From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-43377: ksmbd: Don't log keys in SMB3 signing and encryption key generation
Date: Fri, 8 May 2026 16:21:46 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026050831-CVE-2026-43377-b039@gregkh> (raw)
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Description
===========
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: Don't log keys in SMB3 signing and encryption key generation
When KSMBD_DEBUG_AUTH logging is enabled, generate_smb3signingkey() and
generate_smb3encryptionkey() log the session, signing, encryption, and
decryption key bytes. Remove the logs to avoid exposing credentials.
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-43377 to this issue.
Affected and fixed versions
===========================
Issue introduced in 5.15 with commit e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 and fixed in 6.1.167 with commit 4084ed720d7d5f4e975c9e4a6267a552dad3b24a
Issue introduced in 5.15 with commit e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 and fixed in 6.6.130 with commit fec5c70b82af3f59f15bb984df94e5ad1fccfb1e
Issue introduced in 5.15 with commit e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 and fixed in 6.12.78 with commit 3fe2d9ec166b7df9a8df6c0fdcfc210572e27e3f
Issue introduced in 5.15 with commit e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 and fixed in 6.18.20 with commit 407cc37c21d51f9b9d4d20204b04890880cfa6ae
Issue introduced in 5.15 with commit e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 and fixed in 6.19.9 with commit c6b01b997a2094969e315f1ebfc1d64b8ae2163d
Issue introduced in 5.15 with commit e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 and fixed in 7.0 with commit 441336115df26b966575de56daf7107ed474faed
Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.
Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at
https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-43377
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.
Affected files
==============
The file(s) affected by this issue are:
fs/smb/server/auth.c
Mitigation
==========
The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4084ed720d7d5f4e975c9e4a6267a552dad3b24a
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fec5c70b82af3f59f15bb984df94e5ad1fccfb1e
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3fe2d9ec166b7df9a8df6c0fdcfc210572e27e3f
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/407cc37c21d51f9b9d4d20204b04890880cfa6ae
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6b01b997a2094969e315f1ebfc1d64b8ae2163d
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/441336115df26b966575de56daf7107ed474faed
reply other threads:[~2026-05-08 14:23 UTC|newest]
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