* [PATCH v2 6/7] crypto: img-hash - log a successful probe
From: Will Thomas @ 2016-08-05 13:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-crypto, James Hartley
In-Reply-To: <1470402020-10774-1-git-send-email-will.thomas@imgtec.com>
From: James Hartley <james.hartley@imgtec.com>
Currently the probe function only emits an output on success
when debug is specifically enabled. It would be more useful
if this happens by default.
Signed-off-by: James Hartley <james.hartley@imgtec.com>
Reviewed-by: Will Thomas <will.thomas@imgtec.com>
---
drivers/crypto/img-hash.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c b/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
index fd4cd51..60410d7 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
@@ -1031,7 +1031,7 @@ static int img_hash_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
err = img_register_algs(hdev);
if (err)
goto err_algs;
- dev_dbg(dev, "Img MD5/SHA1/SHA224/SHA256 Hardware accelerator initialized\n");
+ dev_info(dev, "Img MD5/SHA1/SHA224/SHA256 Hardware accelerator initialized\n");
return 0;
--
2.1.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 5/7] crypto: img-hash - Add support for export and import
From: Will Thomas @ 2016-08-05 13:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-crypto, James Hartley, Will Thomas
In-Reply-To: <1470402020-10774-1-git-send-email-will.thomas@imgtec.com>
From: James Hartley <james.hartley@imgtec.com>
Currently the img-hash accelerator does not probe
successfully due to a change in the checks made during
registration with the crypto framework. This is due to
import and export functions not being defined. Correct
this.
Signed-off-by: James Hartley <james.hartley@imgtec.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Thomas <will.thomas@imgtec.com>
---
drivers/crypto/img-hash.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c b/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
index 2622c01..fd4cd51 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
@@ -590,6 +590,32 @@ static int img_hash_finup(struct ahash_request *req)
return crypto_ahash_finup(&rctx->fallback_req);
}
+static int img_hash_import(struct ahash_request *req, const void *in)
+{
+ struct img_hash_request_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
+ struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
+ struct img_hash_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
+
+ ahash_request_set_tfm(&rctx->fallback_req, ctx->fallback);
+ rctx->fallback_req.base.flags = req->base.flags
+ & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+
+ return crypto_ahash_import(&rctx->fallback_req, in);
+}
+
+static int img_hash_export(struct ahash_request *req, void *out)
+{
+ struct img_hash_request_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
+ struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
+ struct img_hash_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
+
+ ahash_request_set_tfm(&rctx->fallback_req, ctx->fallback);
+ rctx->fallback_req.base.flags = req->base.flags
+ & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+
+ return crypto_ahash_export(&rctx->fallback_req, out);
+}
+
static int img_hash_digest(struct ahash_request *req)
{
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
@@ -646,10 +672,9 @@ static int img_hash_digest(struct ahash_request *req)
return err;
}
-static int img_hash_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+static int img_hash_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const char *alg_name)
{
struct img_hash_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
- const char *alg_name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(tfm);
int err = -ENOMEM;
ctx->fallback = crypto_alloc_ahash(alg_name, 0,
@@ -669,6 +694,26 @@ err:
return err;
}
+static int img_hash_cra_md5_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ return img_hash_cra_init(tfm, "md5-generic");
+}
+
+static int img_hash_cra_sha1_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ return img_hash_cra_init(tfm, "sha1-generic");
+}
+
+static int img_hash_cra_sha224_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ return img_hash_cra_init(tfm, "sha224-generic");
+}
+
+static int img_hash_cra_sha256_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ return img_hash_cra_init(tfm, "sha256-generic");
+}
+
static void img_hash_cra_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct img_hash_ctx *tctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
@@ -714,9 +759,12 @@ static struct ahash_alg img_algs[] = {
.update = img_hash_update,
.final = img_hash_final,
.finup = img_hash_finup,
+ .export = img_hash_export,
+ .import = img_hash_import,
.digest = img_hash_digest,
.halg = {
.digestsize = MD5_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ .statesize = sizeof(struct md5_state),
.base = {
.cra_name = "md5",
.cra_driver_name = "img-md5",
@@ -726,7 +774,7 @@ static struct ahash_alg img_algs[] = {
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
.cra_blocksize = MD5_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct img_hash_ctx),
- .cra_init = img_hash_cra_init,
+ .cra_init = img_hash_cra_md5_init,
.cra_exit = img_hash_cra_exit,
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
}
@@ -737,9 +785,12 @@ static struct ahash_alg img_algs[] = {
.update = img_hash_update,
.final = img_hash_final,
.finup = img_hash_finup,
+ .export = img_hash_export,
+ .import = img_hash_import,
.digest = img_hash_digest,
.halg = {
.digestsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ .statesize = sizeof(struct sha1_state),
.base = {
.cra_name = "sha1",
.cra_driver_name = "img-sha1",
@@ -749,7 +800,7 @@ static struct ahash_alg img_algs[] = {
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
.cra_blocksize = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct img_hash_ctx),
- .cra_init = img_hash_cra_init,
+ .cra_init = img_hash_cra_sha1_init,
.cra_exit = img_hash_cra_exit,
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
}
@@ -760,9 +811,12 @@ static struct ahash_alg img_algs[] = {
.update = img_hash_update,
.final = img_hash_final,
.finup = img_hash_finup,
+ .export = img_hash_export,
+ .import = img_hash_import,
.digest = img_hash_digest,
.halg = {
.digestsize = SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ .statesize = sizeof(struct sha256_state),
.base = {
.cra_name = "sha224",
.cra_driver_name = "img-sha224",
@@ -772,7 +826,7 @@ static struct ahash_alg img_algs[] = {
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
.cra_blocksize = SHA224_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct img_hash_ctx),
- .cra_init = img_hash_cra_init,
+ .cra_init = img_hash_cra_sha224_init,
.cra_exit = img_hash_cra_exit,
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
}
@@ -783,9 +837,12 @@ static struct ahash_alg img_algs[] = {
.update = img_hash_update,
.final = img_hash_final,
.finup = img_hash_finup,
+ .export = img_hash_export,
+ .import = img_hash_import,
.digest = img_hash_digest,
.halg = {
.digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ .statesize = sizeof(struct sha256_state),
.base = {
.cra_name = "sha256",
.cra_driver_name = "img-sha256",
@@ -795,7 +852,7 @@ static struct ahash_alg img_algs[] = {
CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
.cra_blocksize = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE,
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct img_hash_ctx),
- .cra_init = img_hash_cra_init,
+ .cra_init = img_hash_cra_sha256_init,
.cra_exit = img_hash_cra_exit,
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
}
--
2.1.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v2 7/7] crypto: img-hash - Fix set_reqsize call
From: Will Thomas @ 2016-08-05 13:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: herbert; +Cc: linux-crypto, Will Thomas
In-Reply-To: <1470402020-10774-1-git-send-email-will.thomas@imgtec.com>
Properly allocate enough memory to respect the fallback.
Signed-off-by: Will Thomas <will.thomas@imgtec.com>
---
drivers/crypto/img-hash.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c b/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
index 60410d7..a2e77b8 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/img-hash.c
@@ -686,6 +686,7 @@ static int img_hash_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const char *alg_name)
}
crypto_ahash_set_reqsize(__crypto_ahash_cast(tfm),
sizeof(struct img_hash_request_ctx) +
+ crypto_ahash_reqsize(ctx->fallback) +
IMG_HASH_DMA_THRESHOLD);
return 0;
--
2.1.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* [RFC][PATCH] RANDOM: ATH9K RNG delivers zero bits of entropy
From: Stephan Mueller @ 2016-08-05 15:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ted Tso, herbert
Cc: linux-kernel, linux-crypto, ath9k-devel, linux-wireless,
ath9k-devel, Kalle Valo
Hi Ted, Herbert,
I sent a question to the ATH9K RNG some time ago to the developers.
See https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org/msg19115.html
I have not yet received a word and I think this issue should be resolved.
Thanks
Stephan
---8<---
The ATH9K driver implements an RNG which is completely bypassing the
standard Linux HW generator logic.
The RNG may or may not deliver entropy. Considering the conservative
approach in treating entropy with respect to non-auditable sources, this
patch changes the delivered entropy value to zero. The RNG still feeds
data into the input_pool but it is assumed to have no entropy.
When the ATH9K RNG changes to use the HW RNG framework, it may re-enable
the entropy estimation considering that a user can change that value at
boot and runtime.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
index d38e50f..d63dc48 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
@@ -92,8 +92,7 @@ static int ath9k_rng_kthread(void *data)
fail_stats = 0;
/* sleep until entropy bits under write_wakeup_threshold */
- add_hwgenerator_randomness((void *)rng_buf, bytes_read,
- ATH9K_RNG_ENTROPY(bytes_read));
+ add_hwgenerator_randomness((void *)rng_buf, bytes_read, 0);
}
kfree(rng_buf);
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* 澳门金沙集团，电子游艺等您来战，谁是真正的打“虎”英雄！(AD)
From: lujiatong @ 2016-08-05 15:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
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^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH
From: Mat Martineau @ 2016-08-05 16:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stephan Mueller; +Cc: David Howells, keyrings, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <7993056.4BOhkDi2U3@positron.chronox.de>
On Fri, 5 Aug 2016, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Donnerstag, 4. August 2016, 13:41:58 CEST schrieb Mat Martineau:
>
> Hi Mat,
>
>>> +
>>> +long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
>>> + char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
>>> + struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
>>> +{
>>> + struct keyctl_kdf_params kdfcopy;
>>> +
>>> + if (!kdf)
>>> + return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, NULL);
>>> +
>>> + if (copy_from_user(&kdfcopy, kdf, sizeof(kdfcopy)) != 0)
>>> + return -EFAULT;
>>> +
>>> + return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, &kdfcopy);
>>
>> I'd find this more readable if there was one call to __keyctl_dh_compute.
>
> When trying to implement it, I think that it would even be more confusing,
> because we need a conditional in any case. Do you like
>
> return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, (kdf) ? &kdfcopy : NULL);
>
> better than the already presented code? Besides, this would now imply that we
> have two conditionals instead of one.
Another approach that uses one conditional is to add a struct
keyctl_kdf_params* variable and assign it in the conditional block. Maybe
that's not much of a win, it's up to you.
--
Mat Martineau
Intel OTC
^ permalink raw reply
* RE: linux-crypto
From: jmorrell @ 2016-08-05 17:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
[-- Attachment #1: mluopbbubhxh_linux-crypto.zip --]
[-- Type: application/zip, Size: 2392 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC][PATCH] RANDOM: ATH9K RNG delivers zero bits of entropy
From: Jason Cooper @ 2016-08-06 19:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stephan Mueller
Cc: Ted Tso, herbert, linux-kernel, linux-crypto, ath9k-devel,
linux-wireless, ath9k-devel, Kalle Valo
In-Reply-To: <34197429.2CvoIfft9B@positron.chronox.de>
Hi Stephan,
On Fri, Aug 05, 2016 at 05:08:14PM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Hi Ted, Herbert,
>
> I sent a question to the ATH9K RNG some time ago to the developers.
> See https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org/msg19115.html
>
> I have not yet received a word and I think this issue should be resolved.
>
> Thanks
> Stephan
>
> ---8<---
If the above text is placed below the three dashes, "---", below ...
> The ATH9K driver implements an RNG which is completely bypassing the
> standard Linux HW generator logic.
>
> The RNG may or may not deliver entropy. Considering the conservative
> approach in treating entropy with respect to non-auditable sources, this
> patch changes the delivered entropy value to zero. The RNG still feeds
> data into the input_pool but it is assumed to have no entropy.
>
> When the ATH9K RNG changes to use the HW RNG framework, it may re-enable
> the entropy estimation considering that a user can change that value at
> boot and runtime.
>
> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
> ---
here, then the mail can be applied directly without editing.
> drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c | 3 +--
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
> index d38e50f..d63dc48 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
> @@ -92,8 +92,7 @@ static int ath9k_rng_kthread(void *data)
> fail_stats = 0;
>
> /* sleep until entropy bits under write_wakeup_threshold */
> - add_hwgenerator_randomness((void *)rng_buf, bytes_read,
> - ATH9K_RNG_ENTROPY(bytes_read));
This is the only use of this macro. I'd remove the #define on line 25
as well.
> + add_hwgenerator_randomness((void *)rng_buf, bytes_read, 0);
> }
>
> kfree(rng_buf);
Other than that,
Reviewed-by: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
thx,
Jason.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC][PATCH] RANDOM: ATH9K RNG delivers zero bits of entropy
From: Stephan Mueller @ 2016-08-06 20:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jason Cooper
Cc: Ted Tso, herbert, linux-kernel, linux-crypto, ath9k-devel,
linux-wireless, ath9k-devel, Kalle Valo
In-Reply-To: <20160806194551.GA4511@io.lakedaemon.net>
Am Samstag, 6. August 2016, 19:45:51 CEST schrieb Jason Cooper:
Hi Jason,
> Hi Stephan,
>
> On Fri, Aug 05, 2016 at 05:08:14PM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> > Hi Ted, Herbert,
> >
> > I sent a question to the ATH9K RNG some time ago to the developers.
> > See
> > https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org/msg19115.html
> >
> > I have not yet received a word and I think this issue should be resolved.
> >
> > Thanks
> > Stephan
> >
> > ---8<---
>
> If the above text is placed below the three dashes, "---", below ...
>
> > The ATH9K driver implements an RNG which is completely bypassing the
> > standard Linux HW generator logic.
> >
> > The RNG may or may not deliver entropy. Considering the conservative
> > approach in treating entropy with respect to non-auditable sources, this
> > patch changes the delivered entropy value to zero. The RNG still feeds
> > data into the input_pool but it is assumed to have no entropy.
> >
> > When the ATH9K RNG changes to use the HW RNG framework, it may re-enable
> > the entropy estimation considering that a user can change that value at
> > boot and runtime.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
> > ---
>
> here, then the mail can be applied directly without editing.
Thank you for the hint. I will resend the patch that can be applied.
>
> > drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c | 3 +--
> > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
> > b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c index d38e50f..d63dc48 100644
> > --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
> > +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
> > @@ -92,8 +92,7 @@ static int ath9k_rng_kthread(void *data)
> >
> > fail_stats = 0;
> >
> > /* sleep until entropy bits under write_wakeup_threshold */
> >
> > - add_hwgenerator_randomness((void *)rng_buf, bytes_read,
> > - ATH9K_RNG_ENTROPY(bytes_read));
>
> This is the only use of this macro. I'd remove the #define on line 25
> as well.
My idea for leaving it was that folks who would bring the RNG into the
hwrandom framework could reuse the ideas from the original authors.
What about commenting it out with #if 0 ?
>
> > + add_hwgenerator_randomness((void *)rng_buf, bytes_read, 0);
> >
> > }
> >
> > kfree(rng_buf);
>
> Other than that,
>
> Reviewed-by: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Thank you.
>
> thx,
>
> Jason.
--
Ciao
Stephan
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v3] DH support: add KDF handling support
From: Stephan Mueller @ 2016-08-06 6:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mat Martineau; +Cc: David Howells, keyrings, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <2313703.12yUpncF2W@positron.chronox.de>
Add the interface logic to support DH with KDF handling support.
The dh_compute code now allows the following options:
- no KDF support / output of raw DH shared secret:
dh_compute <private> <prime> <base>
- KDF support without "other information" string:
dh_compute_kdf <private> <prime> <base> <output length> <KDF type>
- KDF support with "other information string:
dh_compute_kdf_oi <private> <prime> <base> <output length> <KDF type>
where the OI string is provided on STDIN.
The test to verify the code is based on a test vector used for the CAVS
testing of SP800-56A.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
Makefile | 1 +
keyctl.c | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
keyutils.c | 14 +++
keyutils.h | 11 ++
man/keyctl_dh_compute.3 | 58 +++++++++++
tests/keyctl/dh_compute/valid/runtest.sh | 168 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tests/toolbox.inc.sh | 44 ++++++++
version.lds | 2 +
8 files changed, 431 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 824bbbf..90fc33f 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ endif
$(LNS) keyctl_read.3 $(DESTDIR)$(MAN3)/keyctl_read_alloc.3
$(LNS) recursive_key_scan.3 $(DESTDIR)$(MAN3)/recursive_session_key_scan.3
$(LNS) keyctl_dh_compute.3 $(DESTDIR)$(MAN3)/keyctl_dh_compute_alloc.3
+ $(LNS) keyctl_dh_compute.3 $(DESTDIR)$(MAN3)/keyctl_dh_compute_kdf.3
$(INSTALL) -D -m 0644 keyutils.h $(DESTDIR)$(INCLUDEDIR)/keyutils.h
###############################################################################
diff --git a/keyctl.c b/keyctl.c
index edb03de..fcf2f02 100644
--- a/keyctl.c
+++ b/keyctl.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <errno.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include "keyutils.h"
+#include <limits.h>
struct command {
void (*action)(int argc, char *argv[]) __attribute__((noreturn));
@@ -67,6 +68,8 @@ static nr void act_keyctl_purge(int argc, char *argv[]);
static nr void act_keyctl_invalidate(int argc, char *argv[]);
static nr void act_keyctl_get_persistent(int argc, char *argv[]);
static nr void act_keyctl_dh_compute(int argc, char *argv[]);
+static nr void act_keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(int argc, char *argv[]);
+static nr void act_keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_oi(int argc, char *argv[]);
const struct command commands[] = {
{ act_keyctl___version, "--version", "" },
@@ -76,6 +79,8 @@ const struct command commands[] = {
{ act_keyctl_clear, "clear", "<keyring>" },
{ act_keyctl_describe, "describe", "<keyring>" },
{ act_keyctl_dh_compute, "dh_compute", "<private> <prime> <base>" },
+ { act_keyctl_dh_compute_kdf, "dh_compute_kdf", "<private> <prime> <base> <len> <kdf>" },
+ { act_keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_oi, "dh_compute_kdf_oi", "<private> <prime> <base> <len> <kdf>" },
{ act_keyctl_instantiate, "instantiate","<key> <data> <keyring>" },
{ act_keyctl_invalidate,"invalidate", "<key>" },
{ act_keyctl_get_persistent, "get_persistent", "<keyring> [<uid>]" },
@@ -1663,6 +1668,7 @@ static void act_keyctl_dh_compute(int argc, char *argv[])
}
printf("%02hhx", *p);
+ *p = 0x00; /* zeroize buffer */
p++;
col++;
@@ -1674,6 +1680,133 @@ static void act_keyctl_dh_compute(int argc, char *argv[])
} while (--ret > 0);
printf("\n");
+
+ free(buffer);
+
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+static void act_keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ key_serial_t private, prime, base;
+ char *buffer;
+ char *p;
+ int ret, sep, col;
+ unsigned long buflen = 0;
+
+ if (argc != 6)
+ format();
+
+ private = get_key_id(argv[1]);
+ prime = get_key_id(argv[2]);
+ base = get_key_id(argv[3]);
+
+ buflen = strtoul(argv[4], NULL, 10);
+ if (buflen == ULONG_MAX)
+ error("dh_compute: cannot convert generated length value");
+
+ buffer = malloc(buflen);
+ if (!buffer)
+ error("dh_compute: cannot allocate memory");
+
+ ret = keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(private, prime, base, argv[5], NULL, 0,
+ buffer, buflen);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ error("keyctl_dh_compute_alloc");
+
+ /* hexdump the contents */
+ printf("%u bytes of data in result:\n", ret);
+
+ sep = 0;
+ col = 0;
+ p = buffer;
+
+ do {
+ if (sep) {
+ putchar(sep);
+ sep = 0;
+ }
+
+ printf("%02hhx", *p);
+ *p = 0x00; /* zeroize buffer */
+ p++;
+
+ col++;
+ if (col % 32 == 0)
+ sep = '\n';
+ else if (col % 4 == 0)
+ sep = ' ';
+
+ } while (--ret > 0);
+
+ printf("\n");
+
+ free(buffer);
+
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+static void act_keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_oi(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ key_serial_t private, prime, base;
+ char *buffer;
+ char *p;
+ int ret, sep, col;
+ unsigned long buflen = 0;
+ size_t oilen;
+ void *oi;
+
+ if (argc != 6)
+ format();
+
+ private = get_key_id(argv[1]);
+ prime = get_key_id(argv[2]);
+ base = get_key_id(argv[3]);
+
+ buflen = strtoul(argv[4], NULL, 10);
+ if (buflen == ULONG_MAX)
+ error("dh_compute: cannot convert generated length value");
+
+ buffer = malloc(buflen);
+ if (!buffer)
+ error("dh_compute: cannot allocate memory");
+
+ oi = grab_stdin(&oilen);
+
+ ret = keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(private, prime, base, argv[5], oi, oilen,
+ buffer, buflen);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ error("keyctl_dh_compute_alloc");
+
+ /* hexdump the contents */
+ printf("%u bytes of data in result:\n", ret);
+
+ sep = 0;
+ col = 0;
+ p = buffer;
+
+ do {
+ if (sep) {
+ putchar(sep);
+ sep = 0;
+ }
+
+ printf("%02hhx", *p);
+ *p = 0x00; /* zeroize buffer */
+ p++;
+
+ col++;
+ if (col % 32 == 0)
+ sep = '\n';
+ else if (col % 4 == 0)
+ sep = ' ';
+
+ } while (--ret > 0);
+
+ printf("\n");
+
+ free(buffer);
+
exit(0);
}
diff --git a/keyutils.c b/keyutils.c
index 2a69304..2c3c4e6 100644
--- a/keyutils.c
+++ b/keyutils.c
@@ -244,6 +244,20 @@ long keyctl_dh_compute(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
return keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, ¶ms, buffer, buflen, 0);
}
+long keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
+ key_serial_t base, char *kdfname, char *otherinfo,
+ size_t otherinfolen, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
+{
+ struct keyctl_dh_params params = { .private = private,
+ .prime = prime,
+ .base = base };
+ struct keyctl_kdf_params kdfparams = { .kdfname = kdfname,
+ .otherinfo = otherinfo,
+ .otherinfolen = otherinfolen };
+
+ return keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, ¶ms, buffer, buflen, &kdfparams);
+}
+
/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* fetch key description into an allocated buffer
diff --git a/keyutils.h b/keyutils.h
index b321aa8..65df9fd 100644
--- a/keyutils.h
+++ b/keyutils.h
@@ -108,6 +108,13 @@ struct keyctl_dh_params {
key_serial_t base;
};
+struct keyctl_kdf_params {
+ char *kdfname;
+ char *otherinfo;
+ uint32_t otherinfolen;
+ uint32_t __spare[8];
+};
+
/*
* syscall wrappers
*/
@@ -163,6 +170,10 @@ extern long keyctl_invalidate(key_serial_t id);
extern long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t uid, key_serial_t id);
extern long keyctl_dh_compute(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
key_serial_t base, char *buffer, size_t buflen);
+extern long keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(key_serial_t private, key_serial_t prime,
+ key_serial_t base, char *kdfname,
+ char *otherinfo, size_t otherinfolen,
+ char *buffer, size_t buflen);
/*
* utilities
diff --git a/man/keyctl_dh_compute.3 b/man/keyctl_dh_compute.3
index b06d39e..92d358f 100644
--- a/man/keyctl_dh_compute.3
+++ b/man/keyctl_dh_compute.3
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
.\"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
.SH NAME
keyctl_dh_compute \- Compute a Diffie-Hellman shared secret or public key
+.br
+keyctl_dh_compute_kdf \- Derive key from a Diffie-Hellman shared secret
.\"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
.SH SYNOPSIS
.nf
@@ -21,6 +23,10 @@ keyctl_dh_compute \- Compute a Diffie-Hellman shared secret or public key
.sp
.BI "long keyctl_dh_compute_alloc(key_serial_t " private,
.BI "key_serial_t " prime ", key_serial_t " base ", void **" _buffer ");"
+.sp
+.BI "long keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(key_serial_t " private ", key_serial_t " prime ,
+.BI "key_serial_t " base ", char *" kdfname ", char *" otherinfo ",
+.BI "size_t " otherinfolen ", char *" buffer ", size_t " buflen ");"
.\"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
.SH DESCRIPTION
.BR keyctl_dh_compute ()
@@ -64,6 +70,49 @@ places the data in it. If successful, a pointer to the buffer is placed in
.IR *_buffer .
The caller must free the buffer.
.P
+.BR keyctl_dh_compute_kdf ()
+derives a key from a Diffie-Hellman shared secret according to the protocol
+specified in SP800-56A. The Diffie-Hellman computation is based on the same
+primitives as discussed
+for
+.BR keyctl_dy_compute ().
+.P
+To implement the protocol of SP800-56A
+.I base
+is a key containing the remote public key to compute the Diffie-Hellman
+shared secret. That shared secret is post-processed with a key derivation
+function.
+.P
+The
+.I kdfname
+specifies the Linux kernel crypto API name for a key derivation function
+using a non-keyed hash, such as kdf_ctr(sha256). Using the counter KDF function
+specified with kdf_ctr() makes the key derivation compliant to SP800-56A.
+The
+.I kdfname
+must be a NULL terminated string.
+.P
+Following the specification of SP800-56A section 5.8.1.2 the
+.I otherinfo
+parameter may be provided. The format of the OtherInfo field is defined
+by the caller. The caller may also specify NULL as a valid argument when
+no OtherInfo data shall be processed. The length of the
+.I otherinfo
+parameter is specified with
+.I otherinfolen
+and is restricted to a maximum length by the kernel.
+.P
+The KDF returns the requested number of bytes specified with the
+.I genlen
+or the
+.I buflen
+parameter depending on the invoked function.
+.P
+.I buffer
+and
+.I buflen
+specify the buffer into which the computed result will be placed.
+.P
.\"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
.SH RETURN VALUE
On success
@@ -91,6 +140,15 @@ The buffer pointer is invalid or buflen is too small.
.TP
.B EOPNOTSUPP
One of the keys was not a valid user key.
+.TP
+.B EMSGSIZE
+When using
+.BR keyctl_dh_compute_kdf (),
+the size of either
+.I otherinfolen
+or
+.I buflen
+is too big.
.\"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
.SH LINKING
This is a library function that can be found in
diff --git a/tests/keyctl/dh_compute/valid/runtest.sh b/tests/keyctl/dh_compute/valid/runtest.sh
index f2aace6..d8e338b 100644
--- a/tests/keyctl/dh_compute/valid/runtest.sh
+++ b/tests/keyctl/dh_compute/valid/runtest.sh
@@ -84,5 +84,173 @@ expect_multiline payload "$public"
echo "++++ FINISHED TEST: $result" >>$OUTPUTFILE
+
+################################################################
+# Testing DH compute with KDF according to SP800-56A
+#
+# test vectors from http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/keymgmt/KASTestVectorsFFC2014.zip
+################################################################
+
+# SHA-256
+
+# XephemCAVS
+private="\x81\xb2\xc6\x5f\x5c\xba\xc0\x0b\x13\x53\xac\x38\xbd\x77\xa2\x5a"
+private+="\x86\x50\xed\x48\x5e\x41\x3e\xac\x1d\x6c\x48\x85"
+
+# P
+prime="\xa3\xcc\x62\x23\xe5\x0c\x6e\x3f\x7b\xb0\x58\x1d\xcb\x9e\x9f\xf0"
+prime+="\x2c\x58\x07\x68\x32\x8a\x15\x20\x7b\x1c\x32\x31\x7f\xb7\x84\x96"
+prime+="\x81\x5e\x3c\xf7\xf9\xd0\x9c\xcb\x9f\xa8\x40\xff\x47\x98\x51\x1a"
+prime+="\x17\xb5\x59\x28\x72\x1e\x5d\xfb\xcc\xc5\x41\x47\xe0\xf0\x5f\x85"
+prime+="\xb3\xac\x41\x0b\x6a\xe3\xf5\x9b\x79\x6f\x3f\xea\xc7\xfc\x52\x49"
+prime+="\x21\x7e\xb2\xa0\x45\x88\x29\x3a\x5a\xde\x22\x78\x79\xf4\x6c\xeb"
+prime+="\x56\x45\x7b\x5c\x43\x12\x93\xe5\xe1\x04\xd1\xb9\x64\xbd\x2c\xdf"
+prime+="\xde\xff\xa0\x40\x49\xa9\x1e\x67\xee\x8c\x86\xe9\x44\xf0\x4f\x94"
+prime+="\x4a\x30\xe3\x61\xf8\xd1\x5d\x17\xe5\x01\x0c\xab\xb4\xef\x40\xc0"
+prime+="\xeb\xa5\xf4\xa2\x52\xd4\xfd\x6c\xf9\xda\xe6\x0e\x86\xe4\xb3\x00"
+prime+="\x9b\x1d\xfc\x92\x66\x70\x35\x72\x61\x58\x7a\xd0\x5c\x00\xa6\xc6"
+prime+="\xf0\x10\x6c\xec\x8f\xc5\x91\x31\x51\x50\x84\xa8\x70\x59\x41\x65"
+prime+="\xb4\x93\x90\xdb\x2d\x00\xe7\x53\x8f\x23\x0d\x53\x2f\x4a\x4e\xca"
+prime+="\x83\x09\xd7\x07\xc0\xb3\x83\x5c\xee\x04\xf3\xca\x55\x8a\x22\xc6"
+prime+="\xb5\x20\xfe\x25\xde\x6f\xfa\x90\xef\xda\x49\x27\xd0\x18\x59\x4c"
+prime+="\x0c\x0b\x77\x06\x73\x93\xb7\xf1\xe0\xfc\x7c\xf2\x16\xaf\xf3\x9f"
+
+# YephemIUT
+xa="\x9a\x70\x82\x2d\x3f\x06\x12\x3d\x0e\x51\x8e\xe1\x16\x51\xe5\xf6"
+xa+="\xb1\x19\xdc\x3b\x97\xd5\xb1\xc0\xa2\xa6\xf6\xde\x94\x25\x64\xba"
+xa+="\x10\x06\x1e\xec\xde\xb7\x36\x9c\xa5\x37\x49\x9e\x04\xb0\x36\xe9"
+xa+="\x7f\x44\x5a\x95\x6f\x63\x69\xae\x6e\x63\xfd\x27\xea\xe3\xe3\x47"
+xa+="\x85\x54\x47\xd3\xba\xc1\xc6\x0c\x10\xe7\x35\x07\x72\xc6\xc0\xc6"
+xa+="\xfb\xf9\xca\x3e\x38\xf0\xe8\x65\x88\x25\xd3\xb2\x0f\x1f\x02\x8f"
+xa+="\x35\xe3\x4d\x12\x35\x10\x3d\xf2\x33\x9b\x5b\x09\x9d\x3f\xe3\xe5"
+xa+="\x34\x6a\x69\x16\x42\xba\xc5\xb0\xbb\x03\xcd\x5d\x04\xd7\x56\x26"
+xa+="\x21\x49\x3f\xf1\xc4\x27\x3b\x6a\x45\xc5\xec\xb0\xb5\xe9\x08\xa0"
+xa+="\xf9\xf5\x62\x28\x2e\x85\x3e\xfc\x9a\x7e\xa1\x12\xe9\x47\x4f\xf6"
+xa+="\x94\x18\xf7\xc4\x7a\xe9\x66\xd4\x52\x4c\xa1\x70\x1b\x60\xa4\xbe"
+xa+="\x15\xc7\x5e\x27\xb4\x05\x80\x64\x68\x15\x6e\x02\xcb\xc5\x8f\xf4"
+xa+="\x66\x3c\x96\xac\x0c\x87\x36\x81\x35\xfa\x9b\x0b\xb6\x33\x7a\xe2"
+xa+="\x58\x52\x1d\x7d\x60\xc2\xa9\x1b\x4e\xd7\x72\xad\x65\x03\x40\x49"
+xa+="\x97\xf6\x79\x9d\xf6\x63\xa8\x99\x9c\xfd\x74\x7f\xa0\x67\xb9\x05"
+xa+="\x8a\xb3\x3b\xc1\x45\x94\x36\x6f\x28\xf5\xa2\xd9\x00\xb6\x46\x7a"
+
+# Z
+read -d '' shared <<"EOF"
+0fdbd9a2 ebf50cba 489b4e4d 7cd6924a 42ee6324 a26988b2 22bc38e6 9cc445f1
+eb47c1a4 62eca39f 39bcd7b8 19dede51 30bc38da ec99c16f 40a4e5c1 9c97b796
+8b41823d a0650e37 13c73e6f 5f2a9dff 2e67dbf5 40ee66f4 e694c28f ba1d604b
+71b57b8a eeb67a35 ba425a38 490b6fb9 f713db22 6f893b7a 8962f426 ba3046fb
+cff8538c 16f583e8 ae947672 0ba55ff9 75b440d0 c4565cc7 5837d23a fea61a39
+e0b7f6c4 e24c2154 7eb19fce f8dbed10 b06a9cce 971c0f0f ba7c1d5c b5035eaa
+4fddd3ba fe757339 e3321e3e 4ebfe9e7 9c6c0401 4df63cf9 28d0a2c0 5b2d5521
+030c35f1 c84c97fe 64cad509 8012a003 d52d24c4 1a1f9348 b7575251 3facb02f
+EOF
+
+# OI
+otherinfo="\xa1\xb2\xc3\xd4\xe5\x43\x41\x56\x53\x69\x64\x0d\x64\xc1\xb2"
+otherinfo+="\x33\x61\xb2\x61\xde\x78\x68\x8e\xa8\x65\xfc\xff\x11\x3c\x84"
+
+# DKM
+read -d '' derived <<"EOF"
+8284e313 02c8a26b 393ec52d 9f9e0882
+EOF
+
+pcreate_key "-e $prime" user dh:prime @s
+expect_keyid primeid
+
+pcreate_key "-e $xa" user dh:xa @s
+expect_keyid xaid
+
+pcreate_key "-e $private" user dh:private @s
+expect_keyid privateid
+
+marker "COMPUTE DH SHARED SECRET"
+dh_compute $privateid $primeid $xaid
+expect_multiline payload "$shared"
+
+marker "COMPUTE DERIVED KEY FROM DH SHARED SECRET (SHA-256)"
+echo -e -n $otherinfo | dh_compute_kdf_oi $privateid $primeid $xaid 16 "kdf_ctr(sha256)"
+expect_multiline payload "$derived"
+
+
+# SHA-224
+
+# XephemCAVS
+private="\x86\x1b\xa2\x59\xab\xa6\xaa\x57\x7d\xe2\x2f\x50\x8e\xcb\xbc\x26"
+private+="\xc5\xac\xfc\xcb\x9e\xa2\x3b\x43\x4d\x6d\x2b\x79"
+
+# P
+prime="\xa5\xb1\x76\x4e\x13\xc8\x16\x99\xab\xa3\x8f\x0d\xc0\xd1\x5e\x15"
+prime+="\xf5\x0f\xcd\x5c\xf7\xc2\x23\x72\xca\xfc\x5e\xd7\x62\x94\x1b\xd9"
+prime+="\xe0\xfb\x9a\xab\xee\x74\x66\xd2\xc8\x29\xaa\xb0\x31\xdb\x7b\x1b"
+prime+="\x5a\x64\xe6\x8e\xd5\x3b\xaf\xb2\x83\xba\x0f\x01\x8b\xeb\x3e\xdc"
+prime+="\x95\x7f\xe4\x53\xbe\x0d\xaa\xb6\x1b\x32\x28\x76\x3e\x80\x75\x8c"
+prime+="\x6d\x8c\x28\x3c\xf6\x30\xed\xd9\xd7\x0a\x8a\xf3\x30\xdd\x0a\xf6"
+prime+="\xa8\xd5\x94\xc2\x3c\xdd\x24\xc8\xad\x3f\xcf\xea\x41\x75\x77\x72"
+prime+="\xce\xed\x92\x1e\x63\x86\x2f\x24\x6e\x6f\x49\xd8\x74\x7e\x44\xae"
+prime+="\xf0\x1e\x30\x9b\x6d\xcc\x80\xd4\x50\x38\x3b\xb1\xf9\x4d\xd5\x90"
+prime+="\x84\xf8\xe9\x6f\x85\x6e\xc7\xc8\x33\x5e\xdb\x05\x5f\x8e\xc6\xc4"
+prime+="\x81\x52\x0b\x3f\x28\xe8\x0b\x62\x09\xb8\xae\x61\xcc\x86\x0e\x24"
+prime+="\xc8\x22\xb6\x6c\x4f\x97\x80\x49\x93\xbc\xd0\xa9\x72\xb3\x53\x54"
+prime+="\x01\x33\x0e\xbe\x4b\x2e\x92\x3f\x18\x9b\x63\x35\x62\xe4\x68\xeb"
+prime+="\x99\xa4\xbc\x88\xcc\xbf\xf8\xdf\x0f\xd5\xaf\xcf\xe6\xae\x19\x18"
+prime+="\x42\x14\xab\x3f\xef\xb7\xf0\x66\x8b\x8b\x26\x83\xbe\xbd\x56\x51"
+prime+="\xa4\xc6\x38\x43\xb9\xb1\x4b\xc7\x38\xd5\x20\xb1\xb7\x21\x2c\x69"
+
+# YephemIUT
+xa="\x17\xd7\x1a\xf4\x35\x3c\x22\x12\x2a\xeb\x2a\x06\x19\xcc\x2c\xf7"
+xa+="\x35\x53\xf2\x8e\x9f\xb1\x91\xfd\xb2\x86\xb1\x15\xb9\xfd\xa8\x66"
+xa+="\x2d\xe5\x17\x3b\x1a\xff\x70\x48\x8d\x9b\xc8\x48\xe5\x37\xd7\xe5"
+xa+="\x02\x16\x49\xd3\x7d\xc7\x8c\x94\x36\x9d\xb9\x0c\x27\x84\xc9\x4d"
+xa+="\x97\x0a\xc9\xb5\xe3\x5e\xfd\x22\xd4\x18\xd3\x1b\x68\xd9\x55\x0b"
+xa+="\xaa\x77\x16\xe9\x8e\xa6\x78\x3b\xb3\xa8\x45\x05\x9f\xba\xa4\xa6"
+xa+="\x72\x0a\x6a\x23\xc5\x6b\xa5\x2b\x4d\x9b\x72\x6e\x00\x68\xe9\xeb"
+xa+="\x4d\x17\x5b\xff\x43\x69\xf3\xd2\xa4\xaf\x66\xee\xcd\x62\xef\x7b"
+xa+="\x23\xc3\x37\xd4\x70\x95\x2b\x17\x67\xc8\xbf\x78\x2f\x0b\x58\xb4"
+xa+="\xfc\x82\x45\xf8\x40\x78\x71\x70\xf4\xb0\xa5\x1b\x5e\xb4\x60\x75"
+xa+="\x8a\xdd\xc9\xf4\x4a\x73\xa3\xf6\x07\x60\x3b\xd3\x50\x73\xd1\xa6"
+xa+="\x9a\x20\x3a\x04\x94\xa8\xc2\x02\x1b\xa0\xda\x1f\x04\x95\xf5\x60"
+xa+="\xc0\xba\x81\x79\x4e\xee\xeb\x82\x5d\x1b\xd3\x43\x16\xa5\x2a\xe1"
+xa+="\xc9\x00\x10\x0c\x0d\x6f\xa0\x25\x46\xed\x7a\x9c\x38\xa6\xa3\x43"
+xa+="\xd6\x86\x59\xee\xb5\x9c\xf3\x81\x04\xa9\x6b\xb2\x5a\x6d\xbb\xf0"
+xa+="\xcb\xc0\xed\xe7\x3a\x7b\xba\x67\x51\x81\xe0\xcd\x2e\x7b\x9f\x89"
+
+# Z
+read -d '' shared <<"EOF"
+057c22b8 c5872fef 08ebe852 fafab4b7 c2c2ffbb 376d71bd a941b16e 32614adf
+ebb82aeb d50f29d3 cec63d10 77f50e21 cf381b87 a818c614 52c5cce2 af85f40c
+06615b97 fe8c3a80 68990ac5 83957b52 8dd6d52d a3b51e84 aec355fd 4a3fe5ce
+faa3b17c 9e71cb4d 28ecab6d 21297280 e52397b7 ccb1b62d 8d5d3ce4 1d26b2a3
+bdbf880b b39e8b02 8a745ff2 9f0984da efe97084 5d850884 525403ca d2a52956
+f55b9a89 b2d801f1 710333c0 479c5955 b54c8163 83c65ad9 c78b8c67 cc1b211b
+208b9fab b9c99a68 18293e6a 8da069e6 75eb4317 668a7d4b 6f235533 f3ff4ed0
+4f8ad579 f9ad14e7 f68ae183 41d603d9 d6297123 00716c98 bbbf16eb 2a2cc92f
+EOF
+
+# OI
+otherinfo="\xa1\xb2\xc3\xd4\xe5\x43\x41\x56\x53\x69\x64\xaa\x27\xe2\x49"
+otherinfo+="\xbf\x0a\x12\x76\x46\x8d\x80\x82\x59\xf3\xb8\xe2\x68\x78\x51"
+
+# DKM
+read -d '' derived <<"EOF"
+88bf39c0 08eec33a dc3b4430 054ba262
+EOF
+
+pcreate_key "-e $prime" user dh:prime @s
+expect_keyid primeid
+
+pcreate_key "-e $xa" user dh:xa @s
+expect_keyid xaid
+
+pcreate_key "-e $private" user dh:private @s
+expect_keyid privateid
+
+marker "COMPUTE DH SHARED SECRET"
+dh_compute $privateid $primeid $xaid
+expect_multiline payload "$shared"
+
+marker "COMPUTE DERIVED KEY FROM DH SHARED SECRET (SHA-224)"
+echo -e -n $otherinfo | dh_compute_kdf_oi $privateid $primeid $xaid 16 "kdf_ctr(sha224)"
+expect_multiline payload "$derived"
+
# --- then report the results in the database ---
toolbox_report_result $TEST $result
diff --git a/tests/toolbox.inc.sh b/tests/toolbox.inc.sh
index 7f19a02..27b253f 100644
--- a/tests/toolbox.inc.sh
+++ b/tests/toolbox.inc.sh
@@ -1106,6 +1106,50 @@ function dh_compute ()
###############################################################################
#
+# Do a DH computation post-processed by a KDF
+#
+###############################################################################
+function dh_compute_kdf ()
+{
+ my_exitval=0
+ if [ "x$1" = "x--fail" ]
+ then
+ my_exitval=1
+ shift
+ fi
+
+ echo keyctl dh_compute_kdf $@ >>$OUTPUTFILE
+ keyctl dh_compute_kdf $@ >>$OUTPUTFILE 2>&1
+ if [ $? != $my_exitval ]
+ then
+ failed
+ fi
+}
+
+###############################################################################
+#
+# Do a DH computation post-processed by a KDF with other information
+#
+###############################################################################
+function dh_compute_kdf_oi ()
+{
+ my_exitval=0
+ if [ "x$1" = "x--fail" ]
+ then
+ my_exitval=1
+ shift
+ fi
+
+ echo keyctl dh_compute_kdf_oi $@ >>$OUTPUTFILE
+ keyctl dh_compute_kdf_oi $@ >>$OUTPUTFILE 2>&1
+ if [ $? != $my_exitval ]
+ then
+ failed
+ fi
+}
+
+###############################################################################
+#
# Make sure we sleep at least N seconds
#
###############################################################################
diff --git a/version.lds b/version.lds
index 2bfed13..b8eebfb 100644
--- a/version.lds
+++ b/version.lds
@@ -66,5 +66,7 @@ KEYUTILS_1.6 {
/* management functions */
keyctl_dh_compute;
keyctl_dh_compute_alloc;
+ keyctl_dh_compute_kdf;
+ keyctl_dh_compute_kdf_alloc;
} KEYUTILS_1.5;
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [RFC][PATCH] RANDOM: ATH9K RNG delivers zero bits of entropy
From: Jason Cooper @ 2016-08-06 20:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stephan Mueller
Cc: Ted Tso, herbert, linux-kernel, linux-crypto, ath9k-devel,
linux-wireless, ath9k-devel, Kalle Valo
In-Reply-To: <6481670.KeU7RXkv1k@myon.chronox.de>
Hi Stephan,
On Sat, Aug 06, 2016 at 10:03:58PM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Samstag, 6. August 2016, 19:45:51 CEST schrieb Jason Cooper:
> > On Fri, Aug 05, 2016 at 05:08:14PM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
...
> > > diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
> > > b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c index d38e50f..d63dc48 100644
> > > --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
> > > +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
> > > @@ -92,8 +92,7 @@ static int ath9k_rng_kthread(void *data)
> > >
> > > fail_stats = 0;
> > >
> > > /* sleep until entropy bits under write_wakeup_threshold */
> > >
> > > - add_hwgenerator_randomness((void *)rng_buf, bytes_read,
> > > - ATH9K_RNG_ENTROPY(bytes_read));
> >
> > This is the only use of this macro. I'd remove the #define on line 25
> > as well.
>
> My idea for leaving it was that folks who would bring the RNG into the
> hwrandom framework could reuse the ideas from the original authors.
>
> What about commenting it out with #if 0 ?
#if 0 is frowned upon. If that calculation is documented somewhere,
then it can be redone from the spec. If it isn't, then I'd be curious
to know where it came from.
Perhaps one of the ath9k devs can point to a document containing the
formula? We could put the reference in a comment.
thx,
Jason.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH
From: Stephan Mueller @ 2016-08-06 6:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mat Martineau; +Cc: David Howells, keyrings, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <alpine.OSX.2.20.1608050858270.69454@mjmartin-mac01.local>
Am Freitag, 5. August 2016, 09:08:59 CEST schrieb Mat Martineau:
Hi Mat,
> >
> > When trying to implement it, I think that it would even be more confusing,
> > because we need a conditional in any case. Do you like
> >
> > return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, (kdf) ? &kdfcopy :
> > NULL);
> >
> > better than the already presented code? Besides, this would now imply that
> > we have two conditionals instead of one.
>
> Another approach that uses one conditional is to add a struct
> keyctl_kdf_params* variable and assign it in the conditional block. Maybe
> that's not much of a win, it's up to you.
To be honest, I like the code as is, because although you have two
invocations, it is yet just a few lines in size and thus readable and second
either my suggestion or yours with the additional variable implies one or more
additional instructions (yes, I know, this should not matter too much, but
still ... ).
Ciao
Stephan
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v3] KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH
From: Stephan Mueller @ 2016-08-06 6:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mat Martineau; +Cc: David Howells, keyrings, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <2239809.KsND40bFeW@positron.chronox.de>
SP800-56A defines the use of DH with key derivation function based on a
counter. The input to the KDF is defined as (DH shared secret || other
information). The value for the "other information" is to be provided by
the caller.
The KDF is provided by the kernel crypto API. The SP800-56A KDF is equal
to the SP800-108 counter KDF. However, the caller is allowed to specify
the KDF type that he wants to use to derive the key material allowing
the use of the other KDFs provided with the kernel crypto API.
As the KDF implements the proper truncation of the DH shared secret to
the requested size, this patch fills the caller buffer up to its size.
The patch is tested with a new test added to the keyutils user space
code which uses a CAVS test vector testing the compliance with
SP800-56A.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
Documentation/security/keys.txt | 35 ++++++++++---
include/linux/compat.h | 7 +++
include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h | 7 +++
security/keys/Kconfig | 1 +
security/keys/Makefile | 3 +-
security/keys/compat.c | 5 +-
security/keys/compat_dh.c | 36 +++++++++++++
security/keys/dh.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
security/keys/internal.h | 21 +++++++-
security/keys/keyctl.c | 2 +-
10 files changed, 201 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/keys/compat_dh.c
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
index 3849814..9df0605 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
@@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
long keyctl(KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, struct keyctl_dh_params *params,
char *buffer, size_t buflen,
- void *reserved);
+ struct keyctl_kdf_params *kdf);
The params struct contains serial numbers for three keys:
@@ -844,18 +844,37 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
public key. If the base is the remote public key, the result is
the shared secret.
- The reserved argument must be set to NULL.
+ If the parameter kdf is NULL, the following applies:
- The buffer length must be at least the length of the prime, or zero.
+ - The buffer length must be at least the length of the prime, or zero.
- If the buffer length is nonzero, the length of the result is
- returned when it is successfully calculated and copied in to the
- buffer. When the buffer length is zero, the minimum required
- buffer length is returned.
+ - If the buffer length is nonzero, the length of the result is
+ returned when it is successfully calculated and copied in to the
+ buffer. When the buffer length is zero, the minimum required
+ buffer length is returned.
+
+ The kdf parameter allows the caller to apply a key derivation function
+ (KDF) on the Diffie-Hellman computation where only the result
+ of the KDF is returned to the caller. The KDF is characterized with
+ struct keyctl_kdf_params as follows:
+
+ - char *kdfname specifies the NUL terminated string identifying
+ the KDF function used from the kernel crypto API. As of now,
+ only non-keyed KDFs are supported, such as kdf_ctr(sha256),
+ kdf_fb(sha1) or kdf_dpi(sha512). The use of kdf_ctr() complies
+ with SP800-56A.
+
+ - char *otherinfo specifies the OtherInfo data as documented in
+ SP800-56A section 5.8.1.2. The length of the buffer is given with
+ otherinfolen. The format of OtherInfo is defined by the caller.
+ The otherinfo pointer may be NULL if no OtherInfo shall be used.
This function will return error EOPNOTSUPP if the key type is not
supported, error ENOKEY if the key could not be found, or error
- EACCES if the key is not readable by the caller.
+ EACCES if the key is not readable by the caller. In addition, the
+ function will return EMSGSIZE when the parameter kdf is non-NULL
+ and either the buffer length or the OtherInfo length exceeds the
+ allowed length.
===============
KERNEL SERVICES
diff --git a/include/linux/compat.h b/include/linux/compat.h
index f964ef7..00f348f 100644
--- a/include/linux/compat.h
+++ b/include/linux/compat.h
@@ -295,6 +295,13 @@ struct compat_old_sigaction {
};
#endif
+struct compat_keyctl_kdf_params {
+ compat_uptr_t kdfname;
+ compat_uptr_t otherinfo;
+ __u32 otherinfolen;
+ __u32 __spare[8];
+};
+
struct compat_statfs;
struct compat_statfs64;
struct compat_old_linux_dirent;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h
index 86eddd6..0abe048 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h
@@ -68,4 +68,11 @@ struct keyctl_dh_params {
__s32 base;
};
+struct keyctl_kdf_params {
+ char *kdfname;
+ char *otherinfo;
+ __u32 otherinfolen;
+ __u32 __spare[8];
+};
+
#endif /* _LINUX_KEYCTL_H */
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
index f826e87..56491fe 100644
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ config KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
bool "Diffie-Hellman operations on retained keys"
depends on KEYS
select MPILIB
+ select CRYPTO_KDF
help
This option provides support for calculating Diffie-Hellman
public keys and shared secrets using values stored as keys
diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile
index 1fd4a16..57dff0c 100644
--- a/security/keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@ obj-y := \
request_key.o \
request_key_auth.o \
user_defined.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o
+compat-obj-$(CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS) += compat_dh.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o $(compat-obj-y)
obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS) += persistent.o
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index 36c80bf..b674886 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -133,8 +133,9 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, u32, option,
return keyctl_get_persistent(arg2, arg3);
case KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE:
- return keyctl_dh_compute(compat_ptr(arg2), compat_ptr(arg3),
- arg4, compat_ptr(arg5));
+ return compat_keyctl_dh_compute(compat_ptr(arg2),
+ compat_ptr(arg3),
+ arg4, compat_ptr(arg5));
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
diff --git a/security/keys/compat_dh.c b/security/keys/compat_dh.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc93e95e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/compat_dh.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/* 32-bit compatibility syscall for 64-bit systems for DH operations
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * Perform the DH computation or DH based key derivation.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 will be returned.
+ */
+long compat_keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+ char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+ struct compat_keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
+{
+ struct keyctl_kdf_params kdfcopy;
+ struct compat_keyctl_kdf_params compat_kdfcopy;
+
+ if (!kdf)
+ return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, NULL);
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&compat_kdfcopy, kdf, sizeof(compat_kdfcopy)) != 0)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ kdfcopy.kdfname = compat_ptr(compat_kdfcopy.kdfname);
+ kdfcopy.otherinfo = compat_ptr(compat_kdfcopy.otherinfo);
+ kdfcopy.otherinfolen = compat_kdfcopy.otherinfolen;
+
+ return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, &kdfcopy);
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/dh.c b/security/keys/dh.c
index 531ed2e..8054454 100644
--- a/security/keys/dh.c
+++ b/security/keys/dh.c
@@ -77,9 +77,35 @@ error:
return ret;
}
-long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
- char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
- void __user *reserved)
+static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
+ char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+ uint8_t *kbuf, size_t kbuflen)
+{
+ uint8_t *outbuf = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
+ outbuf = kmalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!outbuf) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = crypto_rng_generate(tfm, kbuf, kbuflen, outbuf, buflen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = buflen;
+ if (copy_to_user(buffer, outbuf, buflen) != 0)
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+
+err:
+ kzfree(outbuf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+ char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+ struct keyctl_kdf_params *kdfcopy)
{
long ret;
MPI base, private, prime, result;
@@ -88,6 +114,7 @@ long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
uint8_t *kbuf;
ssize_t keylen;
size_t resultlen;
+ struct crypto_rng *tfm = NULL;
if (!params || (!buffer && buflen)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -98,12 +125,36 @@ long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
goto out;
}
- if (reserved) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
+ if (kdfcopy) {
+ char *kdfname;
+
+ if (buflen > KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OUTPUT_LEN ||
+ kdfcopy->otherinfolen > KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OI_LEN) {
+ ret = -EMSGSIZE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* get KDF name string */
+ kdfname = strndup_user(kdfcopy->kdfname, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
+ if (IS_ERR(kdfname)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(kdfname);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* allocate KDF from the kernel crypto API */
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_rng(kdfname, 0, 0);
+ kfree(kdfname);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ goto out;
+ }
}
- keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.prime, buflen, &prime);
+ /*
+ * If the caller requests postprocessing with a KDF, allow an
+ * arbitrary output buffer size since the KDF ensures proper truncation.
+ */
+ keylen = mpi_from_key(pcopy.prime, kdfcopy ? SIZE_MAX : buflen, &prime);
if (keylen < 0 || !prime) {
/* buflen == 0 may be used to query the required buffer size,
* which is the prime key length.
@@ -133,12 +184,25 @@ long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
goto error3;
}
- kbuf = kmalloc(resultlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ /* allocate space for DH shared secret and SP800-56A otherinfo */
+ kbuf = kmalloc(kdfcopy ? (resultlen + kdfcopy->otherinfolen) : resultlen,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kbuf) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto error4;
}
+ /*
+ * Concatenate SP800-56A otherinfo past DH shared secret -- the
+ * input to the KDF is (DH shared secret || otherinfo)
+ */
+ if (kdfcopy && kdfcopy->otherinfo &&
+ copy_from_user(kbuf + resultlen, kdfcopy->otherinfo,
+ kdfcopy->otherinfolen) != 0) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto error5;
+ }
+
ret = do_dh(result, base, private, prime);
if (ret)
goto error5;
@@ -147,12 +211,17 @@ long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
if (ret != 0)
goto error5;
- ret = nbytes;
- if (copy_to_user(buffer, kbuf, nbytes) != 0)
- ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (kdfcopy) {
+ ret = keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(tfm, buffer, buflen, kbuf,
+ resultlen + kdfcopy->otherinfolen);
+ } else {
+ ret = nbytes;
+ if (copy_to_user(buffer, kbuf, nbytes) != 0)
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ }
error5:
- kfree(kbuf);
+ kzfree(kbuf);
error4:
mpi_free(result);
error3:
@@ -162,5 +231,22 @@ error2:
error1:
mpi_free(prime);
out:
+ if (tfm)
+ crypto_free_rng(tfm);
return ret;
}
+
+long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+ char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+ struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
+{
+ struct keyctl_kdf_params kdfcopy;
+
+ if (!kdf)
+ return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, NULL);
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&kdfcopy, kdf, sizeof(kdfcopy)) != 0)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return __keyctl_dh_compute(params, buffer, buflen, &kdfcopy);
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index a705a7d..7659b52 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -259,15 +259,32 @@ static inline long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t uid, key_serial_t destring)
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
+#include <crypto/rng.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
extern long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *, char __user *,
- size_t, void __user *);
+ size_t, struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *);
+extern long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *, char __user *,
+ size_t, struct keyctl_kdf_params *);
+extern long compat_keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+ char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+ struct compat_keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf);
+#define KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OUTPUT_LEN 1024 /* max length of KDF output */
+#define KEYCTL_KDF_MAX_OI_LEN 64 /* max length of otherinfo */
#else
static inline long keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
- void __user *reserved)
+ struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
+
+static inline long compat_keyctl_dh_compute(
+ struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
+ char __user *buffer, size_t buflen,
+ struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *kdf)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP
+}
#endif
/*
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index d580ad0..b106898 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1689,7 +1689,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
case KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE:
return keyctl_dh_compute((struct keyctl_dh_params __user *) arg2,
(char __user *) arg3, (size_t) arg4,
- (void __user *) arg5);
+ (struct keyctl_kdf_params __user *) arg5);
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* 澳门金沙集团全球最大博彩公司，我们一直被模仿，但从未被超越(AD)！
From: jipuwen @ 2016-08-06 5:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto
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^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v2] RANDOM: ATH9K RNG delivers zero bits of entropy
From: Stephan Mueller @ 2016-08-07 9:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ted Tso
Cc: herbert, linux-kernel, linux-crypto, ath9k-devel, linux-wireless,
ath9k-devel, Kalle Valo, Jason Cooper
In-Reply-To: <34197429.2CvoIfft9B@positron.chronox.de>
The ATH9K driver implements an RNG which is completely bypassing the
standard Linux HW generator logic.
The RNG may or may not deliver entropy. Considering the conservative
approach in treating entropy with respect to non-auditable sources, this
patch changes the delivered entropy value to zero. The RNG still feeds
data into the input_pool but it is assumed to have no entropy.
When the ATH9K RNG changes to use the HW RNG framework, it may re-enable
the entropy estimation considering that a user can change that value at
boot and runtime.
Reviewed-by: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c | 4 +---
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
index d38e50f..1ed8338 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
#include "ar9003_phy.h"
#define ATH9K_RNG_BUF_SIZE 320
-#define ATH9K_RNG_ENTROPY(x) (((x) * 8 * 320) >> 10) /* quality: 320/1024 */
static int ath9k_rng_data_read(struct ath_softc *sc, u32 *buf, u32 buf_size)
{
@@ -92,8 +91,7 @@ static int ath9k_rng_kthread(void *data)
fail_stats = 0;
/* sleep until entropy bits under write_wakeup_threshold */
- add_hwgenerator_randomness((void *)rng_buf, bytes_read,
- ATH9K_RNG_ENTROPY(bytes_read));
+ add_hwgenerator_randomness((void *)rng_buf, bytes_read, 0);
}
kfree(rng_buf);
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* Announce loop-AES-v3.7i file/swap crypto package
From: Jari Ruusu @ 2016-08-07 16:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-crypto; +Cc: linux-kernel
loop-AES changes since previous release:
- Worked around block layer interface changes on 4.7 kernels.
bzip2 compressed tarball is here:
http://loop-aes.sourceforge.net/loop-AES/loop-AES-v3.7i.tar.bz2
md5sum dd465844a650ea4d4856ee26756a0235
http://loop-aes.sourceforge.net/loop-AES/loop-AES-v3.7i.tar.bz2.sign
--
Jari Ruusu 4096R/8132F189 12D6 4C3A DCDA 0AA4 27BD ACDF F073 3C80 8132 F189
^ permalink raw reply
* RE: [PATCH v2] RANDOM: ATH9K RNG delivers zero bits of entropy
From: Pan, Miaoqing @ 2016-08-08 2:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stephan Mueller, Ted Tso, Sepehrdad, Pouyan
Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, ath9k-devel,
linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, ath9k-devel@lists.ath9k.org,
Kalle Valo, Jason Cooper
In-Reply-To: <1654172.XfclnXhRmn@positron.chronox.de>
The entropy was evaluated by crypto expert, the analysis report show the ADC with at least 10bits and up to 22 bits of min-entropy for a 32 bits value, we conservatively assume the min-entropy is 10 bits out of 32 bits, so that's why set entropy quality to 320/1024 = 10/32. Also we have explained in the commit message why can't use the HW RNG framework.
Otherwise, your patch will cause high CPU load, as continuously read ADC data if entropy bits under write_wakeup_threshold.
--
Miaoqing
-----Original Message-----
From: Stephan Mueller [mailto:smueller@chronox.de]
Sent: Sunday, August 07, 2016 5:36 PM
To: Ted Tso <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org; linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org; ath9k-devel <ath9k-devel@qca.qualcomm.com>; linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org; ath9k-devel@lists.ath9k.org; Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>; Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Subject: [PATCH v2] RANDOM: ATH9K RNG delivers zero bits of entropy
The ATH9K driver implements an RNG which is completely bypassing the standard Linux HW generator logic.
The RNG may or may not deliver entropy. Considering the conservative approach in treating entropy with respect to non-auditable sources, this patch changes the delivered entropy value to zero. The RNG still feeds data into the input_pool but it is assumed to have no entropy.
When the ATH9K RNG changes to use the HW RNG framework, it may re-enable the entropy estimation considering that a user can change that value at boot and runtime.
Reviewed-by: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c | 4 +---
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
index d38e50f..1ed8338 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
#include "ar9003_phy.h"
#define ATH9K_RNG_BUF_SIZE 320
-#define ATH9K_RNG_ENTROPY(x) (((x) * 8 * 320) >> 10) /* quality: 320/1024 */
static int ath9k_rng_data_read(struct ath_softc *sc, u32 *buf, u32 buf_size) { @@ -92,8 +91,7 @@ static int ath9k_rng_kthread(void *data)
fail_stats = 0;
/* sleep until entropy bits under write_wakeup_threshold */
- add_hwgenerator_randomness((void *)rng_buf, bytes_read,
- ATH9K_RNG_ENTROPY(bytes_read));
+ add_hwgenerator_randomness((void *)rng_buf, bytes_read, 0);
}
kfree(rng_buf);
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH v2] RANDOM: ATH9K RNG delivers zero bits of entropy
From: Stephan Mueller @ 2016-08-08 6:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pan, Miaoqing
Cc: Ted Tso, Sepehrdad, Pouyan, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
ath9k-devel, linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org,
ath9k-devel@lists.ath9k.org, Kalle Valo, Jason Cooper
In-Reply-To: <657897b90b8344eeab10d7a0f604988d@aptaiexm02f.ap.qualcomm.com>
Am Montag, 8. August 2016, 02:03:36 CEST schrieb Pan, Miaoqing:
Hi Miaoqing,
> The entropy was evaluated by crypto expert, the analysis report show the
> ADC with at least 10bits and up to 22 bits of min-entropy for a 32 bits
> value, we conservatively assume the min-entropy is 10 bits out of 32 bits,
> so that's why set entropy quality to 320/1024 = 10/32. Also we have
> explained in the commit message why can't use the HW RNG framework.
Where is the description of the RNG, where is the test implementation?
>
> Otherwise, your patch will cause high CPU load, as continuously read ADC
> data if entropy bits under write_wakeup_threshold.
The issue is that although you may have analyzed it, others are unable to
measure the quality of the RNG and assess the design as well as the
implementation of the RNG. This RNG is the only implementation of a hardware
RNG that per default and without being able to change it at runtime injects
data into the input_pool where the noise source cannot be audited. Note, even
other respected RNG noise sources like the Intel RDRAND will not feed into /
dev/random per default in a way that dominates all other noise sources.
I would like to be able to deactivate that noise source to the extent that it
does not cause /dev/random to unblock. The reason is that your noise source
starts to dominate all other noise sources.
If you think that this patch is a challenge because your driver starts to
spin, please help and offer another solution.
>
> --
> Miaoqing
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Stephan Mueller [mailto:smueller@chronox.de]
> Sent: Sunday, August 07, 2016 5:36 PM
> To: Ted Tso <tytso@mit.edu>
> Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org;
> linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org; ath9k-devel <ath9k-devel@qca.qualcomm.com>;
> linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org; ath9k-devel@lists.ath9k.org; Kalle Valo
> <kvalo@codeaurora.org>; Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net> Subject: [PATCH
> v2] RANDOM: ATH9K RNG delivers zero bits of entropy
>
> The ATH9K driver implements an RNG which is completely bypassing the
> standard Linux HW generator logic.
>
> The RNG may or may not deliver entropy. Considering the conservative
> approach in treating entropy with respect to non-auditable sources, this
> patch changes the delivered entropy value to zero. The RNG still feeds data
> into the input_pool but it is assumed to have no entropy.
>
> When the ATH9K RNG changes to use the HW RNG framework, it may re-enable
the
> entropy estimation considering that a user can change that value at boot
> and runtime.
>
> Reviewed-by: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
> ---
> drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c | 4 +---
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
> b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c index d38e50f..1ed8338 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/rng.c
> @@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
> #include "ar9003_phy.h"
>
> #define ATH9K_RNG_BUF_SIZE 320
> -#define ATH9K_RNG_ENTROPY(x) (((x) * 8 * 320) >> 10) /* quality: 320/1024
> */
>
> static int ath9k_rng_data_read(struct ath_softc *sc, u32 *buf, u32
> buf_size) { @@ -92,8 +91,7 @@ static int ath9k_rng_kthread(void *data)
> fail_stats = 0;
>
> /* sleep until entropy bits under write_wakeup_threshold */
> - add_hwgenerator_randomness((void *)rng_buf, bytes_read,
> - ATH9K_RNG_ENTROPY(bytes_read));
> + add_hwgenerator_randomness((void *)rng_buf, bytes_read, 0);
> }
>
> kfree(rng_buf);
> --
> 2.7.4
Ciao
Stephan
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] crypto: crc32c-vpmsum - Convert to CPU feature based module autoloading
From: Herbert Xu @ 2016-08-08 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Ellerman
Cc: anton, anton, benh, paulus, davem, alastair, linuxppc-dev,
linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <87y44biu7s.fsf@concordia.ellerman.id.au>
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> wrote:
>
> This is actually an arch/powerpc patch, so I'll merge it unless Herbert
> objects.
It's fine with me.
Cheers,
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] crypto: sha3 - Add missing ULL suffixes for 64-bit constants
From: Herbert Xu @ 2016-08-08 16:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Geert Uytterhoeven
Cc: Jeff Garzik, Raveendra Padasalagi, David S. Miller, linux-crypto,
linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <1470245823-21090-1-git-send-email-geert@linux-m68k.org>
On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 07:37:03PM +0200, Geert Uytterhoeven wrote:
> On 32-bit (e.g. with m68k-linux-gnu-gcc-4.1):
>
> crypto/sha3_generic.c:27: warning: integer constant is too large for ‘long’ type
> crypto/sha3_generic.c:28: warning: integer constant is too large for ‘long’ type
> crypto/sha3_generic.c:29: warning: integer constant is too large for ‘long’ type
> crypto/sha3_generic.c:29: warning: integer constant is too large for ‘long’ type
> crypto/sha3_generic.c:31: warning: integer constant is too large for ‘long’ type
> crypto/sha3_generic.c:31: warning: integer constant is too large for ‘long’ type
> crypto/sha3_generic.c:32: warning: integer constant is too large for ‘long’ type
> crypto/sha3_generic.c:32: warning: integer constant is too large for ‘long’ type
> crypto/sha3_generic.c:32: warning: integer constant is too large for ‘long’ type
> crypto/sha3_generic.c:33: warning: integer constant is too large for ‘long’ type
> crypto/sha3_generic.c:33: warning: integer constant is too large for ‘long’ type
> crypto/sha3_generic.c:34: warning: integer constant is too large for ‘long’ type
> crypto/sha3_generic.c:34: warning: integer constant is too large for ‘long’ type
>
> Fixes: 53964b9ee63b7075 ("crypto: sha3 - Add SHA-3 hash algorithm")
> Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Patch applied. Thanks.
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 0/2] crypto: caam - authenc fixes
From: Herbert Xu @ 2016-08-08 16:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Horia Geantă; +Cc: linux-crypto, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <1470330167-31534-1-git-send-email-horia.geanta@nxp.com>
On Thu, Aug 04, 2016 at 08:02:45PM +0300, Horia Geantă wrote:
> The first patch fixes a few typos in the encrypt shared descriptor
> used by echainiv(authenc) algorithms.
>
> Second patch fixes the case when .setkey is called before .setauthsize,
> avoiding creating authenc descriptors with zero authsize.
>
> Both patches are also being sent to -stable for v4.3+ kernels.
Both patches applied. Thanks.
--
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
* AF_ALG broken?
From: Russell King - ARM Linux @ 2016-08-08 16:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, linux-crypto
Hi,
When trying to use the openssl AF_ALG module with 4.8-rc1 with imx
caam, I get this:
$ OPENSSL_CONF=/shared/crypto/openssl-imx.cnf strace openssl dgst -md5 </bin/bash
...
socket(PF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0) = 3
close(3) = 0
socket(PF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0) = 3
bind(3, {sa_family=AF_ALG, sa_data="hash\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0"}, 88) = 0
accept(3, 0, NULL) = 4
fstat64(0, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=666864, ...}) = 0
mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb6fab000
read(0, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\2\0(\0\1\0\0\0\21'\2\0004\0\0\0"..., 8192) = 8192
send(4, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\2\0(\0\1\0\0\0\21'\2\0004\0\0\0"..., 8192, MSG_MORE) = -1 ENOKEY (Required key not available)
This used to work, so something in the kernel AF_ALG API has changed
which has broken userspace. Any ideas what's up, or where to look?
Thanks.
--
RMK's Patch system: http://www.armlinux.org.uk/developer/patches/
FTTC broadband for 0.8mile line: currently at 9.6Mbps down 400kbps up
according to speedtest.net.
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 00/11] Further iMX CAAM updates
From: Russell King - ARM Linux @ 2016-08-08 17:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Fabio Estevam, Herbert Xu; +Cc: David S. Miller, linux-crypto
This is a re-post (with hopefully bugs fixed from December's review).
Untested, because AF_ALG appears to be broken in 4.8-rc1. Maybe
someone can provide some hints how to test using tcrypt please?
Here are further imx-caam updates that I've had since before the
previous merge window. Please review and (I guess) if Freescale
folk can provide acks etc that would be nice. Thanks.
drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c | 540 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h | 1 -
drivers/crypto/caam/jr.c | 25 +-
3 files changed, 305 insertions(+), 261 deletions(-)
--
RMK's Patch system: http://www.armlinux.org.uk/developer/patches/
FTTC broadband for 0.8mile line: currently at 9.6Mbps down 400kbps up
according to speedtest.net.
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH 01/11] crypto: caam: fix DMA API mapping leak
From: Russell King @ 2016-08-08 17:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Fabio Estevam, Herbert Xu; +Cc: David S. Miller, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <20160808170400.GC1041@n2100.armlinux.org.uk>
caamhash contains this weird code:
src_nents = sg_count(req->src, req->nbytes);
dma_map_sg(jrdev, req->src, src_nents ? : 1, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
...
edesc->src_nents = src_nents;
sg_count() returns zero when sg_nents_for_len() returns zero or one.
This means we don't need to use a hardware scatterlist. However,
setting src_nents to zero causes problems when we unmap:
if (edesc->src_nents)
dma_unmap_sg_chained(dev, req->src, edesc->src_nents,
DMA_TO_DEVICE, edesc->chained);
as zero here means that we have no entries to unmap. This causes us
to leak DMA mappings, where we map one scatterlist entry and then
fail to unmap it.
This can be fixed in two ways: either by writing the number of entries
that were requested of dma_map_sg(), or by reworking the "no SG
required" case.
We adopt the re-work solution here - we replace sg_count() with
sg_nents_for_len(), so src_nents now contains the real number of
scatterlist entries, and we then change the test for using the
hardware scatterlist to src_nents > 1 rather than just non-zero.
This change passes my sshd, openssl tests hashing /bin and tcrypt
tests.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
---
drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c
index f1ecc8df8d41..85c8b048bdc1 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c
@@ -1094,13 +1094,16 @@ static int ahash_digest(struct ahash_request *req)
u32 options;
int sh_len;
- src_nents = sg_count(req->src, req->nbytes);
+ src_nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->src, req->nbytes);
if (src_nents < 0) {
dev_err(jrdev, "Invalid number of src SG.\n");
return src_nents;
}
- dma_map_sg(jrdev, req->src, src_nents ? : 1, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
- sec4_sg_bytes = src_nents * sizeof(struct sec4_sg_entry);
+ dma_map_sg(jrdev, req->src, src_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ if (src_nents > 1)
+ sec4_sg_bytes = src_nents * sizeof(struct sec4_sg_entry);
+ else
+ sec4_sg_bytes = 0;
/* allocate space for base edesc and hw desc commands, link tables */
edesc = kzalloc(sizeof(*edesc) + sec4_sg_bytes + DESC_JOB_IO_LEN,
@@ -1118,7 +1121,7 @@ static int ahash_digest(struct ahash_request *req)
desc = edesc->hw_desc;
init_job_desc_shared(desc, ptr, sh_len, HDR_SHARE_DEFER | HDR_REVERSE);
- if (src_nents) {
+ if (src_nents > 1) {
sg_to_sec4_sg_last(req->src, src_nents, edesc->sec4_sg, 0);
edesc->sec4_sg_dma = dma_map_single(jrdev, edesc->sec4_sg,
sec4_sg_bytes, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
@@ -1246,7 +1249,7 @@ static int ahash_update_no_ctx(struct ahash_request *req)
if (to_hash) {
src_nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->src,
- req->nbytes - (*next_buflen));
+ req->nbytes - *next_buflen);
if (src_nents < 0) {
dev_err(jrdev, "Invalid number of src SG.\n");
return src_nents;
@@ -1450,13 +1453,18 @@ static int ahash_update_first(struct ahash_request *req)
to_hash = req->nbytes - *next_buflen;
if (to_hash) {
- src_nents = sg_count(req->src, req->nbytes - (*next_buflen));
+ src_nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->src,
+ req->nbytes - *next_buflen);
if (src_nents < 0) {
dev_err(jrdev, "Invalid number of src SG.\n");
return src_nents;
}
- dma_map_sg(jrdev, req->src, src_nents ? : 1, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
- sec4_sg_bytes = src_nents * sizeof(struct sec4_sg_entry);
+ dma_map_sg(jrdev, req->src, src_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ if (src_nents > 1)
+ sec4_sg_bytes = src_nents *
+ sizeof(struct sec4_sg_entry);
+ else
+ sec4_sg_bytes = 0;
/*
* allocate space for base edesc and hw desc commands,
@@ -1476,7 +1484,7 @@ static int ahash_update_first(struct ahash_request *req)
DESC_JOB_IO_LEN;
edesc->dst_dma = 0;
- if (src_nents) {
+ if (src_nents > 1) {
sg_to_sec4_sg_last(req->src, src_nents,
edesc->sec4_sg, 0);
edesc->sec4_sg_dma = dma_map_single(jrdev,
--
2.1.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH 02/11] crypto: caam: ensure descriptor buffers are cacheline aligned
From: Russell King @ 2016-08-08 17:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Fabio Estevam, Herbert Xu; +Cc: David S. Miller, linux-crypto
In-Reply-To: <20160808170400.GC1041@n2100.armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
---
drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c | 14 +++++++-------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c
index 85c8b048bdc1..47ea7b428156 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c
@@ -99,17 +99,17 @@ static struct list_head hash_list;
/* ahash per-session context */
struct caam_hash_ctx {
- struct device *jrdev;
- u32 sh_desc_update[DESC_HASH_MAX_USED_LEN];
- u32 sh_desc_update_first[DESC_HASH_MAX_USED_LEN];
- u32 sh_desc_fin[DESC_HASH_MAX_USED_LEN];
- u32 sh_desc_digest[DESC_HASH_MAX_USED_LEN];
- u32 sh_desc_finup[DESC_HASH_MAX_USED_LEN];
- dma_addr_t sh_desc_update_dma;
+ u32 sh_desc_update[DESC_HASH_MAX_USED_LEN] ____cacheline_aligned;
+ u32 sh_desc_update_first[DESC_HASH_MAX_USED_LEN] ____cacheline_aligned;
+ u32 sh_desc_fin[DESC_HASH_MAX_USED_LEN] ____cacheline_aligned;
+ u32 sh_desc_digest[DESC_HASH_MAX_USED_LEN] ____cacheline_aligned;
+ u32 sh_desc_finup[DESC_HASH_MAX_USED_LEN] ____cacheline_aligned;
+ dma_addr_t sh_desc_update_dma ____cacheline_aligned;
dma_addr_t sh_desc_update_first_dma;
dma_addr_t sh_desc_fin_dma;
dma_addr_t sh_desc_digest_dma;
dma_addr_t sh_desc_finup_dma;
+ struct device *jrdev;
u32 alg_type;
u32 alg_op;
u8 key[CAAM_MAX_HASH_KEY_SIZE];
--
2.1.0
^ permalink raw reply related
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