* [PATCH 1/3] PKCS#7: Fix panic when referring to the empty AKID when DEBUG defined
From: David Howells @ 2016-07-17 23:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris
Cc: keyring, Lans Zhang, Baoquan He, kexec, linux-kernel, dhowells,
linux-security-module, linux-crypto, Dave Young, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <146879703192.32133.3670984393495441516.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
From: Lans Zhang <jia.zhang@windriver.com>
This fix resolves the following kernel panic if an empty or missing
AuthorityKeyIdentifier is encountered and DEBUG is defined in
pkcs7_verify.c.
[ 459.041989] PKEY: <==public_key_verify_signature() = 0
[ 459.041993] PKCS7: Verified signature 1
[ 459.041995] PKCS7: ==> pkcs7_verify_sig_chain()
[ 459.041999] PKCS7: verify Sample DB Certificate for SCP: 01
[ 459.042002] PKCS7: - issuer Sample KEK Certificate for SCP
[ 459.042014] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 459.042135] IP: [<ffffffff813e7b4c>] pkcs7_verify+0x72c/0x7f0
[ 459.042217] PGD 739e6067 PUD 77719067 PMD 0
[ 459.042286] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 459.042328] Modules linked in:
[ 459.042368] CPU: 0 PID: 474 Comm: kexec Not tainted 4.7.0-rc7-WR8.0.0.0_standard+ #18
[ 459.042462] Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 10/09/2014
[ 459.042586] task: ffff880073a50000 ti: ffff8800738e8000 task.ti: ffff8800738e8000
[ 459.042675] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff813e7b4c>] [<ffffffff813e7b4c>] pkcs7_verify+0x72c/0x7f0
[ 459.042784] RSP: 0018:ffff8800738ebd58 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 459.042845] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880076b7da80 RCX: 0000000000000006
[ 459.042929] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff81c85001 RDI: ffffffff81ca00a9
[ 459.043014] RBP: ffff8800738ebd98 R08: 0000000000000400 R09: ffff8800788a304c
[ 459.043098] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000000060ca R12: ffff8800769a2bc0
[ 459.043182] R13: ffff880077358300 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8800769a2dc0
[ 459.043268] FS: 00007f24cc741700(0000) GS:ffff880074e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 459.043365] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 459.043431] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000073a36000 CR4: 00000000001006f0
[ 459.043514] Stack:
[ 459.043530] 0000000000000000 ffffffbf00000020 31ffffff813e68b0 0000000000000002
[ 459.043644] ffff8800769a2bc0 0000000000000000 00000000007197b8 0000000000000002
[ 459.043756] ffff8800738ebdd8 ffffffff81153fb1 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 459.043869] Call Trace:
[ 459.043898] [<ffffffff81153fb1>] verify_pkcs7_signature+0x61/0x140
[ 459.043974] [<ffffffff813e7f0b>] verify_pefile_signature+0x2cb/0x830
[ 459.044052] [<ffffffff813e8470>] ? verify_pefile_signature+0x830/0x830
[ 459.044134] [<ffffffff81048e25>] bzImage64_verify_sig+0x15/0x20
[ 459.046332] [<ffffffff81046e09>] arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig+0x29/0x40
[ 459.048552] [<ffffffff810f10e4>] SyS_kexec_file_load+0x1f4/0x6c0
[ 459.050768] [<ffffffff81050e36>] ? __do_page_fault+0x1b6/0x550
[ 459.052996] [<ffffffff8199241f>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x17/0x93
[ 459.055242] Code: e8 0a d6 ff ff 85 c0 0f 88 7a fb ff ff 4d 39 fd 4d 89 7d 08 74 45 4d 89 fd e9 14 fe ff ff 4d 8b 76 08 31 c0 48 c7 c7 a9 00 ca 81 <41> 0f b7 36 49 8d 56 02 e8 d0 91 d6 ff 4d 8b 3c 24 4d 85 ff 0f
[ 459.060535] RIP [<ffffffff813e7b4c>] pkcs7_verify+0x72c/0x7f0
[ 459.063040] RSP <ffff8800738ebd58>
[ 459.065456] CR2: 0000000000000000
[ 459.075998] ---[ end trace c15f0e897cda28dc ]---
Signed-off-by: Lans Zhang <jia.zhang@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index 44b746e9df1b..2ffd69769466 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->id, auth))
goto found_issuer_check_skid;
}
- } else {
+ } else if (sig->auth_ids[1]) {
auth = sig->auth_ids[1];
pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 2/3] pefile: Fix the failure of calculation for digest
From: David Howells @ 2016-07-17 23:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris
Cc: keyring, Lans Zhang, Baoquan He, kexec, linux-kernel, dhowells,
linux-security-module, linux-crypto, Dave Young, Vivek Goyal
In-Reply-To: <146879703192.32133.3670984393495441516.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
From: Lans Zhang <jia.zhang@windriver.com>
Commit e68503bd68 forgot to set digest_len and thus cause the following
error reported by kexec when launching a crash kernel:
kexec_file_load failed: Bad message
Fixes: e68503bd68 (KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content)
Signed-off-by: Lans Zhang <jia.zhang@windriver.com>
Tested-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
index 6a76d5c70ef6..9492e1c22d38 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
@@ -124,5 +124,10 @@ int mscode_note_digest(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
struct pefile_context *ctx = context;
ctx->digest = kmemdup(value, vlen, GFP_KERNEL);
- return ctx->digest ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+ if (!ctx->digest)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ctx->digest_len = vlen;
+
+ return 0;
}
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 3/3] KEYS: Fix for erroneous trust of incorrectly signed X.509 certs
From: David Howells @ 2016-07-17 23:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris
Cc: keyring, Petko Manolov, Mat Martineau, linux-kernel, dhowells,
linux-security-module, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <146879703192.32133.3670984393495441516.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
From: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Arbitrary X.509 certificates without authority key identifiers (AKIs)
can be added to "trusted" keyrings, including IMA or EVM certs loaded
from the filesystem. Signature verification is currently bypassed for
certs without AKIs.
Trusted keys were recently refactored, and this bug is not present in
4.6.
restrict_link_by_signature should return -ENOKEY (no matching parent
certificate found) if the certificate being evaluated has no AKIs,
instead of bypassing signature checks and returning 0 (new certificate
accepted).
Reported-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
index ac4bddf669de..19d1afb9890f 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *trust_keyring,
sig = payload->data[asym_auth];
if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1])
- return 0;
+ return -ENOKEY;
if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid))
return -EPERM;
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH 5/6] crypto: img-hash - Add support for export and import
From: Herbert Xu @ 2016-07-18 6:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Will Thomas; +Cc: linux-crypto, james.hartley
In-Reply-To: <578649C2.801@imgtec.com>
On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 03:01:38PM +0100, Will Thomas wrote:
>
> I don't see any other drivers explicitly requesting a fallback
> driver by name. Anyways, should this be done using "sha1-generic"
The problem is that you're relying on the fallback to implement
import/export. So if the fallback changes, then your algorithm
parameters will change which is not allowed.
> in the crypto_alloc_ahash call when setting up the fallback tfm?
Yes that should be sufficient.
Cheers,
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] crypto: add template handling for RNGs
From: Herbert Xu @ 2016-07-18 7:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stephan Mueller; +Cc: mathew.j.martineau, dhowells, keyrings, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <2944776.2qGGKJgDkv@positron.chronox.de>
Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> wrote:
> This patch adds the ability to register templates for RNGs. RNGs are
> "meta" mechanisms using raw cipher primitives. Thus, RNGs can now be
> implemented as templates to allow the complete flexibility the kernel
> crypto API provides.
>
> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
> ---
> crypto/rng.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/crypto/rng.h | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 70 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/crypto/rng.c b/crypto/rng.c
> index b81cffb..92cc02a 100644
> --- a/crypto/rng.c
> +++ b/crypto/rng.c
> @@ -232,5 +232,36 @@ void crypto_unregister_rngs(struct rng_alg *algs, int count)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_unregister_rngs);
>
> +void rng_free_instance(struct crypto_instance *inst)
> +{
> + crypto_drop_spawn(crypto_instance_ctx(inst));
> + kfree(rng_instance(inst));
> +}
Please use the new free interface, i.e.,
void rng_free_instance(struct rng_instance *inst)
and then
inst->free = rng_free_instance;
> +static inline struct rng_alg *__crypto_rng_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
> +{
> + return container_of(alg, struct rng_alg, base);
> +}
> +
> +static inline struct rng_instance *rng_instance(
> + struct crypto_instance *inst)
> +{
> + return container_of(__crypto_rng_alg(&inst->alg),
> + struct rng_instance, alg);
> +}
These two can then be deleted.
Thanks,
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] crypto: add template handling for RNGs
From: Stephan Mueller @ 2016-07-18 7:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Herbert Xu; +Cc: mathew.j.martineau, dhowells, keyrings, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <20160718071417.GA12600@gondor.apana.org.au>
Am Montag, 18. Juli 2016, 15:14:17 schrieb Herbert Xu:
Hi Herbert,
> >
> > diff --git a/crypto/rng.c b/crypto/rng.c
> > index b81cffb..92cc02a 100644
> > --- a/crypto/rng.c
> > +++ b/crypto/rng.c
> > @@ -232,5 +232,36 @@ void crypto_unregister_rngs(struct rng_alg *algs, int
> > count) }
> > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_unregister_rngs);
> >
> > +void rng_free_instance(struct crypto_instance *inst)
> > +{
> > + crypto_drop_spawn(crypto_instance_ctx(inst));
> > + kfree(rng_instance(inst));
> > +}
>
> Please use the new free interface, i.e.,
>
> void rng_free_instance(struct rng_instance *inst)
>
> and then
>
> inst->free = rng_free_instance;
>
> > +static inline struct rng_alg *__crypto_rng_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
> > +{
> > + return container_of(alg, struct rng_alg, base);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static inline struct rng_instance *rng_instance(
> > + struct crypto_instance *inst)
> > +{
> > + return container_of(__crypto_rng_alg(&inst->alg),
> > + struct rng_instance, alg);
> > +}
>
> These two can then be deleted.
Thanks. I will add that to the next round.
>
> Thanks,
Ciao
Stephan
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [patch] crypto: sha256-mb - cleanup a || vs | typo
From: Pavel Machek @ 2016-07-18 8:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linus Torvalds
Cc: Herbert Xu, Tim Chen, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin, Dan Carpenter,
David S. Miller, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
the arch/x86 maintainers, Megha Dey, Wang, Rui Y, Denys Vlasenko,
Xiaodong Liu, Linux Crypto Mailing List,
Linux Kernel Mailing List, kernel-janitors, Andrew Morton,
Peter Zijlstra
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFyQYJerovMsSoSKS7PessZBr4vNp-3QUUwhqk4A4_jcbg@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri 2016-07-08 10:19:26, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> [ rare comment rant. I think I'll do this once, and then ignore the discussion ]
>
> On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 9:45 AM, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:
> >
> > Nack. As I said the commenting style in the crypto API is the
> > same as the network stack. So unless we decide to change both
> > please stick to the current style.
>
> Can we please get rid of the brain-damaged stupid networking comment
> syntax style, PLEASE?
Please? :-). Having different comment styles between networking and
the rest is confusing.
And yes, this uglyness is documented for net/ and drivers/net/, but
not for crypto/, so at the very least Documentation/CodingStyle should
be updated.
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH] crypto: marvell: Fix wrong flag used for GFP in mv_cesa_dma_add_iv_op
From: Romain Perier @ 2016-07-18 9:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Boris Brezillon, Arnaud Ebalard
Cc: David S. Miller, linux-crypto, Thomas Petazzoni, Jason Cooper,
Andrew Lunn, Sebastian Hesselbarth, Gregory Clement
Use the parameter 'gfp_flags' instead of 'flag' as second argument of
dma_pool_alloc(). The parameter 'flag' is for the TDMA descriptor, its
content has no sense for the allocator.
Signed-off-by: Romain Perier <romain.perier@free-electrons.com>
---
drivers/crypto/marvell/tdma.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/marvell/tdma.c b/drivers/crypto/marvell/tdma.c
index 942f4b6..51a631d 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/marvell/tdma.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/marvell/tdma.c
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ int mv_cesa_dma_add_iv_op(struct mv_cesa_tdma_chain *chain, dma_addr_t src,
if (IS_ERR(tdma))
return PTR_ERR(tdma);
- iv = dma_pool_alloc(cesa_dev->dma->iv_pool, flags, &dma_handle);
+ iv = dma_pool_alloc(cesa_dev->dma->iv_pool, gfp_flags, &dma_handle);
if (!iv)
return -ENOMEM;
--
2.8.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH] crypto: marvell: Fix wrong flag used for GFP in mv_cesa_dma_add_iv_op
From: Boris Brezillon @ 2016-07-18 10:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Romain Perier
Cc: Arnaud Ebalard, David S. Miller, linux-crypto, Thomas Petazzoni,
Jason Cooper, Andrew Lunn, Sebastian Hesselbarth, Gregory Clement
In-Reply-To: <1468834344-14160-1-git-send-email-romain.perier@free-electrons.com>
On Mon, 18 Jul 2016 11:32:24 +0200
Romain Perier <romain.perier@free-electrons.com> wrote:
> Use the parameter 'gfp_flags' instead of 'flag' as second argument of
> dma_pool_alloc(). The parameter 'flag' is for the TDMA descriptor, its
> content has no sense for the allocator.
>
> Signed-off-by: Romain Perier <romain.perier@free-electrons.com>
Acked-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com>
Herbert, can you add the following line when applying then patch?
Fixes: bac8e805a30d ("crypto: marvell - Copy IV vectors by DMA transfers for acipher requests")
> ---
> drivers/crypto/marvell/tdma.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/marvell/tdma.c b/drivers/crypto/marvell/tdma.c
> index 942f4b6..51a631d 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/marvell/tdma.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/marvell/tdma.c
> @@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ int mv_cesa_dma_add_iv_op(struct mv_cesa_tdma_chain *chain, dma_addr_t src,
> if (IS_ERR(tdma))
> return PTR_ERR(tdma);
>
> - iv = dma_pool_alloc(cesa_dev->dma->iv_pool, flags, &dma_handle);
> + iv = dma_pool_alloc(cesa_dev->dma->iv_pool, gfp_flags, &dma_handle);
> if (!iv)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH] crypto: testmgr - Print akcipher algorithm name
From: Herbert Xu @ 2016-07-18 10:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linux Crypto Mailing List
When an akcipher test fails, we don't know which algorithm failed
because the name is not printed. This patch fixes this.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
index 769cc2a..5c9d5a5 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -2034,6 +2034,8 @@ free_xbuf:
static int test_akcipher(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const char *alg,
struct akcipher_testvec *vecs, unsigned int tcount)
{
+ const char *algo =
+ crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_akcipher_tfm(tfm));
int ret, i;
for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
@@ -2041,8 +2043,8 @@ static int test_akcipher(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const char *alg,
if (!ret)
continue;
- pr_err("alg: akcipher: test failed on vector %d, err=%d\n",
- i + 1, ret);
+ pr_err("alg: akcipher: test %d failed for %s, err=%d\n",
+ i + 1, algo, ret);
return ret;
}
return 0;
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Fix akcipher request allocation
From: Herbert Xu @ 2016-07-18 10:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tadeusz Struk; +Cc: Salvatore Benedetto, davem, andrew.zaborowski, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <bed68e2b-6397-1663-606c-6f19695d94ed@gmail.com>
On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 08:39:18PM -0700, Tadeusz Struk wrote:
> Hi Salvatore,
> On 07/14/2016 03:25 AM, Salvatore Benedetto wrote:
> > Embedding the akcipher_request in pkcs1pad_request don't take
> > into account the context space required by the akcipher object.
>
> I think we do take into account the sub request context. See line 675.
> The only thing that is wrong is that the child_req should be at
> the end of the structure. This is build tested only.
>
> ---8<---
> From: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
> Subject: [PATCH] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix rsa-pkcs1pad request struct
>
> To allow for child request context the struct akcipher_request child_req
> needs to be at the end of the structure.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Patch applied. Thanks.
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [patch] crypto: nx - off by one bug in nx_of_update_msc()
From: Herbert Xu @ 2016-07-18 10:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dan Carpenter
Cc: Leonidas S. Barbosa, Kent Yoder, Paulo Flabiano Smorigo,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt, Paul Mackerras, Michael Ellerman,
David S. Miller, linux-crypto, linuxppc-dev, kernel-janitors
In-Reply-To: <20160715110912.GE9258@mwanda>
On Fri, Jul 15, 2016 at 02:09:13PM +0300, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> The props->ap[] array is defined like this:
>
> struct alg_props ap[NX_MAX_FC][NX_MAX_MODE][3];
>
> So we can see that if msc->fc and msc->mode are == to NX_MAX_FC or
> NX_MAX_MODE then we're off by one.
>
> Fixes: ae0222b7289d ('powerpc/crypto: nx driver code supporting nx encryption')
> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Patch applied. Thanks.
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 0/2] Automatically load the vmx_crypto module if supported
From: Herbert Xu @ 2016-07-18 10:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: alastair
Cc: mpe, benh, paulus, davem, linuxppc-dev, linux-crypto,
linux-kernel, Alastair D'Silva
In-Reply-To: <1468388840-12068-1-git-send-email-alastair@au1.ibm.com>
On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 03:47:16PM +1000, alastair@au1.ibm.com wrote:
> From: Alastair D'Silva <alastair@d-silva.org>
>
> This series allows the vmx_crypto module to be detected and automatically
> loaded via UDEV if the CPU supports the vector crypto feature.
>
> Alastair D'Silva (2):
> powerpc: Add module autoloading based on CPU features
> crypto: vmx - Convert to CPU feature based module autoloading
Both patches applied. Thanks.
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
* [cryptodev:master 147/175] DocBook: include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
From: kbuild test robot @ 2016-07-18 12:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
Cc: kbuild-all, linux-crypto, Herbert Xu
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2964 bytes --]
tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/cryptodev-2.6.git master
head: c6335cbb0486f09b4c2ae86e84bf87efd667afa6
commit: 4e6c3df4d729f85997cbf276bfa8ffd8579b8e77 [147/175] crypto: skcipher - Add low-level skcipher interface
reproduce: make htmldocs
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
>> include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
>> include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
>> include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
>> include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
>> include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
>> include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
>> include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
>> include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
>> include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
>> include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
>> include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
>> include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
>> include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
>> include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
>> include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
>> include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
>> include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
vim +/base +135 include/crypto/skcipher.h
119 * All fields except @ivsize are mandatory and must be filled.
120 */
121 struct skcipher_alg {
122 int (*setkey)(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
123 unsigned int keylen);
124 int (*encrypt)(struct skcipher_request *req);
125 int (*decrypt)(struct skcipher_request *req);
126 int (*init)(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm);
127 void (*exit)(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm);
128
129 unsigned int min_keysize;
130 unsigned int max_keysize;
131 unsigned int ivsize;
132 unsigned int chunksize;
133
134 struct crypto_alg base;
> 135 };
136
137 #define SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(name, tfm) \
138 char __##name##_desc[sizeof(struct skcipher_request) + \
139 crypto_skcipher_reqsize(tfm)] CRYPTO_MINALIGN_ATTR; \
140 struct skcipher_request *name = (void *)__##name##_desc
141
142 static inline struct crypto_ablkcipher *skcipher_givcrypt_reqtfm(
143 struct skcipher_givcrypt_request *req)
---
0-DAY kernel test infrastructure Open Source Technology Center
https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all Intel Corporation
[-- Attachment #2: .config.gz --]
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^ permalink raw reply
* [cryptodev:master 163/175] DocBook: include/linux/crypto.h:1: warning: no structured comments found
From: kbuild test robot @ 2016-07-18 13:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
Cc: kbuild-all, linux-crypto, Herbert Xu
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3050 bytes --]
tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/cryptodev-2.6.git master
head: c6335cbb0486f09b4c2ae86e84bf87efd667afa6
commit: 3a01d0ee2b991c8c267620e63a4ab47cd8c30cc4 [163/175] crypto: skcipher - Remove top-level givcipher interface
reproduce: make htmldocs
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
>> include/linux/crypto.h:1: warning: no structured comments found
Was looking for 'crypto_alloc_ablkcipher'.
vim +1 include/linux/crypto.h
^1da177e Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 @1 /*
^1da177e Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 2 * Scatterlist Cryptographic API.
^1da177e Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 3 *
^1da177e Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 4 * Copyright (c) 2002 James Morris <jmorris@intercode.com.au>
^1da177e Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 5 * Copyright (c) 2002 David S. Miller (davem@redhat.com)
5cb1454b Herbert Xu 2005-11-05 6 * Copyright (c) 2005 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
^1da177e Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 7 *
^1da177e Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 8 * Portions derived from Cryptoapi, by Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@fast.no>
18735dd8 John Anthony Kazos Jr 2007-10-19 9 * and Nettle, by Niels Möller.
:::::: The code at line 1 was first introduced by commit
:::::: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 Linux-2.6.12-rc2
:::::: TO: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org>
:::::: CC: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org>
---
0-DAY kernel test infrastructure Open Source Technology Center
https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all Intel Corporation
[-- Attachment #2: .config.gz --]
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^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] crypto: add template handling for RNGs
From: Sandy Harris @ 2016-07-18 15:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Herbert Xu
Cc: Stephan Mueller, mathew.j.martineau, dhowells, keyrings,
linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <20160718071417.GA12600@gondor.apana.org.au>
On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 3:14 AM, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:
> Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> wrote:
>> This patch adds the ability to register templates for RNGs. RNGs are
>> "meta" mechanisms using raw cipher primitives. Thus, RNGs can now be
>> implemented as templates to allow the complete flexibility the kernel
>> crypto API provides.
I do not see why this might be desirable, let alone necessary.
Security-critical code should be kept as simple as possible.
Don't we need just one good RNG?
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v2 1/2] crypto: vmx - Adding asm subroutines for XTS
From: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo @ 2016-07-18 15:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Leonidas S. Barbosa, Herbert Xu, Paul Mackerras,
open list:IBM Power VMX Cryptographic instructions,
Paulo Flabiano Smorigo,
open list:LINUX FOR POWERPC 32-BIT AND 64-BIT, David S. Miller
This patch add XTS subroutines using VMX-crypto driver.
It gives a boost of 20 times using XTS.
These code has been adopted from OpenSSL project in collaboration
with the original author (Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>).
Signed-off-by: Leonidas S. Barbosa <leosilva@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <pfsmorigo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/vmx/aesp8-ppc.h | 4 +
drivers/crypto/vmx/aesp8-ppc.pl | 1865 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 1867 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/vmx/aesp8-ppc.h b/drivers/crypto/vmx/aesp8-ppc.h
index 4cd34ee..01972e1 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/vmx/aesp8-ppc.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/vmx/aesp8-ppc.h
@@ -19,3 +19,7 @@ void aes_p8_cbc_encrypt(const u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len,
void aes_p8_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const u8 *in, u8 *out,
size_t len, const struct aes_key *key,
const u8 *iv);
+void aes_p8_xts_encrypt(const u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len,
+ const struct aes_key *key1, const struct aes_key *key2, u8 *iv);
+void aes_p8_xts_decrypt(const u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len,
+ const struct aes_key *key1, const struct aes_key *key2, u8 *iv);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/vmx/aesp8-ppc.pl b/drivers/crypto/vmx/aesp8-ppc.pl
index 2280539..813ffcc 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/vmx/aesp8-ppc.pl
+++ b/drivers/crypto/vmx/aesp8-ppc.pl
@@ -1,4 +1,11 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env perl
+#! /usr/bin/env perl
+# Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+#
+# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+
#
# ====================================================================
# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
@@ -20,6 +27,19 @@
# instructions are interleaved. It's reckoned that eventual
# misalignment penalties at page boundaries are in average lower
# than additional overhead in pure AltiVec approach.
+#
+# May 2016
+#
+# Add XTS subroutine, 9x on little- and 12x improvement on big-endian
+# systems were measured.
+#
+######################################################################
+# Current large-block performance in cycles per byte processed with
+# 128-bit key (less is better).
+#
+# CBC en-/decrypt CTR XTS
+# POWER8[le] 3.96/0.72 0.74 1.1
+# POWER8[be] 3.75/0.65 0.66 1.0
$flavour = shift;
@@ -1875,6 +1895,1847 @@ Lctr32_enc8x_done:
___
}} }}}
+#########################################################################
+{{{ # XTS procedures #
+# int aes_p8_xts_[en|de]crypt(const char *inp, char *out, size_t len, #
+# const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2, #
+# [const] unsigned char iv[16]); #
+# If $key2 is NULL, then a "tweak chaining" mode is engaged, in which #
+# input tweak value is assumed to be encrypted already, and last tweak #
+# value, one suitable for consecutive call on same chunk of data, is #
+# written back to original buffer. In addition, in "tweak chaining" #
+# mode only complete input blocks are processed. #
+
+my ($inp,$out,$len,$key1,$key2,$ivp,$rounds,$idx) = map("r$_",(3..10));
+my ($rndkey0,$rndkey1,$inout) = map("v$_",(0..2));
+my ($output,$inptail,$inpperm,$leperm,$keyperm) = map("v$_",(3..7));
+my ($tweak,$seven,$eighty7,$tmp,$tweak1) = map("v$_",(8..12));
+my $taillen = $key2;
+
+ ($inp,$idx) = ($idx,$inp); # reassign
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.globl .${prefix}_xts_encrypt
+ mr $inp,r3 # reassign
+ li r3,-1
+ ${UCMP}i $len,16
+ bltlr-
+
+ lis r0,0xfff0
+ mfspr r12,256 # save vrsave
+ li r11,0
+ mtspr 256,r0
+
+ vspltisb $seven,0x07 # 0x070707..07
+ le?lvsl $leperm,r11,r11
+ le?vspltisb $tmp,0x0f
+ le?vxor $leperm,$leperm,$seven
+
+ li $idx,15
+ lvx $tweak,0,$ivp # load [unaligned] iv
+ lvsl $inpperm,0,$ivp
+ lvx $inptail,$idx,$ivp
+ le?vxor $inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp
+ vperm $tweak,$tweak,$inptail,$inpperm
+
+ neg r11,$inp
+ lvsr $inpperm,0,r11 # prepare for unaligned load
+ lvx $inout,0,$inp
+ addi $inp,$inp,15 # 15 is not typo
+ le?vxor $inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp
+
+ ${UCMP}i $key2,0 # key2==NULL?
+ beq Lxts_enc_no_key2
+
+ ?lvsl $keyperm,0,$key2 # prepare for unaligned key
+ lwz $rounds,240($key2)
+ srwi $rounds,$rounds,1
+ subi $rounds,$rounds,1
+ li $idx,16
+
+ lvx $rndkey0,0,$key2
+ lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key2
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+ ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key2
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+ mtctr $rounds
+
+Ltweak_xts_enc:
+ ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+ vcipher $tweak,$tweak,$rndkey1
+ lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key2
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+ ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+ vcipher $tweak,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key2
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+ bdnz Ltweak_xts_enc
+
+ ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+ vcipher $tweak,$tweak,$rndkey1
+ lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key2
+ ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+ vcipherlast $tweak,$tweak,$rndkey0
+
+ li $ivp,0 # don't chain the tweak
+ b Lxts_enc
+
+Lxts_enc_no_key2:
+ li $idx,-16
+ and $len,$len,$idx # in "tweak chaining"
+ # mode only complete
+ # blocks are processed
+Lxts_enc:
+ lvx $inptail,0,$inp
+ addi $inp,$inp,16
+
+ ?lvsl $keyperm,0,$key1 # prepare for unaligned key
+ lwz $rounds,240($key1)
+ srwi $rounds,$rounds,1
+ subi $rounds,$rounds,1
+ li $idx,16
+
+ vslb $eighty7,$seven,$seven # 0x808080..80
+ vor $eighty7,$eighty7,$seven # 0x878787..87
+ vspltisb $tmp,1 # 0x010101..01
+ vsldoi $eighty7,$eighty7,$tmp,15 # 0x870101..01
+
+ ${UCMP}i $len,96
+ bge _aesp8_xts_encrypt6x
+
+ andi. $taillen,$len,15
+ subic r0,$len,32
+ subi $taillen,$taillen,16
+ subfe r0,r0,r0
+ and r0,r0,$taillen
+ add $inp,$inp,r0
+
+ lvx $rndkey0,0,$key1
+ lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key1
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+ vperm $inout,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm
+ ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+ vxor $inout,$inout,$tweak
+ vxor $inout,$inout,$rndkey0
+ lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key1
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+ mtctr $rounds
+ b Loop_xts_enc
+
+.align 5
+Loop_xts_enc:
+ ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+ vcipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey1
+ lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key1
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+ ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+ vcipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey0
+ lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key1
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+ bdnz Loop_xts_enc
+
+ ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+ vcipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey1
+ lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key1
+ li $idx,16
+ ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+ vxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$tweak
+ vcipherlast $output,$inout,$rndkey0
+
+ le?vperm $tmp,$output,$output,$leperm
+ be?nop
+ le?stvx_u $tmp,0,$out
+ be?stvx_u $output,0,$out
+ addi $out,$out,16
+
+ subic. $len,$len,16
+ beq Lxts_enc_done
+
+ vmr $inout,$inptail
+ lvx $inptail,0,$inp
+ addi $inp,$inp,16
+ lvx $rndkey0,0,$key1
+ lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key1
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+
+ subic r0,$len,32
+ subfe r0,r0,r0
+ and r0,r0,$taillen
+ add $inp,$inp,r0
+
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+ vperm $inout,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm
+ ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+ vxor $inout,$inout,$tweak
+ vxor $output,$output,$rndkey0 # just in case $len<16
+ vxor $inout,$inout,$rndkey0
+ lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key1
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+
+ mtctr $rounds
+ ${UCMP}i $len,16
+ bge Loop_xts_enc
+
+ vxor $output,$output,$tweak
+ lvsr $inpperm,0,$len # $inpperm is no longer needed
+ vxor $inptail,$inptail,$inptail # $inptail is no longer needed
+ vspltisb $tmp,-1
+ vperm $inptail,$inptail,$tmp,$inpperm
+ vsel $inout,$inout,$output,$inptail
+
+ subi r11,$out,17
+ subi $out,$out,16
+ mtctr $len
+ li $len,16
+Loop_xts_enc_steal:
+ lbzu r0,1(r11)
+ stb r0,16(r11)
+ bdnz Loop_xts_enc_steal
+
+ mtctr $rounds
+ b Loop_xts_enc # one more time...
+
+Lxts_enc_done:
+ ${UCMP}i $ivp,0
+ beq Lxts_enc_ret
+
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+ le?vperm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak,$leperm
+ stvx_u $tweak,0,$ivp
+
+Lxts_enc_ret:
+ mtspr 256,r12 # restore vrsave
+ li r3,0
+ blr
+ .long 0
+ .byte 0,12,0x04,0,0x80,6,6,0
+ .long 0
+.size .${prefix}_xts_encrypt,.-.${prefix}_xts_encrypt
+
+.globl .${prefix}_xts_decrypt
+.align 5
+.${prefix}_xts_decrypt:
+ mr $inp,r3 # reassign
+ li r3,-1
+ ${UCMP}i $len,16
+ bltlr-
+
+ lis r0,0xfff8
+ mfspr r12,256 # save vrsave
+ li r11,0
+ mtspr 256,r0
+
+ andi. r0,$len,15
+ neg r0,r0
+ andi. r0,r0,16
+ sub $len,$len,r0
+
+ vspltisb $seven,0x07 # 0x070707..07
+ le?lvsl $leperm,r11,r11
+ le?vspltisb $tmp,0x0f
+ le?vxor $leperm,$leperm,$seven
+
+ li $idx,15
+ lvx $tweak,0,$ivp # load [unaligned] iv
+ lvsl $inpperm,0,$ivp
+ lvx $inptail,$idx,$ivp
+ le?vxor $inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp
+ vperm $tweak,$tweak,$inptail,$inpperm
+
+ neg r11,$inp
+ lvsr $inpperm,0,r11 # prepare for unaligned load
+ lvx $inout,0,$inp
+ addi $inp,$inp,15 # 15 is not typo
+ le?vxor $inpperm,$inpperm,$tmp
+
+ ${UCMP}i $key2,0 # key2==NULL?
+ beq Lxts_dec_no_key2
+
+ ?lvsl $keyperm,0,$key2 # prepare for unaligned key
+ lwz $rounds,240($key2)
+ srwi $rounds,$rounds,1
+ subi $rounds,$rounds,1
+ li $idx,16
+
+ lvx $rndkey0,0,$key2
+ lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key2
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+ ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key2
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+ mtctr $rounds
+
+Ltweak_xts_dec:
+ ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+ vcipher $tweak,$tweak,$rndkey1
+ lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key2
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+ ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+ vcipher $tweak,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key2
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+ bdnz Ltweak_xts_dec
+
+ ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+ vcipher $tweak,$tweak,$rndkey1
+ lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key2
+ ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+ vcipherlast $tweak,$tweak,$rndkey0
+
+ li $ivp,0 # don't chain the tweak
+ b Lxts_dec
+
+Lxts_dec_no_key2:
+ neg $idx,$len
+ andi. $idx,$idx,15
+ add $len,$len,$idx # in "tweak chaining"
+ # mode only complete
+ # blocks are processed
+Lxts_dec:
+ lvx $inptail,0,$inp
+ addi $inp,$inp,16
+
+ ?lvsl $keyperm,0,$key1 # prepare for unaligned key
+ lwz $rounds,240($key1)
+ srwi $rounds,$rounds,1
+ subi $rounds,$rounds,1
+ li $idx,16
+
+ vslb $eighty7,$seven,$seven # 0x808080..80
+ vor $eighty7,$eighty7,$seven # 0x878787..87
+ vspltisb $tmp,1 # 0x010101..01
+ vsldoi $eighty7,$eighty7,$tmp,15 # 0x870101..01
+
+ ${UCMP}i $len,96
+ bge _aesp8_xts_decrypt6x
+
+ lvx $rndkey0,0,$key1
+ lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key1
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+ vperm $inout,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm
+ ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+ vxor $inout,$inout,$tweak
+ vxor $inout,$inout,$rndkey0
+ lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key1
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+ mtctr $rounds
+
+ ${UCMP}i $len,16
+ blt Ltail_xts_dec
+ be?b Loop_xts_dec
+
+.align 5
+Loop_xts_dec:
+ ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+ vncipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey1
+ lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key1
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+ ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+ vncipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey0
+ lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key1
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+ bdnz Loop_xts_dec
+
+ ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+ vncipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey1
+ lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key1
+ li $idx,16
+ ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+ vxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$tweak
+ vncipherlast $output,$inout,$rndkey0
+
+ le?vperm $tmp,$output,$output,$leperm
+ be?nop
+ le?stvx_u $tmp,0,$out
+ be?stvx_u $output,0,$out
+ addi $out,$out,16
+
+ subic. $len,$len,16
+ beq Lxts_dec_done
+
+ vmr $inout,$inptail
+ lvx $inptail,0,$inp
+ addi $inp,$inp,16
+ lvx $rndkey0,0,$key1
+ lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key1
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+ vperm $inout,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm
+ ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+ vxor $inout,$inout,$tweak
+ vxor $inout,$inout,$rndkey0
+ lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key1
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+
+ mtctr $rounds
+ ${UCMP}i $len,16
+ bge Loop_xts_dec
+
+Ltail_xts_dec:
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vaddubm $tweak1,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vxor $tweak1,$tweak1,$tmp
+
+ subi $inp,$inp,16
+ add $inp,$inp,$len
+
+ vxor $inout,$inout,$tweak # :-(
+ vxor $inout,$inout,$tweak1 # :-)
+
+Loop_xts_dec_short:
+ ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+ vncipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey1
+ lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key1
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+ ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+ vncipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey0
+ lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key1
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+ bdnz Loop_xts_dec_short
+
+ ?vperm $rndkey1,$rndkey1,$rndkey0,$keyperm
+ vncipher $inout,$inout,$rndkey1
+ lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key1
+ li $idx,16
+ ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+ vxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$tweak1
+ vncipherlast $output,$inout,$rndkey0
+
+ le?vperm $tmp,$output,$output,$leperm
+ be?nop
+ le?stvx_u $tmp,0,$out
+ be?stvx_u $output,0,$out
+
+ vmr $inout,$inptail
+ lvx $inptail,0,$inp
+ #addi $inp,$inp,16
+ lvx $rndkey0,0,$key1
+ lvx $rndkey1,$idx,$key1
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+ vperm $inout,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm
+ ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$rndkey1,$keyperm
+
+ lvsr $inpperm,0,$len # $inpperm is no longer needed
+ vxor $inptail,$inptail,$inptail # $inptail is no longer needed
+ vspltisb $tmp,-1
+ vperm $inptail,$inptail,$tmp,$inpperm
+ vsel $inout,$inout,$output,$inptail
+
+ vxor $rndkey0,$rndkey0,$tweak
+ vxor $inout,$inout,$rndkey0
+ lvx $rndkey0,$idx,$key1
+ addi $idx,$idx,16
+
+ subi r11,$out,1
+ mtctr $len
+ li $len,16
+Loop_xts_dec_steal:
+ lbzu r0,1(r11)
+ stb r0,16(r11)
+ bdnz Loop_xts_dec_steal
+
+ mtctr $rounds
+ b Loop_xts_dec # one more time...
+
+Lxts_dec_done:
+ ${UCMP}i $ivp,0
+ beq Lxts_dec_ret
+
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+ le?vperm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak,$leperm
+ stvx_u $tweak,0,$ivp
+
+Lxts_dec_ret:
+ mtspr 256,r12 # restore vrsave
+ li r3,0
+ blr
+ .long 0
+ .byte 0,12,0x04,0,0x80,6,6,0
+ .long 0
+.size .${prefix}_xts_decrypt,.-.${prefix}_xts_decrypt
+___
+#########################################################################
+{{ # Optimized XTS procedures #
+my $key_=$key2;
+my ($x00,$x10,$x20,$x30,$x40,$x50,$x60,$x70)=map("r$_",(0,3,26..31));
+ $x00=0 if ($flavour =~ /osx/);
+my ($in0, $in1, $in2, $in3, $in4, $in5 )=map("v$_",(0..5));
+my ($out0, $out1, $out2, $out3, $out4, $out5)=map("v$_",(7,12..16));
+my ($twk0, $twk1, $twk2, $twk3, $twk4, $twk5)=map("v$_",(17..22));
+my $rndkey0="v23"; # v24-v25 rotating buffer for first found keys
+ # v26-v31 last 6 round keys
+my ($keyperm)=($out0); # aliases with "caller", redundant assignment
+my $taillen=$x70;
+
+$code.=<<___;
+.align 5
+_aesp8_xts_encrypt6x:
+ $STU $sp,-`($FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T)`($sp)
+ mflr r11
+ li r7,`$FRAME+8*16+15`
+ li r3,`$FRAME+8*16+31`
+ $PUSH r11,`$FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+ stvx v20,r7,$sp # ABI says so
+ addi r7,r7,32
+ stvx v21,r3,$sp
+ addi r3,r3,32
+ stvx v22,r7,$sp
+ addi r7,r7,32
+ stvx v23,r3,$sp
+ addi r3,r3,32
+ stvx v24,r7,$sp
+ addi r7,r7,32
+ stvx v25,r3,$sp
+ addi r3,r3,32
+ stvx v26,r7,$sp
+ addi r7,r7,32
+ stvx v27,r3,$sp
+ addi r3,r3,32
+ stvx v28,r7,$sp
+ addi r7,r7,32
+ stvx v29,r3,$sp
+ addi r3,r3,32
+ stvx v30,r7,$sp
+ stvx v31,r3,$sp
+ li r0,-1
+ stw $vrsave,`$FRAME+21*16-4`($sp) # save vrsave
+ li $x10,0x10
+ $PUSH r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ li $x20,0x20
+ $PUSH r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ li $x30,0x30
+ $PUSH r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ li $x40,0x40
+ $PUSH r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ li $x50,0x50
+ $PUSH r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ li $x60,0x60
+ $PUSH r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ li $x70,0x70
+ mtspr 256,r0
+
+ subi $rounds,$rounds,3 # -4 in total
+
+ lvx $rndkey0,$x00,$key1 # load key schedule
+ lvx v30,$x10,$key1
+ addi $key1,$key1,0x20
+ lvx v31,$x00,$key1
+ ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,v30,$keyperm
+ addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15
+ mtctr $rounds
+
+Load_xts_enc_key:
+ ?vperm v24,v30,v31,$keyperm
+ lvx v30,$x10,$key1
+ addi $key1,$key1,0x20
+ stvx v24,$x00,$key_ # off-load round[1]
+ ?vperm v25,v31,v30,$keyperm
+ lvx v31,$x00,$key1
+ stvx v25,$x10,$key_ # off-load round[2]
+ addi $key_,$key_,0x20
+ bdnz Load_xts_enc_key
+
+ lvx v26,$x10,$key1
+ ?vperm v24,v30,v31,$keyperm
+ lvx v27,$x20,$key1
+ stvx v24,$x00,$key_ # off-load round[3]
+ ?vperm v25,v31,v26,$keyperm
+ lvx v28,$x30,$key1
+ stvx v25,$x10,$key_ # off-load round[4]
+ addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_
+ ?vperm v26,v26,v27,$keyperm
+ lvx v29,$x40,$key1
+ ?vperm v27,v27,v28,$keyperm
+ lvx v30,$x50,$key1
+ ?vperm v28,v28,v29,$keyperm
+ lvx v31,$x60,$key1
+ ?vperm v29,v29,v30,$keyperm
+ lvx $twk5,$x70,$key1 # borrow $twk5
+ ?vperm v30,v30,v31,$keyperm
+ lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # pre-load round[1]
+ ?vperm v31,v31,$twk5,$keyperm
+ lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # pre-load round[2]
+
+ vperm $in0,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm
+ subi $inp,$inp,31 # undo "caller"
+ vxor $twk0,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vxor $out0,$in0,$twk0
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+ lvx_u $in1,$x10,$inp
+ vxor $twk1,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ le?vperm $in1,$in1,$in1,$leperm
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vxor $out1,$in1,$twk1
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+ lvx_u $in2,$x20,$inp
+ andi. $taillen,$len,15
+ vxor $twk2,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ le?vperm $in2,$in2,$in2,$leperm
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vxor $out2,$in2,$twk2
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+ lvx_u $in3,$x30,$inp
+ sub $len,$len,$taillen
+ vxor $twk3,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ le?vperm $in3,$in3,$in3,$leperm
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vxor $out3,$in3,$twk3
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+ lvx_u $in4,$x40,$inp
+ subi $len,$len,0x60
+ vxor $twk4,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ le?vperm $in4,$in4,$in4,$leperm
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vxor $out4,$in4,$twk4
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+ lvx_u $in5,$x50,$inp
+ addi $inp,$inp,0x60
+ vxor $twk5,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ le?vperm $in5,$in5,$in5,$leperm
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vxor $out5,$in5,$twk5
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+ vxor v31,v31,$rndkey0
+ mtctr $rounds
+ b Loop_xts_enc6x
+
+.align 5
+Loop_xts_enc6x:
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v24
+ vcipher $out1,$out1,v24
+ vcipher $out2,$out2,v24
+ vcipher $out3,$out3,v24
+ vcipher $out4,$out4,v24
+ vcipher $out5,$out5,v24
+ lvx v24,$x20,$key_ # round[3]
+ addi $key_,$key_,0x20
+
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v25
+ vcipher $out1,$out1,v25
+ vcipher $out2,$out2,v25
+ vcipher $out3,$out3,v25
+ vcipher $out4,$out4,v25
+ vcipher $out5,$out5,v25
+ lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # round[4]
+ bdnz Loop_xts_enc6x
+
+ subic $len,$len,96 # $len-=96
+ vxor $in0,$twk0,v31 # xor with last round key
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v24
+ vcipher $out1,$out1,v24
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vxor $twk0,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vcipher $out2,$out2,v24
+ vcipher $out3,$out3,v24
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ vcipher $out4,$out4,v24
+ vcipher $out5,$out5,v24
+
+ subfe. r0,r0,r0 # borrow?-1:0
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v25
+ vcipher $out1,$out1,v25
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ vcipher $out2,$out2,v25
+ vcipher $out3,$out3,v25
+ vxor $in1,$twk1,v31
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vxor $twk1,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ vcipher $out4,$out4,v25
+ vcipher $out5,$out5,v25
+
+ and r0,r0,$len
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v26
+ vcipher $out1,$out1,v26
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vcipher $out2,$out2,v26
+ vcipher $out3,$out3,v26
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ vcipher $out4,$out4,v26
+ vcipher $out5,$out5,v26
+
+ add $inp,$inp,r0 # $inp is adjusted in such
+ # way that at exit from the
+ # loop inX-in5 are loaded
+ # with last "words"
+ vxor $in2,$twk2,v31
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vxor $twk2,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v27
+ vcipher $out1,$out1,v27
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ vcipher $out2,$out2,v27
+ vcipher $out3,$out3,v27
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vcipher $out4,$out4,v27
+ vcipher $out5,$out5,v27
+
+ addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v28
+ vcipher $out1,$out1,v28
+ vxor $in3,$twk3,v31
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vxor $twk3,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ vcipher $out2,$out2,v28
+ vcipher $out3,$out3,v28
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ vcipher $out4,$out4,v28
+ vcipher $out5,$out5,v28
+ lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # re-pre-load round[1]
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v29
+ vcipher $out1,$out1,v29
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ vcipher $out2,$out2,v29
+ vcipher $out3,$out3,v29
+ vxor $in4,$twk4,v31
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vxor $twk4,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ vcipher $out4,$out4,v29
+ vcipher $out5,$out5,v29
+ lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # re-pre-load round[2]
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v30
+ vcipher $out1,$out1,v30
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vcipher $out2,$out2,v30
+ vcipher $out3,$out3,v30
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ vcipher $out4,$out4,v30
+ vcipher $out5,$out5,v30
+ vxor $in5,$twk5,v31
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vxor $twk5,$tweak,$rndkey0
+
+ vcipherlast $out0,$out0,$in0
+ lvx_u $in0,$x00,$inp # load next input block
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ vcipherlast $out1,$out1,$in1
+ lvx_u $in1,$x10,$inp
+ vcipherlast $out2,$out2,$in2
+ le?vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm
+ lvx_u $in2,$x20,$inp
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vcipherlast $out3,$out3,$in3
+ le?vperm $in1,$in1,$in1,$leperm
+ lvx_u $in3,$x30,$inp
+ vcipherlast $out4,$out4,$in4
+ le?vperm $in2,$in2,$in2,$leperm
+ lvx_u $in4,$x40,$inp
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ vcipherlast $tmp,$out5,$in5 # last block might be needed
+ # in stealing mode
+ le?vperm $in3,$in3,$in3,$leperm
+ lvx_u $in5,$x50,$inp
+ addi $inp,$inp,0x60
+ le?vperm $in4,$in4,$in4,$leperm
+ le?vperm $in5,$in5,$in5,$leperm
+
+ le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+ le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output
+ vxor $out0,$in0,$twk0
+ le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out
+ vxor $out1,$in1,$twk1
+ le?vperm $out3,$out3,$out3,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out
+ vxor $out2,$in2,$twk2
+ le?vperm $out4,$out4,$out4,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out3,$x30,$out
+ vxor $out3,$in3,$twk3
+ le?vperm $out5,$tmp,$tmp,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out4,$x40,$out
+ vxor $out4,$in4,$twk4
+ le?stvx_u $out5,$x50,$out
+ be?stvx_u $tmp, $x50,$out
+ vxor $out5,$in5,$twk5
+ addi $out,$out,0x60
+
+ mtctr $rounds
+ beq Loop_xts_enc6x # did $len-=96 borrow?
+
+ addic. $len,$len,0x60
+ beq Lxts_enc6x_zero
+ cmpwi $len,0x20
+ blt Lxts_enc6x_one
+ nop
+ beq Lxts_enc6x_two
+ cmpwi $len,0x40
+ blt Lxts_enc6x_three
+ nop
+ beq Lxts_enc6x_four
+
+Lxts_enc6x_five:
+ vxor $out0,$in1,$twk0
+ vxor $out1,$in2,$twk1
+ vxor $out2,$in3,$twk2
+ vxor $out3,$in4,$twk3
+ vxor $out4,$in5,$twk4
+
+ bl _aesp8_xts_enc5x
+
+ le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+ vmr $twk0,$twk5 # unused tweak
+ le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output
+ le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out
+ le?vperm $out3,$out3,$out3,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out
+ vxor $tmp,$out4,$twk5 # last block prep for stealing
+ le?vperm $out4,$out4,$out4,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out3,$x30,$out
+ stvx_u $out4,$x40,$out
+ addi $out,$out,0x50
+ bne Lxts_enc6x_steal
+ b Lxts_enc6x_done
+
+.align 4
+Lxts_enc6x_four:
+ vxor $out0,$in2,$twk0
+ vxor $out1,$in3,$twk1
+ vxor $out2,$in4,$twk2
+ vxor $out3,$in5,$twk3
+ vxor $out4,$out4,$out4
+
+ bl _aesp8_xts_enc5x
+
+ le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+ vmr $twk0,$twk4 # unused tweak
+ le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output
+ le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out
+ vxor $tmp,$out3,$twk4 # last block prep for stealing
+ le?vperm $out3,$out3,$out3,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out
+ stvx_u $out3,$x30,$out
+ addi $out,$out,0x40
+ bne Lxts_enc6x_steal
+ b Lxts_enc6x_done
+
+.align 4
+Lxts_enc6x_three:
+ vxor $out0,$in3,$twk0
+ vxor $out1,$in4,$twk1
+ vxor $out2,$in5,$twk2
+ vxor $out3,$out3,$out3
+ vxor $out4,$out4,$out4
+
+ bl _aesp8_xts_enc5x
+
+ le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+ vmr $twk0,$twk3 # unused tweak
+ le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output
+ vxor $tmp,$out2,$twk3 # last block prep for stealing
+ le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out
+ stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out
+ addi $out,$out,0x30
+ bne Lxts_enc6x_steal
+ b Lxts_enc6x_done
+
+.align 4
+Lxts_enc6x_two:
+ vxor $out0,$in4,$twk0
+ vxor $out1,$in5,$twk1
+ vxor $out2,$out2,$out2
+ vxor $out3,$out3,$out3
+ vxor $out4,$out4,$out4
+
+ bl _aesp8_xts_enc5x
+
+ le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+ vmr $twk0,$twk2 # unused tweak
+ vxor $tmp,$out1,$twk2 # last block prep for stealing
+ le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output
+ stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out
+ addi $out,$out,0x20
+ bne Lxts_enc6x_steal
+ b Lxts_enc6x_done
+
+.align 4
+Lxts_enc6x_one:
+ vxor $out0,$in5,$twk0
+ nop
+Loop_xts_enc1x:
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v24
+ lvx v24,$x20,$key_ # round[3]
+ addi $key_,$key_,0x20
+
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v25
+ lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # round[4]
+ bdnz Loop_xts_enc1x
+
+ add $inp,$inp,$taillen
+ cmpwi $taillen,0
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v24
+
+ subi $inp,$inp,16
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v25
+
+ lvsr $inpperm,0,$taillen
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v26
+
+ lvx_u $in0,0,$inp
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v27
+
+ addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v28
+ lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # re-pre-load round[1]
+
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v29
+ lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # re-pre-load round[2]
+ vxor $twk0,$twk0,v31
+
+ le?vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v30
+
+ vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$inpperm
+ vcipherlast $out0,$out0,$twk0
+
+ vmr $twk0,$twk1 # unused tweak
+ vxor $tmp,$out0,$twk1 # last block prep for stealing
+ le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output
+ addi $out,$out,0x10
+ bne Lxts_enc6x_steal
+ b Lxts_enc6x_done
+
+.align 4
+Lxts_enc6x_zero:
+ cmpwi $taillen,0
+ beq Lxts_enc6x_done
+
+ add $inp,$inp,$taillen
+ subi $inp,$inp,16
+ lvx_u $in0,0,$inp
+ lvsr $inpperm,0,$taillen # $in5 is no more
+ le?vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm
+ vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$inpperm
+ vxor $tmp,$tmp,$twk0
+Lxts_enc6x_steal:
+ vxor $in0,$in0,$twk0
+ vxor $out0,$out0,$out0
+ vspltisb $out1,-1
+ vperm $out0,$out0,$out1,$inpperm
+ vsel $out0,$in0,$tmp,$out0 # $tmp is last block, remember?
+
+ subi r30,$out,17
+ subi $out,$out,16
+ mtctr $taillen
+Loop_xts_enc6x_steal:
+ lbzu r0,1(r30)
+ stb r0,16(r30)
+ bdnz Loop_xts_enc6x_steal
+
+ li $taillen,0
+ mtctr $rounds
+ b Loop_xts_enc1x # one more time...
+
+.align 4
+Lxts_enc6x_done:
+ ${UCMP}i $ivp,0
+ beq Lxts_enc6x_ret
+
+ vxor $tweak,$twk0,$rndkey0
+ le?vperm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak,$leperm
+ stvx_u $tweak,0,$ivp
+
+Lxts_enc6x_ret:
+ mtlr r11
+ li r10,`$FRAME+15`
+ li r11,`$FRAME+31`
+ stvx $seven,r10,$sp # wipe copies of round keys
+ addi r10,r10,32
+ stvx $seven,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
+ stvx $seven,r10,$sp
+ addi r10,r10,32
+ stvx $seven,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
+ stvx $seven,r10,$sp
+ addi r10,r10,32
+ stvx $seven,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
+ stvx $seven,r10,$sp
+ addi r10,r10,32
+ stvx $seven,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
+
+ mtspr 256,$vrsave
+ lvx v20,r10,$sp # ABI says so
+ addi r10,r10,32
+ lvx v21,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
+ lvx v22,r10,$sp
+ addi r10,r10,32
+ lvx v23,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
+ lvx v24,r10,$sp
+ addi r10,r10,32
+ lvx v25,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
+ lvx v26,r10,$sp
+ addi r10,r10,32
+ lvx v27,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
+ lvx v28,r10,$sp
+ addi r10,r10,32
+ lvx v29,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
+ lvx v30,r10,$sp
+ lvx v31,r11,$sp
+ $POP r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ $POP r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ $POP r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ $POP r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ $POP r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ $POP r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ addi $sp,$sp,`$FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T`
+ blr
+ .long 0
+ .byte 0,12,0x04,1,0x80,6,6,0
+ .long 0
+
+.align 5
+_aesp8_xts_enc5x:
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v24
+ vcipher $out1,$out1,v24
+ vcipher $out2,$out2,v24
+ vcipher $out3,$out3,v24
+ vcipher $out4,$out4,v24
+ lvx v24,$x20,$key_ # round[3]
+ addi $key_,$key_,0x20
+
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v25
+ vcipher $out1,$out1,v25
+ vcipher $out2,$out2,v25
+ vcipher $out3,$out3,v25
+ vcipher $out4,$out4,v25
+ lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # round[4]
+ bdnz _aesp8_xts_enc5x
+
+ add $inp,$inp,$taillen
+ cmpwi $taillen,0
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v24
+ vcipher $out1,$out1,v24
+ vcipher $out2,$out2,v24
+ vcipher $out3,$out3,v24
+ vcipher $out4,$out4,v24
+
+ subi $inp,$inp,16
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v25
+ vcipher $out1,$out1,v25
+ vcipher $out2,$out2,v25
+ vcipher $out3,$out3,v25
+ vcipher $out4,$out4,v25
+ vxor $twk0,$twk0,v31
+
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v26
+ lvsr $inpperm,r0,$taillen # $in5 is no more
+ vcipher $out1,$out1,v26
+ vcipher $out2,$out2,v26
+ vcipher $out3,$out3,v26
+ vcipher $out4,$out4,v26
+ vxor $in1,$twk1,v31
+
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v27
+ lvx_u $in0,0,$inp
+ vcipher $out1,$out1,v27
+ vcipher $out2,$out2,v27
+ vcipher $out3,$out3,v27
+ vcipher $out4,$out4,v27
+ vxor $in2,$twk2,v31
+
+ addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v28
+ vcipher $out1,$out1,v28
+ vcipher $out2,$out2,v28
+ vcipher $out3,$out3,v28
+ vcipher $out4,$out4,v28
+ lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # re-pre-load round[1]
+ vxor $in3,$twk3,v31
+
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v29
+ le?vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm
+ vcipher $out1,$out1,v29
+ vcipher $out2,$out2,v29
+ vcipher $out3,$out3,v29
+ vcipher $out4,$out4,v29
+ lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # re-pre-load round[2]
+ vxor $in4,$twk4,v31
+
+ vcipher $out0,$out0,v30
+ vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$inpperm
+ vcipher $out1,$out1,v30
+ vcipher $out2,$out2,v30
+ vcipher $out3,$out3,v30
+ vcipher $out4,$out4,v30
+
+ vcipherlast $out0,$out0,$twk0
+ vcipherlast $out1,$out1,$in1
+ vcipherlast $out2,$out2,$in2
+ vcipherlast $out3,$out3,$in3
+ vcipherlast $out4,$out4,$in4
+ blr
+ .long 0
+ .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+
+.align 5
+_aesp8_xts_decrypt6x:
+ $STU $sp,-`($FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T)`($sp)
+ mflr r11
+ li r7,`$FRAME+8*16+15`
+ li r3,`$FRAME+8*16+31`
+ $PUSH r11,`$FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T+$LRSAVE`($sp)
+ stvx v20,r7,$sp # ABI says so
+ addi r7,r7,32
+ stvx v21,r3,$sp
+ addi r3,r3,32
+ stvx v22,r7,$sp
+ addi r7,r7,32
+ stvx v23,r3,$sp
+ addi r3,r3,32
+ stvx v24,r7,$sp
+ addi r7,r7,32
+ stvx v25,r3,$sp
+ addi r3,r3,32
+ stvx v26,r7,$sp
+ addi r7,r7,32
+ stvx v27,r3,$sp
+ addi r3,r3,32
+ stvx v28,r7,$sp
+ addi r7,r7,32
+ stvx v29,r3,$sp
+ addi r3,r3,32
+ stvx v30,r7,$sp
+ stvx v31,r3,$sp
+ li r0,-1
+ stw $vrsave,`$FRAME+21*16-4`($sp) # save vrsave
+ li $x10,0x10
+ $PUSH r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ li $x20,0x20
+ $PUSH r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ li $x30,0x30
+ $PUSH r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ li $x40,0x40
+ $PUSH r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ li $x50,0x50
+ $PUSH r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ li $x60,0x60
+ $PUSH r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ li $x70,0x70
+ mtspr 256,r0
+
+ subi $rounds,$rounds,3 # -4 in total
+
+ lvx $rndkey0,$x00,$key1 # load key schedule
+ lvx v30,$x10,$key1
+ addi $key1,$key1,0x20
+ lvx v31,$x00,$key1
+ ?vperm $rndkey0,$rndkey0,v30,$keyperm
+ addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15
+ mtctr $rounds
+
+Load_xts_dec_key:
+ ?vperm v24,v30,v31,$keyperm
+ lvx v30,$x10,$key1
+ addi $key1,$key1,0x20
+ stvx v24,$x00,$key_ # off-load round[1]
+ ?vperm v25,v31,v30,$keyperm
+ lvx v31,$x00,$key1
+ stvx v25,$x10,$key_ # off-load round[2]
+ addi $key_,$key_,0x20
+ bdnz Load_xts_dec_key
+
+ lvx v26,$x10,$key1
+ ?vperm v24,v30,v31,$keyperm
+ lvx v27,$x20,$key1
+ stvx v24,$x00,$key_ # off-load round[3]
+ ?vperm v25,v31,v26,$keyperm
+ lvx v28,$x30,$key1
+ stvx v25,$x10,$key_ # off-load round[4]
+ addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_
+ ?vperm v26,v26,v27,$keyperm
+ lvx v29,$x40,$key1
+ ?vperm v27,v27,v28,$keyperm
+ lvx v30,$x50,$key1
+ ?vperm v28,v28,v29,$keyperm
+ lvx v31,$x60,$key1
+ ?vperm v29,v29,v30,$keyperm
+ lvx $twk5,$x70,$key1 # borrow $twk5
+ ?vperm v30,v30,v31,$keyperm
+ lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # pre-load round[1]
+ ?vperm v31,v31,$twk5,$keyperm
+ lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # pre-load round[2]
+
+ vperm $in0,$inout,$inptail,$inpperm
+ subi $inp,$inp,31 # undo "caller"
+ vxor $twk0,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vxor $out0,$in0,$twk0
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+ lvx_u $in1,$x10,$inp
+ vxor $twk1,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ le?vperm $in1,$in1,$in1,$leperm
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vxor $out1,$in1,$twk1
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+ lvx_u $in2,$x20,$inp
+ andi. $taillen,$len,15
+ vxor $twk2,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ le?vperm $in2,$in2,$in2,$leperm
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vxor $out2,$in2,$twk2
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+ lvx_u $in3,$x30,$inp
+ sub $len,$len,$taillen
+ vxor $twk3,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ le?vperm $in3,$in3,$in3,$leperm
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vxor $out3,$in3,$twk3
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+ lvx_u $in4,$x40,$inp
+ subi $len,$len,0x60
+ vxor $twk4,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ le?vperm $in4,$in4,$in4,$leperm
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vxor $out4,$in4,$twk4
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+ lvx_u $in5,$x50,$inp
+ addi $inp,$inp,0x60
+ vxor $twk5,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ le?vperm $in5,$in5,$in5,$leperm
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vxor $out5,$in5,$twk5
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+
+ vxor v31,v31,$rndkey0
+ mtctr $rounds
+ b Loop_xts_dec6x
+
+.align 5
+Loop_xts_dec6x:
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v24
+ vncipher $out1,$out1,v24
+ vncipher $out2,$out2,v24
+ vncipher $out3,$out3,v24
+ vncipher $out4,$out4,v24
+ vncipher $out5,$out5,v24
+ lvx v24,$x20,$key_ # round[3]
+ addi $key_,$key_,0x20
+
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v25
+ vncipher $out1,$out1,v25
+ vncipher $out2,$out2,v25
+ vncipher $out3,$out3,v25
+ vncipher $out4,$out4,v25
+ vncipher $out5,$out5,v25
+ lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # round[4]
+ bdnz Loop_xts_dec6x
+
+ subic $len,$len,96 # $len-=96
+ vxor $in0,$twk0,v31 # xor with last round key
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v24
+ vncipher $out1,$out1,v24
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vxor $twk0,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vncipher $out2,$out2,v24
+ vncipher $out3,$out3,v24
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ vncipher $out4,$out4,v24
+ vncipher $out5,$out5,v24
+
+ subfe. r0,r0,r0 # borrow?-1:0
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v25
+ vncipher $out1,$out1,v25
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ vncipher $out2,$out2,v25
+ vncipher $out3,$out3,v25
+ vxor $in1,$twk1,v31
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vxor $twk1,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ vncipher $out4,$out4,v25
+ vncipher $out5,$out5,v25
+
+ and r0,r0,$len
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v26
+ vncipher $out1,$out1,v26
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vncipher $out2,$out2,v26
+ vncipher $out3,$out3,v26
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ vncipher $out4,$out4,v26
+ vncipher $out5,$out5,v26
+
+ add $inp,$inp,r0 # $inp is adjusted in such
+ # way that at exit from the
+ # loop inX-in5 are loaded
+ # with last "words"
+ vxor $in2,$twk2,v31
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vxor $twk2,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v27
+ vncipher $out1,$out1,v27
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ vncipher $out2,$out2,v27
+ vncipher $out3,$out3,v27
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vncipher $out4,$out4,v27
+ vncipher $out5,$out5,v27
+
+ addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v28
+ vncipher $out1,$out1,v28
+ vxor $in3,$twk3,v31
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vxor $twk3,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ vncipher $out2,$out2,v28
+ vncipher $out3,$out3,v28
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ vncipher $out4,$out4,v28
+ vncipher $out5,$out5,v28
+ lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # re-pre-load round[1]
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v29
+ vncipher $out1,$out1,v29
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ vncipher $out2,$out2,v29
+ vncipher $out3,$out3,v29
+ vxor $in4,$twk4,v31
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vxor $twk4,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ vncipher $out4,$out4,v29
+ vncipher $out5,$out5,v29
+ lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # re-pre-load round[2]
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v30
+ vncipher $out1,$out1,v30
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vncipher $out2,$out2,v30
+ vncipher $out3,$out3,v30
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ vncipher $out4,$out4,v30
+ vncipher $out5,$out5,v30
+ vxor $in5,$twk5,v31
+ vsrab $tmp,$tweak,$seven # next tweak value
+ vxor $twk5,$tweak,$rndkey0
+
+ vncipherlast $out0,$out0,$in0
+ lvx_u $in0,$x00,$inp # load next input block
+ vaddubm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak
+ vsldoi $tmp,$tmp,$tmp,15
+ vncipherlast $out1,$out1,$in1
+ lvx_u $in1,$x10,$inp
+ vncipherlast $out2,$out2,$in2
+ le?vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm
+ lvx_u $in2,$x20,$inp
+ vand $tmp,$tmp,$eighty7
+ vncipherlast $out3,$out3,$in3
+ le?vperm $in1,$in1,$in1,$leperm
+ lvx_u $in3,$x30,$inp
+ vncipherlast $out4,$out4,$in4
+ le?vperm $in2,$in2,$in2,$leperm
+ lvx_u $in4,$x40,$inp
+ vxor $tweak,$tweak,$tmp
+ vncipherlast $out5,$out5,$in5
+ le?vperm $in3,$in3,$in3,$leperm
+ lvx_u $in5,$x50,$inp
+ addi $inp,$inp,0x60
+ le?vperm $in4,$in4,$in4,$leperm
+ le?vperm $in5,$in5,$in5,$leperm
+
+ le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+ le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output
+ vxor $out0,$in0,$twk0
+ le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out
+ vxor $out1,$in1,$twk1
+ le?vperm $out3,$out3,$out3,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out
+ vxor $out2,$in2,$twk2
+ le?vperm $out4,$out4,$out4,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out3,$x30,$out
+ vxor $out3,$in3,$twk3
+ le?vperm $out5,$out5,$out5,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out4,$x40,$out
+ vxor $out4,$in4,$twk4
+ stvx_u $out5,$x50,$out
+ vxor $out5,$in5,$twk5
+ addi $out,$out,0x60
+
+ mtctr $rounds
+ beq Loop_xts_dec6x # did $len-=96 borrow?
+
+ addic. $len,$len,0x60
+ beq Lxts_dec6x_zero
+ cmpwi $len,0x20
+ blt Lxts_dec6x_one
+ nop
+ beq Lxts_dec6x_two
+ cmpwi $len,0x40
+ blt Lxts_dec6x_three
+ nop
+ beq Lxts_dec6x_four
+
+Lxts_dec6x_five:
+ vxor $out0,$in1,$twk0
+ vxor $out1,$in2,$twk1
+ vxor $out2,$in3,$twk2
+ vxor $out3,$in4,$twk3
+ vxor $out4,$in5,$twk4
+
+ bl _aesp8_xts_dec5x
+
+ le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+ vmr $twk0,$twk5 # unused tweak
+ vxor $twk1,$tweak,$rndkey0
+ le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output
+ vxor $out0,$in0,$twk1
+ le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out
+ le?vperm $out3,$out3,$out3,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out
+ le?vperm $out4,$out4,$out4,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out3,$x30,$out
+ stvx_u $out4,$x40,$out
+ addi $out,$out,0x50
+ bne Lxts_dec6x_steal
+ b Lxts_dec6x_done
+
+.align 4
+Lxts_dec6x_four:
+ vxor $out0,$in2,$twk0
+ vxor $out1,$in3,$twk1
+ vxor $out2,$in4,$twk2
+ vxor $out3,$in5,$twk3
+ vxor $out4,$out4,$out4
+
+ bl _aesp8_xts_dec5x
+
+ le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+ vmr $twk0,$twk4 # unused tweak
+ vmr $twk1,$twk5
+ le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output
+ vxor $out0,$in0,$twk5
+ le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out
+ le?vperm $out3,$out3,$out3,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out
+ stvx_u $out3,$x30,$out
+ addi $out,$out,0x40
+ bne Lxts_dec6x_steal
+ b Lxts_dec6x_done
+
+.align 4
+Lxts_dec6x_three:
+ vxor $out0,$in3,$twk0
+ vxor $out1,$in4,$twk1
+ vxor $out2,$in5,$twk2
+ vxor $out3,$out3,$out3
+ vxor $out4,$out4,$out4
+
+ bl _aesp8_xts_dec5x
+
+ le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+ vmr $twk0,$twk3 # unused tweak
+ vmr $twk1,$twk4
+ le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output
+ vxor $out0,$in0,$twk4
+ le?vperm $out2,$out2,$out2,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out
+ stvx_u $out2,$x20,$out
+ addi $out,$out,0x30
+ bne Lxts_dec6x_steal
+ b Lxts_dec6x_done
+
+.align 4
+Lxts_dec6x_two:
+ vxor $out0,$in4,$twk0
+ vxor $out1,$in5,$twk1
+ vxor $out2,$out2,$out2
+ vxor $out3,$out3,$out3
+ vxor $out4,$out4,$out4
+
+ bl _aesp8_xts_dec5x
+
+ le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+ vmr $twk0,$twk2 # unused tweak
+ vmr $twk1,$twk3
+ le?vperm $out1,$out1,$out1,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output
+ vxor $out0,$in0,$twk3
+ stvx_u $out1,$x10,$out
+ addi $out,$out,0x20
+ bne Lxts_dec6x_steal
+ b Lxts_dec6x_done
+
+.align 4
+Lxts_dec6x_one:
+ vxor $out0,$in5,$twk0
+ nop
+Loop_xts_dec1x:
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v24
+ lvx v24,$x20,$key_ # round[3]
+ addi $key_,$key_,0x20
+
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v25
+ lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # round[4]
+ bdnz Loop_xts_dec1x
+
+ subi r0,$taillen,1
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v24
+
+ andi. r0,r0,16
+ cmpwi $taillen,0
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v25
+
+ sub $inp,$inp,r0
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v26
+
+ lvx_u $in0,0,$inp
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v27
+
+ addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v28
+ lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # re-pre-load round[1]
+
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v29
+ lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # re-pre-load round[2]
+ vxor $twk0,$twk0,v31
+
+ le?vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v30
+
+ mtctr $rounds
+ vncipherlast $out0,$out0,$twk0
+
+ vmr $twk0,$twk1 # unused tweak
+ vmr $twk1,$twk2
+ le?vperm $out0,$out0,$out0,$leperm
+ stvx_u $out0,$x00,$out # store output
+ addi $out,$out,0x10
+ vxor $out0,$in0,$twk2
+ bne Lxts_dec6x_steal
+ b Lxts_dec6x_done
+
+.align 4
+Lxts_dec6x_zero:
+ cmpwi $taillen,0
+ beq Lxts_dec6x_done
+
+ lvx_u $in0,0,$inp
+ le?vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm
+ vxor $out0,$in0,$twk1
+Lxts_dec6x_steal:
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v24
+ lvx v24,$x20,$key_ # round[3]
+ addi $key_,$key_,0x20
+
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v25
+ lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # round[4]
+ bdnz Lxts_dec6x_steal
+
+ add $inp,$inp,$taillen
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v24
+
+ cmpwi $taillen,0
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v25
+
+ lvx_u $in0,0,$inp
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v26
+
+ lvsr $inpperm,0,$taillen # $in5 is no more
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v27
+
+ addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v28
+ lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # re-pre-load round[1]
+
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v29
+ lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # re-pre-load round[2]
+ vxor $twk1,$twk1,v31
+
+ le?vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v30
+
+ vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$inpperm
+ vncipherlast $tmp,$out0,$twk1
+
+ le?vperm $out0,$tmp,$tmp,$leperm
+ le?stvx_u $out0,0,$out
+ be?stvx_u $tmp,0,$out
+
+ vxor $out0,$out0,$out0
+ vspltisb $out1,-1
+ vperm $out0,$out0,$out1,$inpperm
+ vsel $out0,$in0,$tmp,$out0
+ vxor $out0,$out0,$twk0
+
+ subi r30,$out,1
+ mtctr $taillen
+Loop_xts_dec6x_steal:
+ lbzu r0,1(r30)
+ stb r0,16(r30)
+ bdnz Loop_xts_dec6x_steal
+
+ li $taillen,0
+ mtctr $rounds
+ b Loop_xts_dec1x # one more time...
+
+.align 4
+Lxts_dec6x_done:
+ ${UCMP}i $ivp,0
+ beq Lxts_dec6x_ret
+
+ vxor $tweak,$twk0,$rndkey0
+ le?vperm $tweak,$tweak,$tweak,$leperm
+ stvx_u $tweak,0,$ivp
+
+Lxts_dec6x_ret:
+ mtlr r11
+ li r10,`$FRAME+15`
+ li r11,`$FRAME+31`
+ stvx $seven,r10,$sp # wipe copies of round keys
+ addi r10,r10,32
+ stvx $seven,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
+ stvx $seven,r10,$sp
+ addi r10,r10,32
+ stvx $seven,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
+ stvx $seven,r10,$sp
+ addi r10,r10,32
+ stvx $seven,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
+ stvx $seven,r10,$sp
+ addi r10,r10,32
+ stvx $seven,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
+
+ mtspr 256,$vrsave
+ lvx v20,r10,$sp # ABI says so
+ addi r10,r10,32
+ lvx v21,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
+ lvx v22,r10,$sp
+ addi r10,r10,32
+ lvx v23,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
+ lvx v24,r10,$sp
+ addi r10,r10,32
+ lvx v25,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
+ lvx v26,r10,$sp
+ addi r10,r10,32
+ lvx v27,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
+ lvx v28,r10,$sp
+ addi r10,r10,32
+ lvx v29,r11,$sp
+ addi r11,r11,32
+ lvx v30,r10,$sp
+ lvx v31,r11,$sp
+ $POP r26,`$FRAME+21*16+0*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ $POP r27,`$FRAME+21*16+1*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ $POP r28,`$FRAME+21*16+2*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ $POP r29,`$FRAME+21*16+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ $POP r30,`$FRAME+21*16+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ $POP r31,`$FRAME+21*16+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
+ addi $sp,$sp,`$FRAME+21*16+6*$SIZE_T`
+ blr
+ .long 0
+ .byte 0,12,0x04,1,0x80,6,6,0
+ .long 0
+
+.align 5
+_aesp8_xts_dec5x:
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v24
+ vncipher $out1,$out1,v24
+ vncipher $out2,$out2,v24
+ vncipher $out3,$out3,v24
+ vncipher $out4,$out4,v24
+ lvx v24,$x20,$key_ # round[3]
+ addi $key_,$key_,0x20
+
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v25
+ vncipher $out1,$out1,v25
+ vncipher $out2,$out2,v25
+ vncipher $out3,$out3,v25
+ vncipher $out4,$out4,v25
+ lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # round[4]
+ bdnz _aesp8_xts_dec5x
+
+ subi r0,$taillen,1
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v24
+ vncipher $out1,$out1,v24
+ vncipher $out2,$out2,v24
+ vncipher $out3,$out3,v24
+ vncipher $out4,$out4,v24
+
+ andi. r0,r0,16
+ cmpwi $taillen,0
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v25
+ vncipher $out1,$out1,v25
+ vncipher $out2,$out2,v25
+ vncipher $out3,$out3,v25
+ vncipher $out4,$out4,v25
+ vxor $twk0,$twk0,v31
+
+ sub $inp,$inp,r0
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v26
+ vncipher $out1,$out1,v26
+ vncipher $out2,$out2,v26
+ vncipher $out3,$out3,v26
+ vncipher $out4,$out4,v26
+ vxor $in1,$twk1,v31
+
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v27
+ lvx_u $in0,0,$inp
+ vncipher $out1,$out1,v27
+ vncipher $out2,$out2,v27
+ vncipher $out3,$out3,v27
+ vncipher $out4,$out4,v27
+ vxor $in2,$twk2,v31
+
+ addi $key_,$sp,$FRAME+15 # rewind $key_
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v28
+ vncipher $out1,$out1,v28
+ vncipher $out2,$out2,v28
+ vncipher $out3,$out3,v28
+ vncipher $out4,$out4,v28
+ lvx v24,$x00,$key_ # re-pre-load round[1]
+ vxor $in3,$twk3,v31
+
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v29
+ le?vperm $in0,$in0,$in0,$leperm
+ vncipher $out1,$out1,v29
+ vncipher $out2,$out2,v29
+ vncipher $out3,$out3,v29
+ vncipher $out4,$out4,v29
+ lvx v25,$x10,$key_ # re-pre-load round[2]
+ vxor $in4,$twk4,v31
+
+ vncipher $out0,$out0,v30
+ vncipher $out1,$out1,v30
+ vncipher $out2,$out2,v30
+ vncipher $out3,$out3,v30
+ vncipher $out4,$out4,v30
+
+ vncipherlast $out0,$out0,$twk0
+ vncipherlast $out1,$out1,$in1
+ vncipherlast $out2,$out2,$in2
+ vncipherlast $out3,$out3,$in3
+ vncipherlast $out4,$out4,$in4
+ mtctr $rounds
+ blr
+ .long 0
+ .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
+___
+}} }}}
+
my $consts=1;
foreach(split("\n",$code)) {
s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/geo;
@@ -1898,7 +3759,7 @@ foreach(split("\n",$code)) {
if ($flavour =~ /le$/o) {
SWITCH: for($conv) {
/\?inv/ && do { @bytes=map($_^0xf,@bytes); last; };
- /\?rev/ && do { @bytes=reverse(@bytes); last; };
+ /\?rev/ && do { @bytes=reverse(@bytes); last; };
}
}
--
2.5.5
_______________________________________________
Linuxppc-dev mailing list
Linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
https://lists.ozlabs.org/listinfo/linuxppc-dev
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: vmx - Adding support for XTS
From: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo @ 2016-07-18 15:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Leonidas S. Barbosa, Paulo Flabiano Smorigo,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt, Paul Mackerras, Michael Ellerman,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller,
open list:IBM Power VMX Cryptographic instructions,
open list:LINUX FOR POWERPC (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)
In-Reply-To: <1468855586-848-1-git-send-email-pfsmorigo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
From: "Leonidas S. Barbosa" <leosilva@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This patch add XTS support using VMX-crypto driver.
Signed-off-by: Leonidas S. Barbosa <leosilva@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <pfsmorigo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
drivers/crypto/vmx/Makefile | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/vmx/aes_xts.c | 190 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/crypto/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +
3 files changed, 193 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/vmx/aes_xts.c
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/vmx/Makefile b/drivers/crypto/vmx/Makefile
index d28ab96..de6e241 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/vmx/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/crypto/vmx/Makefile
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_VMX_ENCRYPT) += vmx-crypto.o
-vmx-crypto-objs := vmx.o aesp8-ppc.o ghashp8-ppc.o aes.o aes_cbc.o aes_ctr.o ghash.o
+vmx-crypto-objs := vmx.o aesp8-ppc.o ghashp8-ppc.o aes.o aes_cbc.o aes_ctr.o aes_xts.o ghash.o
ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN),y)
TARGET := linux-ppc64le
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/vmx/aes_xts.c b/drivers/crypto/vmx/aes_xts.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cfb2541
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/vmx/aes_xts.c
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+/**
+ * AES XTS routines supporting VMX In-core instructions on Power 8
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 International Business Machines Inc.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundations; version 2 only.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY of FITNESS FOR A PARTICUPAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+ *
+ * Author: Leonidas S. Barbosa <leosilva@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/hardirq.h>
+#include <asm/switch_to.h>
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
+#include <crypto/xts.h>
+
+#include "aesp8-ppc.h"
+
+struct p8_aes_xts_ctx {
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *fallback;
+ struct aes_key enc_key;
+ struct aes_key dec_key;
+ struct aes_key tweak_key;
+};
+
+static int p8_aes_xts_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ const char *alg;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *fallback;
+ struct p8_aes_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ if (!(alg = crypto_tfm_alg_name(tfm))) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Failed to get algorithm name.\n");
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
+ fallback =
+ crypto_alloc_blkcipher(alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
+ if (IS_ERR(fallback)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "Failed to allocate transformation for '%s': %ld\n",
+ alg, PTR_ERR(fallback));
+ return PTR_ERR(fallback);
+ }
+ printk(KERN_INFO "Using '%s' as fallback implementation.\n",
+ crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name((struct crypto_tfm *) fallback));
+
+ crypto_blkcipher_set_flags(
+ fallback,
+ crypto_blkcipher_get_flags((struct crypto_blkcipher *)tfm));
+ ctx->fallback = fallback;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void p8_aes_xts_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ struct p8_aes_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ if (ctx->fallback) {
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(ctx->fallback);
+ ctx->fallback = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+static int p8_aes_xts_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct p8_aes_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ ret = xts_check_key(tfm, key, keylen);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ preempt_disable();
+ pagefault_disable();
+ enable_kernel_vsx();
+ ret = aes_p8_set_encrypt_key(key + keylen/2, (keylen/2) * 8, &ctx->tweak_key);
+ ret += aes_p8_set_encrypt_key(key, (keylen/2) * 8, &ctx->enc_key);
+ ret += aes_p8_set_decrypt_key(key, (keylen/2) * 8, &ctx->dec_key);
+ disable_kernel_vsx();
+ pagefault_enable();
+ preempt_enable();
+
+ ret += crypto_blkcipher_setkey(ctx->fallback, key, keylen);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int p8_aes_xts_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst,
+ struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes, int enc)
+{
+ int ret;
+ u8 tweak[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 *iv;
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+ struct p8_aes_xts_ctx *ctx =
+ crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_blkcipher_tfm(desc->tfm));
+ struct blkcipher_desc fallback_desc = {
+ .tfm = ctx->fallback,
+ .info = desc->info,
+ .flags = desc->flags
+ };
+
+ if (in_interrupt()) {
+ ret = enc ? crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&fallback_desc, dst, src, nbytes) :
+ crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&fallback_desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+ } else {
+ preempt_disable();
+ pagefault_disable();
+ enable_kernel_vsx();
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+
+ iv = (u8 *)walk.iv;
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
+ memset(tweak, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ aes_p8_encrypt(iv, tweak, &ctx->tweak_key);
+
+ while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
+ if (enc)
+ aes_p8_xts_encrypt(walk.src.virt.addr, walk.dst.virt.addr,
+ nbytes & AES_BLOCK_MASK, &ctx->enc_key, NULL, tweak);
+ else
+ aes_p8_xts_decrypt(walk.src.virt.addr, walk.dst.virt.addr,
+ nbytes & AES_BLOCK_MASK, &ctx->dec_key, NULL, tweak);
+
+ nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
+ }
+
+ disable_kernel_vsx();
+ pagefault_enable();
+ preempt_enable();
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int p8_aes_xts_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst,
+ struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ return p8_aes_xts_crypt(desc, dst, src, nbytes, 1);
+}
+
+static int p8_aes_xts_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst,
+ struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ return p8_aes_xts_crypt(desc, dst, src, nbytes, 0);
+}
+
+struct crypto_alg p8_aes_xts_alg = {
+ .cra_name = "xts(aes)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "p8_aes_xts",
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_priority = 2000,
+ .cra_type = &crypto_blkcipher_type,
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER | CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
+ .cra_alignmask = 0,
+ .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct p8_aes_xts_ctx),
+ .cra_init = p8_aes_xts_init,
+ .cra_exit = p8_aes_xts_exit,
+ .cra_blkcipher = {
+ .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .min_keysize = 2 * AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+ .max_keysize = 2 * AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+ .setkey = p8_aes_xts_setkey,
+ .encrypt = p8_aes_xts_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = p8_aes_xts_decrypt,
+ }
+};
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/vmx/vmx.c b/drivers/crypto/vmx/vmx.c
index e163d57..f688c32 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -31,10 +31,12 @@ extern struct shash_alg p8_ghash_alg;
extern struct crypto_alg p8_aes_alg;
extern struct crypto_alg p8_aes_cbc_alg;
extern struct crypto_alg p8_aes_ctr_alg;
+extern struct crypto_alg p8_aes_xts_alg;
static struct crypto_alg *algs[] = {
&p8_aes_alg,
&p8_aes_cbc_alg,
&p8_aes_ctr_alg,
+ &p8_aes_xts_alg,
NULL,
};
--
2.5.5
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] crypto: add template handling for RNGs
From: Stephan Mueller @ 2016-07-18 15:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sandy Harris
Cc: Herbert Xu, mathew.j.martineau, dhowells, keyrings, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <CACXcFmk2huwT94eVec46Dmfs2p3dcMNzf+nUaFRgYPB-AnZo3g@mail.gmail.com>
Am Montag, 18. Juli 2016, 11:23:26 schrieb Sandy Harris:
Hi Sandy,
> On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 3:14 AM, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
wrote:
> > Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> wrote:
> >> This patch adds the ability to register templates for RNGs. RNGs are
> >> "meta" mechanisms using raw cipher primitives. Thus, RNGs can now be
> >> implemented as templates to allow the complete flexibility the kernel
> >> crypto API provides.
>
> I do not see why this might be desirable, let alone necessary.
> Security-critical code should be kept as simple as possible.
> Don't we need just one good RNG?
Well, why do we have multiple symmetric ciphers, hashes, or asymmetric
ciphers? This allows different users to pick the cipher he likes. Maybe there
is an issue found in one of them and having multiple at the disposal, allows
an immediate fixing of issues.
Furthermore, the kernel crypto API supports hardware implementations. So, on
one arch, you may have an accelerated SHA256 whereas on another you have an
accelerated SHA512. And accelerated implementations are not only useful for
speed improvements, but for security purposes as well (like cache-attack
resistance).
This applies to RNGs too. Furthermore, I think an SP800-90A DRBG is a good
one. But many people find this standard smelly just because of the Dual EC
fiasco. Or it is smelly because it was developed by the US organization called
NIST.
At the level of the kernel crypto API, no policies should be enforced.
Policies (such as what is the "right" cipher) should be defined outside the
kernel.
Furthermore, the RNG approach shall be usable for mechanisms that act RNG-like
but are no real RNGs. The prime example as given with the patch set is the
KDF. A KDF acts like an RNG, but is not considered as one. Now, there are many
different types of KDFs out there. SP800-108 is one (defining three types),
SP800-56A defines more.
For the KDF implementation I did not want to hard-wire the KDF logic with a
defined cipher like SHA-256, but allow the caller to define the used hash.
Thus I need the plumbing code do to that.
Ciao
Stephan
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [cryptodev:master 147/175] DocBook: include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
From: Herbert Xu @ 2016-07-18 16:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kbuild test robot; +Cc: kbuild-all, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <201607182016.m8f2psvQ%fengguang.wu@intel.com>
On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 08:25:17PM +0800, kbuild test robot wrote:
> tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/cryptodev-2.6.git master
> head: c6335cbb0486f09b4c2ae86e84bf87efd667afa6
> commit: 4e6c3df4d729f85997cbf276bfa8ffd8579b8e77 [147/175] crypto: skcipher - Add low-level skcipher interface
> reproduce: make htmldocs
>
> All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
>
> >> include/crypto/skcipher.h:135: warning: No description found for parameter 'base'
Thanks for the report.
---8<---
Subject: crypto: skcipher - Add comment for skcipher_alg->base
This patch adds a missing comment for the base parameter in struct
skcipher_alg.
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
diff --git a/include/crypto/skcipher.h b/include/crypto/skcipher.h
index 59c8f6c..bb7db84 100644
--- a/include/crypto/skcipher.h
+++ b/include/crypto/skcipher.h
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ struct crypto_skcipher {
* IV of exactly that size to perform the encrypt or decrypt operation.
* @chunksize: Equal to the block size except for stream ciphers such as
* CTR where it is set to the underlying block size.
+ * @base: Definition of a generic crypto algorithm.
*
* All fields except @ivsize are mandatory and must be filled.
*/
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [patch] crypto: sha256-mb - cleanup a || vs | typo
From: Tim Chen @ 2016-07-18 22:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pavel Machek, Linus Torvalds
Cc: Herbert Xu, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin, Dan Carpenter,
David S. Miller, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
the arch/x86 maintainers, Megha Dey, Wang, Rui Y, Denys Vlasenko,
Xiaodong Liu, Linux Crypto Mailing List,
Linux Kernel Mailing List, kernel-janitors, Andrew Morton,
Peter Zijlstra
In-Reply-To: <20160718085905.GA5701@amd>
On Mon, 2016-07-18 at 10:59 +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> On Fri 2016-07-08 10:19:26, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> >
> > [ rare comment rant. I think I'll do this once, and then ignore the discussion ]
> >
> > On Fri, Jul 8, 2016 at 9:45 AM, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > Nack. As I said the commenting style in the crypto API is the
> > > same as the network stack. So unless we decide to change both
> > > please stick to the current style.
> > Can we please get rid of the brain-damaged stupid networking comment
> > syntax style, PLEASE?
> Please? :-). Having different comment styles between networking and
> the rest is confusing.
>
> And yes, this uglyness is documented for net/ and drivers/net/, but
> not for crypto/, so at the very least Documentation/CodingStyle should
> be updated.
>
> Pavel
The cleanup patch has already been merged. Thanks.
Tim
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^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 0/2] Automatically load the vmx_crypto module if supported
From: Michael Ellerman @ 2016-07-19 1:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Herbert Xu, alastair
Cc: linux-kernel, paulus, linux-crypto, Alastair D'Silva,
linuxppc-dev, davem
In-Reply-To: <20160718102253.GA13780@gondor.apana.org.au>
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> writes:
> On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 03:47:16PM +1000, alastair@au1.ibm.com wrote:
>> From: Alastair D'Silva <alastair@d-silva.org>
>>
>> This series allows the vmx_crypto module to be detected and automatically
>> loaded via UDEV if the CPU supports the vector crypto feature.
>>
>> Alastair D'Silva (2):
>> powerpc: Add module autoloading based on CPU features
>> crypto: vmx - Convert to CPU feature based module autoloading
>
> Both patches applied. Thanks.
Hi Herbert,
Can you please ask for an ack before merging arch patches?
That's a 70 line powerpc patch and a 6 line crypto patch. It has no
reviews and no acks. I would have preferred it if we could take it via
the powerpc tree.
cheers
_______________________________________________
Linuxppc-dev mailing list
Linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
https://lists.ozlabs.org/listinfo/linuxppc-dev
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 0/2] Automatically load the vmx_crypto module if supported
From: Michael Ellerman @ 2016-07-19 1:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Herbert Xu, alastair
Cc: linux-kernel, paulus, linux-crypto, Alastair D'Silva,
linuxppc-dev, davem
In-Reply-To: <20160718102253.GA13780@gondor.apana.org.au>
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> writes:
> On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 03:47:16PM +1000, alastair@au1.ibm.com wrote:
>> From: Alastair D'Silva <alastair@d-silva.org>
>>
>> This series allows the vmx_crypto module to be detected and automatically
>> loaded via UDEV if the CPU supports the vector crypto feature.
>>
>> Alastair D'Silva (2):
>> powerpc: Add module autoloading based on CPU features
>> crypto: vmx - Convert to CPU feature based module autoloading
>
> Both patches applied. Thanks.
Hi Herbert,
Can you please ask for an ack before merging arch patches?
That's a 70 line powerpc patch and a 6 line crypto patch. It has no
reviews and no acks. I would have preferred it if we could take it via
the powerpc tree.
cheers
_______________________________________________
Linuxppc-dev mailing list
Linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
https://lists.ozlabs.org/listinfo/linuxppc-dev
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 1/2] powerpc: Add module autoloading based on CPU features
From: Michael Ellerman @ 2016-07-19 1:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: alastair
Cc: herbert, linux-kernel, paulus, linux-crypto, Alastair D'Silva,
linuxppc-dev, davem
In-Reply-To: <1468388840-12068-3-git-send-email-alastair@au1.ibm.com>
alastair@au1.ibm.com writes:
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..df31627
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
> +/* CPU feature definitions for module loading, used by
> + * module_cpu_feature_match(), see asm/cputable.h for powerpc CPU features
> + *
> + * Copyright 2016 Alastair D'Silva, IBM Corporation.
> + *
> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
> + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
> + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
> + * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef __ASM_CPUFEATURE_H
> +#define __ASM_POWERPC_CPUFEATURE_H
Those should match. The latter is preferred.
cheers
_______________________________________________
Linuxppc-dev mailing list
Linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
https://lists.ozlabs.org/listinfo/linuxppc-dev
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 1/2] powerpc: Add module autoloading based on CPU features
From: Michael Ellerman @ 2016-07-19 1:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: alastair
Cc: herbert, linux-kernel, paulus, linux-crypto, Alastair D'Silva,
linuxppc-dev, davem
In-Reply-To: <1468388840-12068-3-git-send-email-alastair@au1.ibm.com>
alastair@au1.ibm.com writes:
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..df31627
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/cpufeature.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
> +/* CPU feature definitions for module loading, used by
> + * module_cpu_feature_match(), see asm/cputable.h for powerpc CPU features
> + *
> + * Copyright 2016 Alastair D'Silva, IBM Corporation.
> + *
> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
> + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
> + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
> + * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef __ASM_CPUFEATURE_H
> +#define __ASM_POWERPC_CPUFEATURE_H
Those should match. The latter is preferred.
cheers
_______________________________________________
Linuxppc-dev mailing list
Linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
https://lists.ozlabs.org/listinfo/linuxppc-dev
^ permalink raw reply
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