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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Jinjie Ruan" <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
Cc: conor+dt@kernel.org, robh@kernel.org, krzk+dt@kernel.org,
	devicetree@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 03/15] x86/kexec: Fix potential buffer overflow in prepare_elf_headers()
Date: Tue, 12 May 2026 00:18:52 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260512001853.10D95C2BCB0@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260511030454.1730881-4-ruanjinjie@huawei.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] Spurious -ENOMEM failure to userspace and false architectural assumption regarding hotplug correction (fixed later in series).
--

commit a014be7b4b0eecc06de944b08ad83662babd2b5d
Author: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>

x86/kexec: Fix potential buffer overflow in prepare_elf_headers()

This commit adds a boundary check in prepare_elf64_ram_headers_callback()
to prevent a buffer overflow if memory hotplug increases the number of
memory regions between the counting and population passes.

> Since x86 supports crash hotplug, any data inconsistency caused by
> a race during the initial load will be corrected by the subsequent
> hotplug update. However, we must prevent a buffer overflow if the
> number of memory regions increases between the two passes.

Is this description of the hotplug update accurate?

The initial load syscall actively holds the atomic kexec_trylock() for its
entire duration. If a hotplug event occurs concurrently, wouldn't the
hotplug notifier (crash_handle_hotplug_event()) fail to acquire the lock,
log a lock failure, and permanently drop the update?

> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
> @@ -225,6 +225,9 @@ static int prepare_elf64_ram_headers_callback(struct resource *res, void *arg)
>  {
>  	struct crash_mem *cmem = arg;
>  
> +	if (cmem->nr_ranges >= cmem->max_nr_ranges)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +

Does returning -ENOMEM here abort the sys_kexec_file_load() syscall,
propagating a spurious error to userspace and leaving the system without a
loaded crash kernel?

Commit a0b7fe2dc98fe ("crash: Add crash_prepare_headers() to exclude crash
kernel memory") later in the series resolves this spurious error by adding
get_online_mems() to serialize the memory passes.

However, if the hotplug update is dropped due to the kexec_trylock()
contention mentioned above, and the race occurs in a way that does not
trigger this bounds check (such as memory regions decreasing), does the
kdump image still remain permanently out of sync with the actual memory
layout?

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260511030454.1730881-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com?part=3

  reply	other threads:[~2026-05-12  0:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-11  3:04 [PATCH v13 00/15] arm64/riscv: Add support for crashkernel CMA reservation Jinjie Ruan
2026-05-11  3:04 ` [PATCH v13 01/15] riscv: kexec_file: Fix crashk_low_res not exclude bug Jinjie Ruan
2026-05-11  3:04 ` [PATCH v13 02/15] powerpc/crash: Fix possible memory leak in update_crash_elfcorehdr() Jinjie Ruan
2026-05-11  3:04 ` [PATCH v13 03/15] x86/kexec: Fix potential buffer overflow in prepare_elf_headers() Jinjie Ruan
2026-05-12  0:18   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-05-11  3:04 ` [PATCH v13 04/15] arm64: kexec_file: " Jinjie Ruan
2026-05-11  9:46   ` Breno Leitao
2026-05-11 11:30     ` Jinjie Ruan
2026-05-11 12:30       ` Breno Leitao
2026-05-12  0:45   ` sashiko-bot
2026-05-11  3:04 ` [PATCH v13 05/15] riscv: " Jinjie Ruan
2026-05-11  3:04 ` [PATCH v13 06/15] LoongArch: kexec: " Jinjie Ruan
2026-05-11  3:04 ` [PATCH v13 07/15] powerpc/crash: sort crash memory ranges before preparing elfcorehdr Jinjie Ruan
2026-05-11  3:04 ` [PATCH v13 08/15] crash: Add crash_prepare_headers() to exclude crash kernel memory Jinjie Ruan
2026-05-12  4:23   ` sashiko-bot
2026-05-11  3:04 ` [PATCH v13 09/15] arm64: kexec_file: Use crash_prepare_headers() helper to simplify code Jinjie Ruan
2026-05-11  3:04 ` [PATCH v13 10/15] x86/kexec: " Jinjie Ruan
2026-05-12  5:48   ` sashiko-bot
2026-05-11  3:04 ` [PATCH v13 11/15] riscv: kexec_file: " Jinjie Ruan
2026-05-11  3:04 ` [PATCH v13 12/15] LoongArch: kexec: " Jinjie Ruan
2026-05-11  3:04 ` [PATCH v13 13/15] crash: Use crash_exclude_core_ranges() on powerpc Jinjie Ruan
2026-05-11  3:04 ` [PATCH v13 14/15] arm64: kexec: Add support for crashkernel CMA reservation Jinjie Ruan
2026-05-11  3:04 ` [PATCH v13 15/15] riscv: " Jinjie Ruan

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