From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-43304: libceph: define and enforce CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN
Date: Fri, 8 May 2026 15:12:09 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026050857-CVE-2026-43304-a225@gregkh> (raw)
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Description
===========
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: define and enforce CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN
When decoding the key, verify that the key material would fit into
a fixed-size buffer in process_auth_done() and generally has a sane
length.
The new CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN check replaces the existing check for a key
with no key material which is a) not universal since CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE
has to be excluded and b) doesn't provide much value since a smaller
than needed key is just as invalid as no key -- this has to be handled
elsewhere anyway.
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-43304 to this issue.
Affected and fixed versions
===========================
Fixed in 5.15.202 with commit 6405e8c680974bb74e2c98d5249fb52c7b12a6c6
Fixed in 6.1.165 with commit 8d745d38c88ecbed95f6b2b39857bf89f35a3244
Fixed in 6.6.128 with commit e1dc45d97975f9db65694d234fbddf1915176e16
Fixed in 6.12.75 with commit 1b275bd49e58752efb83767a5d1aed41356c5e64
Fixed in 6.18.16 with commit c1a0f5f1e5e7e98c36a362ec3d1fcfd9932931ed
Fixed in 6.19.6 with commit d82467c07b03a27c3c5469b62bb3b726305a80bb
Fixed in 7.0 with commit ac431d597a9bdfc2ba6b314813f29a6ef2b4a3bf
Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.
Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at
https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-43304
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.
Affected files
==============
The file(s) affected by this issue are:
net/ceph/crypto.c
net/ceph/crypto.h
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c
Mitigation
==========
The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6405e8c680974bb74e2c98d5249fb52c7b12a6c6
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d745d38c88ecbed95f6b2b39857bf89f35a3244
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e1dc45d97975f9db65694d234fbddf1915176e16
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1b275bd49e58752efb83767a5d1aed41356c5e64
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1a0f5f1e5e7e98c36a362ec3d1fcfd9932931ed
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d82467c07b03a27c3c5469b62bb3b726305a80bb
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac431d597a9bdfc2ba6b314813f29a6ef2b4a3bf
reply other threads:[~2026-05-08 13:14 UTC|newest]
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