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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-89654: ceph: fix UAF in check_new_map() on session freed during unlock
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 21:45:43 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026091145-CVE-2026-89654-49e3@gregkh> (raw)

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ceph: fix UAF in check_new_map() on session freed during unlock

check_new_map() iterates mdsc->sessions[] and for each active session
drops mdsc->mutex to perform per-session operations.  The forced-close
path (rank removed from map) correctly takes a reference on s via
ceph_get_mds_session() before releasing mdsc->mutex, but three other
paths do not:

  Path A (address changed):  mutex_unlock → mutex_lock(&s->s_mutex)
  Path B (reconnect):        mutex_unlock → send_mds_reconnect(mdsc, s)
  Path C (active transition): mutex_unlock → mutex_lock(&s->s_mutex)

Without the extra reference, another thread can acquire mdsc->mutex
during the unlock window, call __unregister_session() which drops the
last reference on s, and free it.  The original thread then accesses
freed memory via s->s_mutex.

Fix by adding ceph_get_mds_session(s) before each mutex_unlock and
ceph_put_mds_session(s) after the corresponding mutex_lock, matching
the pattern already used in the forced-close path.

Race timeline (Path A):

  Thread A (check_new_map)             Thread B (another map update
    holds mdsc->mutex                      or session teardown)
  --------------------------           --------------------------
  s = mdsc->sessions[i]
  (refcount == 1, held only by
   sessions[] array)

  mutex_unlock(&mdsc->mutex)
                               --->    acquires mdsc->mutex
                                       __unregister_session(mdsc, s)
                                         sessions[i] = NULL
                                         ceph_put_mds_session(s)
                                           refcount: 1 -> 0
                                           kfree(s)  <--- freed!

  mutex_lock(&s->s_mutex)
  UAF on freed s->s_mutex

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-89654 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Fixed in 7.2.4 with commit 21d5be092d947f8d83f76f7ebf3989e7e9230a98
	Fixed in 7.3-rc1 with commit ee611a7509554c4ca1f54f6aefe592fb1df7ea70

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-89654
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	fs/ceph/mds_client.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21d5be092d947f8d83f76f7ebf3989e7e9230a98
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ee611a7509554c4ca1f54f6aefe592fb1df7ea70

                 reply	other threads:[~2026-09-11 20:00 UTC|newest]

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