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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-74342: kernfs: link kn to its parent before the LSM init hook
Date: Sat, 15 Aug 2026 15:11:09 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026081557-CVE-2026-74342-511d@gregkh> (raw)

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

kernfs: link kn to its parent before the LSM init hook

After commit 12e9e3cd03b5 ("simpe_xattr: use per-sb cache"),
kernfs_xattr_set() and kernfs_xattr_get() compute the cache via
kernfs_root(kn) before any other check.  kernfs_root(kn) walks
kn->__parent first and falls back to kn->dir.root, both of which are
NULL on a freshly kmem_cache_zalloc()'d kn. kn->__parent was being set
in kernfs_new_node() after __kernfs_new_node() returned, and kn->dir.root
is set even later by kernfs_create_dir_ns() / kernfs_create_empty_dir().

The LSM kernfs_init_security hook is invoked from inside
__kernfs_new_node(), before either field has been initialized.
selinux_kernfs_init_security() ends with kernfs_xattr_set(kn,
XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ...).  kernfs_root(kn) then returns NULL, and
&((struct kernfs_root *)NULL)->xa_cache evaluates to
offsetof(struct kernfs_root, xa_cache) which faults:

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000e0
  RIP: 0010:simple_xattr_set+0x27/0x8b0
  Call Trace:
   kernfs_xattr_set+0x63/0xb0
   selinux_kernfs_init_security+0x13b/0x270
   security_kernfs_init_security+0x36/0xc0
   __kernfs_new_node+0x182/0x290
   kernfs_new_node+0x80/0xc0
   kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x2b/0xa0
   cgroup_create+0x116/0x380
   cgroup_mkdir+0x7c/0x1a0

Reproduces deterministically at PID 1 (systemd) on an SELinux-enabled
distro. The first cgroup mkdir under /sys/fs/cgroup with a labelled
parent panics the kernel.

The LSM hook's contract is that the kn_dir argument is the parent of
the new kn, so kn->__parent should already point at kn_dir when the
hook runs.  Move kernfs_get(parent) and rcu_assign_pointer of
kn->__parent from kernfs_new_node() into __kernfs_new_node() right
before the security hook, and unwind the parent reference on the
err_out4 path.  kernfs_root(kn) then takes its parent branch during
the hook and returns parent->dir.root, which is the correct root.

This also closes the same-shape latent bug in kernfs_xattr_get() (which
today is hidden only by kernfs_iattrs_noalloc() returning NULL on a
fresh kn).

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-74342 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Fixed in 7.1.5 with commit 319b82e8b46edaf557436ad858e734e583f78ec9
	Fixed in 7.2-rc1 with commit 6cccc49b027c7551ffc1d2532f2ef1922661f3da

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-74342
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	fs/kernfs/dir.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/319b82e8b46edaf557436ad858e734e583f78ec9
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6cccc49b027c7551ffc1d2532f2ef1922661f3da

                 reply	other threads:[~2026-08-15  6:35 UTC|newest]

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