From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A9759C19F2A for ; Thu, 4 Aug 2022 13:19:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S239625AbiHDNTK (ORCPT ); Thu, 4 Aug 2022 09:19:10 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54642 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231807AbiHDNTJ (ORCPT ); Thu, 4 Aug 2022 09:19:09 -0400 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com (frasgout.his.huawei.com [185.176.79.56]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1C4F4D6D for ; Thu, 4 Aug 2022 06:19:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: from fraeml734-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.200]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4Lz8Mt3WyGz67HRc; Thu, 4 Aug 2022 21:14:50 +0800 (CST) Received: from lhrpeml500005.china.huawei.com (7.191.163.240) by fraeml734-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.215) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2375.24; Thu, 4 Aug 2022 15:19:03 +0200 Received: from localhost (10.202.226.42) by lhrpeml500005.china.huawei.com (7.191.163.240) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2375.24; Thu, 4 Aug 2022 14:19:02 +0100 Date: Thu, 4 Aug 2022 14:19:01 +0100 From: Jonathan Cameron To: Dave Jiang CC: , , , , , , , Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 11/15] cxl/pmem: Add "Unlock" security command support Message-ID: <20220804141901.00005a2a@huawei.com> In-Reply-To: <165791937639.2491387.6281906434880014077.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> References: <165791918718.2491387.4203738301057301285.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> <165791937639.2491387.6281906434880014077.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> X-Mailer: Claws Mail 4.0.0 (GTK+ 3.24.29; i686-w64-mingw32) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Originating-IP: [10.202.226.42] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhreml731-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.82) To lhrpeml500005.china.huawei.com (7.191.163.240) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org On Fri, 15 Jul 2022 14:09:36 -0700 Dave Jiang wrote: > Create callback function to support the nvdimm_security_ops() ->unlock() > callback. Translate the operation to send "Unlock" security command for CXL > mem device. > > When the mem device is unlocked, arch_invalidate_nvdimm_cache() is called > in order to invalidate all CPU caches before attempting to access the mem > device. > > See CXL 2.0 spec section 8.2.9.5.6.4 for reference. > > Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang Hi Dave, One trivial thing inline. Thanks, Jonathan > --- > drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h | 1 + > drivers/cxl/security.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h > index ced85be291f3..ae8ccd484491 100644 > --- a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h > +++ b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h > @@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ enum cxl_opcode { > CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE = 0x4500, > CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PASSPHRASE = 0x4501, > CXL_MBOX_OP_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE = 0x4502, > + CXL_MBOX_OP_UNLOCK = 0x4503, > CXL_MBOX_OP_FREEZE_SECURITY = 0x4504, > CXL_MBOX_OP_MAX = 0x10000 > }; > diff --git a/drivers/cxl/security.c b/drivers/cxl/security.c > index 6399266a5908..d15520f280f0 100644 > --- a/drivers/cxl/security.c > +++ b/drivers/cxl/security.c > @@ -114,11 +114,32 @@ static int cxl_pmem_security_freeze(struct nvdimm *nvdimm) > return cxl_mbox_send_cmd(cxlds, CXL_MBOX_OP_FREEZE_SECURITY, NULL, 0, NULL, 0); > } > > +static int cxl_pmem_security_unlock(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, > + const struct nvdimm_key_data *key_data) > +{ > + struct cxl_nvdimm *cxl_nvd = nvdimm_provider_data(nvdimm); > + struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = cxl_nvd->cxlmd; > + struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = cxlmd->cxlds; > + u8 pass[NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN]; > + int rc; > + > + memcpy(pass, key_data->data, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN); Why do we need a local copy? I'd have thought we could just pass keydata->data in as the payload for cxl_mbox_send_cmd() There might be some value in making it easier to check by having a structure defined for this payload (obviously trivial) but given we are using an array of length defined by a non CXL define, I'm not sure there is any point in the copy. > + rc = cxl_mbox_send_cmd(cxlds, CXL_MBOX_OP_UNLOCK, > + pass, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN, NULL, 0); > + if (rc < 0) > + return rc; > + > + /* DIMM unlocked, invalidate all CPU caches before we read it */ > + arch_invalidate_nvdimm_cache(); > + return 0; > +} > + > static const struct nvdimm_security_ops __cxl_security_ops = { > .get_flags = cxl_pmem_get_security_flags, > .change_key = cxl_pmem_security_change_key, > .disable = cxl_pmem_security_disable, > .freeze = cxl_pmem_security_freeze, > + .unlock = cxl_pmem_security_unlock, > }; > > const struct nvdimm_security_ops *cxl_security_ops = &__cxl_security_ops; > >