* Re: [PATCH v2] kernel/padata.c: share code between CPU_ONLINE and CPU_DOWN_FAILED, same to CPU_DOWN_PREPARE and CPU_UP_CANCELED
From: Chen Gang @ 2013-08-26 1:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Herbert Xu; +Cc: Steffen Klassert, linux-crypto, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <20130823104731.GA30865@gondor.apana.org.au>
On 08/23/2013 06:47 PM, Herbert Xu wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 12:44:48PM +0200, Steffen Klassert wrote:
>> On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 02:43:37PM +0800, Chen Gang wrote:
>>> Share code between CPU_ONLINE and CPU_DOWN_FAILED, same to
>>> CPU_DOWN_PREPARE and CPU_UP_CANCELED.
>>>
>>> It will fix 2 bugs:
>>>
>>> "not check the return value of __padata_remove_cpu() and __padata_add_cpu()".
>>> "need add 'break' between CPU_UP_CANCELED and CPU_DOWN_FAILED".
>>>
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com>
>>
>> This looks ok to me, Herbert can you take this one?
>
> Sure.
>
Thank you all.
> Thanks,
>
Thanks.
--
Chen Gang
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC] [PATCH] Fix for a warning - crypto/fcrypt,c
From: Herbert Xu @ 2013-08-26 6:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan-Simon Möller; +Cc: linux-crypto, behanw, pageexec
In-Reply-To: <3514602.viscUS1bgS@aragorn.auenland.lan>
On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 10:42:01PM +0200, Jan-Simon Möller wrote:
>
> Should I resend a fixed version with
> (1U << 27) - 1) instead ?
Sure.
Thanks,
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 02/18] asymmetric keys: implement EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE in rsa
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-26 10:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, linux-pm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-crypto-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
opensuse-kernel-stAJ6ESoqRxg9hUCZPvPmw, David Howells,
Rafael J. Wysocki, Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer,
Vojtech Pavlik, Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH,
JKosina-IBi9RG/b67k, Rusty Russell, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller,
H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek, Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130825155309.GA5171-tWAi6jLit6GreWDznjuHag@public.gmane.org>
Hi Pavel,
First, thanks for your review!
於 日，2013-08-25 於 17:53 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:41, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > Implement EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE [RFC3447 sec 9.2] in rsa.c. It's the
> > first step of signature generation operation
> > (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN).
>
> Is this your own code, or did you copy it from somewhere?
>
It's my own code, development base on RSA PKCS#1 spec. So the naming of
variables are match with PKCS#1 spec.
> > + if (!T)
> > + goto error_T;
> > +
> > + memcpy(T, RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].data, RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].size);
> > + memcpy(T + RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].size, pks->digest, pks->digest_size);
> > +
> > + /* 3) check If emLen < tLen + 11, output "intended encoded message length too short" */
> > + if (emLen < tLen + 11) {
> > + ret = EINVAL;
> > + goto error_emLen;
> > + }
>
> Normal kernel calling convention is 0 / -EINVAL.
Yes, here is my mistake, I will modify it.
>
> > + memcpy(EM + 2, PS, emLen - tLen - 3);
> > + EM[2 + emLen - tLen - 3] = 0x00;
> > + memcpy(EM + 2 + emLen - tLen - 3 + 1, T, tLen);
>
> ThisDoesNotLookLikeKernelCode, NoCamelCase, please.
>
Thanks for you point out, I will change it.
> > + *_EM = EM;
>
> And we don't usually use _ prefix like this.
>
Thanks! I will change it.
>
> > --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
> > +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> > @@ -110,6 +110,8 @@ extern void public_key_destroy(void *payload);
> > struct public_key_signature {
> > u8 *digest;
> > u8 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
> > + u8 *S; /* signature S of length k octets */
>
> u8 *signature?
Yes, this 'S' is signature. I put the naming full match with spec for
development, I will change it to match kernel rule. e.g. signature_S
>
> > + size_t k; /* length k of signature S */
>
> u8 *signature_length.
>
I will use signature_leng_k to also match with PKCS#1 spec, I think it's
better for review source code with the spec for debugging.
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 02/18] asymmetric keys: implement EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE in rsa
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-26 10:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer, Vojtech Pavlik,
Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina, Rusty Russell,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek,
Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130825155309.GA5171@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
Hi Pavel,
First, thanks for your review!
於 日，2013-08-25 於 17:53 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:41, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > Implement EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE [RFC3447 sec 9.2] in rsa.c. It's the
> > first step of signature generation operation
> > (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN).
>
> Is this your own code, or did you copy it from somewhere?
>
It's my own code, development base on RSA PKCS#1 spec. So the naming of
variables are match with PKCS#1 spec.
> > + if (!T)
> > + goto error_T;
> > +
> > + memcpy(T, RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].data, RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].size);
> > + memcpy(T + RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].size, pks->digest, pks->digest_size);
> > +
> > + /* 3) check If emLen < tLen + 11, output "intended encoded message length too short" */
> > + if (emLen < tLen + 11) {
> > + ret = EINVAL;
> > + goto error_emLen;
> > + }
>
> Normal kernel calling convention is 0 / -EINVAL.
Yes, here is my mistake, I will modify it.
>
> > + memcpy(EM + 2, PS, emLen - tLen - 3);
> > + EM[2 + emLen - tLen - 3] = 0x00;
> > + memcpy(EM + 2 + emLen - tLen - 3 + 1, T, tLen);
>
> ThisDoesNotLookLikeKernelCode, NoCamelCase, please.
>
Thanks for you point out, I will change it.
> > + *_EM = EM;
>
> And we don't usually use _ prefix like this.
>
Thanks! I will change it.
>
> > --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
> > +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> > @@ -110,6 +110,8 @@ extern void public_key_destroy(void *payload);
> > struct public_key_signature {
> > u8 *digest;
> > u8 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
> > + u8 *S; /* signature S of length k octets */
>
> u8 *signature?
Yes, this 'S' is signature. I put the naming full match with spec for
development, I will change it to match kernel rule. e.g. signature_S
>
> > + size_t k; /* length k of signature S */
>
> u8 *signature_length.
>
I will use signature_leng_k to also match with PKCS#1 spec, I think it's
better for review source code with the spec for debugging.
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 02/18] asymmetric keys: implement EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE in rsa
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-26 10:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer, Vojtech Pavlik,
Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina, Rusty Russell,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek,
Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130825155309.GA5171@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
Hi Pavel,
First, thanks for your review!
於 日，2013-08-25 於 17:53 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:41, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > Implement EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE [RFC3447 sec 9.2] in rsa.c. It's the
> > first step of signature generation operation
> > (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN).
>
> Is this your own code, or did you copy it from somewhere?
>
It's my own code, development base on RSA PKCS#1 spec. So the naming of
variables are match with PKCS#1 spec.
> > + if (!T)
> > + goto error_T;
> > +
> > + memcpy(T, RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].data, RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].size);
> > + memcpy(T + RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].size, pks->digest, pks->digest_size);
> > +
> > + /* 3) check If emLen < tLen + 11, output "intended encoded message length too short" */
> > + if (emLen < tLen + 11) {
> > + ret = EINVAL;
> > + goto error_emLen;
> > + }
>
> Normal kernel calling convention is 0 / -EINVAL.
Yes, here is my mistake, I will modify it.
>
> > + memcpy(EM + 2, PS, emLen - tLen - 3);
> > + EM[2 + emLen - tLen - 3] = 0x00;
> > + memcpy(EM + 2 + emLen - tLen - 3 + 1, T, tLen);
>
> ThisDoesNotLookLikeKernelCode, NoCamelCase, please.
>
Thanks for you point out, I will change it.
> > + *_EM = EM;
>
> And we don't usually use _ prefix like this.
>
Thanks! I will change it.
>
> > --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
> > +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> > @@ -110,6 +110,8 @@ extern void public_key_destroy(void *payload);
> > struct public_key_signature {
> > u8 *digest;
> > u8 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
> > + u8 *S; /* signature S of length k octets */
>
> u8 *signature?
Yes, this 'S' is signature. I put the naming full match with spec for
development, I will change it to match kernel rule. e.g. signature_S
>
> > + size_t k; /* length k of signature S */
>
> u8 *signature_length.
>
I will use signature_leng_k to also match with PKCS#1 spec, I think it's
better for review source code with the spec for debugging.
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 02/18] asymmetric keys: implement EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE in rsa
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-26 10:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer, Vojtech Pavlik,
Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina, Rusty Russell,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek,
Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130825155309.GA5171@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
Hi Pavel,
First, thanks for your review!
於 日，2013-08-25 於 17:53 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:41, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > Implement EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE [RFC3447 sec 9.2] in rsa.c. It's the
> > first step of signature generation operation
> > (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN).
>
> Is this your own code, or did you copy it from somewhere?
>
It's my own code, development base on RSA PKCS#1 spec. So the naming of
variables are match with PKCS#1 spec.
> > + if (!T)
> > + goto error_T;
> > +
> > + memcpy(T, RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].data, RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].size);
> > + memcpy(T + RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].size, pks->digest, pks->digest_size);
> > +
> > + /* 3) check If emLen < tLen + 11, output "intended encoded message length too short" */
> > + if (emLen < tLen + 11) {
> > + ret = EINVAL;
> > + goto error_emLen;
> > + }
>
> Normal kernel calling convention is 0 / -EINVAL.
Yes, here is my mistake, I will modify it.
>
> > + memcpy(EM + 2, PS, emLen - tLen - 3);
> > + EM[2 + emLen - tLen - 3] = 0x00;
> > + memcpy(EM + 2 + emLen - tLen - 3 + 1, T, tLen);
>
> ThisDoesNotLookLikeKernelCode, NoCamelCase, please.
>
Thanks for you point out, I will change it.
> > + *_EM = EM;
>
> And we don't usually use _ prefix like this.
>
Thanks! I will change it.
>
> > --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
> > +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> > @@ -110,6 +110,8 @@ extern void public_key_destroy(void *payload);
> > struct public_key_signature {
> > u8 *digest;
> > u8 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
> > + u8 *S; /* signature S of length k octets */
>
> u8 *signature?
Yes, this 'S' is signature. I put the naming full match with spec for
development, I will change it to match kernel rule. e.g. signature_S
>
> > + size_t k; /* length k of signature S */
>
> u8 *signature_length.
>
I will use signature_leng_k to also match with PKCS#1 spec, I think it's
better for review source code with the spec for debugging.
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 02/18] asymmetric keys: implement EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE in rsa
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-26 10:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer, Vojtech Pavlik,
Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina, Rusty Russell,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek,
Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130825155309.GA5171@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
Hi Pavel,
First, thanks for your review!
於 日，2013-08-25 於 17:53 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:41, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > Implement EMSA_PKCS1-v1_5-ENCODE [RFC3447 sec 9.2] in rsa.c. It's the
> > first step of signature generation operation
> > (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN).
>
> Is this your own code, or did you copy it from somewhere?
>
It's my own code, development base on RSA PKCS#1 spec. So the naming of
variables are match with PKCS#1 spec.
> > + if (!T)
> > + goto error_T;
> > +
> > + memcpy(T, RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].data, RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].size);
> > + memcpy(T + RSA_ASN1_templates[hash_algo].size, pks->digest, pks->digest_size);
> > +
> > + /* 3) check If emLen < tLen + 11, output "intended encoded message length too short" */
> > + if (emLen < tLen + 11) {
> > + ret = EINVAL;
> > + goto error_emLen;
> > + }
>
> Normal kernel calling convention is 0 / -EINVAL.
Yes, here is my mistake, I will modify it.
>
> > + memcpy(EM + 2, PS, emLen - tLen - 3);
> > + EM[2 + emLen - tLen - 3] = 0x00;
> > + memcpy(EM + 2 + emLen - tLen - 3 + 1, T, tLen);
>
> ThisDoesNotLookLikeKernelCode, NoCamelCase, please.
>
Thanks for you point out, I will change it.
> > + *_EM = EM;
>
> And we don't usually use _ prefix like this.
>
Thanks! I will change it.
>
> > --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
> > +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> > @@ -110,6 +110,8 @@ extern void public_key_destroy(void *payload);
> > struct public_key_signature {
> > u8 *digest;
> > u8 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
> > + u8 *S; /* signature S of length k octets */
>
> u8 *signature?
Yes, this 'S' is signature. I put the naming full match with spec for
development, I will change it to match kernel rule. e.g. signature_S
>
> > + size_t k; /* length k of signature S */
>
> u8 *signature_length.
>
I will use signature_leng_k to also match with PKCS#1 spec, I think it's
better for review source code with the spec for debugging.
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 03/18] asymmetric keys: separate the length checking of octet string from RSA_I2OSP
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-26 10:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, linux-pm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-crypto-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
opensuse-kernel-stAJ6ESoqRxg9hUCZPvPmw, David Howells,
Rafael J. Wysocki, Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer,
Vojtech Pavlik, Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH,
JKosina-IBi9RG/b67k, Rusty Russell, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller,
H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek, Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130825160147.GB5171-tWAi6jLit6GreWDznjuHag@public.gmane.org>
於 日，2013-08-25 於 18:01 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:42, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > Due to RSA_I2OSP is not only used by signature verification path but also used
> > in signature generation path. So, separate the length checking of octet string
> > because it's not for generate 0x00 0x01 leading string when used in signature
> > generation.
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina-AlSwsSmVLrQ@public.gmane.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>
>
> > +static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **_X)
> > +{
> > + unsigned x_size;
> > + unsigned X_size;
> > + u8 *X = NULL;
>
> Is this kernel code or entry into obfuscated C code contest? This is not funny.
>
> Pavel
The small "x" is the input integer that will transfer to big "X" that is
a octet sting.
Sorry for I direct give variable name to match with spec, maybe I need
use big_X or....
Do you have good suggest for the naming?
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 03/18] asymmetric keys: separate the length checking of octet string from RSA_I2OSP
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-26 10:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer, Vojtech Pavlik,
Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina, Rusty Russell,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek,
Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130825160147.GB5171@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
於 日，2013-08-25 於 18:01 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:42, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > Due to RSA_I2OSP is not only used by signature verification path but also used
> > in signature generation path. So, separate the length checking of octet string
> > because it's not for generate 0x00 0x01 leading string when used in signature
> > generation.
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
> > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
>
> > +static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **_X)
> > +{
> > + unsigned x_size;
> > + unsigned X_size;
> > + u8 *X = NULL;
>
> Is this kernel code or entry into obfuscated C code contest? This is not funny.
>
> Pavel
The small "x" is the input integer that will transfer to big "X" that is
a octet sting.
Sorry for I direct give variable name to match with spec, maybe I need
use big_X or....
Do you have good suggest for the naming?
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 03/18] asymmetric keys: separate the length checking of octet string from RSA_I2OSP
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-26 10:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer, Vojtech Pavlik,
Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina, Rusty Russell,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek,
Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130825160147.GB5171@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
於 日，2013-08-25 於 18:01 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:42, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > Due to RSA_I2OSP is not only used by signature verification path but also used
> > in signature generation path. So, separate the length checking of octet string
> > because it's not for generate 0x00 0x01 leading string when used in signature
> > generation.
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
> > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
>
> > +static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **_X)
> > +{
> > + unsigned x_size;
> > + unsigned X_size;
> > + u8 *X = NULL;
>
> Is this kernel code or entry into obfuscated C code contest? This is not funny.
>
> Pavel
The small "x" is the input integer that will transfer to big "X" that is
a octet sting.
Sorry for I direct give variable name to match with spec, maybe I need
use big_X or....
Do you have good suggest for the naming?
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 03/18] asymmetric keys: separate the length checking of octet string from RSA_I2OSP
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-26 10:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer, Vojtech Pavlik,
Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina, Rusty Russell,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek,
Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130825160147.GB5171@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
於 日，2013-08-25 於 18:01 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:42, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > Due to RSA_I2OSP is not only used by signature verification path but also used
> > in signature generation path. So, separate the length checking of octet string
> > because it's not for generate 0x00 0x01 leading string when used in signature
> > generation.
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
> > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
>
> > +static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **_X)
> > +{
> > + unsigned x_size;
> > + unsigned X_size;
> > + u8 *X = NULL;
>
> Is this kernel code or entry into obfuscated C code contest? This is not funny.
>
> Pavel
The small "x" is the input integer that will transfer to big "X" that is
a octet sting.
Sorry for I direct give variable name to match with spec, maybe I need
use big_X or....
Do you have good suggest for the naming?
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 03/18] asymmetric keys: separate the length checking of octet string from RSA_I2OSP
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-26 10:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer, Vojtech Pavlik,
Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina, Rusty Russell,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek,
Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130825160147.GB5171@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
於 日，2013-08-25 於 18:01 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:42, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > Due to RSA_I2OSP is not only used by signature verification path but also used
> > in signature generation path. So, separate the length checking of octet string
> > because it's not for generate 0x00 0x01 leading string when used in signature
> > generation.
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
> > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
>
> > +static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **_X)
> > +{
> > + unsigned x_size;
> > + unsigned X_size;
> > + u8 *X = NULL;
>
> Is this kernel code or entry into obfuscated C code contest? This is not funny.
>
> Pavel
The small "x" is the input integer that will transfer to big "X" that is
a octet sting.
Sorry for I direct give variable name to match with spec, maybe I need
use big_X or....
Do you have good suggest for the naming?
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 03/18] asymmetric keys: separate the length checking of octet string from RSA_I2OSP
From: Pavel Machek @ 2013-08-26 11:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: joeyli
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, linux-pm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-crypto-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
opensuse-kernel-stAJ6ESoqRxg9hUCZPvPmw, David Howells,
Rafael J. Wysocki, Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer,
Vojtech Pavlik, Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH,
JKosina-IBi9RG/b67k, Rusty Russell, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller,
H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek, Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <1377512731.27967.34.camel-ONCj+Eqt86TasUa73XJKwA@public.gmane.org>
Hi!
> > > Due to RSA_I2OSP is not only used by signature verification path but also used
> > > in signature generation path. So, separate the length checking of octet string
> > > because it's not for generate 0x00 0x01 leading string when used in signature
> > > generation.
> > >
> > > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina-AlSwsSmVLrQ@public.gmane.org>
> > > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>
> >
> > > +static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **_X)
> > > +{
> > > + unsigned x_size;
> > > + unsigned X_size;
> > > + u8 *X = NULL;
> >
> > Is this kernel code or entry into obfuscated C code contest? This is not funny.
> >
> The small "x" is the input integer that will transfer to big "X" that is
> a octet sting.
>
> Sorry for I direct give variable name to match with spec, maybe I need
> use big_X or....
Having variables that differ only in case is confusing. Actually
RSA_I2OSP is not a good name for function, either.
If it converts x into X, perhaps you can name one input and second output?
> Do you have good suggest for the naming?
Not really, sorry.
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
^ permalink raw reply
* Announce loop-AES-v3.7a file/swap crypto package
From: Jari Ruusu @ 2013-08-26 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto; +Cc: linux-kernel
loop-AES changes since previous release:
- Code and struct cleanup, make it work on 3.11-rc kernels.
- Fixed directory permissions bug in util-linux-2.23.2 when "mount -a" set
up encrypted file system using ramdom keys. util-linux-2.21.2 and older
versions are not affected.
bzip2 compressed tarball is here:
http://loop-aes.sourceforge.net/loop-AES/loop-AES-v3.7a.tar.bz2
md5sum f267cb2108ee94b09a30b2fc7e292104
http://loop-aes.sourceforge.net/loop-AES/loop-AES-v3.7a.tar.bz2.sign
--
Jari Ruusu 1024R/3A220F51 5B 4B F9 BB D3 3F 52 E9 DB 1D EB E3 24 0E A9 DD
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 12/18] Hibernate: generate and verify signature of snapshot
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-27 3:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, linux-pm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-crypto-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
opensuse-kernel-stAJ6ESoqRxg9hUCZPvPmw, David Howells,
Rafael J. Wysocki, Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer,
Vojtech Pavlik, Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH,
JKosina-IBi9RG/b67k, Rusty Russell, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller,
H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek, Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130825163648.GI5171-tWAi6jLit6GreWDznjuHag@public.gmane.org>
Hi Pavel,
Thanks for your time to review my patches.
於 日，2013-08-25 於 18:36 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:51, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > This patch add the code for generate/verify signature of snapshot, it
> > put the signature to snapshot header. This approach can support both
> > on userspace hibernate and in-kernel hibernate.
> >
> > v2:
> > - Due to loaded S4 sign key before ExitBootServices, we need forward key from
> > boot kernel to resume target kernel. So this patch add a empty page in
> > snapshot image, then we keep the pfn of this empty page in snapshot header.
> > When system resume from hibernate, we fill new sign key to this empty page
> > space after snapshot image checked pass. This mechanism let boot kernel can
> > forward new sign key to resume target kernel but don't need write new private
> > key to any other storage, e.g. swap.
> >
> > Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59-1xO5oi07KQx4cg9Nei1l7Q@public.gmane.org>
> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina-AlSwsSmVLrQ@public.gmane.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>
> > ---
> > kernel/power/power.h | 6 +
> > kernel/power/snapshot.c | 280 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > kernel/power/swap.c | 14 +++
> > kernel/power/user.c | 9 ++
> > 4 files changed, 302 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/power/power.h b/kernel/power/power.h
> > index 69a81d8..84e0b06 100644
> > --- a/kernel/power/power.h
> > +++ b/kernel/power/power.h
> > @@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
> > #include <linux/utsname.h>
> > #include <linux/freezer.h>
> >
> > +/* The maximum length of snapshot signature */
> > +#define SIG_LENG 512
> > +
> > struct swsusp_info {
> > struct new_utsname uts;
> > u32 version_code;
> > @@ -11,6 +14,8 @@ struct swsusp_info {
> > unsigned long image_pages;
> > unsigned long pages;
> > unsigned long size;
> > + unsigned long skey_data_buf_pfn;
> > + u8 signature[SIG_LENG];
> > } __attribute__((aligned(PAGE_SIZE)));
>
> SIG_LEN or SIG_LENGTH. Select one.
>
I will use SIG_LEN at next version, thanks!
>
> > +static int
> > copy_data_pages(struct memory_bitmap *copy_bm, struct memory_bitmap *orig_bm)
> > {
> > struct zone *zone;
> > - unsigned long pfn;
> > + unsigned long pfn, dst_pfn;
> ...
> > + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(SNAPSHOT_HASH, 0, 0);
> > + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
> > + pr_err("IS_ERR(tfm): %ld", PTR_ERR(tfm));
> > + return PTR_ERR(tfm);
> > + }
> > +
> > + desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
> > + digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
> > + digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
>
> Are you sure GFP_KERNEL allocation is okay at this phase of
> hibernation?
>
> Could the hashing be done at later phase, when writing the image to
> disk?
>
Thanks for you point out!
Yes, call memory allocate here is not a good design due to it causes
garbage in snapshot that will not released by resumed kernel.
I just finished another implementation, the respin patch extracts the
signature generation code to another function then call the function in
swsusp_save() after copy_data_pages() finished. We can write to memory
at that stage.
> >
> > +void **h_buf;
>
> helpfully named.
>
I will change the name to handle_buffers;
> > + ret = verify_signature(s4_wake_key, pks);
> > + if (ret) {
> > + pr_err("snapshot S4 signature verification fail: %d\n", ret);
> > + goto error_verify;
> > + } else
> > + pr_info("snapshot S4 signature verification pass!\n");
> > +
> > + if (pks->rsa.s)
> > + mpi_free(pks->rsa.s);
> > + kfree(pks);
>
> ret = 0 and fall through?
>
When verification success, verify_signature() will return 0.
Yes, here have duplicate code, I will clear up it.
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > +error_verify:
> > + if (pks->rsa.s)
> > + mpi_free(pks->rsa.s);
> > +error_mpi:
> > + kfree(pks);
> > + return ret;
> > +}
>
>
> > + ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
> > + if (ret)
> > + goto error_shash;
> > +
> > + ret = snapshot_verify_signature(digest, digest_size);
> > + if (ret)
> > + goto error_verify;
> > +
> > + kfree(h_buf);
> > + kfree(digest);
> > + crypto_free_shash(tfm);
> > + return 0;
>
> These four lines can be deleted.
>
Yes, here also duplicate, I will remove.
> > +
> > +error_verify:
> > +error_shash:
> > + kfree(h_buf);
> > + kfree(digest);
> > +error_digest:
> > + crypto_free_shash(tfm);
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> Pavel
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 12/18] Hibernate: generate and verify signature of snapshot
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-27 3:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer, Vojtech Pavlik,
Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina, Rusty Russell,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek,
Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130825163648.GI5171@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
Hi Pavel,
Thanks for your time to review my patches.
於 日，2013-08-25 於 18:36 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:51, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > This patch add the code for generate/verify signature of snapshot, it
> > put the signature to snapshot header. This approach can support both
> > on userspace hibernate and in-kernel hibernate.
> >
> > v2:
> > - Due to loaded S4 sign key before ExitBootServices, we need forward key from
> > boot kernel to resume target kernel. So this patch add a empty page in
> > snapshot image, then we keep the pfn of this empty page in snapshot header.
> > When system resume from hibernate, we fill new sign key to this empty page
> > space after snapshot image checked pass. This mechanism let boot kernel can
> > forward new sign key to resume target kernel but don't need write new private
> > key to any other storage, e.g. swap.
> >
> > Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
> > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> > ---
> > kernel/power/power.h | 6 +
> > kernel/power/snapshot.c | 280 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > kernel/power/swap.c | 14 +++
> > kernel/power/user.c | 9 ++
> > 4 files changed, 302 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/power/power.h b/kernel/power/power.h
> > index 69a81d8..84e0b06 100644
> > --- a/kernel/power/power.h
> > +++ b/kernel/power/power.h
> > @@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
> > #include <linux/utsname.h>
> > #include <linux/freezer.h>
> >
> > +/* The maximum length of snapshot signature */
> > +#define SIG_LENG 512
> > +
> > struct swsusp_info {
> > struct new_utsname uts;
> > u32 version_code;
> > @@ -11,6 +14,8 @@ struct swsusp_info {
> > unsigned long image_pages;
> > unsigned long pages;
> > unsigned long size;
> > + unsigned long skey_data_buf_pfn;
> > + u8 signature[SIG_LENG];
> > } __attribute__((aligned(PAGE_SIZE)));
>
> SIG_LEN or SIG_LENGTH. Select one.
>
I will use SIG_LEN at next version, thanks!
>
> > +static int
> > copy_data_pages(struct memory_bitmap *copy_bm, struct memory_bitmap *orig_bm)
> > {
> > struct zone *zone;
> > - unsigned long pfn;
> > + unsigned long pfn, dst_pfn;
> ...
> > + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(SNAPSHOT_HASH, 0, 0);
> > + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
> > + pr_err("IS_ERR(tfm): %ld", PTR_ERR(tfm));
> > + return PTR_ERR(tfm);
> > + }
> > +
> > + desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
> > + digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
> > + digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
>
> Are you sure GFP_KERNEL allocation is okay at this phase of
> hibernation?
>
> Could the hashing be done at later phase, when writing the image to
> disk?
>
Thanks for you point out!
Yes, call memory allocate here is not a good design due to it causes
garbage in snapshot that will not released by resumed kernel.
I just finished another implementation, the respin patch extracts the
signature generation code to another function then call the function in
swsusp_save() after copy_data_pages() finished. We can write to memory
at that stage.
> >
> > +void **h_buf;
>
> helpfully named.
>
I will change the name to handle_buffers;
> > + ret = verify_signature(s4_wake_key, pks);
> > + if (ret) {
> > + pr_err("snapshot S4 signature verification fail: %d\n", ret);
> > + goto error_verify;
> > + } else
> > + pr_info("snapshot S4 signature verification pass!\n");
> > +
> > + if (pks->rsa.s)
> > + mpi_free(pks->rsa.s);
> > + kfree(pks);
>
> ret = 0 and fall through?
>
When verification success, verify_signature() will return 0.
Yes, here have duplicate code, I will clear up it.
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > +error_verify:
> > + if (pks->rsa.s)
> > + mpi_free(pks->rsa.s);
> > +error_mpi:
> > + kfree(pks);
> > + return ret;
> > +}
>
>
> > + ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
> > + if (ret)
> > + goto error_shash;
> > +
> > + ret = snapshot_verify_signature(digest, digest_size);
> > + if (ret)
> > + goto error_verify;
> > +
> > + kfree(h_buf);
> > + kfree(digest);
> > + crypto_free_shash(tfm);
> > + return 0;
>
> These four lines can be deleted.
>
Yes, here also duplicate, I will remove.
> > +
> > +error_verify:
> > +error_shash:
> > + kfree(h_buf);
> > + kfree(digest);
> > +error_digest:
> > + crypto_free_shash(tfm);
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> Pavel
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 12/18] Hibernate: generate and verify signature of snapshot
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-27 3:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer, Vojtech Pavlik,
Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina, Rusty Russell,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek,
Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130825163648.GI5171@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
Hi Pavel,
Thanks for your time to review my patches.
於 日，2013-08-25 於 18:36 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:51, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > This patch add the code for generate/verify signature of snapshot, it
> > put the signature to snapshot header. This approach can support both
> > on userspace hibernate and in-kernel hibernate.
> >
> > v2:
> > - Due to loaded S4 sign key before ExitBootServices, we need forward key from
> > boot kernel to resume target kernel. So this patch add a empty page in
> > snapshot image, then we keep the pfn of this empty page in snapshot header.
> > When system resume from hibernate, we fill new sign key to this empty page
> > space after snapshot image checked pass. This mechanism let boot kernel can
> > forward new sign key to resume target kernel but don't need write new private
> > key to any other storage, e.g. swap.
> >
> > Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
> > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> > ---
> > kernel/power/power.h | 6 +
> > kernel/power/snapshot.c | 280 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > kernel/power/swap.c | 14 +++
> > kernel/power/user.c | 9 ++
> > 4 files changed, 302 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/power/power.h b/kernel/power/power.h
> > index 69a81d8..84e0b06 100644
> > --- a/kernel/power/power.h
> > +++ b/kernel/power/power.h
> > @@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
> > #include <linux/utsname.h>
> > #include <linux/freezer.h>
> >
> > +/* The maximum length of snapshot signature */
> > +#define SIG_LENG 512
> > +
> > struct swsusp_info {
> > struct new_utsname uts;
> > u32 version_code;
> > @@ -11,6 +14,8 @@ struct swsusp_info {
> > unsigned long image_pages;
> > unsigned long pages;
> > unsigned long size;
> > + unsigned long skey_data_buf_pfn;
> > + u8 signature[SIG_LENG];
> > } __attribute__((aligned(PAGE_SIZE)));
>
> SIG_LEN or SIG_LENGTH. Select one.
>
I will use SIG_LEN at next version, thanks!
>
> > +static int
> > copy_data_pages(struct memory_bitmap *copy_bm, struct memory_bitmap *orig_bm)
> > {
> > struct zone *zone;
> > - unsigned long pfn;
> > + unsigned long pfn, dst_pfn;
> ...
> > + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(SNAPSHOT_HASH, 0, 0);
> > + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
> > + pr_err("IS_ERR(tfm): %ld", PTR_ERR(tfm));
> > + return PTR_ERR(tfm);
> > + }
> > +
> > + desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
> > + digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
> > + digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
>
> Are you sure GFP_KERNEL allocation is okay at this phase of
> hibernation?
>
> Could the hashing be done at later phase, when writing the image to
> disk?
>
Thanks for you point out!
Yes, call memory allocate here is not a good design due to it causes
garbage in snapshot that will not released by resumed kernel.
I just finished another implementation, the respin patch extracts the
signature generation code to another function then call the function in
swsusp_save() after copy_data_pages() finished. We can write to memory
at that stage.
> >
> > +void **h_buf;
>
> helpfully named.
>
I will change the name to handle_buffers;
> > + ret = verify_signature(s4_wake_key, pks);
> > + if (ret) {
> > + pr_err("snapshot S4 signature verification fail: %d\n", ret);
> > + goto error_verify;
> > + } else
> > + pr_info("snapshot S4 signature verification pass!\n");
> > +
> > + if (pks->rsa.s)
> > + mpi_free(pks->rsa.s);
> > + kfree(pks);
>
> ret = 0 and fall through?
>
When verification success, verify_signature() will return 0.
Yes, here have duplicate code, I will clear up it.
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > +error_verify:
> > + if (pks->rsa.s)
> > + mpi_free(pks->rsa.s);
> > +error_mpi:
> > + kfree(pks);
> > + return ret;
> > +}
>
>
> > + ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
> > + if (ret)
> > + goto error_shash;
> > +
> > + ret = snapshot_verify_signature(digest, digest_size);
> > + if (ret)
> > + goto error_verify;
> > +
> > + kfree(h_buf);
> > + kfree(digest);
> > + crypto_free_shash(tfm);
> > + return 0;
>
> These four lines can be deleted.
>
Yes, here also duplicate, I will remove.
> > +
> > +error_verify:
> > +error_shash:
> > + kfree(h_buf);
> > + kfree(digest);
> > +error_digest:
> > + crypto_free_shash(tfm);
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> Pavel
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
--
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^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 12/18] Hibernate: generate and verify signature of snapshot
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-27 3:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer, Vojtech Pavlik,
Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina, Rusty Russell,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek,
Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130825163648.GI5171@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
Hi Pavel,
Thanks for your time to review my patches.
於 日，2013-08-25 於 18:36 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:51, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > This patch add the code for generate/verify signature of snapshot, it
> > put the signature to snapshot header. This approach can support both
> > on userspace hibernate and in-kernel hibernate.
> >
> > v2:
> > - Due to loaded S4 sign key before ExitBootServices, we need forward key from
> > boot kernel to resume target kernel. So this patch add a empty page in
> > snapshot image, then we keep the pfn of this empty page in snapshot header.
> > When system resume from hibernate, we fill new sign key to this empty page
> > space after snapshot image checked pass. This mechanism let boot kernel can
> > forward new sign key to resume target kernel but don't need write new private
> > key to any other storage, e.g. swap.
> >
> > Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
> > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> > ---
> > kernel/power/power.h | 6 +
> > kernel/power/snapshot.c | 280 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > kernel/power/swap.c | 14 +++
> > kernel/power/user.c | 9 ++
> > 4 files changed, 302 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/power/power.h b/kernel/power/power.h
> > index 69a81d8..84e0b06 100644
> > --- a/kernel/power/power.h
> > +++ b/kernel/power/power.h
> > @@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
> > #include <linux/utsname.h>
> > #include <linux/freezer.h>
> >
> > +/* The maximum length of snapshot signature */
> > +#define SIG_LENG 512
> > +
> > struct swsusp_info {
> > struct new_utsname uts;
> > u32 version_code;
> > @@ -11,6 +14,8 @@ struct swsusp_info {
> > unsigned long image_pages;
> > unsigned long pages;
> > unsigned long size;
> > + unsigned long skey_data_buf_pfn;
> > + u8 signature[SIG_LENG];
> > } __attribute__((aligned(PAGE_SIZE)));
>
> SIG_LEN or SIG_LENGTH. Select one.
>
I will use SIG_LEN at next version, thanks!
>
> > +static int
> > copy_data_pages(struct memory_bitmap *copy_bm, struct memory_bitmap *orig_bm)
> > {
> > struct zone *zone;
> > - unsigned long pfn;
> > + unsigned long pfn, dst_pfn;
> ...
> > + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(SNAPSHOT_HASH, 0, 0);
> > + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
> > + pr_err("IS_ERR(tfm): %ld", PTR_ERR(tfm));
> > + return PTR_ERR(tfm);
> > + }
> > +
> > + desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
> > + digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
> > + digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
>
> Are you sure GFP_KERNEL allocation is okay at this phase of
> hibernation?
>
> Could the hashing be done at later phase, when writing the image to
> disk?
>
Thanks for you point out!
Yes, call memory allocate here is not a good design due to it causes
garbage in snapshot that will not released by resumed kernel.
I just finished another implementation, the respin patch extracts the
signature generation code to another function then call the function in
swsusp_save() after copy_data_pages() finished. We can write to memory
at that stage.
> >
> > +void **h_buf;
>
> helpfully named.
>
I will change the name to handle_buffers;
> > + ret = verify_signature(s4_wake_key, pks);
> > + if (ret) {
> > + pr_err("snapshot S4 signature verification fail: %d\n", ret);
> > + goto error_verify;
> > + } else
> > + pr_info("snapshot S4 signature verification pass!\n");
> > +
> > + if (pks->rsa.s)
> > + mpi_free(pks->rsa.s);
> > + kfree(pks);
>
> ret = 0 and fall through?
>
When verification success, verify_signature() will return 0.
Yes, here have duplicate code, I will clear up it.
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > +error_verify:
> > + if (pks->rsa.s)
> > + mpi_free(pks->rsa.s);
> > +error_mpi:
> > + kfree(pks);
> > + return ret;
> > +}
>
>
> > + ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
> > + if (ret)
> > + goto error_shash;
> > +
> > + ret = snapshot_verify_signature(digest, digest_size);
> > + if (ret)
> > + goto error_verify;
> > +
> > + kfree(h_buf);
> > + kfree(digest);
> > + crypto_free_shash(tfm);
> > + return 0;
>
> These four lines can be deleted.
>
Yes, here also duplicate, I will remove.
> > +
> > +error_verify:
> > +error_shash:
> > + kfree(h_buf);
> > + kfree(digest);
> > +error_digest:
> > + crypto_free_shash(tfm);
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> Pavel
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 12/18] Hibernate: generate and verify signature of snapshot
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-27 3:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer, Vojtech Pavlik,
Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina, Rusty Russell,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek,
Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130825163648.GI5171@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
Hi Pavel,
Thanks for your time to review my patches.
於 日，2013-08-25 於 18:36 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:51, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > This patch add the code for generate/verify signature of snapshot, it
> > put the signature to snapshot header. This approach can support both
> > on userspace hibernate and in-kernel hibernate.
> >
> > v2:
> > - Due to loaded S4 sign key before ExitBootServices, we need forward key from
> > boot kernel to resume target kernel. So this patch add a empty page in
> > snapshot image, then we keep the pfn of this empty page in snapshot header.
> > When system resume from hibernate, we fill new sign key to this empty page
> > space after snapshot image checked pass. This mechanism let boot kernel can
> > forward new sign key to resume target kernel but don't need write new private
> > key to any other storage, e.g. swap.
> >
> > Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
> > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> > ---
> > kernel/power/power.h | 6 +
> > kernel/power/snapshot.c | 280 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > kernel/power/swap.c | 14 +++
> > kernel/power/user.c | 9 ++
> > 4 files changed, 302 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/power/power.h b/kernel/power/power.h
> > index 69a81d8..84e0b06 100644
> > --- a/kernel/power/power.h
> > +++ b/kernel/power/power.h
> > @@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
> > #include <linux/utsname.h>
> > #include <linux/freezer.h>
> >
> > +/* The maximum length of snapshot signature */
> > +#define SIG_LENG 512
> > +
> > struct swsusp_info {
> > struct new_utsname uts;
> > u32 version_code;
> > @@ -11,6 +14,8 @@ struct swsusp_info {
> > unsigned long image_pages;
> > unsigned long pages;
> > unsigned long size;
> > + unsigned long skey_data_buf_pfn;
> > + u8 signature[SIG_LENG];
> > } __attribute__((aligned(PAGE_SIZE)));
>
> SIG_LEN or SIG_LENGTH. Select one.
>
I will use SIG_LEN at next version, thanks!
>
> > +static int
> > copy_data_pages(struct memory_bitmap *copy_bm, struct memory_bitmap *orig_bm)
> > {
> > struct zone *zone;
> > - unsigned long pfn;
> > + unsigned long pfn, dst_pfn;
> ...
> > + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(SNAPSHOT_HASH, 0, 0);
> > + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
> > + pr_err("IS_ERR(tfm): %ld", PTR_ERR(tfm));
> > + return PTR_ERR(tfm);
> > + }
> > +
> > + desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
> > + digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
> > + digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
>
> Are you sure GFP_KERNEL allocation is okay at this phase of
> hibernation?
>
> Could the hashing be done at later phase, when writing the image to
> disk?
>
Thanks for you point out!
Yes, call memory allocate here is not a good design due to it causes
garbage in snapshot that will not released by resumed kernel.
I just finished another implementation, the respin patch extracts the
signature generation code to another function then call the function in
swsusp_save() after copy_data_pages() finished. We can write to memory
at that stage.
> >
> > +void **h_buf;
>
> helpfully named.
>
I will change the name to handle_buffers;
> > + ret = verify_signature(s4_wake_key, pks);
> > + if (ret) {
> > + pr_err("snapshot S4 signature verification fail: %d\n", ret);
> > + goto error_verify;
> > + } else
> > + pr_info("snapshot S4 signature verification pass!\n");
> > +
> > + if (pks->rsa.s)
> > + mpi_free(pks->rsa.s);
> > + kfree(pks);
>
> ret = 0 and fall through?
>
When verification success, verify_signature() will return 0.
Yes, here have duplicate code, I will clear up it.
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > +error_verify:
> > + if (pks->rsa.s)
> > + mpi_free(pks->rsa.s);
> > +error_mpi:
> > + kfree(pks);
> > + return ret;
> > +}
>
>
> > + ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
> > + if (ret)
> > + goto error_shash;
> > +
> > + ret = snapshot_verify_signature(digest, digest_size);
> > + if (ret)
> > + goto error_verify;
> > +
> > + kfree(h_buf);
> > + kfree(digest);
> > + crypto_free_shash(tfm);
> > + return 0;
>
> These four lines can be deleted.
>
Yes, here also duplicate, I will remove.
> > +
> > +error_verify:
> > +error_shash:
> > + kfree(h_buf);
> > + kfree(digest);
> > +error_digest:
> > + crypto_free_shash(tfm);
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> Pavel
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 13/18] Hibernate: Avoid S4 sign key data included in snapshot image
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-27 8:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer, Vojtech Pavlik,
Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina, Rusty Russell,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek,
Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130825163931.GJ5171@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
於 日，2013-08-25 於 18:39 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:52, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > This patch add swsusp_page_is_sign_key() method to hibernate_key.c and
> > check the page is S4 sign key data when collect saveable page in
> > snapshot.c to avoid sign key data included in snapshot image.
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
> > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> > ---
> > kernel/power/snapshot.c | 6 ++++++
> > 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
> > index 72e2911..9e4c94b 100644
> > --- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c
> > +++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
> > @@ -860,6 +860,9 @@ static struct page *saveable_highmem_page(struct zone *zone, unsigned long pfn)
> >
> > BUG_ON(!PageHighMem(page));
> >
> > + if (swsusp_page_is_sign_key(page))
> > + return NULL;
> > +
> > if (swsusp_page_is_forbidden(page) || swsusp_page_is_free(page) ||
> > PageReserved(page))
> > return NULL;
>
> Just do set_page_forbidden() on your page?
Before call swsusp_unset_page_forbidden(), we need make sure the
create_basic_memory_bitmaps() function already called to initial
forbidden_pages_map. That means need careful the timing, otherwise the
page of private key will not register to forbidden pages map.
So, I choice to refuse the page of private key when snapshot finding
which page is saveable. It has clearer code and we don't need worry the
future change of hibernate.c or user.c for when they call
create_basic_memory_bitmaps() and when the code clear forbidden pages
map.
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
--
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^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 13/18] Hibernate: Avoid S4 sign key data included in snapshot image
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-27 8:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, linux-pm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-crypto-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
opensuse-kernel-stAJ6ESoqRxg9hUCZPvPmw, David Howells,
Rafael J. Wysocki, Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer,
Vojtech Pavlik, Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH,
JKosina-IBi9RG/b67k, Rusty Russell, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller,
H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek, Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130825163931.GJ5171-tWAi6jLit6GreWDznjuHag@public.gmane.org>
於 日，2013-08-25 於 18:39 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:52, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > This patch add swsusp_page_is_sign_key() method to hibernate_key.c and
> > check the page is S4 sign key data when collect saveable page in
> > snapshot.c to avoid sign key data included in snapshot image.
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina-AlSwsSmVLrQ@public.gmane.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>
> > ---
> > kernel/power/snapshot.c | 6 ++++++
> > 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
> > index 72e2911..9e4c94b 100644
> > --- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c
> > +++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
> > @@ -860,6 +860,9 @@ static struct page *saveable_highmem_page(struct zone *zone, unsigned long pfn)
> >
> > BUG_ON(!PageHighMem(page));
> >
> > + if (swsusp_page_is_sign_key(page))
> > + return NULL;
> > +
> > if (swsusp_page_is_forbidden(page) || swsusp_page_is_free(page) ||
> > PageReserved(page))
> > return NULL;
>
> Just do set_page_forbidden() on your page?
Before call swsusp_unset_page_forbidden(), we need make sure the
create_basic_memory_bitmaps() function already called to initial
forbidden_pages_map. That means need careful the timing, otherwise the
page of private key will not register to forbidden pages map.
So, I choice to refuse the page of private key when snapshot finding
which page is saveable. It has clearer code and we don't need worry the
future change of hibernate.c or user.c for when they call
create_basic_memory_bitmaps() and when the code clear forbidden pages
map.
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 13/18] Hibernate: Avoid S4 sign key data included in snapshot image
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-27 8:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer, Vojtech Pavlik,
Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina, Rusty Russell,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek,
Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130825163931.GJ5171@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
於 日，2013-08-25 於 18:39 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:52, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > This patch add swsusp_page_is_sign_key() method to hibernate_key.c and
> > check the page is S4 sign key data when collect saveable page in
> > snapshot.c to avoid sign key data included in snapshot image.
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
> > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> > ---
> > kernel/power/snapshot.c | 6 ++++++
> > 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
> > index 72e2911..9e4c94b 100644
> > --- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c
> > +++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
> > @@ -860,6 +860,9 @@ static struct page *saveable_highmem_page(struct zone *zone, unsigned long pfn)
> >
> > BUG_ON(!PageHighMem(page));
> >
> > + if (swsusp_page_is_sign_key(page))
> > + return NULL;
> > +
> > if (swsusp_page_is_forbidden(page) || swsusp_page_is_free(page) ||
> > PageReserved(page))
> > return NULL;
>
> Just do set_page_forbidden() on your page?
Before call swsusp_unset_page_forbidden(), we need make sure the
create_basic_memory_bitmaps() function already called to initial
forbidden_pages_map. That means need careful the timing, otherwise the
page of private key will not register to forbidden pages map.
So, I choice to refuse the page of private key when snapshot finding
which page is saveable. It has clearer code and we don't need worry the
future change of hibernate.c or user.c for when they call
create_basic_memory_bitmaps() and when the code clear forbidden pages
map.
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 13/18] Hibernate: Avoid S4 sign key data included in snapshot image
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-27 8:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer, Vojtech Pavlik,
Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina, Rusty Russell,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek,
Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130825163931.GJ5171@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
於 日，2013-08-25 於 18:39 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:52, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > This patch add swsusp_page_is_sign_key() method to hibernate_key.c and
> > check the page is S4 sign key data when collect saveable page in
> > snapshot.c to avoid sign key data included in snapshot image.
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
> > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> > ---
> > kernel/power/snapshot.c | 6 ++++++
> > 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
> > index 72e2911..9e4c94b 100644
> > --- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c
> > +++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
> > @@ -860,6 +860,9 @@ static struct page *saveable_highmem_page(struct zone *zone, unsigned long pfn)
> >
> > BUG_ON(!PageHighMem(page));
> >
> > + if (swsusp_page_is_sign_key(page))
> > + return NULL;
> > +
> > if (swsusp_page_is_forbidden(page) || swsusp_page_is_free(page) ||
> > PageReserved(page))
> > return NULL;
>
> Just do set_page_forbidden() on your page?
Before call swsusp_unset_page_forbidden(), we need make sure the
create_basic_memory_bitmaps() function already called to initial
forbidden_pages_map. That means need careful the timing, otherwise the
page of private key will not register to forbidden pages map.
So, I choice to refuse the page of private key when snapshot finding
which page is saveable. It has clearer code and we don't need worry the
future change of hibernate.c or user.c for when they call
create_basic_memory_bitmaps() and when the code clear forbidden pages
map.
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 13/18] Hibernate: Avoid S4 sign key data included in snapshot image
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-27 8:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer, Vojtech Pavlik,
Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina, Rusty Russell,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek,
Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130825163931.GJ5171@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
於 日，2013-08-25 於 18:39 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> On Thu 2013-08-22 19:01:52, Lee, Chun-Yi wrote:
> > This patch add swsusp_page_is_sign_key() method to hibernate_key.c and
> > check the page is S4 sign key data when collect saveable page in
> > snapshot.c to avoid sign key data included in snapshot image.
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
> > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
> > ---
> > kernel/power/snapshot.c | 6 ++++++
> > 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
> > index 72e2911..9e4c94b 100644
> > --- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c
> > +++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
> > @@ -860,6 +860,9 @@ static struct page *saveable_highmem_page(struct zone *zone, unsigned long pfn)
> >
> > BUG_ON(!PageHighMem(page));
> >
> > + if (swsusp_page_is_sign_key(page))
> > + return NULL;
> > +
> > if (swsusp_page_is_forbidden(page) || swsusp_page_is_free(page) ||
> > PageReserved(page))
> > return NULL;
>
> Just do set_page_forbidden() on your page?
Before call swsusp_unset_page_forbidden(), we need make sure the
create_basic_memory_bitmaps() function already called to initial
forbidden_pages_map. That means need careful the timing, otherwise the
page of private key will not register to forbidden pages map.
So, I choice to refuse the page of private key when snapshot finding
which page is saveable. It has clearer code and we don't need worry the
future change of hibernate.c or user.c for when they call
create_basic_memory_bitmaps() and when the code clear forbidden pages
map.
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 03/18] asymmetric keys: separate the length checking of octet string from RSA_I2OSP
From: Jiri Kosina @ 2013-08-27 8:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: joeyli, linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, linux-pm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-crypto-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
opensuse-kernel-stAJ6ESoqRxg9hUCZPvPmw, David Howells,
Rafael J. Wysocki, Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer,
Vojtech Pavlik, Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH,
Rusty Russell, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin,
Michal Marek, Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130826112737.GA18300-tWAi6jLit6GreWDznjuHag@public.gmane.org>
On Mon, 26 Aug 2013, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > > > Due to RSA_I2OSP is not only used by signature verification path but also used
> > > > in signature generation path. So, separate the length checking of octet string
> > > > because it's not for generate 0x00 0x01 leading string when used in signature
> > > > generation.
> > > >
> > > > Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina-AlSwsSmVLrQ@public.gmane.org>
> > > > Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>
> > >
> > > > +static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **_X)
> > > > +{
> > > > + unsigned x_size;
> > > > + unsigned X_size;
> > > > + u8 *X = NULL;
> > >
> > > Is this kernel code or entry into obfuscated C code contest? This is not funny.
> > >
> > The small "x" is the input integer that will transfer to big "X" that is
> > a octet sting.
> >
> > Sorry for I direct give variable name to match with spec, maybe I need
> > use big_X or....
>
> Having variables that differ only in case is confusing. Actually
> RSA_I2OSP is not a good name for function, either.
>
> If it converts x into X, perhaps you can name one input and second output?
The variable naming is according to spec, and I believe it makes sense to
keep it so, no matter how stupid the naming in the spec might be.
Otherwise you have to do mental remapping when looking at the code and the
spec at the same time, which is very inconvenient.
Would a comment next to the variable declaration, that would point this
fact out, be satisfactory for you?
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
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