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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-64190: net: team: fix NULL pointer dereference in team_xmit during mode change
Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2026 18:27:53 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026072051-CVE-2026-64190-9dfc@gregkh> (raw)

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: team: fix NULL pointer dereference in team_xmit during mode change

__team_change_mode() clears team->ops with memset() before restoring
safe dummy handlers via team_adjust_ops(). A concurrent team_xmit()
running under RCU on another CPU can read team->ops.transmit during
this window and call a NULL function pointer, crashing the kernel.

The race requires a mode change (CAP_NET_ADMIN) concurrent with
transmit on the team device.

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
 Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
 RIP: 0010:0x0
 Call Trace:
  team_xmit (drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1853)
  dev_hard_start_xmit (net/core/dev.c:3904)
  __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:4871)
  packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3109)
  __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2265)

The original code assumed that no ports means no traffic, so mode
changes could freely memset()/memcpy() the ops.  AF_PACKET with
forced carrier breaks that assumption.

Prevent the race instead of making it safe: replace memset()/memcpy()
with per-field updates that never touch transmit or receive.  Those
two handlers are managed solely by team_adjust_ops(), which already
installs dummies when tx_en_port_count == 0 (always true during mode
change since no ports are present).  WRITE_ONCE/READ_ONCE prevent
store/load tearing on the handler pointers.

synchronize_net() before exit_op() drains in-flight readers that may
still reference old mode state from before port removal switched the
handlers to dummies.

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-64190 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Issue introduced in 3.3 with commit 3d249d4ca7d0ed6629a135ea1ea21c72286c0d80 and fixed in 6.18.35 with commit 03e9405c518c4d61f28079492f252d6d4e2bac5c
	Issue introduced in 3.3 with commit 3d249d4ca7d0ed6629a135ea1ea21c72286c0d80 and fixed in 7.1 with commit 25fe708bbc59289d3d1ea4b126fbc1b460a072a5

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-64190
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	drivers/net/team/team_core.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03e9405c518c4d61f28079492f252d6d4e2bac5c
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25fe708bbc59289d3d1ea4b126fbc1b460a072a5

                 reply	other threads:[~2026-07-20 16:28 UTC|newest]

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