX_CPB_KEY_SIZE(csbcpb) == NX_KS_AES_128 ? 16 :
- NX_CPB_KEY_SIZE(csbcpb) == NX_KS_AES_192 ? 24 : 32);
-
- sg_init_one(&sg, src, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ /* Change to ECB mode */
+ csbcpb->cpb.hdr.mode = NX_MODE_AES_ECB;
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ecb.key, csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.key,
+ sizeof(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ecb.key));
if (enc)
- rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(desc, req->dst, &sg,
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
else
- rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(desc, req->dst, &sg,
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- crypto_free_blkcipher(desc->tfm);
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
+ /* Encrypt the counter/IV */
+ in_sg = nx_build_sg_list(nx_ctx->in_sg, (u8 *) desc->info,
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE, nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
+ out_sg = nx_build_sg_list(nx_ctx->out_sg, (u8 *) out, sizeof(out),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
+ nx_ctx->op.inlen = (nx_ctx->in_sg - in_sg) * sizeof(struct nx_sg);
+ nx_ctx->op.outlen = (nx_ctx->out_sg - out_sg) * sizeof(struct nx_sg);
+
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ desc->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+
+ /* Copy out the auth tag */
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.out_pat_or_mac, out,
+ crypto_aead_authsize(crypto_aead_reqtfm(req)));
out:
+ /* Restore XCBC mode */
+ csbcpb->cpb.hdr.mode = NX_MODE_AES_GCM;
+
+ /*
+ * ECB key uses the same region that GCM AAD and counter, so it's safe
+ * to just fill it with zeroes.
+ */
+ memset(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ecb.key, 0, sizeof(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ecb.key));
+
return rc;
}
@@ -242,8 +327,14 @@ static int gcm_aes_nx_crypt(struct aead_request *req, int enc)
*(u32 *)(desc.info + NX_GCM_CTR_OFFSET) = 1;
if (nbytes == 0) {
- rc = gcm_empty(req, &desc, enc);
- goto out;
+ if (req->assoclen == 0)
+ rc = gcm_empty(req, &desc, enc);
+ else
+ rc = gmac(req, &desc);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ else
+ goto mac;
}
/* Process associated data */
@@ -310,6 +401,7 @@ static int gcm_aes_nx_crypt(struct aead_request *req, int enc)
processed += to_process;
} while (processed < nbytes);
+mac:
if (enc) {
/* copy out the auth tag */
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.out_pat_or_mac,
--
1.7.12
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 05/10] crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-GCM
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-23 20:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, linuxppc-dev, Marcelo Cerri
In-Reply-To: <1377288074-18998-1-git-send-email-mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch updates the nx-aes-gcm implementation to perform several
hyper calls if needed in order to always respect the length limits for
scatter/gather lists.
Two different limits are considered:
- "ibm,max-sg-len": maximum number of bytes of each scatter/gather
list.
- "ibm,max-sync-cop":
- The total number of bytes that a scatter/gather list can hold.
- The maximum number of elements that a scatter/gather list can have.
Reviewed-by: Joy Latten <jmlatten@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c | 202 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 136 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c
index c2d6f76..9e89bdf 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c
@@ -125,37 +125,101 @@ static int nx_gca(struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx,
struct aead_request *req,
u8 *out)
{
+ int rc;
struct nx_csbcpb *csbcpb_aead = nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead;
- int rc = -EINVAL;
struct scatter_walk walk;
struct nx_sg *nx_sg = nx_ctx->in_sg;
+ unsigned int nbytes = req->assoclen;
+ unsigned int processed = 0, to_process;
+ u32 max_sg_len;
- if (req->assoclen > nx_ctx->ap->databytelen)
- goto out;
-
- if (req->assoclen <= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ if (nbytes <= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
scatterwalk_start(&walk, req->assoc);
- scatterwalk_copychunks(out, &walk, req->assoclen,
- SCATTERWALK_FROM_SG);
+ scatterwalk_copychunks(out, &walk, nbytes, SCATTERWALK_FROM_SG);
scatterwalk_done(&walk, SCATTERWALK_FROM_SG, 0);
-
- rc = 0;
- goto out;
+ return 0;
}
- nx_sg = nx_walk_and_build(nx_sg, nx_ctx->ap->sglen, req->assoc, 0,
- req->assoclen);
- nx_ctx->op_aead.inlen = (nx_ctx->in_sg - nx_sg) * sizeof(struct nx_sg);
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb_aead) &= ~NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
- rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op_aead,
- req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ /* page_limit: number of sg entries that fit on one page */
+ max_sg_len = min_t(u32, nx_driver.of.max_sg_len/sizeof(struct nx_sg),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
- atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
- atomic64_add(req->assoclen, &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+ do {
+ /*
+ * to_process: the data chunk to process in this update.
+ * This value is bound by sg list limits.
+ */
+ to_process = min_t(u64, nbytes - processed,
+ nx_ctx->ap->databytelen);
+ to_process = min_t(u64, to_process,
+ NX_PAGE_SIZE * (max_sg_len - 1));
+
+ if ((to_process + processed) < nbytes)
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb_aead) |= NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+ else
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb_aead) &= ~NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+
+ nx_sg = nx_walk_and_build(nx_ctx->in_sg, nx_ctx->ap->sglen,
+ req->assoc, processed, to_process);
+ nx_ctx->op_aead.inlen = (nx_ctx->in_sg - nx_sg)
+ * sizeof(struct nx_sg);
+
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op_aead,
+ req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ memcpy(csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_gca.in_pat,
+ csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_gca.out_pat,
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb_aead) |= NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
+
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+ atomic64_add(req->assoclen, &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+
+ processed += to_process;
+ } while (processed < nbytes);
memcpy(out, csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_gca.out_pat, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int gcm_empty(struct aead_request *req, struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ int enc)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(req->base.tfm);
+ struct nx_csbcpb *csbcpb = nx_ctx->csbcpb;
+
+ /* For scenarios where the input message is zero length, AES CTR mode
+ * may be used. Set the source data to be a single block (16B) of all
+ * zeros, and set the input IV value to be the same as the GMAC IV
+ * value. - nx_wb 4.8.1.3 */
+ char src[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = {};
+ struct scatterlist sg;
+
+ desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ctr(aes)", 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ crypto_blkcipher_setkey(desc->tfm, csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.key,
+ NX_CPB_KEY_SIZE(csbcpb) == NX_KS_AES_128 ? 16 :
+ NX_CPB_KEY_SIZE(csbcpb) == NX_KS_AES_192 ? 24 : 32);
+
+ sg_init_one(&sg, src, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ if (enc)
+ rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(desc, req->dst, &sg,
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ else
+ rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(desc, req->dst, &sg,
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(desc->tfm);
+
out:
return rc;
}
@@ -166,79 +230,85 @@ static int gcm_aes_nx_crypt(struct aead_request *req, int enc)
struct nx_csbcpb *csbcpb = nx_ctx->csbcpb;
struct blkcipher_desc desc;
unsigned int nbytes = req->cryptlen;
+ unsigned int processed = 0, to_process;
unsigned long irq_flags;
+ u32 max_sg_len;
int rc = -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
- if (nbytes > nx_ctx->ap->databytelen)
- goto out;
-
desc.info = nx_ctx->priv.gcm.iv;
/* initialize the counter */
*(u32 *)(desc.info + NX_GCM_CTR_OFFSET) = 1;
- /* For scenarios where the input message is zero length, AES CTR mode
- * may be used. Set the source data to be a single block (16B) of all
- * zeros, and set the input IV value to be the same as the GMAC IV
- * value. - nx_wb 4.8.1.3 */
if (nbytes == 0) {
- char src[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = {};
- struct scatterlist sg;
-
- desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ctr(aes)", 0, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm)) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- crypto_blkcipher_setkey(desc.tfm, csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.key,
- NX_CPB_KEY_SIZE(csbcpb) == NX_KS_AES_128 ? 16 :
- NX_CPB_KEY_SIZE(csbcpb) == NX_KS_AES_192 ? 24 : 32);
-
- sg_init_one(&sg, src, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- if (enc)
- crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&desc, req->dst, &sg,
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- else
- crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&desc, req->dst, &sg,
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- crypto_free_blkcipher(desc.tfm);
-
- rc = 0;
+ rc = gcm_empty(req, &desc, enc);
goto out;
}
- desc.tfm = (struct crypto_blkcipher *)req->base.tfm;
-
+ /* Process associated data */
csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.bit_length_aad = req->assoclen * 8;
-
if (req->assoclen) {
rc = nx_gca(nx_ctx, req, csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.in_pat_or_aad);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
- if (enc)
+ /* Set flags for encryption */
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
+ if (enc) {
NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
- else
+ } else {
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
nbytes -= crypto_aead_authsize(crypto_aead_reqtfm(req));
+ }
- csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.bit_length_data = nbytes * 8;
+ /* page_limit: number of sg entries that fit on one page */
+ max_sg_len = min_t(u32, nx_driver.of.max_sg_len/sizeof(struct nx_sg),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, &desc, req->dst, req->src, nbytes, 0,
- csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.iv_or_cnt);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ do {
+ /*
+ * to_process: the data chunk to process in this update.
+ * This value is bound by sg list limits.
+ */
+ to_process = min_t(u64, nbytes - processed,
+ nx_ctx->ap->databytelen);
+ to_process = min_t(u64, to_process,
+ NX_PAGE_SIZE * (max_sg_len - 1));
- rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
- req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ if ((to_process + processed) < nbytes)
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+ else
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
- atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
- atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
- &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.bit_length_data = nbytes * 8;
+ desc.tfm = (struct crypto_blkcipher *) req->base.tfm;
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, &desc, req->dst,
+ req->src, to_process, processed,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.iv_or_cnt);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ memcpy(desc.info, csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.out_cnt, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.in_pat_or_aad,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.out_pat_or_mac, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.in_s0,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.out_s0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
+
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+ atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
+ &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+
+ processed += to_process;
+ } while (processed < nbytes);
if (enc) {
/* copy out the auth tag */
--
1.7.12
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 08/10] crypto: nx - fix XCBC for zero length messages
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-23 20:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, linuxppc-dev, Marcelo Cerri
In-Reply-To: <1377288074-18998-1-git-send-email-mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The NX XCBC implementation doesn't support zero length messages and
because of that NX is currently returning a hard-coded hash for zero
length messages. However this approach is incorrect since the hash value
also depends on which key is used.
This patch removes the hard-coded hash and replace it with an
implementation based on the RFC 3566 using ECB.
Reviewed-by: Joy Latten <jmlatten@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-xcbc.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 77 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-xcbc.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-xcbc.c
index 1a5d9e3..03c4bf5 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-xcbc.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-xcbc.c
@@ -56,6 +56,77 @@ static int nx_xcbc_set_key(struct crypto_shash *desc,
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Based on RFC 3566, for a zero-length message:
+ *
+ * n = 1
+ * K1 = E(K, 0x01010101010101010101010101010101)
+ * K3 = E(K, 0x03030303030303030303030303030303)
+ * E[0] = 0x00000000000000000000000000000000
+ * M[1] = 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (0 length message with padding)
+ * E[1] = (K1, M[1] ^ E[0] ^ K3)
+ * Tag = M[1]
+ */
+static int nx_xcbc_empty(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+ struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(&desc->tfm->base);
+ struct nx_csbcpb *csbcpb = nx_ctx->csbcpb;
+ struct nx_sg *in_sg, *out_sg;
+ u8 keys[2][AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 key[32];
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ /* Change to ECB mode */
+ csbcpb->cpb.hdr.mode = NX_MODE_AES_ECB;
+ memcpy(key, csbcpb->cpb.aes_xcbc.key, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ecb.key, key, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
+
+ /* K1 and K3 base patterns */
+ memset(keys[0], 0x01, sizeof(keys[0]));
+ memset(keys[1], 0x03, sizeof(keys[1]));
+
+ /* Generate K1 and K3 encrypting the patterns */
+ in_sg = nx_build_sg_list(nx_ctx->in_sg, (u8 *) keys, sizeof(keys),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
+ out_sg = nx_build_sg_list(nx_ctx->out_sg, (u8 *) keys, sizeof(keys),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
+ nx_ctx->op.inlen = (nx_ctx->in_sg - in_sg) * sizeof(struct nx_sg);
+ nx_ctx->op.outlen = (nx_ctx->out_sg - out_sg) * sizeof(struct nx_sg);
+
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ desc->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+
+ /* XOr K3 with the padding for a 0 length message */
+ keys[1][0] ^= 0x80;
+
+ /* Encrypt the final result */
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ecb.key, keys[0], AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ in_sg = nx_build_sg_list(nx_ctx->in_sg, (u8 *) keys[1], sizeof(keys[1]),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
+ out_sg = nx_build_sg_list(nx_ctx->out_sg, out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
+ nx_ctx->op.inlen = (nx_ctx->in_sg - in_sg) * sizeof(struct nx_sg);
+ nx_ctx->op.outlen = (nx_ctx->out_sg - out_sg) * sizeof(struct nx_sg);
+
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ desc->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+
+out:
+ /* Restore XCBC mode */
+ csbcpb->cpb.hdr.mode = NX_MODE_AES_XCBC_MAC;
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_xcbc.key, key, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
static int nx_xcbc_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
{
struct xcbc_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
@@ -201,13 +272,12 @@ static int nx_xcbc_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_xcbc.cv,
csbcpb->cpb.aes_xcbc.out_cv_mac, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
} else if (sctx->count == 0) {
- /* we've never seen an update, so this is a 0 byte op. The
- * hardware cannot handle a 0 byte op, so just copy out the
- * known 0 byte result. This is cheaper than allocating a
- * software context to do a 0 byte op */
- u8 data[] = { 0x75, 0xf0, 0x25, 0x1d, 0x52, 0x8a, 0xc0, 0x1c,
- 0x45, 0x73, 0xdf, 0xd5, 0x84, 0xd7, 0x9f, 0x29 };
- memcpy(out, data, sizeof(data));
+ /*
+ * we've never seen an update, so this is a 0 byte op. The
+ * hardware cannot handle a 0 byte op, so just ECB to
+ * generate the hash.
+ */
+ rc = nx_xcbc_empty(desc, out);
goto out;
}
--
1.7.12
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 10/10] crypto: nx - fix SHA-2 for chunks bigger than block size
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-23 20:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, linuxppc-dev, Marcelo Cerri
In-Reply-To: <1377288074-18998-1-git-send-email-mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Each call to the co-processor, with exception of the last call, needs to
send data that is multiple of block size. As consequence, any remaining
data is kept in the internal NX context.
This patch fixes a bug in the driver that causes it to save incorrect
data into the context when data is bigger than the block size.
Reviewed-by: Joy Latten <jmlatten@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha256.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha512.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha256.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha256.c
index 6547a71..da0b24a 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha256.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha256.c
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static int nx_sha256_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
total -= to_process;
- data += to_process;
+ data += to_process - sctx->count;
sctx->count = 0;
in_sg = nx_ctx->in_sg;
} while (leftover >= SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha512.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha512.c
index 236e6af..4ae5b0f 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha512.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha512.c
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static int nx_sha512_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
total -= to_process;
- data += to_process;
+ data += to_process - sctx->count[0];
sctx->count[0] = 0;
in_sg = nx_ctx->in_sg;
} while (leftover >= SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE);
--
1.7.12
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH 02/18] asymmetric keys: implement EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE in rsa
From: Pavel Machek @ 2013-08-25 15:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Lee, Chun-Yi
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, linux-pm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-crypto-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
opensuse-kernel-stAJ6ESoqRxg9hUCZPvPmw, David Howells,
Rafael J. Wysocki, Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer,
Vojtech Pavlik, Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH,
JKosina-IBi9RG/b67k, Rusty Russell, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller,
H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek, Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal, Lee, Chun-Yi
In-Reply-To: <1377169317-5959-3-git-send-email-jlee-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>
On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:41, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> Implement EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE [RFC3447 sec 9.2] in rsa.c. It's the
> first step of signature generation operation
> (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN).
Is this your own code, or did you copy it from somewhere?
> + if (!T)
> + goto error_T;
> +
> + memcpy(T, RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].data, RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].size);
> + memcpy(T + RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].size, pks->digest, pks->digest_size);
> +
> + /* 3) check If emLen < tLen + 11, output "intended encoded message length too short" */
> + if (emLen < tLen + 11) {
> + ret = EINVAL;
> + goto error_emLen;
> + }
Normal kernel calling convention is 0 / -EINVAL.
> + memcpy(EM + 2, PS, emLen - tLen - 3);
> + EM[2 + emLen - tLen - 3] = 0x00;
> + memcpy(EM + 2 + emLen - tLen - 3 + 1, T, tLen);
ThisDoesNotLookLikeKernelCode, NoCamelCase, please.
> + *_EM = EM;
And we don't usually use _ prefix like this.
> --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
> +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> @@ -110,6 +110,8 @@ extern void public_key_destroy(void *payload);
> struct public_key_signature {
> u8 *digest;
> u8 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
> + u8 *S; /* signature S of length k octets */
u8 *signature?
> + size_t k; /* length k of signature S */
u8 *signature_length.
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 03/18] asymmetric keys: separate the length checking of octet string from RSA_I2OSP
From: Pavel Machek @ 2013-08-25 16:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Lee, Chun-Yi
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer, Vojtech Pavlik,
Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina, Rusty Russell,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek,
Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal, Lee, Chun-Yi
In-Reply-To: <1377169317-5959-4-git-send-email-jlee@suse.com>
On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:42, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> Due to RSA_I2OSP is not only used by signature verification path but also used
> in signature generation path. So, separate the length checking of octet string
> because it's not for generate 0x00 0x01 leading string when used in signature
> generation.
>
> Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> +static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **_X)
> +{
> + unsigned x_size;
> + unsigned X_size;
> + u8 *X = NULL;
Is this kernel code or entry into obfuscated C code contest? This is not funny.
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 06/18] asymmetric keys: support parsing PKCS #8 private key information
From: Pavel Machek @ 2013-08-25 16:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Lee, Chun-Yi
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer, Vojtech Pavlik,
Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina, Rusty Russell,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek,
Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal, Lee, Chun-Yi
In-Reply-To: <1377169317-5959-7-git-send-email-jlee@suse.com>
On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:45, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> Add ASN.1 files and parser to support parsing PKCS #8 noncompressed private
> key information. It's better than direct parsing pure private key because
> PKCS #8 has a privateKeyAlgorithm to indicate the algorithm of private
> key, e.g. RSA from PKCS #1
>
> Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> +#include <crypto/public_key.h>
> +
> +struct pkcs8_info {
> + enum pkey_algo privkey_algo:8; /* Private key algorithm */
Are you sure this is well-defined?
> +struct private_key_algorithm *pkcs8_private_key_algorithms[PKEY_ALGO__LAST] = {
> + [PKEY_ALGO_DSA] = NULL,
> +#if defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) || \
> + defined(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA_MODULE)
> + [PKEY_ALGO_RSA] = &RSA_private_key_algorithm,
> +#endif
> +};
pkey_algo
privkey_algo
private_key_algorithm
...you use all variants.
Having symbols with "__" inside them is "interesting". I'd not do it.
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 07/18] asymmetric keys: explicitly add the leading zero byte to encoded message
From: Pavel Machek @ 2013-08-25 16:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Lee, Chun-Yi
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer, Vojtech Pavlik,
Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina, Rusty Russell,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek,
Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal, Lee, Chun-Yi
In-Reply-To: <1377169317-5959-8-git-send-email-jlee@suse.com>
On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:46, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> Per PKCS1 spec, the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoded message is leading by 0x00 0x01 in
> its first 2 bytes. The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI so we pass a
> pointer to the _preceding_ byte to RSA_verify() in original code, but it has
> risk for the byte is not zero because it's not in EM buffer's scope, neither
> RSA_verify() nor mpi_get_buffer() didn't take care the leading byte.
>
> To avoid the risk, that's better we explicitly add the leading zero byte to EM
> for pass to RSA_verify(). This patch allocate a _EM buffer to capture the
> result from RSA_I2OSP(), then set the first byte to zero in EM and copy the
> remaining bytes from _EM.
>
> Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> - ret = RSA_verify(H, EM - 1, k, sig->digest_size,
> + EM = kmalloc(k, GFP_KERNEL);
> + memset(EM, 0, 1);
> + memcpy(EM + 1, _EM, k-1);
> + kfree(_EM);
Spot a crash waiting to happen.
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 08/18] Secure boot: Add new capability
From: Pavel Machek @ 2013-08-25 16:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Lee, Chun-Yi
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer, Vojtech Pavlik,
Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina, Rusty Russell,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek,
Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal, Matthew Garrett, Lee, Chun-Yi
In-Reply-To: <1377169317-5959-9-git-send-email-jlee@suse.com>
On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:47, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
>
> Secure boot adds certain policy requirements, including that root must not
> be able to do anything that could cause the kernel to execute arbitrary code.
> The simplest way to handle this would seem to be to add a new capability
> and gate various functionality on that. We'll then strip it from the initial
> capability set if required.
There was some discussion about this before, right? And I don't think
conclusion was it was acceptable...?
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
> Acked-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 6 +++++-
> 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> index ba478fa..7109e65 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> @@ -343,7 +343,11 @@ struct vfs_cap_data {
>
> #define CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND 36
>
> -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND
> +/* Allow things that trivially permit root to modify the running kernel */
> +
> +#define CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL 37
> +
> +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL
>
> #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
>
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 09/18] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will switch on Secure Boot mode
From: Pavel Machek @ 2013-08-25 16:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Lee, Chun-Yi
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer, Vojtech Pavlik,
Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina, Rusty Russell,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek,
Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal, Lee, Chun-Yi
In-Reply-To: <1377169317-5959-10-git-send-email-jlee@suse.com>
You may want to check subject. If it does something, it is not dummy.
> --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -2784,6 +2784,13 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
> Note: increases power consumption, thus should only be
> enabled if running jitter sensitive (HPC/RT) workloads.
>
> + secureboot_enable=
> + [KNL] Enables an emulated UEFI Secure Boot mode. This
> + locks down various aspects of the kernel guarded by the
> + CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL capability. This includes things
> + like /dev/mem, IO port access, and other areas. It can
> + be used on non-UEFI machines for testing purposes.
> +
> security= [SECURITY] Choose a security module to enable at boot.
> If this boot parameter is not specified, only the first
> security module asking for security registration will be
> diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
> index e0573a4..c3f4e3e 100644
> --- a/kernel/cred.c
> +++ b/kernel/cred.c
> @@ -565,6 +565,23 @@ void __init cred_init(void)
> 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
> }
>
> +void __init secureboot_enable()
> +{
> + pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
> + cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_bset, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
> + cap_lower((&init_cred)->cap_permitted, CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL);
> +}
OTOH you don't implement CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL, so it is dummy after
all. But CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL is infeasible to implement, right?
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 10/18] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when enabled in firmware
From: Pavel Machek @ 2013-08-25 16:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Lee, Chun-Yi
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer, Vojtech Pavlik,
Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina, Rusty Russell,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek,
Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal, Matthew Garrett, Lee, Chun-Yi
In-Reply-To: <1377169317-5959-11-git-send-email-jlee@suse.com>
On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:49, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
>
> The firmware has a set of flags that indicate whether secure boot is enabled
> and enforcing. Use them to indicate whether the kernel should lock itself
> down. We also indicate the machine is in secure boot mode by adding the
> EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit for use with efi_enabled.
> + status = efi_call_phys5(sys_table->runtime->get_variable,
> + L"SecureBoot", &var_guid, NULL, &datasize, &sb);
What is this L"..." thing?
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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