* [PATCH 0/3] crypto: omap-des: Add driver for OMAP DES module
From: Joel Fernandes @ 2013-08-29 23:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, Mark Greer, Tony Lindgren,
Lokesh Vutla
Cc: Linux OMAP List, Linux ARM Kernel List, Linux Kernel Mailing List,
Linux Crypto Mailing List
OMAP4 and AM437x SoCs have a DES3DES module which is capable of performing DES
encrypt/decrypt and 3DES ede encrypt/decrypt operations. Following patch series
adds support for the same.
Tests have been performed with crypto/testmgr and all tests are successful.
Joel Fernandes (3):
crypto: omap-des: Add omap-des driver for OMAP4/AM43xx
crypto: omap-des: Add config and build options
crypto: omap-des: Add triple DES (des3_ede) support to driver
drivers/crypto/Kconfig | 11 +
drivers/crypto/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/crypto/omap-des.c | 1239 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 1251 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/omap-des.c
--
1.8.1.2
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-29 22:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: Florian Weimer, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi,
linux-pm, linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells,
Rafael J. Wysocki, Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer,
Vojtech Pavlik, Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina,
Rusty Russell, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin,
Michal Marek, Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130829213249.GA25940@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
於 四，2013-08-29 於 23:32 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> Hi!
>
> > > > - Bootloader store the public key to EFI boottime variable by itself
> > > > - Bootloader put The private key to S4SignKey EFI variable for forward to
> > > > kernel.
> > >
> > > Is the UEFI NVRAM really suited for such regular updates?
> > >
> >
> > Yes, Matthew raised this concern at before. I modified patch to load
> > private key in efi stub kernel, before ExitBootServices(), that means we
> > don't need generate key-pair at every system boot. So, the above
> > procedure of efi bootloader will only run one time.
> >
> > User can enable SNAPSHOT_REGEN_KEYS kernel config to notify efi
> > booloader regenerate key-pair for every S4 to improve security if he
> > want. So, the key-pair re-generate procedure will only launched when S4
> > resume, not every system boot.
>
> How many writes can UEFI NVRAM survive? (Is it NOR?)
Currently doesn't have enough information for normal. Yes, I don't know.
>
> "every S4 resume" may be approximately "every boot" for some users...
> Pavel
Yes, it's possible.
So, this option will be disabled by default. Default will only generate
one key-pair for every hibernate.
If "re-generate key-pair for every S4" is still hurt lift of UEFI NVRAM
too much, then another thinking for re-generate key-pair are:
+ Re-generate key-pair after a number of hibernates.
e.g. after 5, 10, 20... times
or
+ Random re-generate key-pair?
On the other hand...
In current design, GenS4Key EFI variable could be write by userland
hibernate tool, kernel will respect GenS4Key value from userland when
hibernate launch. So, userland can tell bootloader to lunch the key-pair
regeneration procedure.
Thanks a lot!
Joey LEe
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-29 22:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: Florian Weimer, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi,
linux-pm, linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells,
Rafael J. Wysocki, Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer,
Vojtech Pavlik, Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina,
Rusty Russell, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin,
Michal Marek, Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130829213249.GA25940@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
於 四，2013-08-29 於 23:32 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> Hi!
>
> > > > - Bootloader store the public key to EFI boottime variable by itself
> > > > - Bootloader put The private key to S4SignKey EFI variable for forward to
> > > > kernel.
> > >
> > > Is the UEFI NVRAM really suited for such regular updates?
> > >
> >
> > Yes, Matthew raised this concern at before. I modified patch to load
> > private key in efi stub kernel, before ExitBootServices(), that means we
> > don't need generate key-pair at every system boot. So, the above
> > procedure of efi bootloader will only run one time.
> >
> > User can enable SNAPSHOT_REGEN_KEYS kernel config to notify efi
> > booloader regenerate key-pair for every S4 to improve security if he
> > want. So, the key-pair re-generate procedure will only launched when S4
> > resume, not every system boot.
>
> How many writes can UEFI NVRAM survive? (Is it NOR?)
Currently doesn't have enough information for normal. Yes, I don't know.
>
> "every S4 resume" may be approximately "every boot" for some users...
> Pavel
Yes, it's possible.
So, this option will be disabled by default. Default will only generate
one key-pair for every hibernate.
If "re-generate key-pair for every S4" is still hurt lift of UEFI NVRAM
too much, then another thinking for re-generate key-pair are:
+ Re-generate key-pair after a number of hibernates.
e.g. after 5, 10, 20... times
or
+ Random re-generate key-pair?
On the other hand...
In current design, GenS4Key EFI variable could be write by userland
hibernate tool, kernel will respect GenS4Key value from userland when
hibernate launch. So, userland can tell bootloader to lunch the key-pair
regeneration procedure.
Thanks a lot!
Joey LEe
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-29 22:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: Florian Weimer, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi,
linux-pm, linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells,
Rafael J. Wysocki, Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer,
Vojtech Pavlik, Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina,
Rusty Russell, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin,
Michal Marek, Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130829213249.GA25940@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
於 四，2013-08-29 於 23:32 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> Hi!
>
> > > > - Bootloader store the public key to EFI boottime variable by itself
> > > > - Bootloader put The private key to S4SignKey EFI variable for forward to
> > > > kernel.
> > >
> > > Is the UEFI NVRAM really suited for such regular updates?
> > >
> >
> > Yes, Matthew raised this concern at before. I modified patch to load
> > private key in efi stub kernel, before ExitBootServices(), that means we
> > don't need generate key-pair at every system boot. So, the above
> > procedure of efi bootloader will only run one time.
> >
> > User can enable SNAPSHOT_REGEN_KEYS kernel config to notify efi
> > booloader regenerate key-pair for every S4 to improve security if he
> > want. So, the key-pair re-generate procedure will only launched when S4
> > resume, not every system boot.
>
> How many writes can UEFI NVRAM survive? (Is it NOR?)
Currently doesn't have enough information for normal. Yes, I don't know.
>
> "every S4 resume" may be approximately "every boot" for some users...
> Pavel
Yes, it's possible.
So, this option will be disabled by default. Default will only generate
one key-pair for every hibernate.
If "re-generate key-pair for every S4" is still hurt lift of UEFI NVRAM
too much, then another thinking for re-generate key-pair are:
+ Re-generate key-pair after a number of hibernates.
e.g. after 5, 10, 20... times
or
+ Random re-generate key-pair?
On the other hand...
In current design, GenS4Key EFI variable could be write by userland
hibernate tool, kernel will respect GenS4Key value from userland when
hibernate launch. So, userland can tell bootloader to lunch the key-pair
regeneration procedure.
Thanks a lot!
Joey LEe
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-29 22:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: Florian Weimer, linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, linux-pm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-crypto-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
opensuse-kernel-stAJ6ESoqRxg9hUCZPvPmw, David Howells,
Rafael J. Wysocki, Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer,
Vojtech Pavlik, Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH,
JKosina-IBi9RG/b67k, Rusty Russell, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller,
H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek, Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130829213249.GA25940-tWAi6jLit6GreWDznjuHag@public.gmane.org>
於 四，2013-08-29 於 23:32 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> Hi!
>
> > > > - Bootloader store the public key to EFI boottime variable by itself
> > > > - Bootloader put The private key to S4SignKey EFI variable for forward to
> > > > kernel.
> > >
> > > Is the UEFI NVRAM really suited for such regular updates?
> > >
> >
> > Yes, Matthew raised this concern at before. I modified patch to load
> > private key in efi stub kernel, before ExitBootServices(), that means we
> > don't need generate key-pair at every system boot. So, the above
> > procedure of efi bootloader will only run one time.
> >
> > User can enable SNAPSHOT_REGEN_KEYS kernel config to notify efi
> > booloader regenerate key-pair for every S4 to improve security if he
> > want. So, the key-pair re-generate procedure will only launched when S4
> > resume, not every system boot.
>
> How many writes can UEFI NVRAM survive? (Is it NOR?)
Currently doesn't have enough information for normal. Yes, I don't know.
>
> "every S4 resume" may be approximately "every boot" for some users...
> Pavel
Yes, it's possible.
So, this option will be disabled by default. Default will only generate
one key-pair for every hibernate.
If "re-generate key-pair for every S4" is still hurt lift of UEFI NVRAM
too much, then another thinking for re-generate key-pair are:
+ Re-generate key-pair after a number of hibernates.
e.g. after 5, 10, 20... times
or
+ Random re-generate key-pair?
On the other hand...
In current design, GenS4Key EFI variable could be write by userland
hibernate tool, kernel will respect GenS4Key value from userland when
hibernate launch. So, userland can tell bootloader to lunch the key-pair
regeneration procedure.
Thanks a lot!
Joey LEe
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-29 22:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek
Cc: Florian Weimer, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi,
linux-pm, linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells,
Rafael J. Wysocki, Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer,
Vojtech Pavlik, Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina,
Rusty Russell, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin,
Michal Marek, Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <20130829213249.GA25940@amd.pavel.ucw.cz>
於 四，2013-08-29 於 23:32 +0200，Pavel Machek 提到：
> Hi!
>
> > > > - Bootloader store the public key to EFI boottime variable by itself
> > > > - Bootloader put The private key to S4SignKey EFI variable for forward to
> > > > kernel.
> > >
> > > Is the UEFI NVRAM really suited for such regular updates?
> > >
> >
> > Yes, Matthew raised this concern at before. I modified patch to load
> > private key in efi stub kernel, before ExitBootServices(), that means we
> > don't need generate key-pair at every system boot. So, the above
> > procedure of efi bootloader will only run one time.
> >
> > User can enable SNAPSHOT_REGEN_KEYS kernel config to notify efi
> > booloader regenerate key-pair for every S4 to improve security if he
> > want. So, the key-pair re-generate procedure will only launched when S4
> > resume, not every system boot.
>
> How many writes can UEFI NVRAM survive? (Is it NOR?)
Currently doesn't have enough information for normal. Yes, I don't know.
>
> "every S4 resume" may be approximately "every boot" for some users...
> Pavel
Yes, it's possible.
So, this option will be disabled by default. Default will only generate
one key-pair for every hibernate.
If "re-generate key-pair for every S4" is still hurt lift of UEFI NVRAM
too much, then another thinking for re-generate key-pair are:
+ Re-generate key-pair after a number of hibernates.
e.g. after 5, 10, 20... times
or
+ Random re-generate key-pair?
On the other hand...
In current design, GenS4Key EFI variable could be write by userland
hibernate tool, kernel will respect GenS4Key value from userland when
hibernate launch. So, userland can tell bootloader to lunch the key-pair
regeneration procedure.
Thanks a lot!
Joey LEe
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot
From: Pavel Machek @ 2013-08-29 21:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: joeyli
Cc: Florian Weimer, linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, linux-pm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-crypto-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
opensuse-kernel-stAJ6ESoqRxg9hUCZPvPmw, David Howells,
Rafael J. Wysocki, Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Josh Boyer,
Vojtech Pavlik, Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH,
JKosina-IBi9RG/b67k, Rusty Russell, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller,
H. Peter Anvin, Michal Marek, Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <1377734505.19568.39.camel-ONCj+Eqt86TasUa73XJKwA@public.gmane.org>
Hi!
> > > - Bootloader store the public key to EFI boottime variable by itself
> > > - Bootloader put The private key to S4SignKey EFI variable for forward to
> > > kernel.
> >
> > Is the UEFI NVRAM really suited for such regular updates?
> >
>
> Yes, Matthew raised this concern at before. I modified patch to load
> private key in efi stub kernel, before ExitBootServices(), that means we
> don't need generate key-pair at every system boot. So, the above
> procedure of efi bootloader will only run one time.
>
> User can enable SNAPSHOT_REGEN_KEYS kernel config to notify efi
> booloader regenerate key-pair for every S4 to improve security if he
> want. So, the key-pair re-generate procedure will only launched when S4
> resume, not every system boot.
How many writes can UEFI NVRAM survive? (Is it NOR?)
"every S4 resume" may be approximately "every boot" for some users...
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH] Fix bitoperation for compilation with clang
From: dl9pf @ 2013-08-29 18:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: dl9pf, pageexec, llvmlinux, behanw, herbert, davem, linux-crypto
From: Jan-Simon Möller <dl9pf@gmx.de>
v2: Fix bug in statement as pointed out by Herbert Xu. Kudos to pipacs.
Author: PaX Team <pageexec at freemail.hu>
ML-Post: http://lists.cs.uiuc.edu/pipermail/llvm-commits/Week-of-Mon-20120507/142707.html
URL: http://llvm.linuxfoundation.org
Merge: Jan-Simon Möller <dl9pf at gmx.de>
Description:
Fix for warning:
linux/crypto/fcrypt.c:143:47: warning: signed shift result (0x598000000) requires 36 bits to
represent, but 'int' only has 32 bits [-Wshift-overflow]
Z(0xef), Z(0x70), Z(0xcf), Z(0xc2), Z(0x2a), Z(0xb3), Z(0x61), Z(0xad),
^~~~~~~
linux/crypto/fcrypt.c:113:29: note: expanded from macro 'Z'
^ ~~
linux/include/uapi/linux/byteorder/little_endian.h:38:53: note: expanded from macro
'__cpu_to_be32'
^
linux/include/uapi/linux/swab.h:116:21: note: expanded from macro '__swab32'
___constant_swab32(x) : \
^
linux/include/uapi/linux/swab.h:18:12: note: expanded from macro '___constant_swab32'
(((__u32)(x) & (__u32)0x0000ff00UL) << 8) | \
^
Solution - make sure we don't exceed the 32 bit range.
#define Z(x) cpu_to_be32(((x & 0x1f) << 27) | (x >> 5))
Signed-off-by: Jan-Simon Möller <dl9pf@gmx.de>
CC: pageexec@freemail.hu
CC: llvmlinux@lists.linuxfoundation.org
CC: behanw@converseincode.com
CC: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au
CC: davem@davemloft.net
CC: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
---
crypto/fcrypt.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/fcrypt.c b/crypto/fcrypt.c
index 3b2cf56..021d7fe 100644
--- a/crypto/fcrypt.c
+++ b/crypto/fcrypt.c
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static const __be32 sbox0[256] = {
};
#undef Z
-#define Z(x) cpu_to_be32((x << 27) | (x >> 5))
+#define Z(x) cpu_to_be32(((x & 0x1f) << 27) | (x >> 5))
static const __be32 sbox1[256] = {
Z(0x77), Z(0x14), Z(0xa6), Z(0xfe), Z(0xb2), Z(0x5e), Z(0x8c), Z(0x3e),
Z(0x67), Z(0x6c), Z(0xa1), Z(0x0d), Z(0xc2), Z(0xa2), Z(0xc1), Z(0x85),
--
1.8.1.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 09/10] crypto: nx - fix GCM for zero length messages
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-29 14:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, linuxppc-dev, benh, Marcelo Cerri
In-Reply-To: <1377787000-4966-1-git-send-email-mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The NX CGM implementation doesn't support zero length messages and the
current implementation has two flaws:
- When the input data length is zero, it ignores the associated data.
- Even when both lengths are zero, it uses the Crypto API to encrypt a
zeroed block using ctr(aes) and because of this it allocates a new
transformation and sets the key for this new tfm. Both operations are
intended to be used only in user context, while the cryptographic
operations can be called in both user and softirq contexts.
This patch replaces the nested Crypto API use and adds two special
cases:
- When input data and associated data lengths are zero: it uses NX ECB
mode to emulate the encryption of a zeroed block using ctr(aes).
- When input data is zero and associated data is available: it uses NX
GMAC mode to calculate the associated data MAC.
Reviewed-by: Joy Latten <jmlatten@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c | 132 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 112 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c
index 9e89bdf..025d9a8 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c
@@ -187,40 +187,125 @@ static int nx_gca(struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx,
return rc;
}
+static int gmac(struct aead_request *req, struct blkcipher_desc *desc)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(req->base.tfm);
+ struct nx_csbcpb *csbcpb = nx_ctx->csbcpb;
+ struct nx_sg *nx_sg;
+ unsigned int nbytes = req->assoclen;
+ unsigned int processed = 0, to_process;
+ u32 max_sg_len;
+
+ /* Set GMAC mode */
+ csbcpb->cpb.hdr.mode = NX_MODE_AES_GMAC;
+
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
+
+ /* page_limit: number of sg entries that fit on one page */
+ max_sg_len = min_t(u32, nx_driver.of.max_sg_len/sizeof(struct nx_sg),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
+
+ /* Copy IV */
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.iv_or_cnt, desc->info, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ do {
+ /*
+ * to_process: the data chunk to process in this update.
+ * This value is bound by sg list limits.
+ */
+ to_process = min_t(u64, nbytes - processed,
+ nx_ctx->ap->databytelen);
+ to_process = min_t(u64, to_process,
+ NX_PAGE_SIZE * (max_sg_len - 1));
+
+ if ((to_process + processed) < nbytes)
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+ else
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+
+ nx_sg = nx_walk_and_build(nx_ctx->in_sg, nx_ctx->ap->sglen,
+ req->assoc, processed, to_process);
+ nx_ctx->op.inlen = (nx_ctx->in_sg - nx_sg)
+ * sizeof(struct nx_sg);
+
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.bit_length_data = 0;
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.bit_length_aad = 8 * nbytes;
+
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.in_pat_or_aad,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.out_pat_or_mac, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.in_s0,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.out_s0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
+
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+ atomic64_add(req->assoclen, &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+
+ processed += to_process;
+ } while (processed < nbytes);
+
+out:
+ /* Restore GCM mode */
+ csbcpb->cpb.hdr.mode = NX_MODE_AES_GCM;
+ return rc;
+}
+
static int gcm_empty(struct aead_request *req, struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
int enc)
{
int rc;
struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(req->base.tfm);
struct nx_csbcpb *csbcpb = nx_ctx->csbcpb;
+ char out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ struct nx_sg *in_sg, *out_sg;
/* For scenarios where the input message is zero length, AES CTR mode
* may be used. Set the source data to be a single block (16B) of all
* zeros, and set the input IV value to be the same as the GMAC IV
* value. - nx_wb 4.8.1.3 */
- char src[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = {};
- struct scatterlist sg;
- desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ctr(aes)", 0, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- crypto_blkcipher_setkey(desc->tfm, csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.key,
- NX_CPB_KEY_SIZE(csbcpb) == NX_KS_AES_128 ? 16 :
- NX_CPB_KEY_SIZE(csbcpb) == NX_KS_AES_192 ? 24 : 32);
-
- sg_init_one(&sg, src, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ /* Change to ECB mode */
+ csbcpb->cpb.hdr.mode = NX_MODE_AES_ECB;
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ecb.key, csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.key,
+ sizeof(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ecb.key));
if (enc)
- rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(desc, req->dst, &sg,
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
else
- rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(desc, req->dst, &sg,
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- crypto_free_blkcipher(desc->tfm);
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
+ /* Encrypt the counter/IV */
+ in_sg = nx_build_sg_list(nx_ctx->in_sg, (u8 *) desc->info,
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE, nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
+ out_sg = nx_build_sg_list(nx_ctx->out_sg, (u8 *) out, sizeof(out),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
+ nx_ctx->op.inlen = (nx_ctx->in_sg - in_sg) * sizeof(struct nx_sg);
+ nx_ctx->op.outlen = (nx_ctx->out_sg - out_sg) * sizeof(struct nx_sg);
+
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ desc->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+
+ /* Copy out the auth tag */
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.out_pat_or_mac, out,
+ crypto_aead_authsize(crypto_aead_reqtfm(req)));
out:
+ /* Restore XCBC mode */
+ csbcpb->cpb.hdr.mode = NX_MODE_AES_GCM;
+
+ /*
+ * ECB key uses the same region that GCM AAD and counter, so it's safe
+ * to just fill it with zeroes.
+ */
+ memset(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ecb.key, 0, sizeof(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ecb.key));
+
return rc;
}
@@ -242,8 +327,14 @@ static int gcm_aes_nx_crypt(struct aead_request *req, int enc)
*(u32 *)(desc.info + NX_GCM_CTR_OFFSET) = 1;
if (nbytes == 0) {
- rc = gcm_empty(req, &desc, enc);
- goto out;
+ if (req->assoclen == 0)
+ rc = gcm_empty(req, &desc, enc);
+ else
+ rc = gmac(req, &desc);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ else
+ goto mac;
}
/* Process associated data */
@@ -310,6 +401,7 @@ static int gcm_aes_nx_crypt(struct aead_request *req, int enc)
processed += to_process;
} while (processed < nbytes);
+mac:
if (enc) {
/* copy out the auth tag */
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.out_pat_or_mac,
--
1.7.12
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 08/10] crypto: nx - fix XCBC for zero length messages
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-29 14:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, linuxppc-dev, benh, Marcelo Cerri
In-Reply-To: <1377787000-4966-1-git-send-email-mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The NX XCBC implementation doesn't support zero length messages and
because of that NX is currently returning a hard-coded hash for zero
length messages. However this approach is incorrect since the hash value
also depends on which key is used.
This patch removes the hard-coded hash and replace it with an
implementation based on the RFC 3566 using ECB.
Reviewed-by: Joy Latten <jmlatten@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-xcbc.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 77 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-xcbc.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-xcbc.c
index 1a5d9e3..03c4bf5 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-xcbc.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-xcbc.c
@@ -56,6 +56,77 @@ static int nx_xcbc_set_key(struct crypto_shash *desc,
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Based on RFC 3566, for a zero-length message:
+ *
+ * n = 1
+ * K1 = E(K, 0x01010101010101010101010101010101)
+ * K3 = E(K, 0x03030303030303030303030303030303)
+ * E[0] = 0x00000000000000000000000000000000
+ * M[1] = 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (0 length message with padding)
+ * E[1] = (K1, M[1] ^ E[0] ^ K3)
+ * Tag = M[1]
+ */
+static int nx_xcbc_empty(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+ struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(&desc->tfm->base);
+ struct nx_csbcpb *csbcpb = nx_ctx->csbcpb;
+ struct nx_sg *in_sg, *out_sg;
+ u8 keys[2][AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 key[32];
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ /* Change to ECB mode */
+ csbcpb->cpb.hdr.mode = NX_MODE_AES_ECB;
+ memcpy(key, csbcpb->cpb.aes_xcbc.key, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ecb.key, key, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
+
+ /* K1 and K3 base patterns */
+ memset(keys[0], 0x01, sizeof(keys[0]));
+ memset(keys[1], 0x03, sizeof(keys[1]));
+
+ /* Generate K1 and K3 encrypting the patterns */
+ in_sg = nx_build_sg_list(nx_ctx->in_sg, (u8 *) keys, sizeof(keys),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
+ out_sg = nx_build_sg_list(nx_ctx->out_sg, (u8 *) keys, sizeof(keys),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
+ nx_ctx->op.inlen = (nx_ctx->in_sg - in_sg) * sizeof(struct nx_sg);
+ nx_ctx->op.outlen = (nx_ctx->out_sg - out_sg) * sizeof(struct nx_sg);
+
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ desc->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+
+ /* XOr K3 with the padding for a 0 length message */
+ keys[1][0] ^= 0x80;
+
+ /* Encrypt the final result */
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ecb.key, keys[0], AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ in_sg = nx_build_sg_list(nx_ctx->in_sg, (u8 *) keys[1], sizeof(keys[1]),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
+ out_sg = nx_build_sg_list(nx_ctx->out_sg, out, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
+ nx_ctx->op.inlen = (nx_ctx->in_sg - in_sg) * sizeof(struct nx_sg);
+ nx_ctx->op.outlen = (nx_ctx->out_sg - out_sg) * sizeof(struct nx_sg);
+
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ desc->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+
+out:
+ /* Restore XCBC mode */
+ csbcpb->cpb.hdr.mode = NX_MODE_AES_XCBC_MAC;
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_xcbc.key, key, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
static int nx_xcbc_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
{
struct xcbc_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
@@ -201,13 +272,12 @@ static int nx_xcbc_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_xcbc.cv,
csbcpb->cpb.aes_xcbc.out_cv_mac, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
} else if (sctx->count == 0) {
- /* we've never seen an update, so this is a 0 byte op. The
- * hardware cannot handle a 0 byte op, so just copy out the
- * known 0 byte result. This is cheaper than allocating a
- * software context to do a 0 byte op */
- u8 data[] = { 0x75, 0xf0, 0x25, 0x1d, 0x52, 0x8a, 0xc0, 0x1c,
- 0x45, 0x73, 0xdf, 0xd5, 0x84, 0xd7, 0x9f, 0x29 };
- memcpy(out, data, sizeof(data));
+ /*
+ * we've never seen an update, so this is a 0 byte op. The
+ * hardware cannot handle a 0 byte op, so just ECB to
+ * generate the hash.
+ */
+ rc = nx_xcbc_empty(desc, out);
goto out;
}
--
1.7.12
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 02/10] crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-ECB
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-29 14:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, linuxppc-dev, benh, Marcelo Cerri
In-Reply-To: <1377787000-4966-1-git-send-email-mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch updates the nx-aes-ecb implementation to perform several
hyper calls if needed in order to always respect the length limits for
scatter/gather lists.
Two different limits are considered:
- "ibm,max-sg-len": maximum number of bytes of each scatter/gather
list.
- "ibm,max-sync-cop":
- The total number of bytes that a scatter/gather list can hold.
- The maximum number of elements that a scatter/gather list can have.
Reviewed-by: Joy Latten <jmlatten@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ecb.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ecb.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ecb.c
index fe0d803..85a8d23 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ecb.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ecb.c
@@ -71,37 +71,49 @@ static int ecb_aes_nx_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct nx_csbcpb *csbcpb = nx_ctx->csbcpb;
unsigned long irq_flags;
+ unsigned int processed = 0, to_process;
+ u32 max_sg_len;
int rc;
spin_lock_irqsave(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
- if (nbytes > nx_ctx->ap->databytelen) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ max_sg_len = min_t(u32, nx_driver.of.max_sg_len/sizeof(struct nx_sg),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
if (enc)
NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
else
NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, nbytes, 0, NULL);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ do {
+ to_process = min_t(u64, nbytes - processed,
+ nx_ctx->ap->databytelen);
+ to_process = min_t(u64, to_process,
+ NX_PAGE_SIZE * (max_sg_len - 1));
+ to_process = to_process & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
- if (!nx_ctx->op.inlen || !nx_ctx->op.outlen) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, to_process,
+ processed, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
- rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
- desc->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ if (!nx_ctx->op.inlen || !nx_ctx->op.outlen) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ desc->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+ atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
+ &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+
+ processed += to_process;
+ } while (processed < nbytes);
- atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
- atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
- &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
return rc;
--
1.7.12
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 10/10] crypto: nx - fix SHA-2 for chunks bigger than block size
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-29 14:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, linuxppc-dev, benh, Marcelo Cerri
In-Reply-To: <1377787000-4966-1-git-send-email-mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Each call to the co-processor, with exception of the last call, needs to
send data that is multiple of block size. As consequence, any remaining
data is kept in the internal NX context.
This patch fixes a bug in the driver that causes it to save incorrect
data into the context when data is bigger than the block size.
Reviewed-by: Joy Latten <jmlatten@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha256.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha512.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha256.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha256.c
index 6547a71..da0b24a 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha256.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha256.c
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static int nx_sha256_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
total -= to_process;
- data += to_process;
+ data += to_process - sctx->count;
sctx->count = 0;
in_sg = nx_ctx->in_sg;
} while (leftover >= SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha512.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha512.c
index 236e6af..4ae5b0f 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha512.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha512.c
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static int nx_sha512_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
total -= to_process;
- data += to_process;
+ data += to_process - sctx->count[0];
sctx->count[0] = 0;
in_sg = nx_ctx->in_sg;
} while (leftover >= SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE);
--
1.7.12
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 07/10] crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-CCM
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-29 14:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, linuxppc-dev, benh, Fionnuala Gunter,
Joy Latten
In-Reply-To: <1377787000-4966-1-git-send-email-mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
From: Fionnuala Gunter <fin@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch updates the NX driver to perform several hyper calls when necessary
so that the length limits of scatter/gather lists are respected.
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <jmlatten@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Fionnuala Gunter <fin@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c | 297 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 215 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c
index 666a35b..5ecd4c2 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c
@@ -179,13 +179,26 @@ static int generate_pat(u8 *iv,
struct nx_sg *nx_insg = nx_ctx->in_sg;
struct nx_sg *nx_outsg = nx_ctx->out_sg;
unsigned int iauth_len = 0;
- struct vio_pfo_op *op = NULL;
u8 tmp[16], *b1 = NULL, *b0 = NULL, *result = NULL;
int rc;
/* zero the ctr value */
memset(iv + 15 - iv[0], 0, iv[0] + 1);
+ /* page 78 of nx_wb.pdf has,
+ * Note: RFC3610 allows the AAD data to be up to 2^64 -1 bytes
+ * in length. If a full message is used, the AES CCA implementation
+ * restricts the maximum AAD length to 2^32 -1 bytes.
+ * If partial messages are used, the implementation supports
+ * 2^64 -1 bytes maximum AAD length.
+ *
+ * However, in the cryptoapi's aead_request structure,
+ * assoclen is an unsigned int, thus it cannot hold a length
+ * value greater than 2^32 - 1.
+ * Thus the AAD is further constrained by this and is never
+ * greater than 2^32.
+ */
+
if (!req->assoclen) {
b0 = nx_ctx->csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.in_pat_or_b0;
} else if (req->assoclen <= 14) {
@@ -195,7 +208,46 @@ static int generate_pat(u8 *iv,
b0 = nx_ctx->csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.in_pat_or_b0;
b1 = nx_ctx->priv.ccm.iauth_tag;
iauth_len = req->assoclen;
+ } else if (req->assoclen <= 65280) {
+ /* if associated data is less than (2^16 - 2^8), we construct
+ * B1 differently and feed in the associated data to a CCA
+ * operation */
+ b0 = nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_cca.b0;
+ b1 = nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_cca.b1;
+ iauth_len = 14;
+ } else {
+ b0 = nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_cca.b0;
+ b1 = nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_cca.b1;
+ iauth_len = 10;
+ }
+ /* generate B0 */
+ rc = generate_b0(iv, req->assoclen, authsize, nbytes, b0);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* generate B1:
+ * add control info for associated data
+ * RFC 3610 and NIST Special Publication 800-38C
+ */
+ if (b1) {
+ memset(b1, 0, 16);
+ if (req->assoclen <= 65280) {
+ *(u16 *)b1 = (u16)req->assoclen;
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b1 + 2, req->assoc, 0,
+ iauth_len, SCATTERWALK_FROM_SG);
+ } else {
+ *(u16 *)b1 = (u16)(0xfffe);
+ *(u32 *)&b1[2] = (u32)req->assoclen;
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b1 + 6, req->assoc, 0,
+ iauth_len, SCATTERWALK_FROM_SG);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* now copy any remaining AAD to scatterlist and call nx... */
+ if (!req->assoclen) {
+ return rc;
+ } else if (req->assoclen <= 14) {
nx_insg = nx_build_sg_list(nx_insg, b1, 16, nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
nx_outsg = nx_build_sg_list(nx_outsg, tmp, 16,
nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
@@ -210,56 +262,74 @@ static int generate_pat(u8 *iv,
NX_CPB_FDM(nx_ctx->csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
NX_CPB_FDM(nx_ctx->csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
- op = &nx_ctx->op;
result = nx_ctx->csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.out_pat_or_mac;
- } else if (req->assoclen <= 65280) {
- /* if associated data is less than (2^16 - 2^8), we construct
- * B1 differently and feed in the associated data to a CCA
- * operation */
- b0 = nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_cca.b0;
- b1 = nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_cca.b1;
- iauth_len = 14;
-
- /* remaining assoc data must have scatterlist built for it */
- nx_insg = nx_walk_and_build(nx_insg, nx_ctx->ap->sglen,
- req->assoc, iauth_len,
- req->assoclen - iauth_len);
- nx_ctx->op_aead.inlen = (nx_ctx->in_sg - nx_insg) *
+
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+ atomic64_add(req->assoclen, &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+
+ } else {
+ u32 max_sg_len;
+ unsigned int processed = 0, to_process;
+
+ /* page_limit: number of sg entries that fit on one page */
+ max_sg_len = min_t(u32,
+ nx_driver.of.max_sg_len/sizeof(struct nx_sg),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
+
+ processed += iauth_len;
+
+ do {
+ to_process = min_t(u32, req->assoclen - processed,
+ nx_ctx->ap->databytelen);
+ to_process = min_t(u64, to_process,
+ NX_PAGE_SIZE * (max_sg_len - 1));
+
+ if ((to_process + processed) < req->assoclen) {
+ NX_CPB_FDM(nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead) |=
+ NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+ } else {
+ NX_CPB_FDM(nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead) &=
+ ~NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+ }
+
+ nx_insg = nx_walk_and_build(nx_ctx->in_sg,
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen,
+ req->assoc, processed,
+ to_process);
+
+ nx_ctx->op_aead.inlen = (nx_ctx->in_sg - nx_insg) *
sizeof(struct nx_sg);
- op = &nx_ctx->op_aead;
+ result = nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_cca.out_pat_or_b0;
+
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op_aead,
+ req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ memcpy(nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_cca.b0,
+ nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_cca.out_pat_or_b0,
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ NX_CPB_FDM(nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead) |= NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
+
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+ atomic64_add(req->assoclen,
+ &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+
+ processed += to_process;
+ } while (processed < req->assoclen);
+
result = nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_cca.out_pat_or_b0;
- } else {
- /* if associated data is less than (2^32), we construct B1
- * differently yet again and feed in the associated data to a
- * CCA operation */
- pr_err("associated data len is %u bytes (returning -EINVAL)\n",
- req->assoclen);
- rc = -EINVAL;
}
- rc = generate_b0(iv, req->assoclen, authsize, nbytes, b0);
- if (rc)
- goto done;
+ memcpy(out, result, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- if (b1) {
- memset(b1, 0, 16);
- *(u16 *)b1 = (u16)req->assoclen;
-
- scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b1 + 2, req->assoc, 0,
- iauth_len, SCATTERWALK_FROM_SG);
-
- rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, op,
- req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
- if (rc)
- goto done;
-
- atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
- atomic64_add(req->assoclen, &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
-
- memcpy(out, result, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- }
-done:
return rc;
}
@@ -272,15 +342,12 @@ static int ccm_nx_decrypt(struct aead_request *req,
unsigned int authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(crypto_aead_reqtfm(req));
struct nx_ccm_priv *priv = &nx_ctx->priv.ccm;
unsigned long irq_flags;
+ unsigned int processed = 0, to_process;
+ u32 max_sg_len;
int rc = -1;
spin_lock_irqsave(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
- if (nbytes > nx_ctx->ap->databytelen) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
nbytes -= authsize;
/* copy out the auth tag to compare with later */
@@ -293,22 +360,56 @@ static int ccm_nx_decrypt(struct aead_request *req,
if (rc)
goto out;
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, req->dst, req->src, nbytes, 0,
- csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.iv_or_ctr);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ /* page_limit: number of sg entries that fit on one page */
+ max_sg_len = min_t(u32, nx_driver.of.max_sg_len/sizeof(struct nx_sg),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
- NX_CPB_FDM(nx_ctx->csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
- NX_CPB_FDM(nx_ctx->csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+ do {
- rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ /* to_process: the AES_BLOCK_SIZE data chunk to process in this
+ * update. This value is bound by sg list limits.
+ */
+ to_process = min_t(u64, nbytes - processed,
+ nx_ctx->ap->databytelen);
+ to_process = min_t(u64, to_process,
+ NX_PAGE_SIZE * (max_sg_len - 1));
+
+ if ((to_process + processed) < nbytes)
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+ else
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+
+ NX_CPB_FDM(nx_ctx->csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
+
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, req->dst, req->src,
+ to_process, processed,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.iv_or_ctr);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
- atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
- atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
- &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+ /* for partial completion, copy following for next
+ * entry into loop...
+ */
+ memcpy(desc->info, csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.out_ctr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.in_pat_or_b0,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.out_pat_or_mac, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.in_s0,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.out_s0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
+
+ /* update stats */
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+ atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
+ &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+
+ processed += to_process;
+ } while (processed < nbytes);
rc = memcmp(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.out_pat_or_mac, priv->oauth_tag,
authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
@@ -325,41 +426,73 @@ static int ccm_nx_encrypt(struct aead_request *req,
unsigned int nbytes = req->cryptlen;
unsigned int authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(crypto_aead_reqtfm(req));
unsigned long irq_flags;
+ unsigned int processed = 0, to_process;
+ u32 max_sg_len;
int rc = -1;
spin_lock_irqsave(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
- if (nbytes > nx_ctx->ap->databytelen) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
rc = generate_pat(desc->info, req, nx_ctx, authsize, nbytes,
csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.in_pat_or_b0);
if (rc)
goto out;
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, req->dst, req->src, nbytes, 0,
- csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.iv_or_ctr);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
-
- NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
- NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
-
- rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
- req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
-
- atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
- atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
- &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+ /* page_limit: number of sg entries that fit on one page */
+ max_sg_len = min_t(u32, nx_driver.of.max_sg_len/sizeof(struct nx_sg),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
+
+ do {
+ /* to process: the AES_BLOCK_SIZE data chunk to process in this
+ * update. This value is bound by sg list limits.
+ */
+ to_process = min_t(u64, nbytes - processed,
+ nx_ctx->ap->databytelen);
+ to_process = min_t(u64, to_process,
+ NX_PAGE_SIZE * (max_sg_len - 1));
+
+ if ((to_process + processed) < nbytes)
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+ else
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
+
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, req->dst, req->src,
+ to_process, processed,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.iv_or_ctr);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* for partial completion, copy following for next
+ * entry into loop...
+ */
+ memcpy(desc->info, csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.out_ctr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.in_pat_or_b0,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.out_pat_or_mac, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.in_s0,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.out_s0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
+
+ /* update stats */
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+ atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
+ &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+
+ processed += to_process;
+
+ } while (processed < nbytes);
/* copy out the auth tag */
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.out_pat_or_mac,
req->dst, nbytes, authsize,
SCATTERWALK_TO_SG);
+
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
return rc;
--
1.7.12
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 06/10] crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-XCBC
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-29 14:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, linuxppc-dev, benh, Fionnuala Gunter
In-Reply-To: <1377787000-4966-1-git-send-email-mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
From: Fionnuala Gunter <fin@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch updates the NX driver to perform several hyper calls when necessary
so that the length limits of scatter/gather lists are respected.
Reviewed-by: Joy Latten <jmlatten@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Fionnuala Gunter <fin@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-xcbc.c | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-xcbc.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-xcbc.c
index 658da0f..1a5d9e3 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-xcbc.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-xcbc.c
@@ -88,78 +88,97 @@ static int nx_xcbc_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(&desc->tfm->base);
struct nx_csbcpb *csbcpb = nx_ctx->csbcpb;
struct nx_sg *in_sg;
- u32 to_process, leftover;
+ u32 to_process, leftover, total;
+ u32 max_sg_len;
unsigned long irq_flags;
int rc = 0;
spin_lock_irqsave(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
- if (NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) & NX_FDM_CONTINUATION) {
- /* we've hit the nx chip previously and we're updating again,
- * so copy over the partial digest */
- memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_xcbc.cv,
- csbcpb->cpb.aes_xcbc.out_cv_mac, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- }
+
+ total = sctx->count + len;
/* 2 cases for total data len:
* 1: <= AES_BLOCK_SIZE: copy into state, return 0
* 2: > AES_BLOCK_SIZE: process X blocks, copy in leftover
*/
- if (len + sctx->count <= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ if (total <= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
memcpy(sctx->buffer + sctx->count, data, len);
sctx->count += len;
goto out;
}
- /* to_process: the AES_BLOCK_SIZE data chunk to process in this
- * update */
- to_process = (sctx->count + len) & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
- leftover = (sctx->count + len) & (AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+ in_sg = nx_ctx->in_sg;
+ max_sg_len = min_t(u32, nx_driver.of.max_sg_len/sizeof(struct nx_sg),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
- /* the hardware will not accept a 0 byte operation for this algorithm
- * and the operation MUST be finalized to be correct. So if we happen
- * to get an update that falls on a block sized boundary, we must
- * save off the last block to finalize with later. */
- if (!leftover) {
- to_process -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
- leftover = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
- }
+ do {
- if (sctx->count) {
- in_sg = nx_build_sg_list(nx_ctx->in_sg, sctx->buffer,
- sctx->count, nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
- in_sg = nx_build_sg_list(in_sg, (u8 *)data,
- to_process - sctx->count,
- nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
- nx_ctx->op.inlen = (nx_ctx->in_sg - in_sg) *
- sizeof(struct nx_sg);
- } else {
- in_sg = nx_build_sg_list(nx_ctx->in_sg, (u8 *)data, to_process,
- nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
+ /* to_process: the AES_BLOCK_SIZE data chunk to process in this
+ * update */
+ to_process = min_t(u64, total, nx_ctx->ap->databytelen);
+ to_process = min_t(u64, to_process,
+ NX_PAGE_SIZE * (max_sg_len - 1));
+ to_process = to_process & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+ leftover = total - to_process;
+
+ /* the hardware will not accept a 0 byte operation for this
+ * algorithm and the operation MUST be finalized to be correct.
+ * So if we happen to get an update that falls on a block sized
+ * boundary, we must save off the last block to finalize with
+ * later. */
+ if (!leftover) {
+ to_process -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ leftover = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ if (sctx->count) {
+ in_sg = nx_build_sg_list(nx_ctx->in_sg,
+ (u8 *) sctx->buffer,
+ sctx->count,
+ max_sg_len);
+ }
+ in_sg = nx_build_sg_list(in_sg,
+ (u8 *) data,
+ to_process - sctx->count,
+ max_sg_len);
nx_ctx->op.inlen = (nx_ctx->in_sg - in_sg) *
sizeof(struct nx_sg);
- }
- NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+ /* we've hit the nx chip previously and we're updating again,
+ * so copy over the partial digest */
+ if (NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) & NX_FDM_CONTINUATION) {
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_xcbc.cv,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_xcbc.out_cv_mac,
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ }
- if (!nx_ctx->op.inlen || !nx_ctx->op.outlen) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+ if (!nx_ctx->op.inlen || !nx_ctx->op.outlen) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
- rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
desc->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
- atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+
+ /* everything after the first update is continuation */
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
+
+ total -= to_process;
+ data += to_process - sctx->count;
+ sctx->count = 0;
+ in_sg = nx_ctx->in_sg;
+ } while (leftover > AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
/* copy the leftover back into the state struct */
- memcpy(sctx->buffer, data + len - leftover, leftover);
+ memcpy(sctx->buffer, data, leftover);
sctx->count = leftover;
- /* everything after the first update is continuation */
- NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
return rc;
--
1.7.12
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 05/10] crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-GCM
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-29 14:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, linuxppc-dev, benh, Marcelo Cerri
In-Reply-To: <1377787000-4966-1-git-send-email-mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch updates the nx-aes-gcm implementation to perform several
hyper calls if needed in order to always respect the length limits for
scatter/gather lists.
Two different limits are considered:
- "ibm,max-sg-len": maximum number of bytes of each scatter/gather
list.
- "ibm,max-sync-cop":
- The total number of bytes that a scatter/gather list can hold.
- The maximum number of elements that a scatter/gather list can have.
Reviewed-by: Joy Latten <jmlatten@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c | 202 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 136 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c
index c2d6f76..9e89bdf 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c
@@ -125,37 +125,101 @@ static int nx_gca(struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx,
struct aead_request *req,
u8 *out)
{
+ int rc;
struct nx_csbcpb *csbcpb_aead = nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead;
- int rc = -EINVAL;
struct scatter_walk walk;
struct nx_sg *nx_sg = nx_ctx->in_sg;
+ unsigned int nbytes = req->assoclen;
+ unsigned int processed = 0, to_process;
+ u32 max_sg_len;
- if (req->assoclen > nx_ctx->ap->databytelen)
- goto out;
-
- if (req->assoclen <= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ if (nbytes <= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
scatterwalk_start(&walk, req->assoc);
- scatterwalk_copychunks(out, &walk, req->assoclen,
- SCATTERWALK_FROM_SG);
+ scatterwalk_copychunks(out, &walk, nbytes, SCATTERWALK_FROM_SG);
scatterwalk_done(&walk, SCATTERWALK_FROM_SG, 0);
-
- rc = 0;
- goto out;
+ return 0;
}
- nx_sg = nx_walk_and_build(nx_sg, nx_ctx->ap->sglen, req->assoc, 0,
- req->assoclen);
- nx_ctx->op_aead.inlen = (nx_ctx->in_sg - nx_sg) * sizeof(struct nx_sg);
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb_aead) &= ~NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
- rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op_aead,
- req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ /* page_limit: number of sg entries that fit on one page */
+ max_sg_len = min_t(u32, nx_driver.of.max_sg_len/sizeof(struct nx_sg),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
- atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
- atomic64_add(req->assoclen, &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+ do {
+ /*
+ * to_process: the data chunk to process in this update.
+ * This value is bound by sg list limits.
+ */
+ to_process = min_t(u64, nbytes - processed,
+ nx_ctx->ap->databytelen);
+ to_process = min_t(u64, to_process,
+ NX_PAGE_SIZE * (max_sg_len - 1));
+
+ if ((to_process + processed) < nbytes)
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb_aead) |= NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+ else
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb_aead) &= ~NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+
+ nx_sg = nx_walk_and_build(nx_ctx->in_sg, nx_ctx->ap->sglen,
+ req->assoc, processed, to_process);
+ nx_ctx->op_aead.inlen = (nx_ctx->in_sg - nx_sg)
+ * sizeof(struct nx_sg);
+
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op_aead,
+ req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ memcpy(csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_gca.in_pat,
+ csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_gca.out_pat,
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb_aead) |= NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
+
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+ atomic64_add(req->assoclen, &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+
+ processed += to_process;
+ } while (processed < nbytes);
memcpy(out, csbcpb_aead->cpb.aes_gca.out_pat, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int gcm_empty(struct aead_request *req, struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ int enc)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(req->base.tfm);
+ struct nx_csbcpb *csbcpb = nx_ctx->csbcpb;
+
+ /* For scenarios where the input message is zero length, AES CTR mode
+ * may be used. Set the source data to be a single block (16B) of all
+ * zeros, and set the input IV value to be the same as the GMAC IV
+ * value. - nx_wb 4.8.1.3 */
+ char src[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = {};
+ struct scatterlist sg;
+
+ desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ctr(aes)", 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ crypto_blkcipher_setkey(desc->tfm, csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.key,
+ NX_CPB_KEY_SIZE(csbcpb) == NX_KS_AES_128 ? 16 :
+ NX_CPB_KEY_SIZE(csbcpb) == NX_KS_AES_192 ? 24 : 32);
+
+ sg_init_one(&sg, src, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ if (enc)
+ rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(desc, req->dst, &sg,
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ else
+ rc = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(desc, req->dst, &sg,
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(desc->tfm);
+
out:
return rc;
}
@@ -166,79 +230,85 @@ static int gcm_aes_nx_crypt(struct aead_request *req, int enc)
struct nx_csbcpb *csbcpb = nx_ctx->csbcpb;
struct blkcipher_desc desc;
unsigned int nbytes = req->cryptlen;
+ unsigned int processed = 0, to_process;
unsigned long irq_flags;
+ u32 max_sg_len;
int rc = -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
- if (nbytes > nx_ctx->ap->databytelen)
- goto out;
-
desc.info = nx_ctx->priv.gcm.iv;
/* initialize the counter */
*(u32 *)(desc.info + NX_GCM_CTR_OFFSET) = 1;
- /* For scenarios where the input message is zero length, AES CTR mode
- * may be used. Set the source data to be a single block (16B) of all
- * zeros, and set the input IV value to be the same as the GMAC IV
- * value. - nx_wb 4.8.1.3 */
if (nbytes == 0) {
- char src[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = {};
- struct scatterlist sg;
-
- desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ctr(aes)", 0, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm)) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- crypto_blkcipher_setkey(desc.tfm, csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.key,
- NX_CPB_KEY_SIZE(csbcpb) == NX_KS_AES_128 ? 16 :
- NX_CPB_KEY_SIZE(csbcpb) == NX_KS_AES_192 ? 24 : 32);
-
- sg_init_one(&sg, src, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- if (enc)
- crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(&desc, req->dst, &sg,
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- else
- crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(&desc, req->dst, &sg,
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- crypto_free_blkcipher(desc.tfm);
-
- rc = 0;
+ rc = gcm_empty(req, &desc, enc);
goto out;
}
- desc.tfm = (struct crypto_blkcipher *)req->base.tfm;
-
+ /* Process associated data */
csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.bit_length_aad = req->assoclen * 8;
-
if (req->assoclen) {
rc = nx_gca(nx_ctx, req, csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.in_pat_or_aad);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
- if (enc)
+ /* Set flags for encryption */
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
+ if (enc) {
NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
- else
+ } else {
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
nbytes -= crypto_aead_authsize(crypto_aead_reqtfm(req));
+ }
- csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.bit_length_data = nbytes * 8;
+ /* page_limit: number of sg entries that fit on one page */
+ max_sg_len = min_t(u32, nx_driver.of.max_sg_len/sizeof(struct nx_sg),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, &desc, req->dst, req->src, nbytes, 0,
- csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.iv_or_cnt);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ do {
+ /*
+ * to_process: the data chunk to process in this update.
+ * This value is bound by sg list limits.
+ */
+ to_process = min_t(u64, nbytes - processed,
+ nx_ctx->ap->databytelen);
+ to_process = min_t(u64, to_process,
+ NX_PAGE_SIZE * (max_sg_len - 1));
- rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
- req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ if ((to_process + processed) < nbytes)
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
+ else
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_INTERMEDIATE;
- atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
- atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
- &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.bit_length_data = nbytes * 8;
+ desc.tfm = (struct crypto_blkcipher *) req->base.tfm;
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, &desc, req->dst,
+ req->src, to_process, processed,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.iv_or_cnt);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ memcpy(desc.info, csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.out_cnt, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.in_pat_or_aad,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.out_pat_or_mac, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ memcpy(csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.in_s0,
+ csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.out_s0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_CONTINUATION;
+
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+ atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
+ &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+
+ processed += to_process;
+ } while (processed < nbytes);
if (enc) {
/* copy out the auth tag */
--
1.7.12
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 04/10] crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-CTR
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-29 14:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: Marcelo Cerri, linuxppc-dev, linux-kernel, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <1377787000-4966-1-git-send-email-mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch updates the nx-aes-ctr implementation to perform several
hyper calls if needed in order to always respect the length limits for
scatter/gather lists.
Two different limits are considered:
- "ibm,max-sg-len": maximum number of bytes of each scatter/gather
list.
- "ibm,max-sync-cop":
- The total number of bytes that a scatter/gather list can hold.
- The maximum number of elements that a scatter/gather list can have.
Reviewed-by: Joy Latten <jmlatten@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c
index 80dee8d..a37d009 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c
@@ -89,33 +89,45 @@ static int ctr_aes_nx_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct nx_csbcpb *csbcpb = nx_ctx->csbcpb;
unsigned long irq_flags;
+ unsigned int processed = 0, to_process;
+ u32 max_sg_len;
int rc;
spin_lock_irqsave(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
- if (nbytes > nx_ctx->ap->databytelen) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ max_sg_len = min_t(u32, nx_driver.of.max_sg_len/sizeof(struct nx_sg),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, nbytes, 0,
- csbcpb->cpb.aes_ctr.iv);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ do {
+ to_process = min_t(u64, nbytes - processed,
+ nx_ctx->ap->databytelen);
+ to_process = min_t(u64, to_process,
+ NX_PAGE_SIZE * (max_sg_len - 1));
+ to_process = to_process & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
- if (!nx_ctx->op.inlen || !nx_ctx->op.outlen) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, to_process,
+ processed, csbcpb->cpb.aes_ctr.iv);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
- rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
- desc->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ if (!nx_ctx->op.inlen || !nx_ctx->op.outlen) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
- atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
- atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
- &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ desc->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ memcpy(desc->info, csbcpb->cpb.aes_cbc.cv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+ atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
+ &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+
+ processed += to_process;
+ } while (processed < nbytes);
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
return rc;
--
1.7.12
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 03/10] crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-CBC
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-29 14:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, linuxppc-dev, benh, Marcelo Cerri
In-Reply-To: <1377787000-4966-1-git-send-email-mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch updates the nx-aes-cbc implementation to perform several
hyper calls if needed in order to always respect the length limits for
scatter/gather lists.
Two different limits are considered:
- "ibm,max-sg-len": maximum number of bytes of each scatter/gather
list.
- "ibm,max-sync-cop":
- The total number of bytes that a scatter/gather list can hold.
- The maximum number of elements that a scatter/gather list can have.
Reviewed-by: Joy Latten <jmlatten@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-cbc.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-cbc.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-cbc.c
index a9e76c6..cc00b52 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-cbc.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-cbc.c
@@ -71,39 +71,49 @@ static int cbc_aes_nx_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct nx_csbcpb *csbcpb = nx_ctx->csbcpb;
unsigned long irq_flags;
+ unsigned int processed = 0, to_process;
+ u32 max_sg_len;
int rc;
spin_lock_irqsave(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
- if (nbytes > nx_ctx->ap->databytelen) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ max_sg_len = min_t(u32, nx_driver.of.max_sg_len/sizeof(struct nx_sg),
+ nx_ctx->ap->sglen);
if (enc)
NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) |= NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
else
NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, nbytes, 0,
- csbcpb->cpb.aes_cbc.iv);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ do {
+ to_process = min_t(u64, nbytes - processed,
+ nx_ctx->ap->databytelen);
+ to_process = min_t(u64, to_process,
+ NX_PAGE_SIZE * (max_sg_len - 1));
+ to_process = to_process & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
- if (!nx_ctx->op.inlen || !nx_ctx->op.outlen) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, to_process,
+ processed, csbcpb->cpb.aes_cbc.iv);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
- rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
- desc->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ if (!nx_ctx->op.inlen || !nx_ctx->op.outlen) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
- memcpy(desc->info, csbcpb->cpb.aes_cbc.cv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
- atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
- &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+ rc = nx_hcall_sync(nx_ctx, &nx_ctx->op,
+ desc->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ memcpy(desc->info, csbcpb->cpb.aes_cbc.cv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ atomic_inc(&(nx_ctx->stats->aes_ops));
+ atomic64_add(csbcpb->csb.processed_byte_count,
+ &(nx_ctx->stats->aes_bytes));
+
+ processed += to_process;
+ } while (processed < nbytes);
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
return rc;
--
1.7.12
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 01/10] crypto: nx - add offset to nx_build_sg_lists()
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-29 14:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, linuxppc-dev, benh, Marcelo Cerri
In-Reply-To: <1377787000-4966-1-git-send-email-mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch includes one more parameter to nx_build_sg_lists() to skip
the given number of bytes from beginning of each sg list.
This is needed in order to implement the fixes for the AES modes to make
them able to process larger chunks of data.
Reviewed-by: Joy Latten <jmlatten@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-cbc.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c | 4 ++--
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ecb.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c | 9 +++++++--
drivers/crypto/nx/nx.h | 2 +-
7 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-cbc.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-cbc.c
index 7c0237d..a9e76c6 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-cbc.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-cbc.c
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static int cbc_aes_nx_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
else
NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, nbytes,
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, nbytes, 0,
csbcpb->cpb.aes_cbc.iv);
if (rc)
goto out;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c
index 39d4224..666a35b 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static int ccm_nx_decrypt(struct aead_request *req,
if (rc)
goto out;
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, req->dst, req->src, nbytes,
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, req->dst, req->src, nbytes, 0,
csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.iv_or_ctr);
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static int ccm_nx_encrypt(struct aead_request *req,
if (rc)
goto out;
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, req->dst, req->src, nbytes,
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, req->dst, req->src, nbytes, 0,
csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.iv_or_ctr);
if (rc)
goto out;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c
index 762611b..80dee8d 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static int ctr_aes_nx_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
goto out;
}
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, nbytes,
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, nbytes, 0,
csbcpb->cpb.aes_ctr.iv);
if (rc)
goto out;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ecb.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ecb.c
index 77dbe08..fe0d803 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ecb.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ecb.c
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static int ecb_aes_nx_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
else
NX_CPB_FDM(csbcpb) &= ~NX_FDM_ENDE_ENCRYPT;
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, nbytes, NULL);
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, desc, dst, src, nbytes, 0, NULL);
if (rc)
goto out;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c
index 74feee1..c2d6f76 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static int gcm_aes_nx_crypt(struct aead_request *req, int enc)
csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.bit_length_data = nbytes * 8;
- rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, &desc, req->dst, req->src, nbytes,
+ rc = nx_build_sg_lists(nx_ctx, &desc, req->dst, req->src, nbytes, 0,
csbcpb->cpb.aes_gcm.iv_or_cnt);
if (rc)
goto out;
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c
index bdf4990..5533fe3 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c
@@ -211,6 +211,8 @@ struct nx_sg *nx_walk_and_build(struct nx_sg *nx_dst,
* @dst: destination scatterlist
* @src: source scatterlist
* @nbytes: length of data described in the scatterlists
+ * @offset: number of bytes to fast-forward past at the beginning of
+ * scatterlists.
* @iv: destination for the iv data, if the algorithm requires it
*
* This is common code shared by all the AES algorithms. It uses the block
@@ -222,6 +224,7 @@ int nx_build_sg_lists(struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx,
struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes,
+ unsigned int offset,
u8 *iv)
{
struct nx_sg *nx_insg = nx_ctx->in_sg;
@@ -230,8 +233,10 @@ int nx_build_sg_lists(struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx,
if (iv)
memcpy(iv, desc->info, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- nx_insg = nx_walk_and_build(nx_insg, nx_ctx->ap->sglen, src, 0, nbytes);
- nx_outsg = nx_walk_and_build(nx_outsg, nx_ctx->ap->sglen, dst, 0, nbytes);
+ nx_insg = nx_walk_and_build(nx_insg, nx_ctx->ap->sglen, src,
+ offset, nbytes);
+ nx_outsg = nx_walk_and_build(nx_outsg, nx_ctx->ap->sglen, dst,
+ offset, nbytes);
/* these lengths should be negative, which will indicate to phyp that
* the input and output parameters are scatterlists, not linear
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.h b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.h
index 14bb97f..befda07 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.h
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ int nx_hcall_sync(struct nx_crypto_ctx *ctx, struct vio_pfo_op *op,
struct nx_sg *nx_build_sg_list(struct nx_sg *, u8 *, unsigned int, u32);
int nx_build_sg_lists(struct nx_crypto_ctx *, struct blkcipher_desc *,
struct scatterlist *, struct scatterlist *, unsigned int,
- u8 *);
+ unsigned int, u8 *);
struct nx_sg *nx_walk_and_build(struct nx_sg *, unsigned int,
struct scatterlist *, unsigned int,
unsigned int);
--
1.7.12
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 00/10] Series of fixes for NX driver
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-29 14:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, linuxppc-dev, benh, Marcelo Cerri
This series of patches contains fixes in several algorithms implemented
by the NX driver. The patches can be separated in three different
categories:
- Changes to split the data in several hyper calls to respect the
limits of data that the co-processador can handle. This affects
all AES modes.
- Fixes in how the driver handle zero length messages. This affects
XCBC and GCM.
- Fixes for SHA-2 when chunks bigger than the block size are provided.
v2:
- Fixed conflict.
Fionnuala Gunter (2):
crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-XCBC
crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-CCM
Marcelo Cerri (8):
crypto: nx - add offset to nx_build_sg_lists()
crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-ECB
crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-CBC
crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-CTR
crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-GCM
crypto: nx - fix XCBC for zero length messages
crypto: nx - fix GCM for zero length messages
crypto: nx - fix SHA-2 for chunks bigger than block size
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-cbc.c | 50 ++++---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c | 297 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ctr.c | 50 ++++---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ecb.c | 48 ++++---
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c | 292 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-xcbc.c | 191 +++++++++++++++++++-------
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha256.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-sha512.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c | 9 +-
drivers/crypto/nx/nx.h | 2 +-
10 files changed, 683 insertions(+), 260 deletions(-)
--
1.7.12
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 03/10] crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-CBC
From: Marcelo Cerri @ 2013-08-29 14:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Herbert Xu; +Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, linuxppc-dev
In-Reply-To: <20130829044221.GA25208@gondor.apana.org.au>
On Thu, Aug 29, 2013 at 02:42:22PM +1000, Herbert Xu wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 05:01:07PM -0300, Marcelo Cerri wrote:
> > This patch updates the nx-aes-cbc implementation to perform several
> > hyper calls if needed in order to always respect the length limits for
> > scatter/gather lists.
> >
> > Two different limits are considered:
> >
> > - "ibm,max-sg-len": maximum number of bytes of each scatter/gather
> > list.
> >
> > - "ibm,max-sync-cop":
> > - The total number of bytes that a scatter/gather list can hold.
> > - The maximum number of elements that a scatter/gather list can have.
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Joy Latten <jmlatten@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
>
> This patch does not apply against the current cryptodev tree.
>
> Please regenerate your pathces.
Sorry for this. I'm sending a v2 series without conflicts.
>
> Thanks,
> --
> Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
> PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] kernel/padata.c: share code between CPU_ONLINE and CPU_DOWN_FAILED, same to CPU_DOWN_PREPARE and CPU_UP_CANCELED
From: Chen Gang @ 2013-08-29 5:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Herbert Xu; +Cc: Steffen Klassert, linux-crypto, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <20130829044259.GB25208@gondor.apana.org.au>
On 08/29/2013 12:42 PM, Herbert Xu wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 12:44:48PM +0200, Steffen Klassert wrote:
>> On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 02:43:37PM +0800, Chen Gang wrote:
>>> Share code between CPU_ONLINE and CPU_DOWN_FAILED, same to
>>> CPU_DOWN_PREPARE and CPU_UP_CANCELED.
>>>
>>> It will fix 2 bugs:
>>>
>>> "not check the return value of __padata_remove_cpu() and __padata_add_cpu()".
>>> "need add 'break' between CPU_UP_CANCELED and CPU_DOWN_FAILED".
>>>
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com>
>>
>> This looks ok to me, Herbert can you take this one?
>>
>> Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
>
> Patch applied. Thanks!
>
Thank you too.
--
Chen Gang
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] kernel/padata.c: share code between CPU_ONLINE and CPU_DOWN_FAILED, same to CPU_DOWN_PREPARE and CPU_UP_CANCELED
From: Herbert Xu @ 2013-08-29 4:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steffen Klassert; +Cc: Chen Gang, linux-crypto, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <20130823104448.GI26773@secunet.com>
On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 12:44:48PM +0200, Steffen Klassert wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 02:43:37PM +0800, Chen Gang wrote:
> > Share code between CPU_ONLINE and CPU_DOWN_FAILED, same to
> > CPU_DOWN_PREPARE and CPU_UP_CANCELED.
> >
> > It will fix 2 bugs:
> >
> > "not check the return value of __padata_remove_cpu() and __padata_add_cpu()".
> > "need add 'break' between CPU_UP_CANCELED and CPU_DOWN_FAILED".
> >
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com>
>
> This looks ok to me, Herbert can you take this one?
>
> Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Patch applied. Thanks!
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] kernel/padata.c: Register hotcpu notifier after initialization
From: Herbert Xu @ 2013-08-29 4:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steffen Klassert
Cc: Richard Weinberger, linux-crypto, linux-kernel, gang.chen
In-Reply-To: <20130827093041.GD7660@secunet.com>
On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 11:30:41AM +0200, Steffen Klassert wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 01:12:33PM +0200, Richard Weinberger wrote:
> > padata_cpu_callback() takes pinst->lock, to avoid taking
> > an uninitialized lock, register the notifier after it's
> > initialization.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
>
> Looks ok,
>
> Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Also applied.
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 03/10] crypto: nx - fix limits to sg lists for AES-CBC
From: Herbert Xu @ 2013-08-29 4:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Marcelo Cerri; +Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, linuxppc-dev
In-Reply-To: <1377288074-18998-4-git-send-email-mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 05:01:07PM -0300, Marcelo Cerri wrote:
> This patch updates the nx-aes-cbc implementation to perform several
> hyper calls if needed in order to always respect the length limits for
> scatter/gather lists.
>
> Two different limits are considered:
>
> - "ibm,max-sg-len": maximum number of bytes of each scatter/gather
> list.
>
> - "ibm,max-sync-cop":
> - The total number of bytes that a scatter/gather list can hold.
> - The maximum number of elements that a scatter/gather list can have.
>
> Reviewed-by: Joy Latten <jmlatten@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Cerri <mhcerri@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch does not apply against the current cryptodev tree.
Please regenerate your pathces.
Thanks,
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC PATCH 00/18 v3] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot
From: joeyli @ 2013-08-29 0:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Florian Weimer
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-security-module, linux-efi, linux-pm,
linux-crypto, opensuse-kernel, David Howells, Rafael J. Wysocki,
Matthew Garrett, Len Brown, Pavel Machek, Josh Boyer,
Vojtech Pavlik, Matt Fleming, James Bottomley, Greg KH, JKosina,
Rusty Russell, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, H. Peter Anvin,
Michal Marek, Gary Lin, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <87eh9dzg00.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
Hi Florian,
Thanks for your response.
於 三，2013-08-28 於 23:01 +0200，Florian Weimer 提到：
> * Chun-Yi Lee:
>
> > + EFI bootloader must generate RSA key-pair when system boot:
I should add more information on this sentence for mention need GenS4Key
runtime variable then re-generate key-pair.
Thanks!
> > - Bootloader store the public key to EFI boottime variable by itself
> > - Bootloader put The private key to S4SignKey EFI variable for forward to
> > kernel.
>
> Is the UEFI NVRAM really suited for such regular updates?
>
Yes, Matthew raised this concern at before. I modified patch to load
private key in efi stub kernel, before ExitBootServices(), that means we
don't need generate key-pair at every system boot. So, the above
procedure of efi bootloader will only run one time.
User can enable SNAPSHOT_REGEN_KEYS kernel config to notify efi
booloader regenerate key-pair for every S4 to improve security if he
want. So, the key-pair re-generate procedure will only launched when S4
resume, not every system boot.
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
^ permalink raw reply
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