From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2EBBCC43219 for ; Tue, 15 Nov 2022 17:02:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230348AbiKORCw (ORCPT ); Tue, 15 Nov 2022 12:02:52 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:39878 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231263AbiKORCT (ORCPT ); Tue, 15 Nov 2022 12:02:19 -0500 Received: from mga11.intel.com (mga11.intel.com [192.55.52.93]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7FD0B29346 for ; Tue, 15 Nov 2022 09:02:18 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1668531738; x=1700067738; h=message-id:date:mime-version:subject:from:to:cc: references:in-reply-to:content-transfer-encoding; bh=Fkogvdw0+izFrcVBNhKvdOEZaoJpw/5GhJVHPkvjn/o=; b=P6uFtynr/+8KgyUlMMLhsxclTbLAZJFslHpnXiIWD8t6GZ3Z7V2tmfV5 ekIKN1ADKX2bk4APzNVD59nf1SsTrZjY6qXeI6JrOSlz+cS/lm2iq6/T8 8WfZd1otmCpNv7TxzCenkL6YTlSA6VVDobSg2cVLG4nTMPdt9E+fvCejR SgC4RUT4qjDPq9a1eFY4z48YNlh+Tcw2L6pIUreTTLC81JuLwYYPVVnz9 /W2Yc/lABRd9oFdkwsotZuNwrJI1r2tRA0s35Fi07rcPTDola2Y2aVbqE +mR00hbb9So//FBPYrLx34CkIH/sv5OFbFfwS4Ig+rGg8FDI2JFStOz7I Q==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6500,9779,10532"; a="309934208" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.96,166,1665471600"; d="scan'208";a="309934208" Received: from fmsmga001.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.23]) by fmsmga102.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 15 Nov 2022 09:01:55 -0800 X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6500,9779,10532"; a="781413076" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.96,166,1665471600"; d="scan'208";a="781413076" Received: from djiang5-mobl2.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO [10.212.7.249]) ([10.212.7.249]) by fmsmga001-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 15 Nov 2022 09:01:54 -0800 Message-ID: <14ae41bc-2d63-460b-5ac5-a4d94aa39982@intel.com> Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2022 10:01:53 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0 Thunderbird/102.4.1 Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 12/18] tools/testing/cxl: Add "passphrase secure erase" opcode support Content-Language: en-US From: Dave Jiang To: Jonathan Cameron Cc: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org, nvdimm@lists.linux.dev, dan.j.williams@intel.com, ira.weiny@intel.com, vishal.l.verma@intel.com, alison.schofield@intel.com, dave@stgolabs.net References: <166845791969.2496228.8357488385523295841.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> <166845805415.2496228.732168029765896218.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> <20221115110831.00001fa4@Huawei.com> In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org On 11/15/2022 7:57 AM, Dave Jiang wrote: > > > On 11/15/2022 3:08 AM, Jonathan Cameron wrote: >> On Mon, 14 Nov 2022 13:34:14 -0700 >> Dave Jiang wrote: >> >>> Add support to emulate a CXL mem device support the "passphrase secure >>> erase" operation. >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang >> The logic in here gives me a headache but I'm not sure it's correct >> yet... >> >> If you can figure out what is supposed to happen if this is called >> with Passphrase Type == master before the master passphrase has been set >> then you are doing better than me. >> >> Unlike for the User passphrase, where the language " .. and the user >> passphrase >> is not currently set or is not supported by the device, this value is >> ignored." >> to me implies we wipe the device and clear the non existent user pass >> phrase, >> the not set master passphrase case isn't covered as far as I can see. >> >> The user passphrase question raises a futher question (see inline) >> >> Thoughts? > > Guess this is what happens when you bolt on master passphrase support > after defining the spec without its existence, and then move it to a > different spec and try to maintain compatibility between the two in > order to not fork the hardware/firmware.... > > Should we treat the no passphrase set instance the same as sending a > Secure Erase (Opcode 4401h)? And then the only case left is no master > pass set but user pass is set. > > if (!master_pass_set && pass_type_master) { >     if (user_pass_set) >         return -EINVAL; >     else >         secure_erase; > } > This is the current change: + switch (erase->type) { + case CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER: + if (mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_MASTER_PASS_SET) { + if (memcmp(mdata->master_pass, erase->pass, + NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN)) { + master_plimit_check(mdata); + cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_PASSPHRASE; + return -ENXIO; + } + mdata->master_limit = 0; + mdata->user_limit = 0; + mdata->security_state &= ~CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET; + memset(mdata->user_pass, 0, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN); + mdata->security_state &= ~CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_LOCKED; + } else if (mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET) { + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; + case CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER: + if (mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET) { + if (memcmp(mdata->user_pass, erase->pass, + NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN)) { + user_plimit_check(mdata); + cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_PASSPHRASE; + return -ENXIO; + } + mdata->user_limit = 0; + mdata->security_state &= ~CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET; + memset(mdata->user_pass, 0, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN); + } + + return 0; + default: + fallthrough; + } + + return -EINVAL; >> >> Other than that some suggestions inline but nothing functional, so up >> to you. >> Either way >> >> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron >> >>> --- >>>   tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c |   65 >>> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >>>   1 file changed, 65 insertions(+) >>> >>> diff --git a/tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c b/tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c >>> index 90607597b9a4..fc28f7cc147a 100644 >>> --- a/tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c >>> +++ b/tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c >>> @@ -362,6 +362,68 @@ static int mock_unlock_security(struct >>> cxl_dev_state *cxlds, struct cxl_mbox_cmd >>>       return 0; >>>   } >>> +static int mock_passphrase_secure_erase(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, >>> +                    struct cxl_mbox_cmd *cmd) >>> +{ >>> +    struct cxl_mock_mem_pdata *mdata = dev_get_platdata(cxlds->dev); >>> +    struct cxl_pass_erase *erase; >>> + >>> +    if (cmd->size_in != sizeof(*erase)) >>> +        return -EINVAL; >>> + >>> +    if (cmd->size_out != 0) >>> +        return -EINVAL; >>> + >>> +    erase = cmd->payload_in; >>> +    if (mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_FROZEN) { >>> +        cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_SECURITY; >>> +        return -ENXIO; >>> +    } >>> + >>> +    if (mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PLIMIT && >>> +        erase->type == CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER) { >>> +        cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_SECURITY; >>> +        return -ENXIO; >>> +    } >>> + >>> +    if (mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_MASTER_PLIMIT && >>> +        erase->type == CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER) { >>> +        cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_SECURITY; >>> +        return -ENXIO; >>> +    } >>> + >>> +    if (erase->type == CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER && >>> +        mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_MASTER_PASS_SET) { >>> +        if (memcmp(mdata->master_pass, erase->pass, >>> NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN)) { >>> +            master_plimit_check(mdata); >>> +            cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_PASSPHRASE; >>> +            return -ENXIO; >>> +        } >>> +        mdata->master_limit = 0; >>> +        mdata->user_limit = 0; >>> +        mdata->security_state &= ~CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET; >>> +        memset(mdata->user_pass, 0, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN); >>> +        mdata->security_state &= ~CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_LOCKED; >>> +        return 0; >>> +    } >> What to do if the masterpass phrase isn't set? >> Even if we return 0, I'd slightly prefer to see that done locally so >> refactor as >>     if (erase->type == CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER) { >>         if (!(mdata->security_state & >> CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATATE_MASTER_PASS_SET)) { >>             return 0; /* ? */ >>         if (memcmp)... >>     } else { /* CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER */ //or make it a switch. >> >>> + >>> +    if (erase->type == CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER && >>> +        mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET) { >> >> Given we aren't actually scrambling the encryption keys (as we don't >> have any ;) >> it doesn't make a functional difference, but to line up with the spec, >> I would >> consider changing this to explicitly have the path for no user >> passphrase set. >> >>     if (erase->type == CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER) { >>         if (mdata->security_state & CXL_MEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET) { >>                 if (memcmp(mdata->user_pass, erase->pass, >> NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN)) { >>                 user_plimit_check(mdata); >>                 cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_PASSPHRASE; >>                 return -ENXIO; >>               } >> >>             mdata->user_limit = 0; >>             mdata->security_state &= ~CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET; >>             memset(mdata->user_pass, 0, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN); >>         } >>         /* Change encryption keys */ >>         return 0; >>     } >> >>> +        if (memcmp(mdata->user_pass, erase->pass, >>> NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN)) { >>> +            user_plimit_check(mdata); >>> +            cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_PASSPHRASE; >>> +            return -ENXIO; >>> +        } >>> + >>> +        mdata->user_limit = 0; >>> +        mdata->security_state &= ~CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET; >>> +        memset(mdata->user_pass, 0, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN); >>> +        return 0; >>> +    } >>> + >>> +    return 0; >> >> With above changes you can never reach here. >> >>> +} >>> + >>>   static int mock_get_lsa(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, struct >>> cxl_mbox_cmd *cmd) >>>   { >>>       struct cxl_mbox_get_lsa *get_lsa = cmd->payload_in; >>> @@ -470,6 +532,9 @@ static int cxl_mock_mbox_send(struct >>> cxl_dev_state *cxlds, struct cxl_mbox_cmd * >>>       case CXL_MBOX_OP_UNLOCK: >>>           rc = mock_unlock_security(cxlds, cmd); >>>           break; >>> +    case CXL_MBOX_OP_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE: >>> +        rc = mock_passphrase_secure_erase(cxlds, cmd); >>> +        break; >>>       default: >>>           break; >>>       } >>> >>> >>