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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-43406: libceph: prevent potential out-of-bounds reads in process_message_header()
Date: Fri,  8 May 2026 16:22:15 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026050842-CVE-2026-43406-84a2@gregkh> (raw)

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libceph: prevent potential out-of-bounds reads in process_message_header()

If the message frame is (maliciously) corrupted in a way that the
length of the control segment ends up being less than the size of the
message header or a different frame is made to look like a message
frame, out-of-bounds reads may ensue in process_message_header().

Perform an explicit bounds check before decoding the message header.

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-43406 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Fixed in 5.15.203 with commit 76ccf21a12c5f6d6790bc32c7da82446d877b2f4
	Fixed in 6.1.167 with commit 75582aaa580c11aed4c7731cad6b068b700e7efb
	Fixed in 6.6.130 with commit 50156622eb0888e62541d715a98584480a1bc7cb
	Fixed in 6.12.78 with commit dbd857a9e1e33ea71eaf3e211877027e533770d1
	Fixed in 6.18.19 with commit 69fe5af33fa3806f398d21c081d73c66e5523bc2
	Fixed in 6.19.9 with commit 035867ae6f18df0aeedb2a57a5b74091bd4e3fe8
	Fixed in 7.0 with commit 69fb5d91bba44ecf7eb80530b85fa4fb028921d5

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-43406
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	net/ceph/messenger_v2.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/76ccf21a12c5f6d6790bc32c7da82446d877b2f4
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75582aaa580c11aed4c7731cad6b068b700e7efb
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/50156622eb0888e62541d715a98584480a1bc7cb
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dbd857a9e1e33ea71eaf3e211877027e533770d1
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/69fe5af33fa3806f398d21c081d73c66e5523bc2
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/035867ae6f18df0aeedb2a57a5b74091bd4e3fe8
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/69fb5d91bba44ecf7eb80530b85fa4fb028921d5

                 reply	other threads:[~2026-05-08 14:24 UTC|newest]

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