* [PATCH v4 2/4] crypto: kdf - add known answer tests
From: Stephan Mueller @ 2016-08-04 18:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mat Martineau; +Cc: David Howells, keyrings, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <1908905.sE4dlalNOn@positron.chronox.de>
Add known answer tests to the testmgr for the KDF (SP800-108) cipher.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
crypto/testmgr.c | 226 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
crypto/testmgr.h | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 336 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
index 5c9d5a5..e63b21e 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -116,6 +116,11 @@ struct drbg_test_suite {
unsigned int count;
};
+struct kdf_test_suite {
+ struct kdf_testvec *vecs;
+ unsigned int count;
+};
+
struct akcipher_test_suite {
struct akcipher_testvec *vecs;
unsigned int count;
@@ -139,6 +144,7 @@ struct alg_test_desc {
struct hash_test_suite hash;
struct cprng_test_suite cprng;
struct drbg_test_suite drbg;
+ struct kdf_test_suite kdf;
struct akcipher_test_suite akcipher;
struct kpp_test_suite kpp;
} suite;
@@ -1758,6 +1764,64 @@ outbuf:
return ret;
}
+static int kdf_cavs_test(struct kdf_testvec *test,
+ const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+ int ret = -EAGAIN;
+ struct crypto_rng *drng;
+ unsigned char *buf = kzalloc(test->expectedlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ drng = crypto_alloc_rng(driver, type | CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, mask);
+ if (IS_ERR(drng)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: kdf: could not allocate cipher handle "
+ "for %s\n", driver);
+ kzfree(buf);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ ret = crypto_rng_reset(drng, test->K1, test->K1len);
+ if (ret) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: kdf: could not set key derivation key\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = crypto_rng_generate(drng, test->context, test->contextlen,
+ buf, test->expectedlen);
+ if (ret) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: kdf: could not obtain key data\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = memcmp(test->expected, buf, test->expectedlen);
+
+err:
+ crypto_free_rng(drng);
+ kzfree(buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_kdf(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
+ u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+ unsigned int i = 0;
+ struct kdf_testvec *template = desc->suite.kdf.vecs;
+ unsigned int tcount = desc->suite.kdf.count;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
+ err = kdf_cavs_test(&template[i], driver, type, mask);
+ if (err) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "alg: kdf: Test %d failed for %s\n",
+ i, driver);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return err;
+}
static int alg_test_drbg(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
u32 type, u32 mask)
@@ -3467,6 +3531,168 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = {
.fips_allowed = 1,
.test = alg_test_null,
}, {
+ .alg = "kdf_ctr(cmac(aes))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_ctr(cmac(des3_ede))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_ctr(hmac(sha1))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_ctr(hmac(sha224))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_ctr(hmac(sha256))",
+ .test = alg_test_kdf,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .kdf = {
+ .vecs = kdf_ctr_hmac_sha256_tv_template,
+ .count = ARRAY_SIZE(kdf_ctr_hmac_sha256_tv_template)
+ }
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_ctr(hmac(sha384))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_ctr(hmac(sha512))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_ctr(sha1)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_ctr(sha224)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_ctr(sha256)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_ctr(sha384)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_ctr(sha512)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_dpi(cmac(aes))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_dpi(cmac(des3_ede))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_dpi(hmac(sha1))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_dpi(hmac(sha224))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_dpi(hmac(sha256))",
+ .test = alg_test_kdf,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .kdf = {
+ .vecs = kdf_dpi_hmac_sha256_tv_template,
+ .count = ARRAY_SIZE(kdf_dpi_hmac_sha256_tv_template)
+ }
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_dpi(hmac(sha384))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_dpi(hmac(sha512))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_dpi(sha1)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_dpi(sha224)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_dpi(sha256)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_dpi(sha384)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_dpi(sha512)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_fb(cmac(aes))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_fb(cmac(des3_ede))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_fb(hmac(sha1))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_fb(hmac(sha224))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_fb(hmac(sha256))",
+ .test = alg_test_kdf,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .kdf = {
+ .vecs = kdf_fb_hmac_sha256_tv_template,
+ .count = ARRAY_SIZE(kdf_fb_hmac_sha256_tv_template)
+ }
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_fb(hmac(sha384))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_fb(hmac(sha512))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_fb(sha1)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_fb(sha224)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_fb(sha256)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_fb(sha384)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "kdf_fb(sha512)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
.alg = "kw(aes)",
.test = alg_test_skcipher,
.fips_allowed = 1,
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h
index acb6bbf..1fe93ed 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.h
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.h
@@ -123,6 +123,15 @@ struct drbg_testvec {
size_t expectedlen;
};
+struct kdf_testvec {
+ unsigned char *K1;
+ size_t K1len;
+ unsigned char *context;
+ size_t contextlen;
+ unsigned char *expected;
+ size_t expectedlen;
+};
+
struct akcipher_testvec {
unsigned char *key;
unsigned char *m;
@@ -25827,6 +25836,107 @@ static struct drbg_testvec drbg_nopr_ctr_aes128_tv_template[] = {
},
};
+/*
+ * Test vector obtained from
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/KBKDF800-108/CounterMode.zip
+ */
+static struct kdf_testvec kdf_ctr_hmac_sha256_tv_template[] = {
+ {
+ .K1 = (unsigned char *)
+ "\xdd\x1d\x91\xb7\xd9\x0b\x2b\xd3"
+ "\x13\x85\x33\xce\x92\xb2\x72\xfb"
+ "\xf8\xa3\x69\x31\x6a\xef\xe2\x42"
+ "\xe6\x59\xcc\x0a\xe2\x38\xaf\xe0",
+ .K1len = 32,
+ .context = (unsigned char *)
+ "\x01\x32\x2b\x96\xb3\x0a\xcd\x19"
+ "\x79\x79\x44\x4e\x46\x8e\x1c\x5c"
+ "\x68\x59\xbf\x1b\x1c\xf9\x51\xb7"
+ "\xe7\x25\x30\x3e\x23\x7e\x46\xb8"
+ "\x64\xa1\x45\xfa\xb2\x5e\x51\x7b"
+ "\x08\xf8\x68\x3d\x03\x15\xbb\x29"
+ "\x11\xd8\x0a\x0e\x8a\xba\x17\xf3"
+ "\xb4\x13\xfa\xac",
+ .contextlen = 60,
+ .expected = (unsigned char *)
+ "\x10\x62\x13\x42\xbf\xb0\xfd\x40"
+ "\x04\x6c\x0e\x29\xf2\xcf\xdb\xf0",
+ .expectedlen = 16
+ }
+};
+
+/*
+ * Test vector obtained from
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/KBKDF800-108/FeedbackModeNOzeroiv.zip
+ */
+static struct kdf_testvec kdf_fb_hmac_sha256_tv_template[] = {
+ {
+ .K1 = (unsigned char *)
+ "\x93\xf6\x98\xe8\x42\xee\xd7\x53"
+ "\x94\xd6\x29\xd9\x57\xe2\xe8\x9c"
+ "\x6e\x74\x1f\x81\x0b\x62\x3c\x8b"
+ "\x90\x1e\x38\x37\x6d\x06\x8e\x7b",
+ .K1len = 32,
+ .context = (unsigned char *)
+ "\x9f\x57\x5d\x90\x59\xd3\xe0\xc0"
+ "\x80\x3f\x08\x11\x2f\x8a\x80\x6d"
+ "\xe3\xc3\x47\x19\x12\xcd\xf4\x2b"
+ "\x09\x53\x88\xb1\x4b\x33\x50\x8e"
+ "\x53\xb8\x9c\x18\x69\x0e\x20\x57"
+ "\xa1\xd1\x67\x82\x2e\x63\x6d\xe5"
+ "\x0b\xe0\x01\x85\x32\xc4\x31\xf7"
+ "\xf5\xe3\x7f\x77\x13\x92\x20\xd5"
+ "\xe0\x42\x59\x9e\xbe\x26\x6a\xf5"
+ "\x76\x7e\xe1\x8c\xd2\xc5\xc1\x9a"
+ "\x1f\x0f\x80",
+ .contextlen = 83,
+ .expected = (unsigned char *)
+ "\xbd\x14\x76\xf4\x3a\x4e\x31\x57"
+ "\x47\xcf\x59\x18\xe0\xea\x5b\xc0"
+ "\xd9\x87\x69\x45\x74\x77\xc3\xab"
+ "\x18\xb7\x42\xde\xf0\xe0\x79\xa9"
+ "\x33\xb7\x56\x36\x5a\xfb\x55\x41"
+ "\xf2\x53\xfe\xe4\x3c\x6f\xd7\x88"
+ "\xa4\x40\x41\x03\x85\x09\xe9\xee"
+ "\xb6\x8f\x7d\x65\xff\xbb\x5f\x95",
+ .expectedlen = 64
+ }
+};
+
+/*
+ * Test vector obtained from
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/KBKDF800-108/PipelineModewithCounter.zip
+ */
+static struct kdf_testvec kdf_dpi_hmac_sha256_tv_template[] = {
+ {
+ .K1 = (unsigned char *)
+ "\x02\xd3\x6f\xa0\x21\xc2\x0d\xdb"
+ "\xde\xe4\x69\xf0\x57\x94\x68\xba"
+ "\xe5\xcb\x13\xb5\x48\xb6\xc6\x1c"
+ "\xdf\x9d\x3e\xc4\x19\x11\x1d\xe2",
+ .K1len = 32,
+ .context = (unsigned char *)
+ "\x85\xab\xe3\x8b\xf2\x65\xfb\xdc"
+ "\x64\x45\xae\x5c\x71\x15\x9f\x15"
+ "\x48\xc7\x3b\x7d\x52\x6a\x62\x31"
+ "\x04\x90\x4a\x0f\x87\x92\x07\x0b"
+ "\x3d\xf9\x90\x2b\x96\x69\x49\x04"
+ "\x25\xa3\x85\xea\xdb\x0f\x9c\x76"
+ "\xe4\x6f\x0f",
+ .contextlen = 51,
+ .expected = (unsigned char *)
+ "\xd6\x9f\x74\xf5\x18\xc9\xf6\x4f"
+ "\x90\xa0\xbe\xeb\xab\x69\xf6\x89"
+ "\xb7\x3b\x5c\x13\xeb\x0f\x86\x0a"
+ "\x95\xca\xd7\xd9\x81\x4f\x8c\x50"
+ "\x6e\xb7\xb1\x79\xa5\xc5\xb4\x46"
+ "\x6a\x9e\xc1\x54\xc3\xbf\x1c\x13"
+ "\xef\xd6\xec\x0d\x82\xb0\x2c\x29"
+ "\xaf\x2c\x69\x02\x99\xed\xc4\x53",
+ .expectedlen = 64
+ }
+};
+
/* Cast5 test vectors from RFC 2144 */
#define CAST5_ENC_TEST_VECTORS 4
#define CAST5_DEC_TEST_VECTORS 4
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v4 3/4] crypto: kdf - SP800-108 Key Derivation Function
From: Stephan Mueller @ 2016-08-04 18:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mat Martineau; +Cc: David Howells, keyrings, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <1908905.sE4dlalNOn@positron.chronox.de>
The SP800-108 compliant Key Derivation Function is implemented as a
random number generator considering that it behaves like a deterministic
RNG.
All three KDF types specified in SP800-108 are implemented.
The code comments provide details about how to invoke the different KDF
types.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
crypto/kdf.c | 508 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 508 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 crypto/kdf.c
diff --git a/crypto/kdf.c b/crypto/kdf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f9f082
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/kdf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,508 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
+ * written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2
+ * are required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
+ * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
+ * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
+ * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
+ * DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * For performing a KDF operation, the following input is required
+ * from the caller:
+ *
+ * * Keying material to be used to derive the new keys from
+ * (denoted as Ko in SP800-108)
+ * * Label -- a free form binary string
+ * * Context -- a free form binary string
+ *
+ * The KDF is implemented as a random number generator.
+ *
+ * The Ko keying material is to be provided with the initialization of the KDF
+ * "random number generator", i.e. with the crypto_rng_reset function.
+ *
+ * The Label and Context concatenated string is provided when obtaining random
+ * numbers, i.e. with the crypto_rng_generate function. The caller must format
+ * the free-form Label || Context input as deemed necessary for the given
+ * purpose. Note, SP800-108 mandates that the Label and Context are separated
+ * by a 0x00 byte, i.e. the caller shall provide the input as
+ * Label || 0x00 || Context when trying to be compliant to SP800-108. For
+ * the feedback KDF, an IV is required as documented below.
+ *
+ * Example without proper error handling:
+ * char *keying_material = "\x00\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77";
+ * char *label_context = "\xde\xad\xbe\xef\x00\xde\xad\xbe\xef";
+ * kdf = crypto_alloc_rng(name, 0, 0);
+ * crypto_rng_reset(kdf, keying_material, 8);
+ * crypto_rng_generate(kdf, label_context, 9, outbuf, outbuflen);
+ *
+ * NOTE: In-place cipher operations are not supported.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <crypto/rng.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/rng.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+
+struct crypto_kdf_ctx {
+ struct shash_desc shash;
+ char ctx[];
+};
+
+/* convert 32 bit integer into its string representation */
+static inline void crypto_kw_cpu_to_be32(u32 val, u8 *buf)
+{
+ __be32 *a = (__be32 *)buf;
+
+ *a = cpu_to_be32(val);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Implementation of the KDF in double pipeline iteration mode according with
+ * counter to SP800-108 section 5.3.
+ *
+ * The caller must provide Label || 0x00 || Context in src. This src pointer
+ * may also be NULL if the caller wishes not to provide anything.
+ */
+static int crypto_kdf_dpi_random(struct crypto_rng *rng,
+ const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
+ u8 *dst, unsigned int dlen)
+{
+ struct crypto_kdf_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_rng_tfm(rng));
+ struct shash_desc *desc = &ctx->shash;
+ unsigned int h = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
+ unsigned int alignmask = crypto_shash_alignmask(desc->tfm);
+ int err = 0;
+ u8 *dst_orig = dst;
+ u8 Aiblock[h + alignmask];
+ u8 *Ai = PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)Aiblock, alignmask + 1);
+ u32 i = 1;
+ u8 iteration[sizeof(u32)];
+
+ memset(Ai, 0, h);
+
+ while (dlen) {
+ /* Calculate A(i) */
+ if (dst == dst_orig && src && slen)
+ /* 5.3 step 4 and 5.a */
+ err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, src, slen, Ai);
+ else
+ /* 5.3 step 5.a */
+ err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, Ai, h, Ai);
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Calculate K(i) -- step 5.b */
+ err = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
+
+ err = crypto_shash_update(desc, Ai, h);
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
+
+ crypto_kw_cpu_to_be32(i, iteration);
+ err = crypto_shash_update(desc, iteration, sizeof(u32));
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
+ if (src && slen) {
+ err = crypto_shash_update(desc, src, slen);
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (dlen < h) {
+ u8 tmpbuffer[h];
+
+ err = crypto_shash_final(desc, tmpbuffer);
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(dst, tmpbuffer, dlen);
+ memzero_explicit(tmpbuffer, h);
+ goto ret;
+ } else {
+ err = crypto_shash_final(desc, dst);
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
+ dlen -= h;
+ dst += h;
+ i++;
+ }
+ }
+
+err:
+ memzero_explicit(dst_orig, dlen);
+ret:
+ memzero_explicit(Ai, h);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Implementation of the KDF in feedback mode with a non-NULL IV and with
+ * counter according to SP800-108 section 5.2. The IV is supplied with src
+ * and must be equal to the digestsize of the used cipher.
+ *
+ * In addition, the caller must provide Label || 0x00 || Context in src. This
+ * src pointer must not be NULL as the IV is required. The ultimate format of
+ * the src pointer is IV || Label || 0x00 || Context where the length of the
+ * IV is equal to the output size of the PRF.
+ */
+static int crypto_kdf_fb_random(struct crypto_rng *rng,
+ const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
+ u8 *dst, unsigned int dlen)
+{
+ struct crypto_kdf_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_rng_tfm(rng));
+ struct shash_desc *desc = &ctx->shash;
+ unsigned int h = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
+ int err = 0;
+ u8 *dst_orig = dst;
+ const u8 *label;
+ unsigned int labellen = 0;
+ u32 i = 1;
+ u8 iteration[sizeof(u32)];
+
+ /* require the presence of an IV */
+ if (!src || slen < h)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* calculate the offset of the label / context data */
+ label = src + h;
+ labellen = slen - h;
+
+ while (dlen) {
+ err = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * Feedback mode applies to all rounds except first which uses
+ * the IV.
+ */
+ if (dst_orig == dst)
+ err = crypto_shash_update(desc, src, h);
+ else
+ err = crypto_shash_update(desc, dst - h, h);
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
+
+ crypto_kw_cpu_to_be32(i, iteration);
+ err = crypto_shash_update(desc, iteration, sizeof(u32));
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
+ if (labellen) {
+ err = crypto_shash_update(desc, label, labellen);
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (dlen < h) {
+ u8 tmpbuffer[h];
+
+ err = crypto_shash_final(desc, tmpbuffer);
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(dst, tmpbuffer, dlen);
+ memzero_explicit(tmpbuffer, h);
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ err = crypto_shash_final(desc, dst);
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
+ dlen -= h;
+ dst += h;
+ i++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ memzero_explicit(dst_orig, dlen);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Implementation of the KDF in counter mode according to SP800-108 section 5.1
+ * as well as SP800-56A section 5.8.1 (Single-step KDF).
+ *
+ * SP800-108:
+ * The caller must provide Label || 0x00 || Context in src. This src pointer
+ * may also be NULL if the caller wishes not to provide anything.
+ *
+ * SP800-56A:
+ * The key provided for the HMAC during the crypto_rng_reset shall NOT be the
+ * shared secret from the DH operation, but an independently generated key.
+ * The src pointer is defined as Z || other info where Z is the shared secret
+ * from DH and other info is an arbitrary string (see SP800-56A section
+ * 5.8.1.2).
+ */
+static int crypto_kdf_ctr_random(struct crypto_rng *rng,
+ const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
+ u8 *dst, unsigned int dlen)
+{
+ struct crypto_kdf_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_rng_tfm(rng));
+ struct shash_desc *desc = &ctx->shash;
+ unsigned int h = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
+ int err = 0;
+ u8 *dst_orig = dst;
+ u32 i = 1;
+ u8 iteration[sizeof(u32)];
+
+ while (dlen) {
+ err = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
+
+ crypto_kw_cpu_to_be32(i, iteration);
+ err = crypto_shash_update(desc, iteration, sizeof(u32));
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (src && slen) {
+ err = crypto_shash_update(desc, src, slen);
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (dlen < h) {
+ u8 tmpbuffer[h];
+
+ err = crypto_shash_final(desc, tmpbuffer);
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(dst, tmpbuffer, dlen);
+ memzero_explicit(tmpbuffer, h);
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ err = crypto_shash_final(desc, dst);
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
+
+ dlen -= h;
+ dst += h;
+ i++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ memzero_explicit(dst_orig, dlen);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The seeding of the KDF allows to set a key which must be at least
+ * digestsize long.
+ */
+static int crypto_kdf_seed(struct crypto_rng *rng,
+ const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
+{
+ struct crypto_kdf_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_rng_tfm(rng));
+ unsigned int ds = crypto_shash_digestsize(ctx->shash.tfm);
+
+ /* Check according to SP800-108 section 7.2 */
+ if (ds > slen)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * We require that we operate on a MAC -- if we do not operate on a
+ * MAC, this function returns an error.
+ */
+ return crypto_shash_setkey(ctx->shash.tfm, seed, slen);
+}
+
+static int crypto_kdf_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ struct crypto_instance *inst = crypto_tfm_alg_instance(tfm);
+ struct crypto_shash_spawn *spawn = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
+ struct crypto_kdf_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ struct crypto_shash *hash;
+
+ hash = crypto_spawn_shash(spawn);
+ if (IS_ERR(hash))
+ return PTR_ERR(hash);
+
+ ctx->shash.tfm = hash;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void crypto_kdf_exit_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ struct crypto_kdf_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ crypto_free_shash(ctx->shash.tfm);
+}
+
+static void crypto_kdf_free(struct rng_instance *inst)
+{
+ crypto_drop_spawn(rng_instance_ctx(inst));
+ kfree(inst);
+}
+
+static int crypto_kdf_alloc_common(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
+ struct rtattr **tb,
+ const u8 *name,
+ int (*generate)(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
+ const u8 *src,
+ unsigned int slen,
+ u8 *dst, unsigned int dlen))
+{
+ struct rng_instance *inst;
+ struct crypto_alg *alg;
+ struct shash_alg *salg;
+ int err;
+ unsigned int ds, ss;
+
+ err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_RNG);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ salg = shash_attr_alg(tb[1], 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(salg))
+ return PTR_ERR(salg);
+
+ ds = salg->digestsize;
+ ss = salg->statesize;
+ alg = &salg->base;
+
+ inst = rng_alloc_instance(name, alg);
+ err = PTR_ERR(inst);
+ if (IS_ERR(inst))
+ goto out_put_alg;
+
+ err = crypto_init_shash_spawn(rng_instance_ctx(inst), salg,
+ rng_crypto_instance(inst));
+ if (err)
+ goto out_free_inst;
+
+ inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
+
+ inst->alg.generate = generate;
+ inst->alg.seed = crypto_kdf_seed;
+ inst->alg.seedsize = ds;
+
+ inst->alg.base.cra_init = crypto_kdf_init_tfm;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_exit = crypto_kdf_exit_tfm;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = ALIGN(sizeof(struct crypto_kdf_ctx) +
+ ss * 2, crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment());
+
+ inst->free = crypto_kdf_free;
+
+ err = rng_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
+
+ if (err) {
+out_free_inst:
+ crypto_kdf_free(inst);
+ }
+
+out_put_alg:
+ crypto_mod_put(alg);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int crypto_kdf_ctr_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
+ struct rtattr **tb)
+{
+ return crypto_kdf_alloc_common(tmpl, tb, "kdf_ctr",
+ crypto_kdf_ctr_random);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_template crypto_kdf_ctr_tmpl = {
+ .name = "kdf_ctr",
+ .create = crypto_kdf_ctr_create,
+ .module = THIS_MODULE,
+};
+
+static int crypto_kdf_fb_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
+ struct rtattr **tb) {
+ return crypto_kdf_alloc_common(tmpl, tb, "kdf_fb",
+ crypto_kdf_fb_random);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_template crypto_kdf_fb_tmpl = {
+ .name = "kdf_fb",
+ .create = crypto_kdf_fb_create,
+ .module = THIS_MODULE,
+};
+
+static int crypto_kdf_dpi_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
+ struct rtattr **tb) {
+ return crypto_kdf_alloc_common(tmpl, tb, "kdf_dpi",
+ crypto_kdf_dpi_random);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_template crypto_kdf_dpi_tmpl = {
+ .name = "kdf_dpi",
+ .create = crypto_kdf_dpi_create,
+ .module = THIS_MODULE,
+};
+
+static int __init crypto_kdf_init(void)
+{
+ int err = crypto_register_template(&crypto_kdf_ctr_tmpl);
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ err = crypto_register_template(&crypto_kdf_fb_tmpl);
+ if (err) {
+ crypto_unregister_template(&crypto_kdf_ctr_tmpl);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ err = crypto_register_template(&crypto_kdf_dpi_tmpl);
+ if (err) {
+ crypto_unregister_template(&crypto_kdf_ctr_tmpl);
+ crypto_unregister_template(&crypto_kdf_fb_tmpl);
+ }
+ return err;
+}
+
+static void __exit crypto_kdf_exit(void)
+{
+ crypto_unregister_template(&crypto_kdf_ctr_tmpl);
+ crypto_unregister_template(&crypto_kdf_fb_tmpl);
+ crypto_unregister_template(&crypto_kdf_dpi_tmpl);
+}
+
+module_init(crypto_kdf_init);
+module_exit(crypto_kdf_exit);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Key Derivation Function according to SP800-108 and SP800-56A");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("kdf_ctr");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("kdf_fb");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("kdf_dpi");
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2] KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH
From: Stephan Mueller @ 2016-08-04 18:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mat Martineau, David Howells; +Cc: keyrings, linux-crypto
Hi Mat,
the following code addresses all your comments as discussed.
In addition, this code is now complete: it contains an extension
to the documentation as well as the compat code. The compat
code was tested successfully with compiling the user space tool
with -m32 after applying the patch from David ensuring the
invocation of the keyctl compat syscall.
Ciao
Stephan
---8<----
SP800-56A defines the use of DH with key derivation function based on a
counter. The input to the KDF is defined as (DH shared secret || other
information). The value for the "other information" is to be provided by
the caller.
The KDF is provided by the kernel crypto API. The SP800-56A KDF is equal
to the SP800-108 counter KDF. However, the caller is allowed to specify
the KDF type that he wants to use to derive the key material allowing
the use of the other KDFs provided with the kernel crypto API.
As the KDF implements the proper truncation of the DH shared secret to
the requested size, this patch fills the caller buffer up to its size.
The patch is tested with a new test added to the keyutils user space
code which uses a CAVS test vector testing the compliance with
SP800-56A.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
Documentation/security/keys.txt | 35 +++++++++---
include/linux/compat.h | 7 +++
include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h | 7 +++
security/keys/Kconfig | 1 +
security/keys/compat.c | 34 +++++++++++-
security/keys/dh.c | 119 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
security/keys/internal.h | 9 ++-
security/keys/keyctl.c | 2 +-
8 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
index 3849814..29fc036 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
@@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
long keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, struct keyctl_dh_params *params,
char *buffer, size_t buflen,
- void *reserved);
+ struct keyctl_kdf_params *kdf);
The params struct contains serial numbers for three keys:
@@ -844,18 +844,37 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
public key. If the base is the remote public key, the result is
the shared secret.
- The reserved argument must be set to NULL.
+ If the parameter kdf is NULL, the following applies:
- The buffer length must be at least the length of the prime, or zero.
+ - The buffer length must be at least the length of the prime, or zero.
- If the buffer length is nonzero, the length of the result is
- returned when it is successfully calculated and copied in to the
- buffer. When the buffer length is zero, the minimum required
- buffer length is returned.
+ - If the buffer length is nonzero, the length of the result is
+ returned when it is successfully calculated and copied in to the
+ buffer. When the buffer length is zero, the minimum required
+ buffer length is returned.
+
+ The kdf parameter allows the caller to apply a key derivation function
+ (KDF) on the Diffie-Hellman computation where only the result
+ of the KDF is returned to the caller. The KDF is characterized with
+ struct keyctl_kdf_params as follows:
+
+ - char *kdfname specifies the NULL terminated string identifying
+ the KDF function used from the kernel crypto API. As of now,
+ only non-keyed KDFs are supported, such as kdf_ctr(sha256),
+ kdf_fb(sha1) or kdf_dpi(sha512). The use of kdf_ctr() complies
+ with SP800-56A.
+
+ - char *otherinfo specifies the OtherInfo string as documented in
+ SP800-56A section 5.8.1.2. The length of the buffer is given with
+ otherinfolen. The format of OtherInfo is defined by the caller.
+ The otherinfo pointer may be NULL if no OtherInfo shall be used.
This function will return error EOPNOTSUPP if the key type is not
supported, error ENOKEY if the key could not be found, or error
- EACCES if the key is not readable by the caller.
+ EACCES if the key is not readable by the caller. In addition, the
+ function will return EMSGSIZE when the parameter kdf is non-NULL
+ and either the buffer length or the OtherInfo length exceeds the
+ allowed length.
===============
KERNEL SERVICES
diff --git a/include/linux/compat.h b/include/linux/compat.h
index f964ef7..00f348f 100644
--- a/include/linux/compat.h
+++ b/include/linux/compat.h
@@ -295,6 +295,13 @@ struct compat_old_sigaction {
};
#endif
+struct compat_keyctl_kdf_params {
+ compat_uptr_t kdfname;
+ compat_uptr_t otherinfo;
+ __u32 otherinfolen;
+ __u32 __spare[8];
+};
+
struct compat_statfs;
struct compat_statfs64;
struct compat_old_linux_dirent;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h
index 86eddd6..0abe048 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h
@@ -68,4 +68,11 @@ struct keyctl_dh_params {
__s32 base;
};
+struct keyctl_kdf_params {
+ char *kdfname;
+ char *otherinfo;
+ __u32 otherinfolen;
+ __u32 __spare[8];
+};
+
#endif /* _LINUX_KEYCTL_H */
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
index f826e87..56491fe 100644
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ config KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
bool "Diffie-Hellman operations on retained keys"
depends on KEYS
select MPILIB
+ select CRYPTO_KDF
help
This option provides support for calculating Diffie-Hellman
public keys and shared secrets using values stored as keys
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index 36c80bf..7a7d48a 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -48,6 +48,35 @@ static long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
return ret;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
+static long compat_keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+ char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+ struct compat_keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
+{
+ struct keyctl_kdf_params kdfcopy;
+ struct compat_keyctl_kdf_params compat_kdfcopy;
+
+ if (!kdf)
+ return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, NULL);
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&compat_kdfcopy, kdf, sizeof(compat_kdfcopy)) != 0)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ kdfcopy.kdfname = compat_ptr(compat_kdfcopy.kdfname);
+ kdfcopy.otherinfo = compat_ptr(compat_kdfcopy.otherinfo);
+ kdfcopy.otherinfolen = compat_kdfcopy.otherinfolen;
+
+ return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, &kdfcopy);
+}
+#else
+static long compat_keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+ char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+ struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP
+}
+#endif
+
/*
* The key control system call, 32-bit compatibility version for 64-bit archs
*
@@ -133,8 +162,9 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, u32, option,
return keyctl_get_persistent(arg2, arg3);
case KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE:
- return keyctl_dh_compute(compat_ptr(arg2), compat_ptr(arg3),
- arg4, compat_ptr(arg5));
+ return compat_keyctl_dh_compute(compat_ptr(arg2),
+ compat_ptr(arg3),
+ arg4, compat_ptr(arg5));
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
diff --git a/security/keys/dh.c b/security/keys/dh.c
index 531ed2e..6a3dea9 100644
--- a/security/keys/dh.c
+++ b/security/keys/dh.c
@@ -77,9 +77,44 @@ error:
return ret;
}
-long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
- char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
- void __user *reserved)
+static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
+ char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+ uint8_t *kbuf, size_t kbuflen)
+{
+ uint8_t *outbuf = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
+#if 0
+ /* we do not support HMAC currently */
+ ret = crypto_rng_reset(tfm, xx, xxlen);
+ if (ret) {
+ crypto_free_rng(tfm);
+ goto error5;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ outbuf = kmalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!outbuf) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = crypto_rng_generate(tfm, kbuf, kbuflen, outbuf, buflen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = buflen;
+ if (copy_to_user(buffer, outbuf, buflen) != 0)
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+
+err:
+ kzfree(outbuf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+ char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+ struct keyctl_kdf_params *kdfcopy)
{
long ret;
MPI base, private, prime, result;
@@ -88,6 +123,7 @@ long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
uint8_t *kbuf;
ssize_t keylen;
size_t resultlen;
+ struct crypto_rng *tfm = NULL;
if (!params || (!buffer && buflen)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -98,12 +134,36 @@ long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
goto out;
}
- if (reserved) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
+ if (kdfcopy) {
+ char *kdfname;
+
+ if (buflen > KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OUTPUTLEN ||
+ kdfcopy->otherinfolen > KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_STRING_LEN) {
+ ret = -EMSGSIZE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* get KDF name string */
+ kdfname = strndup_user(kdfcopy->kdfname, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
+ if (IS_ERR(kdfname)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(kdfname);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* allocate KDF from the kernel crypto API */
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_rng(kdfname, 0, 0);
+ kfree(kdfname);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ goto out;
+ }
}
- keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.prime, buflen, &prime);
+ /*
+ * If the caller requests postprocessing with a KDF, allow an
+ * arbitrary output buffer size since the KDF ensures proper truncation.
+ */
+ keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.prime, kdfcopy ? SIZE_MAX : buflen, &prime);
if (keylen < 0 || !prime) {
/* buflen == 0 may be used to query the required buffer size,
* which is the prime key length.
@@ -133,12 +193,25 @@ long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
goto error3;
}
- kbuf = kmalloc(resultlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ /* allocate space for DH shared secret and SP800-56A otherinfo */
+ kbuf = kmalloc(kdfcopy ? (resultlen + kdfcopy->otherinfolen) : resultlen,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kbuf) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto error4;
}
+ /*
+ * Concatenate SP800-56A otherinfo past DH shared secret -- the
+ * input to the KDF is (DH shared secret || otherinfo)
+ */
+ if (kdfcopy && kdfcopy->otherinfo &&
+ copy_from_user(kbuf + resultlen, kdfcopy->otherinfo,
+ kdfcopy->otherinfolen) != 0) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto error5;
+ }
+
ret = do_dh(result, base, private, prime);
if (ret)
goto error5;
@@ -147,12 +220,17 @@ long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
if (ret != 0)
goto error5;
- ret = nbytes;
- if (copy_to_user(buffer, kbuf, nbytes) != 0)
- ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (kdfcopy) {
+ ret = keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(tfm, buffer, buflen, kbuf,
+ resultlen + kdfcopy->otherinfolen);
+ } else {
+ ret = nbytes;
+ if (copy_to_user(buffer, kbuf, nbytes) != 0)
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ }
error5:
- kfree(kbuf);
+ kzfree(kbuf);
error4:
mpi_free(result);
error3:
@@ -162,5 +240,22 @@ error2:
error1:
mpi_free(prime);
out:
+ if (tfm)
+ crypto_free_rng(tfm);
return ret;
}
+
+long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+ char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+ struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
+{
+ struct keyctl_kdf_params kdfcopy;
+
+ if (!kdf)
+ return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, NULL);
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&kdfcopy, kdf, sizeof(kdfcopy)) != 0)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, &kdfcopy);
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index a705a7d..9014af3 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -259,12 +259,17 @@ static inline long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t uid, key_serial_t destring)
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
+#include <crypto/rng.h>
extern long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *, char __user *,
- size_t, void __user *);
+ size_t, struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *);
+extern long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *, char __user *,
+ size_t, struct keyctl_kdf_params *);
+#define KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OUTPUTLEN 1024 /* max length of KDF output */
+#define KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_STRING_LEN 64 /* maximum length of strings */
#else
static inline long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
- void __user *reserved)
+ struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index d580ad0..b106898 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1689,7 +1689,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
case KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE:
return keyctl_dh_compute((struct keyctl_dh_params __user *) arg2,
(char __user *) arg3, (size_t) arg4,
- (void __user *) arg5);
+ (struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *) arg5);
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2] DH support: add KDF handling support
From: Stephan Mueller @ 2016-08-04 18:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mat Martineau; +Cc: David Howells, keyrings, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <2239809.KsND40bFeW@positron.chronox.de>
Hi Mat, David,
this patch covers all comments you raised. I also added a man page
for the new API calls.
---8<---
Add the interface logic to support DH with KDF handling support.
The dh_compute code now allows the following options:
- no KDF support / output of raw DH shared secret:
dh_compute <private> <prime> <base>
- KDF support without "other information" string:
dh_compute_kdf <private> <prime> <base> <output length> <KDF type>
- KDF support with "other information string:
dh_compute_kdf_oi <private> <prime> <base> <output length> <KDF type>
where the OI string is provided on STDIN.
The test to verify the code is based on a test vector used for the CAVS
testing of SP800-56A.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
Makefile | 1 +
keyctl.c | 125 +++++++++++++++++++++++
keyutils.c | 44 ++++++++
keyutils.h | 15 +++
man/keyctl_dh_compute_kdf.3 | 143 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tests/keyctl/dh_compute/valid/runtest.sh | 168 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tests/toolbox.inc.sh | 44 ++++++++
version.lds | 2 +
8 files changed, 542 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 man/keyctl_dh_compute_kdf.3
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 824bbbf..12b0ce9 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ endif
$(LNS) keyctl_read.3 $(DESTDIR)$(MAN3)/keyctl_read_alloc.3
$(LNS) recursive_key_scan.3 $(DESTDIR)$(MAN3)/recursive_session_key_scan.3
$(LNS) keyctl_dh_compute.3 $(DESTDIR)$(MAN3)/keyctl_dh_compute_alloc.3
+ $(LNS) keyctl_dh_compute_kdf.3 $(DESTDIR)$(MAN3)/keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_alloc.3
$(INSTALL) -D -m 0644 keyutils.h $(DESTDIR)$(INCLUDEDIR)/keyutils.h
###############################################################################
diff --git a/keyctl.c b/keyctl.c
index edb03de..38f68d2 100644
--- a/keyctl.c
+++ b/keyctl.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <errno.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include "keyutils.h"
+#include <limits.h>
struct command {
void (*action)(int argc, char *argv[]) __attribute__((noreturn));
@@ -67,6 +68,8 @@ static nr void act_keyctl_purge(int argc, char *argv[]);
static nr void act_keyctl_invalidate(int argc, char *argv[]);
static nr void act_keyctl_get_persistent(int argc, char *argv[]);
static nr void act_keyctl_dh_compute(int argc, char *argv[]);
+static nr void act_keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(int argc, char *argv[]);
+static nr void act_keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_oi(int argc, char *argv[]);
const struct command commands[] = {
{ act_keyctl___version, "--version", "" },
@@ -76,6 +79,8 @@ const struct command commands[] = {
{ act_keyctl_clear, "clear", "<keyring>" },
{ act_keyctl_describe, "describe", "<keyring>" },
{ act_keyctl_dh_compute, "dh_compute", "<private> <prime> <base>" },
+ { act_keyctl_dh_compute_kdf, "dh_compute_kdf", "<private> <prime> <base> <len> <kdf>" },
+ { act_keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_oi, "dh_compute_kdf_oi", "<private> <prime> <base> <len> <kdf>" },
{ act_keyctl_instantiate, "instantiate","<key> <data> <keyring>" },
{ act_keyctl_invalidate,"invalidate", "<key>" },
{ act_keyctl_get_persistent, "get_persistent", "<keyring> [<uid>]" },
@@ -1663,6 +1668,7 @@ static void act_keyctl_dh_compute(int argc, char *argv[])
}
printf("%02hhx", *p);
+ *p = 0x00; /* zeroize buffer */
p++;
col++;
@@ -1674,6 +1680,125 @@ static void act_keyctl_dh_compute(int argc, char *argv[])
} while (--ret > 0);
printf("\n");
+
+ free(buffer);
+
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+static void act_keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ key_serial_t private, prime, base;
+ void *buffer;
+ char *p;
+ int ret, sep, col;
+ unsigned long buflen = 0;
+
+ if (argc != 6)
+ format();
+
+ private = get_key_id(argv[1]);
+ prime = get_key_id(argv[2]);
+ base = get_key_id(argv[3]);
+
+ buflen = strtoul(argv[4], NULL, 10);
+ if (buflen == ULONG_MAX)
+ error("dh_compute: cannot convert generated length value");
+
+ ret = keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_alloc(private, prime, base, buflen,
+ argv[5], NULL, 0, &buffer);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ error("keyctl_dh_compute_alloc");
+
+ /* hexdump the contents */
+ printf("%u bytes of data in result:\n", ret);
+
+ sep = 0;
+ col = 0;
+ p = buffer;
+
+ do {
+ if (sep) {
+ putchar(sep);
+ sep = 0;
+ }
+
+ printf("%02hhx", *p);
+ *p = 0x00; /* zeroize buffer */
+ p++;
+
+ col++;
+ if (col % 32 == 0)
+ sep = '\n';
+ else if (col % 4 == 0)
+ sep = ' ';
+
+ } while (--ret > 0);
+
+ printf("\n");
+
+ free(buffer);
+
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+static void act_keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_oi(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ key_serial_t private, prime, base;
+ void *buffer;
+ char *p;
+ int ret, sep, col;
+ unsigned long buflen = 0;
+ size_t oilen;
+ void *oi;
+
+ if (argc != 6)
+ format();
+
+ private = get_key_id(argv[1]);
+ prime = get_key_id(argv[2]);
+ base = get_key_id(argv[3]);
+
+ buflen = strtoul(argv[4], NULL, 10);
+ if (buflen == ULONG_MAX)
+ error("dh_compute: cannot convert generated length value");
+
+ oi = grab_stdin(&oilen);
+
+ ret = keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_alloc(private, prime, base, buflen,
+ argv[5], oi, oilen, &buffer);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ error("keyctl_dh_compute_alloc");
+
+ /* hexdump the contents */
+ printf("%u bytes of data in result:\n", ret);
+
+ sep = 0;
+ col = 0;
+ p = buffer;
+
+ do {
+ if (sep) {
+ putchar(sep);
+ sep = 0;
+ }
+
+ printf("%02hhx", *p);
+ *p = 0x00; /* zeroize buffer */
+ p++;
+
+ col++;
+ if (col % 32 == 0)
+ sep = '\n';
+ else if (col % 4 == 0)
+ sep = ' ';
+
+ } while (--ret > 0);
+
+ printf("\n");
+
+ free(buffer);
+
exit(0);
}
diff --git a/keyutils.c b/keyutils.c
index 2a69304..0da640c 100644
--- a/keyutils.c
+++ b/keyutils.c
@@ -244,6 +244,20 @@ long keyctl_dh_compute(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
return keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, ¶ms, buffer, buflen, 0);
}
+long keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
+ key_serial_t base, char *kdfname, char *otherinfo,
+ size_t otherinfolen, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
+{
+ struct keyctl_dh_params params = { .private = private,
+ .prime = prime,
+ .base = base };
+ struct keyctl_kdf_params kdfparams = { .kdfname = kdfname,
+ .otherinfo = otherinfo,
+ .otherinfolen = otherinfolen };
+
+ return keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, ¶ms, buffer, buflen, &kdfparams);
+}
+
/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* fetch key description into an allocated buffer
@@ -386,6 +400,36 @@ int keyctl_dh_compute_alloc(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
}
/*
+ * fetch DH computation results processed by a KDF into an
+ * allocated buffer
+ * - resulting buffer has an extra NUL added to the end
+ * - returns count (not including extraneous NUL)
+ */
+int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_alloc(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
+ key_serial_t base, size_t genlen, char *kdfname,
+ char *otherinfo, size_t otherinfolen,
+ void **_buffer)
+{
+ char *buf;
+ int ret;
+
+ buf = malloc(genlen + 1);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -1;
+
+ ret = keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(private, prime, base, kdfname, otherinfo,
+ otherinfolen, buf, genlen);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ free(buf);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ buf[ret] = 0;
+ *_buffer = buf;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
* Depth-first recursively apply a function over a keyring tree
*/
static int recursive_key_scan_aux(key_serial_t parent, key_serial_t key,
diff --git a/keyutils.h b/keyutils.h
index b321aa8..d5abd92 100644
--- a/keyutils.h
+++ b/keyutils.h
@@ -108,6 +108,13 @@ struct keyctl_dh_params {
key_serial_t base;
};
+struct keyctl_kdf_params {
+ char *kdfname;
+ char *otherinfo;
+ uint32_t otherinfolen;
+ uint32_t __spare[8];
+};
+
/*
* syscall wrappers
*/
@@ -163,6 +170,10 @@ extern long keyctl_invalidate(key_serial_t id);
extern long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t uid, key_serial_t id);
extern long keyctl_dh_compute(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
key_serial_t base, char *buffer, size_t buflen);
+extern long keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
+ key_serial_t base, char *kdfname,
+ char *otherinfo, size_t otherinfolen,
+ char *buffer, size_t buflen);
/*
* utilities
@@ -172,6 +183,10 @@ extern int keyctl_read_alloc(key_serial_t id, void **_buffer);
extern int keyctl_get_security_alloc(key_serial_t id, char **_buffer);
extern int keyctl_dh_compute_alloc(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
key_serial_t base, void **_buffer);
+extern int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_alloc(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
+ key_serial_t base, size_t genlen,
+ char *kdfname, char *otherinfo,
+ size_t otherinfolen, void **_buffer);
typedef int (*recursive_key_scanner_t)(key_serial_t parent, key_serial_t key,
char *desc, int desc_len, void *data);
diff --git a/man/keyctl_dh_compute_kdf.3 b/man/keyctl_dh_compute_kdf.3
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..06e2b29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/man/keyctl_dh_compute_kdf.3
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (C) 2006 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+.\" Copyright (C) 2016 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+.\" modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+.\" as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+.\" 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+.\"
+.TH KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE 3 "26 Jul 2016" Linux "Linux Key Management Calls"
+.\"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+.SH NAME
+keyctl_dh_compute_kdf \- Derive key from a Diffie-Hellman shared secret
+.\"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.nf
+.B #include <keyutils.h>
+.sp
+.BI "long keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(key_serial_t " private ", key_serial_t " prime ,
+.BI "key_serial_t " base ", char *" kdfname ", char *" otherinfo ",
+.BI "size_t " otherinfolen ", char *" buffer ", size_t " buflen ");"
+.sp
+.BI "long keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_alloc(key_serial_t " private,
+.BI "key_serial_t " prime ", key_serial_t " base ", size_t " genlen ",
+.BI "char *" kdfname ", "char *" otherinfo ", size_t " otherinfolen ",
+.BI "void **" _buffer ");"
+.\"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.BR keyctl_dh_compute_kdf ()
+derives a key from a Diffie-Hellman shared secret according to the protocol
+specified in SP800-56A.
+.P
+For the Diffie-Hellman computation, the following algorithm is used::
+.IP
+.I base
+^
+.I private
+( mod
+.I prime
+)
+.P
+To implement the protocol of SP800-56A
+.I base
+is a key containing the remote public key to compute the Diffie-Hellman
+shared secret. That shared secret is post-processed with a key derivation
+function.
+.P
+.IR base ", " private ", and " prime
+must all refer to
+.BR user -type
+keys containing the parameters for the computation. Each of these keys must
+grant the caller
+.B read
+permission in order for them to be used.
+.P
+The
+.I kdfname
+specifies the Linux kernel crypto API name for a key derivation function
+using a non-keyed hash, such as kdf_ctr(sha256). Using the counter KDF function
+specified with kdf_ctr() makes the key derivation compliant to SP800-56A.
+The
+.I kdfname
+must be a NULL terminated string.
+.P
+Following the specification of SP800-56A section 5.8.1.2 the
+.I otherinfo
+parameter may be provided. The format of the OtherInfo field is defined
+by the caller. The caller may also specify NULL as a valid argument when
+no OtherInfo data shall be processed. The length of the
+.I otherinfo
+parameter is specified with
+.I otherinfolen
+and is restricted to a maximum length by the kernel.
+.P
+The KDF returns the requested number of bytes specified with the
+.I genlen
+or the
+.I buflen
+parameter depending on the invoked function.
+.P
+.I buffer
+and
+.I buflen
+specify the buffer into which the computed result will be placed.
+.P
+.BR keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_alloc ()
+is similar to
+.BR keyctl_dh_compute_kdf ()
+except that it allocates a buffer with the size of
+.I genlen
+to hold the payload data and places the data in it. If successful, a pointer
+to the buffer is placed in
+.IR *_buffer .
+The caller must free the buffer.
+.P
+.\"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+.SH RETURN VALUE
+On success
+.BR keyctl_dh_compute_kdf ()
+returns the amount of data placed into the buffer when
+.I buflen
+is non-zero.
+.P
+On success
+.BR keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_alloc ()
+returns the amount of data in the buffer.
+.P
+On error, both functions set errno to an appropriate code and return the value
+.BR -1 .
+.\"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+.SH ERRORS
+.TP
+.B ENOKEY
+One of the keys specified is invalid or not readable.
+.TP
+.B EINVAL
+The buffer pointer is invalid or buflen is too small.
+.TP
+.B EOPNOTSUPP
+One of the keys was not a valid user key.
+.TP
+.B EMSGSIZE
+The size of either
+.I otherinfolen
+or
+.I buflen
+is too big.
+.\"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+.SH LINKING
+This is a library function that can be found in
+.IR libkeyutils .
+When linking,
+.B -lkeyutils
+should be specified to the linker.
+.\"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+.SH SEE ALSO
+.BR keyctl (1),
+.br
+.BR keyctl (2),
+.br
+.BR keyctl (3),
+.br
+.BR keyutils (7)
diff --git a/tests/keyctl/dh_compute/valid/runtest.sh b/tests/keyctl/dh_compute/valid/runtest.sh
index f2aace6..d8e338b 100644
--- a/tests/keyctl/dh_compute/valid/runtest.sh
+++ b/tests/keyctl/dh_compute/valid/runtest.sh
@@ -84,5 +84,173 @@ expect_multiline payload "$public"
echo "++++ FINISHED TEST: $result" >>$OUTPUTFILE
+
+################################################################
+# Testing DH compute with KDF according to SP800-56A
+#
+# test vectors from http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/keymgmt/KASTestVectorsFFC2014.zip
+################################################################
+
+# SHA-256
+
+# XephemCAVS
+private="\x81\xb2\xc6\x5f\x5c\xba\xc0\x0b\x13\x53\xac\x38\xbd\x77\xa2\x5a"
+private+="\x86\x50\xed\x48\x5e\x41\x3e\xac\x1d\x6c\x48\x85"
+
+# P
+prime="\xa3\xcc\x62\x23\xe5\x0c\x6e\x3f\x7b\xb0\x58\x1d\xcb\x9e\x9f\xf0"
+prime+="\x2c\x58\x07\x68\x32\x8a\x15\x20\x7b\x1c\x32\x31\x7f\xb7\x84\x96"
+prime+="\x81\x5e\x3c\xf7\xf9\xd0\x9c\xcb\x9f\xa8\x40\xff\x47\x98\x51\x1a"
+prime+="\x17\xb5\x59\x28\x72\x1e\x5d\xfb\xcc\xc5\x41\x47\xe0\xf0\x5f\x85"
+prime+="\xb3\xac\x41\x0b\x6a\xe3\xf5\x9b\x79\x6f\x3f\xea\xc7\xfc\x52\x49"
+prime+="\x21\x7e\xb2\xa0\x45\x88\x29\x3a\x5a\xde\x22\x78\x79\xf4\x6c\xeb"
+prime+="\x56\x45\x7b\x5c\x43\x12\x93\xe5\xe1\x04\xd1\xb9\x64\xbd\x2c\xdf"
+prime+="\xde\xff\xa0\x40\x49\xa9\x1e\x67\xee\x8c\x86\xe9\x44\xf0\x4f\x94"
+prime+="\x4a\x30\xe3\x61\xf8\xd1\x5d\x17\xe5\x01\x0c\xab\xb4\xef\x40\xc0"
+prime+="\xeb\xa5\xf4\xa2\x52\xd4\xfd\x6c\xf9\xda\xe6\x0e\x86\xe4\xb3\x00"
+prime+="\x9b\x1d\xfc\x92\x66\x70\x35\x72\x61\x58\x7a\xd0\x5c\x00\xa6\xc6"
+prime+="\xf0\x10\x6c\xec\x8f\xc5\x91\x31\x51\x50\x84\xa8\x70\x59\x41\x65"
+prime+="\xb4\x93\x90\xdb\x2d\x00\xe7\x53\x8f\x23\x0d\x53\x2f\x4a\x4e\xca"
+prime+="\x83\x09\xd7\x07\xc0\xb3\x83\x5c\xee\x04\xf3\xca\x55\x8a\x22\xc6"
+prime+="\xb5\x20\xfe\x25\xde\x6f\xfa\x90\xef\xda\x49\x27\xd0\x18\x59\x4c"
+prime+="\x0c\x0b\x77\x06\x73\x93\xb7\xf1\xe0\xfc\x7c\xf2\x16\xaf\xf3\x9f"
+
+# YephemIUT
+xa="\x9a\x70\x82\x2d\x3f\x06\x12\x3d\x0e\x51\x8e\xe1\x16\x51\xe5\xf6"
+xa+="\xb1\x19\xdc\x3b\x97\xd5\xb1\xc0\xa2\xa6\xf6\xde\x94\x25\x64\xba"
+xa+="\x10\x06\x1e\xec\xde\xb7\x36\x9c\xa5\x37\x49\x9e\x04\xb0\x36\xe9"
+xa+="\x7f\x44\x5a\x95\x6f\x63\x69\xae\x6e\x63\xfd\x27\xea\xe3\xe3\x47"
+xa+="\x85\x54\x47\xd3\xba\xc1\xc6\x0c\x10\xe7\x35\x07\x72\xc6\xc0\xc6"
+xa+="\xfb\xf9\xca\x3e\x38\xf0\xe8\x65\x88\x25\xd3\xb2\x0f\x1f\x02\x8f"
+xa+="\x35\xe3\x4d\x12\x35\x10\x3d\xf2\x33\x9b\x5b\x09\x9d\x3f\xe3\xe5"
+xa+="\x34\x6a\x69\x16\x42\xba\xc5\xb0\xbb\x03\xcd\x5d\x04\xd7\x56\x26"
+xa+="\x21\x49\x3f\xf1\xc4\x27\x3b\x6a\x45\xc5\xec\xb0\xb5\xe9\x08\xa0"
+xa+="\xf9\xf5\x62\x28\x2e\x85\x3e\xfc\x9a\x7e\xa1\x12\xe9\x47\x4f\xf6"
+xa+="\x94\x18\xf7\xc4\x7a\xe9\x66\xd4\x52\x4c\xa1\x70\x1b\x60\xa4\xbe"
+xa+="\x15\xc7\x5e\x27\xb4\x05\x80\x64\x68\x15\x6e\x02\xcb\xc5\x8f\xf4"
+xa+="\x66\x3c\x96\xac\x0c\x87\x36\x81\x35\xfa\x9b\x0b\xb6\x33\x7a\xe2"
+xa+="\x58\x52\x1d\x7d\x60\xc2\xa9\x1b\x4e\xd7\x72\xad\x65\x03\x40\x49"
+xa+="\x97\xf6\x79\x9d\xf6\x63\xa8\x99\x9c\xfd\x74\x7f\xa0\x67\xb9\x05"
+xa+="\x8a\xb3\x3b\xc1\x45\x94\x36\x6f\x28\xf5\xa2\xd9\x00\xb6\x46\x7a"
+
+# Z
+read -d '' shared <<"EOF"
+0fdbd9a2 ebf50cba 489b4e4d 7cd6924a 42ee6324 a26988b2 22bc38e6 9cc445f1
+eb47c1a4 62eca39f 39bcd7b8 19dede51 30bc38da ec99c16f 40a4e5c1 9c97b796
+8b41823d a0650e37 13c73e6f 5f2a9dff 2e67dbf5 40ee66f4 e694c28f ba1d604b
+71b57b8a eeb67a35 ba425a38 490b6fb9 f713db22 6f893b7a 8962f426 ba3046fb
+cff8538c 16f583e8 ae947672 0ba55ff9 75b440d0 c4565cc7 5837d23a fea61a39
+e0b7f6c4 e24c2154 7eb19fce f8dbed10 b06a9cce 971c0f0f ba7c1d5c b5035eaa
+4fddd3ba fe757339 e3321e3e 4ebfe9e7 9c6c0401 4df63cf9 28d0a2c0 5b2d5521
+030c35f1 c84c97fe 64cad509 8012a003 d52d24c4 1a1f9348 b7575251 3facb02f
+EOF
+
+# OI
+otherinfo="\xa1\xb2\xc3\xd4\xe5\x43\x41\x56\x53\x69\x64\x0d\x64\xc1\xb2"
+otherinfo+="\x33\x61\xb2\x61\xde\x78\x68\x8e\xa8\x65\xfc\xff\x11\x3c\x84"
+
+# DKM
+read -d '' derived <<"EOF"
+8284e313 02c8a26b 393ec52d 9f9e0882
+EOF
+
+pcreate_key "-e $prime" user dh:prime @s
+expect_keyid primeid
+
+pcreate_key "-e $xa" user dh:xa @s
+expect_keyid xaid
+
+pcreate_key "-e $private" user dh:private @s
+expect_keyid privateid
+
+marker "COMPUTE DH SHARED SECRET"
+dh_compute $privateid $primeid $xaid
+expect_multiline payload "$shared"
+
+marker "COMPUTE DERIVED KEY FROM DH SHARED SECRET (SHA-256)"
+echo -e -n $otherinfo | dh_compute_kdf_oi $privateid $primeid $xaid 16 "kdf_ctr(sha256)"
+expect_multiline payload "$derived"
+
+
+# SHA-224
+
+# XephemCAVS
+private="\x86\x1b\xa2\x59\xab\xa6\xaa\x57\x7d\xe2\x2f\x50\x8e\xcb\xbc\x26"
+private+="\xc5\xac\xfc\xcb\x9e\xa2\x3b\x43\x4d\x6d\x2b\x79"
+
+# P
+prime="\xa5\xb1\x76\x4e\x13\xc8\x16\x99\xab\xa3\x8f\x0d\xc0\xd1\x5e\x15"
+prime+="\xf5\x0f\xcd\x5c\xf7\xc2\x23\x72\xca\xfc\x5e\xd7\x62\x94\x1b\xd9"
+prime+="\xe0\xfb\x9a\xab\xee\x74\x66\xd2\xc8\x29\xaa\xb0\x31\xdb\x7b\x1b"
+prime+="\x5a\x64\xe6\x8e\xd5\x3b\xaf\xb2\x83\xba\x0f\x01\x8b\xeb\x3e\xdc"
+prime+="\x95\x7f\xe4\x53\xbe\x0d\xaa\xb6\x1b\x32\x28\x76\x3e\x80\x75\x8c"
+prime+="\x6d\x8c\x28\x3c\xf6\x30\xed\xd9\xd7\x0a\x8a\xf3\x30\xdd\x0a\xf6"
+prime+="\xa8\xd5\x94\xc2\x3c\xdd\x24\xc8\xad\x3f\xcf\xea\x41\x75\x77\x72"
+prime+="\xce\xed\x92\x1e\x63\x86\x2f\x24\x6e\x6f\x49\xd8\x74\x7e\x44\xae"
+prime+="\xf0\x1e\x30\x9b\x6d\xcc\x80\xd4\x50\x38\x3b\xb1\xf9\x4d\xd5\x90"
+prime+="\x84\xf8\xe9\x6f\x85\x6e\xc7\xc8\x33\x5e\xdb\x05\x5f\x8e\xc6\xc4"
+prime+="\x81\x52\x0b\x3f\x28\xe8\x0b\x62\x09\xb8\xae\x61\xcc\x86\x0e\x24"
+prime+="\xc8\x22\xb6\x6c\x4f\x97\x80\x49\x93\xbc\xd0\xa9\x72\xb3\x53\x54"
+prime+="\x01\x33\x0e\xbe\x4b\x2e\x92\x3f\x18\x9b\x63\x35\x62\xe4\x68\xeb"
+prime+="\x99\xa4\xbc\x88\xcc\xbf\xf8\xdf\x0f\xd5\xaf\xcf\xe6\xae\x19\x18"
+prime+="\x42\x14\xab\x3f\xef\xb7\xf0\x66\x8b\x8b\x26\x83\xbe\xbd\x56\x51"
+prime+="\xa4\xc6\x38\x43\xb9\xb1\x4b\xc7\x38\xd5\x20\xb1\xb7\x21\x2c\x69"
+
+# YephemIUT
+xa="\x17\xd7\x1a\xf4\x35\x3c\x22\x12\x2a\xeb\x2a\x06\x19\xcc\x2c\xf7"
+xa+="\x35\x53\xf2\x8e\x9f\xb1\x91\xfd\xb2\x86\xb1\x15\xb9\xfd\xa8\x66"
+xa+="\x2d\xe5\x17\x3b\x1a\xff\x70\x48\x8d\x9b\xc8\x48\xe5\x37\xd7\xe5"
+xa+="\x02\x16\x49\xd3\x7d\xc7\x8c\x94\x36\x9d\xb9\x0c\x27\x84\xc9\x4d"
+xa+="\x97\x0a\xc9\xb5\xe3\x5e\xfd\x22\xd4\x18\xd3\x1b\x68\xd9\x55\x0b"
+xa+="\xaa\x77\x16\xe9\x8e\xa6\x78\x3b\xb3\xa8\x45\x05\x9f\xba\xa4\xa6"
+xa+="\x72\x0a\x6a\x23\xc5\x6b\xa5\x2b\x4d\x9b\x72\x6e\x00\x68\xe9\xeb"
+xa+="\x4d\x17\x5b\xff\x43\x69\xf3\xd2\xa4\xaf\x66\xee\xcd\x62\xef\x7b"
+xa+="\x23\xc3\x37\xd4\x70\x95\x2b\x17\x67\xc8\xbf\x78\x2f\x0b\x58\xb4"
+xa+="\xfc\x82\x45\xf8\x40\x78\x71\x70\xf4\xb0\xa5\x1b\x5e\xb4\x60\x75"
+xa+="\x8a\xdd\xc9\xf4\x4a\x73\xa3\xf6\x07\x60\x3b\xd3\x50\x73\xd1\xa6"
+xa+="\x9a\x20\x3a\x04\x94\xa8\xc2\x02\x1b\xa0\xda\x1f\x04\x95\xf5\x60"
+xa+="\xc0\xba\x81\x79\x4e\xee\xeb\x82\x5d\x1b\xd3\x43\x16\xa5\x2a\xe1"
+xa+="\xc9\x00\x10\x0c\x0d\x6f\xa0\x25\x46\xed\x7a\x9c\x38\xa6\xa3\x43"
+xa+="\xd6\x86\x59\xee\xb5\x9c\xf3\x81\x04\xa9\x6b\xb2\x5a\x6d\xbb\xf0"
+xa+="\xcb\xc0\xed\xe7\x3a\x7b\xba\x67\x51\x81\xe0\xcd\x2e\x7b\x9f\x89"
+
+# Z
+read -d '' shared <<"EOF"
+057c22b8 c5872fef 08ebe852 fafab4b7 c2c2ffbb 376d71bd a941b16e 32614adf
+ebb82aeb d50f29d3 cec63d10 77f50e21 cf381b87 a818c614 52c5cce2 af85f40c
+06615b97 fe8c3a80 68990ac5 83957b52 8dd6d52d a3b51e84 aec355fd 4a3fe5ce
+faa3b17c 9e71cb4d 28ecab6d 21297280 e52397b7 ccb1b62d 8d5d3ce4 1d26b2a3
+bdbf880b b39e8b02 8a745ff2 9f0984da efe97084 5d850884 525403ca d2a52956
+f55b9a89 b2d801f1 710333c0 479c5955 b54c8163 83c65ad9 c78b8c67 cc1b211b
+208b9fab b9c99a68 18293e6a 8da069e6 75eb4317 668a7d4b 6f235533 f3ff4ed0
+4f8ad579 f9ad14e7 f68ae183 41d603d9 d6297123 00716c98 bbbf16eb 2a2cc92f
+EOF
+
+# OI
+otherinfo="\xa1\xb2\xc3\xd4\xe5\x43\x41\x56\x53\x69\x64\xaa\x27\xe2\x49"
+otherinfo+="\xbf\x0a\x12\x76\x46\x8d\x80\x82\x59\xf3\xb8\xe2\x68\x78\x51"
+
+# DKM
+read -d '' derived <<"EOF"
+88bf39c0 08eec33a dc3b4430 054ba262
+EOF
+
+pcreate_key "-e $prime" user dh:prime @s
+expect_keyid primeid
+
+pcreate_key "-e $xa" user dh:xa @s
+expect_keyid xaid
+
+pcreate_key "-e $private" user dh:private @s
+expect_keyid privateid
+
+marker "COMPUTE DH SHARED SECRET"
+dh_compute $privateid $primeid $xaid
+expect_multiline payload "$shared"
+
+marker "COMPUTE DERIVED KEY FROM DH SHARED SECRET (SHA-224)"
+echo -e -n $otherinfo | dh_compute_kdf_oi $privateid $primeid $xaid 16 "kdf_ctr(sha224)"
+expect_multiline payload "$derived"
+
# --- then report the results in the database ---
toolbox_report_result $TEST $result
diff --git a/tests/toolbox.inc.sh b/tests/toolbox.inc.sh
index 7f19a02..27b253f 100644
--- a/tests/toolbox.inc.sh
+++ b/tests/toolbox.inc.sh
@@ -1106,6 +1106,50 @@ function dh_compute ()
###############################################################################
#
+# Do a DH computation post-processed by a KDF
+#
+###############################################################################
+function dh_compute_kdf ()
+{
+ my_exitval=0
+ if [ "x$1" = "x--fail" ]
+ then
+ my_exitval=1
+ shift
+ fi
+
+ echo keyctl dh_compute_kdf $@ >>$OUTPUTFILE
+ keyctl dh_compute_kdf $@ >>$OUTPUTFILE 2>&1
+ if [ $? != $my_exitval ]
+ then
+ failed
+ fi
+}
+
+###############################################################################
+#
+# Do a DH computation post-processed by a KDF with other information
+#
+###############################################################################
+function dh_compute_kdf_oi ()
+{
+ my_exitval=0
+ if [ "x$1" = "x--fail" ]
+ then
+ my_exitval=1
+ shift
+ fi
+
+ echo keyctl dh_compute_kdf_oi $@ >>$OUTPUTFILE
+ keyctl dh_compute_kdf_oi $@ >>$OUTPUTFILE 2>&1
+ if [ $? != $my_exitval ]
+ then
+ failed
+ fi
+}
+
+###############################################################################
+#
# Make sure we sleep at least N seconds
#
###############################################################################
diff --git a/version.lds b/version.lds
index 2bfed13..b8eebfb 100644
--- a/version.lds
+++ b/version.lds
@@ -66,5 +66,7 @@ KEYUTILS_1.6 {
/* management functions */
keyctl_dh_compute;
keyctl_dh_compute_alloc;
+ keyctl_dh_compute_kdf;
+ keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_alloc;
} KEYUTILS_1.5;
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH v2] DH support: add KDF handling support
From: Stephan Mueller @ 2016-08-04 18:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mat Martineau; +Cc: David Howells, keyrings, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <2313703.12yUpncF2W@positron.chronox.de>
Am Donnerstag, 4. August 2016, 20:38:59 CEST schrieb Stephan Mueller:
Hi Mat,
> @@ -1663,6 +1668,7 @@ static void act_keyctl_dh_compute(int argc, char
> *argv[]) }
>
> printf("%02hhx", *p);
> + *p = 0x00; /* zeroize buffer */
> p++;
>
> col++;
> @@ -1674,6 +1680,125 @@ static void act_keyctl_dh_compute(int argc, char
> *argv[]) } while (--ret > 0);
>
> printf("\n");
> +
> + free(buffer);
I hope it is ok that I add a bugfix in that patch set.
Ciao
Stephan
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH
From: Mat Martineau @ 2016-08-04 20:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stephan Mueller; +Cc: David Howells, keyrings, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <2239809.KsND40bFeW@positron.chronox.de>
Stephan,
On Thu, 4 Aug 2016, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Hi Mat,
>
> the following code addresses all your comments as discussed.
>
> In addition, this code is now complete: it contains an extension
> to the documentation as well as the compat code. The compat
> code was tested successfully with compiling the user space tool
> with -m32 after applying the patch from David ensuring the
> invocation of the keyctl compat syscall.
>
> Ciao
> Stephan
>
> ---8<----
>
> SP800-56A defines the use of DH with key derivation function based on a
> counter. The input to the KDF is defined as (DH shared secret || other
> information). The value for the "other information" is to be provided by
> the caller.
>
> The KDF is provided by the kernel crypto API. The SP800-56A KDF is equal
> to the SP800-108 counter KDF. However, the caller is allowed to specify
> the KDF type that he wants to use to derive the key material allowing
> the use of the other KDFs provided with the kernel crypto API.
>
> As the KDF implements the proper truncation of the DH shared secret to
> the requested size, this patch fills the caller buffer up to its size.
>
> The patch is tested with a new test added to the keyutils user space
> code which uses a CAVS test vector testing the compliance with
> SP800-56A.
>
> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
> ---
> Documentation/security/keys.txt | 35 +++++++++---
> include/linux/compat.h | 7 +++
> include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h | 7 +++
> security/keys/Kconfig | 1 +
> security/keys/compat.c | 34 +++++++++++-
> security/keys/dh.c | 119 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> security/keys/internal.h | 9 ++-
> security/keys/keyctl.c | 2 +-
> 8 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
> index 3849814..29fc036 100644
> --- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
> @@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
>
> long keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, struct keyctl_dh_params *params,
> char *buffer, size_t buflen,
> - void *reserved);
> + struct keyctl_kdf_params *kdf);
>
> The params struct contains serial numbers for three keys:
>
> @@ -844,18 +844,37 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
> public key. If the base is the remote public key, the result is
> the shared secret.
>
> - The reserved argument must be set to NULL.
> + If the parameter kdf is NULL, the following applies:
>
> - The buffer length must be at least the length of the prime, or zero.
> + - The buffer length must be at least the length of the prime, or zero.
>
> - If the buffer length is nonzero, the length of the result is
> - returned when it is successfully calculated and copied in to the
> - buffer. When the buffer length is zero, the minimum required
> - buffer length is returned.
> + - If the buffer length is nonzero, the length of the result is
> + returned when it is successfully calculated and copied in to the
> + buffer. When the buffer length is zero, the minimum required
> + buffer length is returned.
> +
> + The kdf parameter allows the caller to apply a key derivation function
> + (KDF) on the Diffie-Hellman computation where only the result
> + of the KDF is returned to the caller. The KDF is characterized with
> + struct keyctl_kdf_params as follows:
> +
> + - char *kdfname specifies the NULL terminated string identifying
Change "NULL" to "NUL". NULL refers to a zero pointer, NUL refers to the
'\0' character.
> + the KDF function used from the kernel crypto API. As of now,
> + only non-keyed KDFs are supported, such as kdf_ctr(sha256),
> + kdf_fb(sha1) or kdf_dpi(sha512). The use of kdf_ctr() complies
> + with SP800-56A.
> +
> + - char *otherinfo specifies the OtherInfo string as documented in
I suggest calling it "OtherInfo data" rather than a "string", which
implies a NUL-terminated C string.
> + SP800-56A section 5.8.1.2. The length of the buffer is given with
> + otherinfolen. The format of OtherInfo is defined by the caller.
> + The otherinfo pointer may be NULL if no OtherInfo shall be used.
>
> This function will return error EOPNOTSUPP if the key type is not
> supported, error ENOKEY if the key could not be found, or error
> - EACCES if the key is not readable by the caller.
> + EACCES if the key is not readable by the caller. In addition, the
> + function will return EMSGSIZE when the parameter kdf is non-NULL
> + and either the buffer length or the OtherInfo length exceeds the
> + allowed length.
>
> ===============
> KERNEL SERVICES
> diff --git a/include/linux/compat.h b/include/linux/compat.h
> index f964ef7..00f348f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/compat.h
> +++ b/include/linux/compat.h
> @@ -295,6 +295,13 @@ struct compat_old_sigaction {
> };
> #endif
>
> +struct compat_keyctl_kdf_params {
> + compat_uptr_t kdfname;
> + compat_uptr_t otherinfo;
> + __u32 otherinfolen;
> + __u32 __spare[8];
> +};
> +
> struct compat_statfs;
> struct compat_statfs64;
> struct compat_old_linux_dirent;
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h
> index 86eddd6..0abe048 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h
> @@ -68,4 +68,11 @@ struct keyctl_dh_params {
> __s32 base;
> };
>
> +struct keyctl_kdf_params {
> + char *kdfname;
> + char *otherinfo;
> + __u32 otherinfolen;
> + __u32 __spare[8];
> +};
> +
> #endif /* _LINUX_KEYCTL_H */
> diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
> index f826e87..56491fe 100644
> --- a/security/keys/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
> @@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ config KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
> bool "Diffie-Hellman operations on retained keys"
> depends on KEYS
> select MPILIB
> + select CRYPTO_KDF
> help
> This option provides support for calculating Diffie-Hellman
> public keys and shared secrets using values stored as keys
> diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
> index 36c80bf..7a7d48a 100644
> --- a/security/keys/compat.c
> +++ b/security/keys/compat.c
> @@ -48,6 +48,35 @@ static long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
> return ret;
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
See chapter 20 of https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/CodingStyle,
preprocessor conditionals are advised against in .c files.
You can put the function prototype and stub implementation in internal.h,
and move the function to compat_dh.c. Then the Makefile should only build
compat_dh.c if both relevant config options are set (look for "compat-obj"
in other Makefiles).
> +static long compat_keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
> + char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
> + struct compat_keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
> +{
> + struct keyctl_kdf_params kdfcopy;
> + struct compat_keyctl_kdf_params compat_kdfcopy;
> +
> + if (!kdf)
> + return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, NULL);
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&compat_kdfcopy, kdf, sizeof(compat_kdfcopy)) != 0)
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + kdfcopy.kdfname = compat_ptr(compat_kdfcopy.kdfname);
> + kdfcopy.otherinfo = compat_ptr(compat_kdfcopy.otherinfo);
> + kdfcopy.otherinfolen = compat_kdfcopy.otherinfolen;
> +
> + return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, &kdfcopy);
> +}
> +#else
> +static long compat_keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
> + char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
> + struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
> +{
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * The key control system call, 32-bit compatibility version for 64-bit archs
> *
> @@ -133,8 +162,9 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, u32, option,
> return keyctl_get_persistent(arg2, arg3);
>
> case KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE:
> - return keyctl_dh_compute(compat_ptr(arg2), compat_ptr(arg3),
> - arg4, compat_ptr(arg5));
> + return compat_keyctl_dh_compute(compat_ptr(arg2),
> + compat_ptr(arg3),
> + arg4, compat_ptr(arg5));
>
> default:
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> diff --git a/security/keys/dh.c b/security/keys/dh.c
> index 531ed2e..6a3dea9 100644
> --- a/security/keys/dh.c
> +++ b/security/keys/dh.c
> @@ -77,9 +77,44 @@ error:
> return ret;
> }
>
> -long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
> - char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
> - void __user *reserved)
> +static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
> + char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
> + uint8_t *kbuf, size_t kbuflen)
> +{
> + uint8_t *outbuf = NULL;
> + int ret;
> +
> +#if 0W
Need to remove these conditional lines.
> + /* we do not support HMAC currently */
> + ret = crypto_rng_reset(tfm, xx, xxlen);
> + if (ret) {
> + crypto_free_rng(tfm);
> + goto error5;
> + }
> +#endif
> +
> + outbuf = kmalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!outbuf) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> + ret = crypto_rng_generate(tfm, kbuf, kbuflen, outbuf, buflen);
> + if (ret)
> + goto err;
> +
> + ret = buflen;
> + if (copy_to_user(buffer, outbuf, buflen) != 0)
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> +
> +err:
> + kzfree(outbuf);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
> + char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
> + struct keyctl_kdf_params *kdfcopy)
> {
> long ret;
> MPI base, private, prime, result;
> @@ -88,6 +123,7 @@ long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
> uint8_t *kbuf;
> ssize_t keylen;
> size_t resultlen;
> + struct crypto_rng *tfm = NULL;
>
> if (!params || (!buffer && buflen)) {
> ret = -EINVAL;
> @@ -98,12 +134,36 @@ long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
> goto out;
> }
>
> - if (reserved) {
> - ret = -EINVAL;
> - goto out;
> + if (kdfcopy) {
> + char *kdfname;
> +
> + if (buflen > KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OUTPUTLEN ||
> + kdfcopy->otherinfolen > KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_STRING_LEN) {
> + ret = -EMSGSIZE;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + /* get KDF name string */
> + kdfname = strndup_user(kdfcopy->kdfname, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
> + if (IS_ERR(kdfname)) {
> + ret = PTR_ERR(kdfname);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + /* allocate KDF from the kernel crypto API */
> + tfm = crypto_alloc_rng(kdfname, 0, 0);
> + kfree(kdfname);
> + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
> + ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
> + goto out;
> + }
> }
>
> - keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.prime, buflen, &prime);
> + /*
> + * If the caller requests postprocessing with a KDF, allow an
> + * arbitrary output buffer size since the KDF ensures proper truncation.
> + */
> + keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.prime, kdfcopy ? SIZE_MAX : buflen, &prime);
> if (keylen < 0 || !prime) {
> /* buflen == 0 may be used to query the required buffer size,
> * which is the prime key length.
> @@ -133,12 +193,25 @@ long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
> goto error3;
> }
>
> - kbuf = kmalloc(resultlen, GFP_KERNEL);
> + /* allocate space for DH shared secret and SP800-56A otherinfo */
> + kbuf = kmalloc(kdfcopy ? (resultlen + kdfcopy->otherinfolen) : resultlen,
> + GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!kbuf) {
> ret = -ENOMEM;
> goto error4;
> }
>
> + /*
> + * Concatenate SP800-56A otherinfo past DH shared secret -- the
> + * input to the KDF is (DH shared secret || otherinfo)
> + */
> + if (kdfcopy && kdfcopy->otherinfo &&
> + copy_from_user(kbuf + resultlen, kdfcopy->otherinfo,
> + kdfcopy->otherinfolen) != 0) {
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + goto error5;
> + }
> +
> ret = do_dh(result, base, private, prime);
> if (ret)
> goto error5;
> @@ -147,12 +220,17 @@ long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
> if (ret != 0)
> goto error5;
>
> - ret = nbytes;
> - if (copy_to_user(buffer, kbuf, nbytes) != 0)
> - ret = -EFAULT;
> + if (kdfcopy) {
> + ret = keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(tfm, buffer, buflen, kbuf,
> + resultlen + kdfcopy->otherinfolen);
> + } else {
> + ret = nbytes;
> + if (copy_to_user(buffer, kbuf, nbytes) != 0)
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> + }
>
> error5:
> - kfree(kbuf);
> + kzfree(kbuf);
> error4:
> mpi_free(result);
> error3:
> @@ -162,5 +240,22 @@ error2:
> error1:
> mpi_free(prime);
> out:
> + if (tfm)
> + crypto_free_rng(tfm);
> return ret;
> }
> +
> +long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
> + char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
> + struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
> +{
> + struct keyctl_kdf_params kdfcopy;
> +
> + if (!kdf)
> + return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, NULL);
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&kdfcopy, kdf, sizeof(kdfcopy)) != 0)
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, &kdfcopy);
I'd find this more readable if there was one call to __keyctl_dh_compute.
> +}
> diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
> index a705a7d..9014af3 100644
> --- a/security/keys/internal.h
> +++ b/security/keys/internal.h
> @@ -259,12 +259,17 @@ static inline long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t uid, key_serial_t destring)
> #endif
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
> +#include <crypto/rng.h>
> extern long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *, char __user *,
> - size_t, void __user *);
> + size_t, struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *);
> +extern long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *, char __user *,
> + size_t, struct keyctl_kdf_params *);
> +#define KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OUTPUTLEN 1024 /* max length of KDF output */
KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OUTPUT_LEN
^
for consistency?
> +#define KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_STRING_LEN 64 /* maximum length of strings */
Since this applies only to otherinfo (binary bytes, not a C string),
avoid "STRING"/"strings".
> #else
> static inline long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
> char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
> - void __user *reserved)
> + struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
> {
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
> diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
> index d580ad0..b106898 100644
> --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
> +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
> @@ -1689,7 +1689,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
> case KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE:
> return keyctl_dh_compute((struct keyctl_dh_params __user *) arg2,
> (char __user *) arg3, (size_t) arg4,
> - (void __user *) arg5);
> + (struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *) arg5);
>
> default:
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
Regards,
--
Mat Martineau
Intel OTC
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] DH support: add KDF handling support
From: Mat Martineau @ 2016-08-04 20:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stephan Mueller; +Cc: David Howells, keyrings, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <2313703.12yUpncF2W@positron.chronox.de>
Stephan,
On Thu, 4 Aug 2016, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Hi Mat, David,
>
> this patch covers all comments you raised. I also added a man page
> for the new API calls.
>
> ---8<---
>
> Add the interface logic to support DH with KDF handling support.
>
> The dh_compute code now allows the following options:
>
> - no KDF support / output of raw DH shared secret:
> dh_compute <private> <prime> <base>
>
> - KDF support without "other information" string:
> dh_compute_kdf <private> <prime> <base> <output length> <KDF type>
>
> - KDF support with "other information string:
> dh_compute_kdf_oi <private> <prime> <base> <output length> <KDF type>
> where the OI string is provided on STDIN.
>
> The test to verify the code is based on a test vector used for the CAVS
> testing of SP800-56A.
>
> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
> ---
> Makefile | 1 +
> keyctl.c | 125 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> keyutils.c | 44 ++++++++
> keyutils.h | 15 +++
> man/keyctl_dh_compute_kdf.3 | 143 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> tests/keyctl/dh_compute/valid/runtest.sh | 168 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> tests/toolbox.inc.sh | 44 ++++++++
> version.lds | 2 +
> 8 files changed, 542 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 man/keyctl_dh_compute_kdf.3
> diff --git a/keyutils.c b/keyutils.c
> index 2a69304..0da640c 100644
> --- a/keyutils.c
> +++ b/keyutils.c
> @@ -244,6 +244,20 @@ long keyctl_dh_compute(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
> return keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, ¶ms, buffer, buflen, 0);
> }
>
> +long keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
> + key_serial_t base, char *kdfname, char *otherinfo,
> + size_t otherinfolen, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
> +{
> + struct keyctl_dh_params params = { .private = private,
> + .prime = prime,
> + .base = base };
> + struct keyctl_kdf_params kdfparams = { .kdfname = kdfname,
> + .otherinfo = otherinfo,
> + .otherinfolen = otherinfolen };
> +
> + return keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, ¶ms, buffer, buflen, &kdfparams);
> +}
> +
> /*****************************************************************************/
> /*
> * fetch key description into an allocated buffer
> @@ -386,6 +400,36 @@ int keyctl_dh_compute_alloc(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
> }
>
> /*
> + * fetch DH computation results processed by a KDF into an
> + * allocated buffer
> + * - resulting buffer has an extra NUL added to the end
> + * - returns count (not including extraneous NUL)
> + */
I don't think this function should be added. Since genlen is known, the
caller can handle all of the memory management and call
keyctl_dh_compute_kdf itself. Other _alloc functions do something extra,
like ask the kernel how big of a buffer is needed.
> +int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_alloc(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
> + key_serial_t base, size_t genlen, char *kdfname,
> + char *otherinfo, size_t otherinfolen,
> + void **_buffer)
> +{
> + char *buf;
> + int ret;
> +
> + buf = malloc(genlen + 1);
> + if (!buf)
> + return -1;
> +
> + ret = keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(private, prime, base, kdfname, otherinfo,
> + otherinfolen, buf, genlen);
> + if (ret < 0) {
> + free(buf);
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> + buf[ret] = 0;
> + *_buffer = buf;
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> * Depth-first recursively apply a function over a keyring tree
> */
> static int recursive_key_scan_aux(key_serial_t parent, key_serial_t key,
> diff --git a/keyutils.h b/keyutils.h
> index b321aa8..d5abd92 100644
> --- a/keyutils.h
> +++ b/keyutils.h
> @@ -108,6 +108,13 @@ struct keyctl_dh_params {
> key_serial_t base;
> };
>
> +struct keyctl_kdf_params {
> + char *kdfname;
> + char *otherinfo;
> + uint32_t otherinfolen;
> + uint32_t __spare[8];
> +};
> +
> /*
> * syscall wrappers
> */
> @@ -163,6 +170,10 @@ extern long keyctl_invalidate(key_serial_t id);
> extern long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t uid, key_serial_t id);
> extern long keyctl_dh_compute(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
> key_serial_t base, char *buffer, size_t buflen);
> +extern long keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
> + key_serial_t base, char *kdfname,
> + char *otherinfo, size_t otherinfolen,
> + char *buffer, size_t buflen);
>
> /*
> * utilities
> @@ -172,6 +183,10 @@ extern int keyctl_read_alloc(key_serial_t id, void **_buffer);
> extern int keyctl_get_security_alloc(key_serial_t id, char **_buffer);
> extern int keyctl_dh_compute_alloc(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
> key_serial_t base, void **_buffer);
> +extern int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_alloc(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
> + key_serial_t base, size_t genlen,
> + char *kdfname, char *otherinfo,
> + size_t otherinfolen, void **_buffer);
>
> typedef int (*recursive_key_scanner_t)(key_serial_t parent, key_serial_t key,
> char *desc, int desc_len, void *data);
> diff --git a/man/keyctl_dh_compute_kdf.3 b/man/keyctl_dh_compute_kdf.3
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..06e2b29
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/man/keyctl_dh_compute_kdf.3
My vote is to include this content in keyctl_dh_compute.3 instead of
adding a separate man page.
> @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
> +.\"
> +.\" Copyright (C) 2006 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
> +.\" Copyright (C) 2016 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
> +.\"
> +.\" This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
> +.\" modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
> +.\" as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
> +.\" 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
> +.\"
> +.TH KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE 3 "26 Jul 2016" Linux "Linux Key Management Calls"
> +.\"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
> +.SH NAME
> +keyctl_dh_compute_kdf \- Derive key from a Diffie-Hellman shared secret
> +.\"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
> +.SH SYNOPSIS
> +.nf
> +.B #include <keyutils.h>
> +.sp
> +.BI "long keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(key_serial_t " private ", key_serial_t " prime ,
> +.BI "key_serial_t " base ", char *" kdfname ", char *" otherinfo ",
> +.BI "size_t " otherinfolen ", char *" buffer ", size_t " buflen ");"
> +.sp
> +.BI "long keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_alloc(key_serial_t " private,
> +.BI "key_serial_t " prime ", key_serial_t " base ", size_t " genlen ",
> +.BI "char *" kdfname ", "char *" otherinfo ", size_t " otherinfolen ",
> +.BI "void **" _buffer ");"
> +.\"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
> +.SH DESCRIPTION
> +.BR keyctl_dh_compute_kdf ()
> +derives a key from a Diffie-Hellman shared secret according to the protocol
> +specified in SP800-56A.
> +.P
> +For the Diffie-Hellman computation, the following algorithm is used::
> +.IP
> +.I base
> +^
> +.I private
> +( mod
> +.I prime
> +)
> +.P
> +To implement the protocol of SP800-56A
> +.I base
> +is a key containing the remote public key to compute the Diffie-Hellman
> +shared secret. That shared secret is post-processed with a key derivation
> +function.
> +.P
> +.IR base ", " private ", and " prime
> +must all refer to
> +.BR user -type
> +keys containing the parameters for the computation. Each of these keys must
> +grant the caller
> +.B read
> +permission in order for them to be used.
> +.P
> +The
> +.I kdfname
> +specifies the Linux kernel crypto API name for a key derivation function
> +using a non-keyed hash, such as kdf_ctr(sha256). Using the counter KDF function
> +specified with kdf_ctr() makes the key derivation compliant to SP800-56A.
> +The
> +.I kdfname
> +must be a NULL terminated string.
> +.P
> +Following the specification of SP800-56A section 5.8.1.2 the
> +.I otherinfo
> +parameter may be provided. The format of the OtherInfo field is defined
> +by the caller. The caller may also specify NULL as a valid argument when
> +no OtherInfo data shall be processed. The length of the
> +.I otherinfo
> +parameter is specified with
> +.I otherinfolen
> +and is restricted to a maximum length by the kernel.
> +.P
> +The KDF returns the requested number of bytes specified with the
> +.I genlen
> +or the
> +.I buflen
> +parameter depending on the invoked function.
> +.P
> +.I buffer
> +and
> +.I buflen
> +specify the buffer into which the computed result will be placed.
> +.P
> +.BR keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_alloc ()
> +is similar to
> +.BR keyctl_dh_compute_kdf ()
> +except that it allocates a buffer with the size of
> +.I genlen
> +to hold the payload data and places the data in it. If successful, a pointer
> +to the buffer is placed in
> +.IR *_buffer .
> +The caller must free the buffer.
> +.P
> +.\"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
> +.SH RETURN VALUE
> +On success
> +.BR keyctl_dh_compute_kdf ()
> +returns the amount of data placed into the buffer when
> +.I buflen
> +is non-zero.
> +.P
> +On success
> +.BR keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_alloc ()
> +returns the amount of data in the buffer.
> +.P
> +On error, both functions set errno to an appropriate code and return the value
> +.BR -1 .
> +.\"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
> +.SH ERRORS
> +.TP
> +.B ENOKEY
> +One of the keys specified is invalid or not readable.
> +.TP
> +.B EINVAL
> +The buffer pointer is invalid or buflen is too small.
> +.TP
> +.B EOPNOTSUPP
> +One of the keys was not a valid user key.
> +.TP
> +.B EMSGSIZE
> +The size of either
> +.I otherinfolen
> +or
> +.I buflen
> +is too big.
> +.\"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
> +.SH LINKING
> +This is a library function that can be found in
> +.IR libkeyutils .
> +When linking,
> +.B -lkeyutils
> +should be specified to the linker.
> +.\"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
> +.SH SEE ALSO
> +.BR keyctl (1),
> +.br
> +.BR keyctl (2),
> +.br
> +.BR keyctl (3),
> +.br
> +.BR keyutils (7)
--
Mat Martineau
Intel OTC
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] DH support: add KDF handling support
From: Stephan Mueller @ 2016-08-05 6:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mat Martineau; +Cc: David Howells, keyrings, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <alpine.OSX.2.20.1608041346090.55029@mjmartin-mac01.local>
Am Donnerstag, 4. August 2016, 13:57:27 CEST schrieb Mat Martineau:
Hi Mat,
> Stephan,
>
> On Thu, 4 Aug 2016, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> > Hi Mat, David,
> >
> > this patch covers all comments you raised. I also added a man page
> > for the new API calls.
> >
> > ---8<---
> >
> > Add the interface logic to support DH with KDF handling support.
> >
> > The dh_compute code now allows the following options:
> >
> > - no KDF support / output of raw DH shared secret:
> > dh_compute <private> <prime> <base>
> >
> > - KDF support without "other information" string:
> > dh_compute_kdf <private> <prime> <base> <output length> <KDF type>
> >
> > - KDF support with "other information string:
> > dh_compute_kdf_oi <private> <prime> <base> <output length> <KDF type>
> >
> > where the OI string is provided on STDIN.
> >
> > The test to verify the code is based on a test vector used for the CAVS
> > testing of SP800-56A.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
> > ---
> > Makefile | 1 +
> > keyctl.c | 125 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> > keyutils.c | 44 ++++++++
> > keyutils.h | 15 +++
> > man/keyctl_dh_compute_kdf.3 | 143 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > tests/keyctl/dh_compute/valid/runtest.sh | 168
> > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/toolbox.inc.sh
> > | 44 ++++++++
> > version.lds | 2 +
> > 8 files changed, 542 insertions(+)
> > create mode 100644 man/keyctl_dh_compute_kdf.3
> >
> > diff --git a/keyutils.c b/keyutils.c
> > index 2a69304..0da640c 100644
> > --- a/keyutils.c
> > +++ b/keyutils.c
> > @@ -244,6 +244,20 @@ long keyctl_dh_compute(key_serial_t private,
> > key_serial_t prime,>
> > return keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, ¶ms, buffer, buflen, 0);
> >
> > }
> >
> > +long keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
> > + key_serial_t base, char *kdfname, char *otherinfo,
> > + size_t otherinfolen, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
> > +{
> > + struct keyctl_dh_params params = { .private = private,
> > + .prime = prime,
> > + .base = base };
> > + struct keyctl_kdf_params kdfparams = { .kdfname = kdfname,
> > + .otherinfo = otherinfo,
> > + .otherinfolen = otherinfolen };
> > +
> > + return keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, ¶ms, buffer, buflen, &kdfparams);
> > +}
> > +
> > /*************************************************************************
> > ****/ /*
> >
> > * fetch key description into an allocated buffer
> >
> > @@ -386,6 +400,36 @@ int keyctl_dh_compute_alloc(key_serial_t private,
> > key_serial_t prime, }
> >
> > /*
> > + * fetch DH computation results processed by a KDF into an
> > + * allocated buffer
> > + * - resulting buffer has an extra NUL added to the end
> > + * - returns count (not including extraneous NUL)
> > + */
>
> I don't think this function should be added. Since genlen is known, the
> caller can handle all of the memory management and call
> keyctl_dh_compute_kdf itself. Other _alloc functions do something extra,
> like ask the kernel how big of a buffer is needed.
Ok, I will remove this one.
>
> > +int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_alloc(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
> > + key_serial_t base, size_t genlen, char *kdfname,
> > + char *otherinfo, size_t otherinfolen,
> > + void **_buffer)
> > +{
> > + char *buf;
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + buf = malloc(genlen + 1);
> > + if (!buf)
> > + return -1;
> > +
> > + ret = keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(private, prime, base, kdfname, otherinfo,
> > + otherinfolen, buf, genlen);
> > + if (ret < 0) {
> > + free(buf);
> > + return -1;
> > + }
> > +
> > + buf[ret] = 0;
> > + *_buffer = buf;
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> >
> > * Depth-first recursively apply a function over a keyring tree
> > */
> >
> > static int recursive_key_scan_aux(key_serial_t parent, key_serial_t key,
> > diff --git a/keyutils.h b/keyutils.h
> > index b321aa8..d5abd92 100644
> > --- a/keyutils.h
> > +++ b/keyutils.h
> > @@ -108,6 +108,13 @@ struct keyctl_dh_params {
> >
> > key_serial_t base;
> >
> > };
> >
> > +struct keyctl_kdf_params {
> > + char *kdfname;
> > + char *otherinfo;
> > + uint32_t otherinfolen;
> > + uint32_t __spare[8];
> > +};
> > +
> > /*
> >
> > * syscall wrappers
> > */
> >
> > @@ -163,6 +170,10 @@ extern long keyctl_invalidate(key_serial_t id);
> > extern long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t uid, key_serial_t id);
> > extern long keyctl_dh_compute(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
> >
> > key_serial_t base, char *buffer, size_t buflen);
> >
> > +extern long keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t
> > prime, + key_serial_t base, char *kdfname,
> > + char *otherinfo, size_t otherinfolen,
> > + char *buffer, size_t buflen);
> >
> > /*
> >
> > * utilities
> >
> > @@ -172,6 +183,10 @@ extern int keyctl_read_alloc(key_serial_t id, void
> > **_buffer); extern int keyctl_get_security_alloc(key_serial_t id, char
> > **_buffer); extern int keyctl_dh_compute_alloc(key_serial_t private,
> > key_serial_t prime,>
> > key_serial_t base, void **_buffer);
> >
> > +extern int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_alloc(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t
> > prime, + key_serial_t base, size_t genlen,
> > + char *kdfname, char *otherinfo,
> > + size_t otherinfolen, void **_buffer);
> >
> > typedef int (*recursive_key_scanner_t)(key_serial_t parent, key_serial_t
> > key,>
> > char *desc, int desc_len, void *data);
> >
> > diff --git a/man/keyctl_dh_compute_kdf.3 b/man/keyctl_dh_compute_kdf.3
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 0000000..06e2b29
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/man/keyctl_dh_compute_kdf.3
>
> My vote is to include this content in keyctl_dh_compute.3 instead of
> adding a separate man page.
Ok, I will move that into the existing man page.
Ciao
Stephan
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH
From: Stephan Mueller @ 2016-08-05 6:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mat Martineau; +Cc: David Howells, keyrings, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <alpine.OSX.2.20.1608041258050.55029@mjmartin-mac01.local>
Am Donnerstag, 4. August 2016, 13:41:58 CEST schrieb Mat Martineau:
Hi Mat,
I will take care of your comments in the next iteration.
Ciao
Stephan
^ permalink raw reply
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From: baliaoyu @ 2016-08-05 6:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
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------------------------------------------
期望决定表现,表现决定结果。
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] crypto: crc32c-vpmsum - Convert to CPU feature based module autoloading
From: Michael Ellerman @ 2016-08-05 6:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Anton Blanchard
Cc: Anton Blanchard, benh, paulus, herbert, davem, alastair,
linuxppc-dev, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <20160804202601.12aa879e@kryten>
Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> writes:
> Hi Michael,
>
>> Is VEC_CRYPTO the right feature?
>>
>> That's new power8 crypto stuff.
>
> The vpmsum* instructions are part of the same pipeline as the vcipher*
> instructions, introduced in POWER8.
OK.
>> I thought this only used VMX? (but I haven't looked closely)
>
> Yes, vcipher* and vpmsum* are VMX instructions.
Right. The confusion is that we have PPC_FEATURE_HAS_ALTIVEC, but that
doesn't mean we have *these* VMX instructions.
This is actually an arch/powerpc patch, so I'll merge it unless Herbert
objects.
cheers
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH
From: Stephan Mueller @ 2016-08-05 7:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mat Martineau; +Cc: David Howells, keyrings, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <alpine.OSX.2.20.1608041258050.55029@mjmartin-mac01.local>
Am Donnerstag, 4. August 2016, 13:41:58 CEST schrieb Mat Martineau:
Hi Mat,
> > +
> > +long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
> > + char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
> > + struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
> > +{
> > + struct keyctl_kdf_params kdfcopy;
> > +
> > + if (!kdf)
> > + return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, NULL);
> > +
> > + if (copy_from_user(&kdfcopy, kdf, sizeof(kdfcopy)) != 0)
> > + return -EFAULT;
> > +
> > + return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, &kdfcopy);
>
> I'd find this more readable if there was one call to __keyctl_dh_compute.
When trying to implement it, I think that it would even be more confusing,
because we need a conditional in any case. Do you like
return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, (kdf) ? &kdfcopy : NULL);
better than the already presented code? Besides, this would now imply that we
have two conditionals instead of one.
Ciao
Stephan
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v2 1/7] crypto: img-hash - Fix null pointer exception
From: Will Thomas @ 2016-08-05 13:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-crypto, Will Thomas
In-Reply-To: <1470402020-10774-1-git-send-email-will.thomas@imgtec.com>
Sporadic null pointer exceptions came from here. Fix them.
Signed-off-by: Will Thomas <will.thomas@imgtec.com>
Reviewed-by: James Hartley <james.hartley@imgtec.com>
---
drivers/crypto/img-hash.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c b/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
index 68e8aa9..e5c941b 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ static void img_hash_dma_task(unsigned long d)
size_t nbytes, bleft, wsend, len, tbc;
struct scatterlist tsg;
- if (!ctx->sg)
+ if (!hdev->req || !ctx->sg)
return;
addr = sg_virt(ctx->sg);
--
2.1.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 2/7] crypto: img-hash - Fix hash request context
From: Will Thomas @ 2016-08-05 13:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-crypto, Will Thomas
In-Reply-To: <1470402020-10774-1-git-send-email-will.thomas@imgtec.com>
Move 0 length buffer to end of structure to stop overwriting
fallback request data. This doesn't cause a bug itself as the
buffer is never used alongside the fallback but should be
changed.
Signed-off-by: Will Thomas <will.thomas@imgtec.com>
Reviewed-by: James Hartley <james.hartley@imgtec.com>
---
drivers/crypto/img-hash.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c b/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
index e5c941b..de2b86e 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
@@ -102,8 +102,10 @@ struct img_hash_request_ctx {
unsigned long op;
size_t bufcnt;
- u8 buffer[0] __aligned(sizeof(u32));
struct ahash_request fallback_req;
+
+ /* Zero length buffer must remain last member of struct */
+ u8 buffer[0] __aligned(sizeof(u32));
};
struct img_hash_ctx {
--
2.1.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 0/7] crypto: img-hash - fixes and interface changes
From: Will Thomas @ 2016-08-05 13:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-crypto, Will Thomas
Hi Herbert,
This patchset includes small stability fixes, power management
and import/export interface functions for the img-hash driver.
Changes as discussed for [1/7], [2/7] and [5/7].
Govindraj Raja (1):
crypto: img-hash - Add suspend resume hooks for img hash
James Hartley (2):
crypto: img-hash - Add support for export and import
crypto: img-hash - log a successful probe
Will Thomas (4):
crypto: img-hash - Fix null pointer exception
crypto: img-hash - Fix hash request context
crypto: img-hash - Reconfigure DMA Burst length
crypto: img-hash - Fix set_reqsize call
drivers/crypto/img-hash.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 98 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--
2.1.4
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v2 3/7] crypto: img-hash - Reconfigure DMA Burst length
From: Will Thomas @ 2016-08-05 13:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-crypto, Will Thomas
In-Reply-To: <1470402020-10774-1-git-send-email-will.thomas@imgtec.com>
Burst length of 16 drives the hash accelerator out of spec
and causes stability issues in some cases. Reduce this to
stop data being lost.
Signed-off-by: Will Thomas <will.thomas@imgtec.com>
Reviewed-by: James Hartley <james.hartley@imgtec.com>
---
drivers/crypto/img-hash.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c b/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
index de2b86e..f8abbe3 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
#define DRIVER_FLAGS_MD5 BIT(21)
#define IMG_HASH_QUEUE_LENGTH 20
+#define IMG_HASH_DMA_BURST 4
#define IMG_HASH_DMA_THRESHOLD 64
#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
@@ -342,7 +343,7 @@ static int img_hash_dma_init(struct img_hash_dev *hdev)
dma_conf.direction = DMA_MEM_TO_DEV;
dma_conf.dst_addr = hdev->bus_addr;
dma_conf.dst_addr_width = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_4_BYTES;
- dma_conf.dst_maxburst = 16;
+ dma_conf.dst_maxburst = IMG_HASH_DMA_BURST;
dma_conf.device_fc = false;
err = dmaengine_slave_config(hdev->dma_lch, &dma_conf);
--
2.1.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 4/7] crypto: img-hash - Add suspend resume hooks for img hash
From: Will Thomas @ 2016-08-05 13:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-crypto, Govindraj Raja
In-Reply-To: <1470402020-10774-1-git-send-email-will.thomas@imgtec.com>
From: Govindraj Raja <Govindraj.Raja@imgtec.com>
Current img hash claims sys and periph gate clocks
and this can be gated in system suspend scenarios.
Add support for Device pm ops for img hash to gate
the clocks claimed by img hash.
Signed-off-by: Govindraj Raja <Govindraj.Raja@imgtec.com>
Reviewed-by: Will Thomas <will.thomas@imgtec.com>
---
drivers/crypto/img-hash.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c b/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
index f8abbe3..2622c01 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
@@ -1016,11 +1016,38 @@ static int img_hash_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
return 0;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP
+static int img_hash_suspend(struct device *dev)
+{
+ struct img_hash_dev *hdev = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
+ clk_disable_unprepare(hdev->hash_clk);
+ clk_disable_unprepare(hdev->sys_clk);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int img_hash_resume(struct device *dev)
+{
+ struct img_hash_dev *hdev = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
+ clk_prepare_enable(hdev->hash_clk);
+ clk_prepare_enable(hdev->sys_clk);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_PM_SLEEP */
+
+static const struct dev_pm_ops img_hash_pm_ops = {
+ SET_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(img_hash_suspend, img_hash_resume)
+};
+
static struct platform_driver img_hash_driver = {
.probe = img_hash_probe,
.remove = img_hash_remove,
.driver = {
.name = "img-hash-accelerator",
+ .pm = &img_hash_pm_ops,
.of_match_table = of_match_ptr(img_hash_match),
}
};
--
2.1.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 6/7] crypto: img-hash - log a successful probe
From: Will Thomas @ 2016-08-05 13:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-crypto, James Hartley
In-Reply-To: <1470402020-10774-1-git-send-email-will.thomas@imgtec.com>
From: James Hartley <james.hartley@imgtec.com>
Currently the probe function only emits an output on success
when debug is specifically enabled. It would be more useful
if this happens by default.
Signed-off-by: James Hartley <james.hartley@imgtec.com>
Reviewed-by: Will Thomas <will.thomas@imgtec.com>
---
drivers/crypto/img-hash.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c b/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
index fd4cd51..60410d7 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
@@ -1031,7 +1031,7 @@ static int img_hash_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
err = img_register_algs(hdev);
if (err)
goto err_algs;
- dev_dbg(dev, "Img MD5/SHA1/SHA224/SHA256 Hardware accelerator initialized\n");
+ dev_info(dev, "Img MD5/SHA1/SHA224/SHA256 Hardware accelerator initialized\n");
return 0;
--
2.1.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 5/7] crypto: img-hash - Add support for export and import
From: Will Thomas @ 2016-08-05 13:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-crypto, James Hartley, Will Thomas
In-Reply-To: <1470402020-10774-1-git-send-email-will.thomas@imgtec.com>
From: James Hartley <james.hartley@imgtec.com>
Currently the img-hash accelerator does not probe
successfully due to a change in the checks made during
registration with the crypto framework. This is due to
import and export functions not being defined. Correct
this.
Signed-off-by: James Hartley <james.hartley@imgtec.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Thomas <will.thomas@imgtec.com>
---
drivers/crypto/img-hash.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c b/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
index 2622c01..fd4cd51 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
@@ -590,6 +590,32 @@ static int img_hash_finup(struct ahash_request *req)
return crypto_ahash_finup(&rctx->fallback_req);
}
+static int img_hash_import(struct ahash_request *req, const void *in)
+{
+ struct img_hash_request_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
+ struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
+ struct img_hash_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
+
+ ahash_request_set_tfm(&rctx->fallback_req, ctx->fallback);
+ rctx->fallback_req.base.flags = req->base.flags
+ & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+
+ return crypto_ahash_import(&rctx->fallback_req, in);
+}
+
+static int img_hash_export(struct ahash_request *req, void *out)
+{
+ struct img_hash_request_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
+ struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
+ struct img_hash_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
+
+ ahash_request_set_tfm(&rctx->fallback_req, ctx->fallback);
+ rctx->fallback_req.base.flags = req->base.flags
+ & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+
+ return crypto_ahash_export(&rctx->fallback_req, out);
+}
+
static int img_hash_digest(struct ahash_request *req)
{
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
@@ -646,10 +672,9 @@ static int img_hash_digest(struct ahash_request *req)
return err;
}
-static int img_hash_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+static int img_hash_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const char *alg_name)
{
struct img_hash_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
- const char *alg_name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(tfm);
int err = -ENOMEM;
ctx->fallback = crypto_alloc_ahash(alg_name, 0,
@@ -669,6 +694,26 @@ err:
return err;
}
+static int img_hash_cra_md5_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ return img_hash_cra_init(tfm, "md5-generic");
+}
+
+static int img_hash_cra_sha1_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ return img_hash_cra_init(tfm, "sha1-generic");
+}
+
+static int img_hash_cra_sha224_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ return img_hash_cra_init(tfm, "sha224-generic");
+}
+
+static int img_hash_cra_sha256_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ return img_hash_cra_init(tfm, "sha256-generic");
+}
+
static void img_hash_cra_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct img_hash_ctx *tctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
@@ -714,9 +759,12 @@ static struct ahash_alg img_algs[] = {
.update = img_hash_update,
.final = img_hash_final,
.finup = img_hash_finup,
+ .export = img_hash_export,
+ .import = img_hash_import,
.digest = img_hash_digest,
.halg = {
.digestsize = MD5_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ .statesize = sizeof(struct md5_state),
.base = {
.cra_name = "md5",
.cra_driver_name = "img-md5",
@@ -726,7 +774,7 @@ static struct ahash_alg img_algs[] = {
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
.cra_blocksize = MD5_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct img_hash_ctx),
- .cra_init = img_hash_cra_init,
+ .cra_init = img_hash_cra_md5_init,
.cra_exit = img_hash_cra_exit,
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
}
@@ -737,9 +785,12 @@ static struct ahash_alg img_algs[] = {
.update = img_hash_update,
.final = img_hash_final,
.finup = img_hash_finup,
+ .export = img_hash_export,
+ .import = img_hash_import,
.digest = img_hash_digest,
.halg = {
.digestsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ .statesize = sizeof(struct sha1_state),
.base = {
.cra_name = "sha1",
.cra_driver_name = "img-sha1",
@@ -749,7 +800,7 @@ static struct ahash_alg img_algs[] = {
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
.cra_blocksize = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct img_hash_ctx),
- .cra_init = img_hash_cra_init,
+ .cra_init = img_hash_cra_sha1_init,
.cra_exit = img_hash_cra_exit,
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
}
@@ -760,9 +811,12 @@ static struct ahash_alg img_algs[] = {
.update = img_hash_update,
.final = img_hash_final,
.finup = img_hash_finup,
+ .export = img_hash_export,
+ .import = img_hash_import,
.digest = img_hash_digest,
.halg = {
.digestsize = SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ .statesize = sizeof(struct sha256_state),
.base = {
.cra_name = "sha224",
.cra_driver_name = "img-sha224",
@@ -772,7 +826,7 @@ static struct ahash_alg img_algs[] = {
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
.cra_blocksize = SHA224_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct img_hash_ctx),
- .cra_init = img_hash_cra_init,
+ .cra_init = img_hash_cra_sha224_init,
.cra_exit = img_hash_cra_exit,
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
}
@@ -783,9 +837,12 @@ static struct ahash_alg img_algs[] = {
.update = img_hash_update,
.final = img_hash_final,
.finup = img_hash_finup,
+ .export = img_hash_export,
+ .import = img_hash_import,
.digest = img_hash_digest,
.halg = {
.digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ .statesize = sizeof(struct sha256_state),
.base = {
.cra_name = "sha256",
.cra_driver_name = "img-sha256",
@@ -795,7 +852,7 @@ static struct ahash_alg img_algs[] = {
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
.cra_blocksize = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct img_hash_ctx),
- .cra_init = img_hash_cra_init,
+ .cra_init = img_hash_cra_sha256_init,
.cra_exit = img_hash_cra_exit,
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
}
--
2.1.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 7/7] crypto: img-hash - Fix set_reqsize call
From: Will Thomas @ 2016-08-05 13:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-crypto, Will Thomas
In-Reply-To: <1470402020-10774-1-git-send-email-will.thomas@imgtec.com>
Properly allocate enough memory to respect the fallback.
Signed-off-by: Will Thomas <will.thomas@imgtec.com>
---
drivers/crypto/img-hash.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c b/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
index 60410d7..a2e77b8 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
@@ -686,6 +686,7 @@ static int img_hash_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const char *alg_name)
}
crypto_ahash_set_reqsize(__crypto_ahash_cast(tfm),
sizeof(struct img_hash_request_ctx) +
+ crypto_ahash_reqsize(ctx->fallback) +
IMG_HASH_DMA_THRESHOLD);
return 0;
--
2.1.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC][PATCH] RANDOM: ATH9K RNG delivers zero bits of entropy
From: Stephan Mueller @ 2016-08-05 15:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ted Tso, herbert
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, ath9k-devel, linux-wireless,
ath9k-devel, Kalle Valo
Hi Ted, Herbert,
I sent a question to the ATH9K RNG some time ago to the developers.
See https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org/msg19115.html
I have not yet received a word and I think this issue should be resolved.
Thanks
Stephan
---8<---
The ATH9K driver implements an RNG which is completely bypassing the
standard Linux HW generator logic.
The RNG may or may not deliver entropy. Considering the conservative
approach in treating entropy with respect to non-auditable sources, this
patch changes the delivered entropy value to zero. The RNG still feeds
data into the input_pool but it is assumed to have no entropy.
When the ATH9K RNG changes to use the HW RNG framework, it may re-enable
the entropy estimation considering that a user can change that value at
boot and runtime.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
index d38e50f..d63dc48 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
@@ -92,8 +92,7 @@ static int ath9k_rng_kthread(void *data)
fail_stats = 0;
/* sleep until entropy bits under write_wakeup_threshold */
- add_hwgenerator_randomness((void *)rng_buf, bytes_read,
- ATH9K_RNG_ENTROPY(bytes_read));
+ add_hwgenerator_randomness((void *)rng_buf, bytes_read, 0);
}
kfree(rng_buf);
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* 澳门金沙集团，电子游艺等您来战，谁是真正的打“虎”英雄！(AD)
From: lujiatong @ 2016-08-05 15:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
Ce message vous a été envoyé parce que "lujiatong <support@xinnet.com>" pense que vous trouverez la page "Sondage" www.hopital.fr intéressante.
Lien vers la page:
http://www.hopital.fr/Media/Sondage/Sondage3
Commentaire par "lujiatong <support@xinnet.com>":
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------------------------------------------
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^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH
From: Mat Martineau @ 2016-08-05 16:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stephan Mueller; +Cc: David Howells, keyrings, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <7993056.4BOhkDi2U3@positron.chronox.de>
On Fri, 5 Aug 2016, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Donnerstag, 4. August 2016, 13:41:58 CEST schrieb Mat Martineau:
>
> Hi Mat,
>
>>> +
>>> +long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
>>> + char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
>>> + struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
>>> +{
>>> + struct keyctl_kdf_params kdfcopy;
>>> +
>>> + if (!kdf)
>>> + return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, NULL);
>>> +
>>> + if (copy_from_user(&kdfcopy, kdf, sizeof(kdfcopy)) != 0)
>>> + return -EFAULT;
>>> +
>>> + return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, &kdfcopy);
>>
>> I'd find this more readable if there was one call to __keyctl_dh_compute.
>
> When trying to implement it, I think that it would even be more confusing,
> because we need a conditional in any case. Do you like
>
> return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, (kdf) ? &kdfcopy : NULL);
>
> better than the already presented code? Besides, this would now imply that we
> have two conditionals instead of one.
Another approach that uses one conditional is to add a struct
keyctl_kdf_params* variable and assign it in the conditional block. Maybe
that's not much of a win, it's up to you.
--
Mat Martineau
Intel OTC
^ permalink raw reply
* RE: linux-crypto
From: jmorrell @ 2016-08-05 17:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
[-- Attachment #1: mluopbbubhxh_linux-crypto.zip --]
[-- Type: application/zip, Size: 2392 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC][PATCH] RANDOM: ATH9K RNG delivers zero bits of entropy
From: Jason Cooper @ 2016-08-06 19:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stephan Mueller
Cc: Ted Tso, herbert, linux-kernel, linux-crypto, ath9k-devel,
linux-wireless, ath9k-devel, Kalle Valo
In-Reply-To: <34197429.2CvoIfft9B@positron.chronox.de>
Hi Stephan,
On Fri, Aug 05, 2016 at 05:08:14PM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Hi Ted, Herbert,
>
> I sent a question to the ATH9K RNG some time ago to the developers.
> See https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org/msg19115.html
>
> I have not yet received a word and I think this issue should be resolved.
>
> Thanks
> Stephan
>
> ---8<---
If the above text is placed below the three dashes, "---", below ...
> The ATH9K driver implements an RNG which is completely bypassing the
> standard Linux HW generator logic.
>
> The RNG may or may not deliver entropy. Considering the conservative
> approach in treating entropy with respect to non-auditable sources, this
> patch changes the delivered entropy value to zero. The RNG still feeds
> data into the input_pool but it is assumed to have no entropy.
>
> When the ATH9K RNG changes to use the HW RNG framework, it may re-enable
> the entropy estimation considering that a user can change that value at
> boot and runtime.
>
> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
> ---
here, then the mail can be applied directly without editing.
> drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c | 3 +--
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
> index d38e50f..d63dc48 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
> @@ -92,8 +92,7 @@ static int ath9k_rng_kthread(void *data)
> fail_stats = 0;
>
> /* sleep until entropy bits under write_wakeup_threshold */
> - add_hwgenerator_randomness((void *)rng_buf, bytes_read,
> - ATH9K_RNG_ENTROPY(bytes_read));
This is the only use of this macro. I'd remove the #define on line 25
as well.
> + add_hwgenerator_randomness((void *)rng_buf, bytes_read, 0);
> }
>
> kfree(rng_buf);
Other than that,
Reviewed-by: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
thx,
Jason.
^ permalink raw reply
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