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From: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>, linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ira.weiny@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] cxl/security: Drop security command ioctl uapi
Date: Tue, 6 Dec 2022 09:56:44 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ee039ca8-4d50-b707-5208-e0cc02af231b@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <167030056464.4044561.11486507095384253833.stgit@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com>



On 12/5/2022 9:22 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
> CXL PMEM security operations are routed through the NVDIMM sysfs
> interface. For this reason the corresponding commands are marked
> "exclusive" to preclude collisions between the ioctl ABI and the sysfs
> ABI. However, a better way to preclude that collision is to simply
> remove the ioctl ABI (command-id definitions) for those operations.
> 
> Now that cxl_internal_send_cmd() (formerly cxl_mbox_send_cmd()) no
> longer needs to talk the cxl_mem_commands array, all of the uapi
> definitions for the security commands can be dropped.
> 
> These never appeared in a released kernel, so no regression risk.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>

Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>

> ---
>   drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c      |   17 -----------------
>   include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h |    6 ------
>   2 files changed, 23 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> index c36a3589377a..b03fba212799 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> @@ -65,12 +65,6 @@ static struct cxl_mem_command cxl_mem_commands[CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_MAX] = {
>   	CXL_CMD(GET_SCAN_MEDIA_CAPS, 0x10, 0x4, 0),
>   	CXL_CMD(SCAN_MEDIA, 0x11, 0, 0),
>   	CXL_CMD(GET_SCAN_MEDIA, 0, CXL_VARIABLE_PAYLOAD, 0),
> -	CXL_CMD(GET_SECURITY_STATE, 0, 0x4, 0),
> -	CXL_CMD(SET_PASSPHRASE, 0x60, 0, 0),
> -	CXL_CMD(DISABLE_PASSPHRASE, 0x40, 0, 0),
> -	CXL_CMD(FREEZE_SECURITY, 0, 0, 0),
> -	CXL_CMD(UNLOCK, 0x20, 0, 0),
> -	CXL_CMD(PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE, 0x40, 0, 0),
>   };
>   
>   /*
> @@ -717,17 +711,6 @@ int cxl_enumerate_cmds(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds)
>   		/* Found the required CEL */
>   		rc = 0;
>   	}
> -
> -	/*
> -	 * Setup permanently kernel exclusive commands, i.e. the
> -	 * mechanism is driven through sysfs, keyctl, etc...
> -	 */
> -	set_bit(CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_SET_PASSPHRASE, cxlds->exclusive_cmds);
> -	set_bit(CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE, cxlds->exclusive_cmds);
> -	set_bit(CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_UNLOCK, cxlds->exclusive_cmds);
> -	set_bit(CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE,
> -		cxlds->exclusive_cmds);
> -
>   out:
>   	kvfree(gsl);
>   	return rc;
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h b/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h
> index 82bdad4ce5de..c71021a2a9ed 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h
> @@ -41,12 +41,6 @@
>   	___C(GET_SCAN_MEDIA_CAPS, "Get Scan Media Capabilities"),         \
>   	___C(SCAN_MEDIA, "Scan Media"),                                   \
>   	___C(GET_SCAN_MEDIA, "Get Scan Media Results"),                   \
> -	___C(GET_SECURITY_STATE, "Get Security State"),			  \
> -	___C(SET_PASSPHRASE, "Set Passphrase"),				  \
> -	___C(DISABLE_PASSPHRASE, "Disable Passphrase"),			  \
> -	___C(FREEZE_SECURITY, "Freeze Security"),			  \
> -	___C(UNLOCK, "Unlock"),						  \
> -	___C(PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE, "Passphrase Secure Erase"),	  \
>   	___C(MAX, "invalid / last command")
>   
>   #define ___C(a, b) CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_##a
> 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-12-06 16:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-12-06  4:22 [PATCH 0/4] cxl/mbox: Output payload validation reworks Dan Williams
2022-12-06  4:22 ` [PATCH 1/4] cxl/security: Fix Get Security State output payload endian handling Dan Williams
2022-12-06  6:07   ` Ira Weiny
2022-12-06 16:21   ` Dave Jiang
2022-12-08 10:52   ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-12-06  4:22 ` [PATCH 2/4] cxl/mbox: Enable cxl_mbox_send_cmd() users to validate output size Dan Williams
2022-12-06  6:27   ` Ira Weiny
2022-12-06 16:35   ` Dave Jiang
2022-12-08 11:01   ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-12-06  4:22 ` [PATCH 3/4] cxl/mbox: Add variable output size validation for internal commands Dan Williams
2022-12-06  6:36   ` Ira Weiny
2022-12-06 16:53   ` Dave Jiang
2022-12-08 11:03   ` Jonathan Cameron
2022-12-08 21:24   ` Alison Schofield
2022-12-06  4:22 ` [PATCH 4/4] cxl/security: Drop security command ioctl uapi Dan Williams
2022-12-06  6:38   ` Ira Weiny
2022-12-06 16:56   ` Dave Jiang [this message]
2022-12-08 10:51   ` Jonathan Cameron

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