From: Pankaj Gupta via B4 Relay <devnull+pankaj.gupta.nxp.com@kernel.org>
To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>,
Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk+dt@kernel.org>,
Conor Dooley <conor+dt@kernel.org>, Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>,
Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>,
Pengutronix Kernel Team <kernel@pengutronix.de>,
Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>,
Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
devicetree@vger.kernel.org, imx@lists.linux.dev,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v37 5/7] firmware: imx: adds miscdev
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2026 17:12:11 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260819-imx-se-if-v37-5-5ef5de9ff1dc@nxp.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260819-imx-se-if-v37-0-5ef5de9ff1dc@nxp.com>
From: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Adds the driver for communication interface to secure-enclave, that
enables exchanging messages with NXP secure enclave HW IP(s)
like EdgeLock Enclave, from:
- User-Space Applications via character driver.
ABI documentation for the NXP secure-enclave driver.
User-space library using this driver:
- i.MX Secure Enclave library:
-- URL: https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-secure-enclave.git,
- i.MX Secure Middle-Ware:
-- URL: https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-smw.git
Following checks are performed on the incoming msg-header,
to block exchanging invalid arbitrary commands:
- maximum allowed words,
- check if command-tag & response-tag are valid
- version,
- command id validation check, to allow limited base-line API(s)
and restrict following:
- exchanging power management commands.
- reset requests.
- BBSM configuration requests.
- re-initializing the FW.
- RNG init
- CAAM resource release management
- SE's internal memory management.
from user-space.
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
---
Changes from v36 to v37:
1. [High] DMA-after-free when a fatal signal races driver unbind.
ele_msg_rcv() gated se_mark_fw_busy() on !completion_done(), but
se_if_probe_cleanup() calls complete_all() before freeing the DMA
buffer. At that point completion_done() returns true, so the circuit
breaker was skipped and teardown freed the DMA buffer while the
enclave could still be writing into it. Remove the !completion_done()
guard: arm the circuit breaker unconditionally when rx_msg is still
set and rx_delivered is not. rx_delivered (set by se_if_rx_callback()
under clbk_rx_lock after a genuine response is copied) is the correct
guard for the safe case.
2. [High] ELE_STORAGE_OPEN_REQ allowed when cmd_receiver slot occupied.
If process A already registered as command receiver and process B
issued ELE_STORAGE_OPEN_REQ, the command was forwarded to firmware
which allocated a new storage handle. NVM callbacks for that handle
were then routed to process A (the existing receiver), letting A
observe and tamper with B's NVM traffic. Pre-check the cmd_receiver
slot in ele_uapi_allowed_fw_cmd() for ELE_STORAGE_OPEN_REQ and reject
with -EBUSY before the command reaches firmware, so no handle is
allocated when the slot is occupied by another context.
3. [High] Short rx_buf_sz bypasses handle recording causing a firmware
resource leak. For ELE_SESSION_OPEN_REQ and ELE_STORAGE_OPEN_REQ the
caller-supplied rx_buf_sz is now validated against the minimum
response size (ELE_SESSION_OPEN_RSP_SZ / ELE_STORAGE_OPEN_RSP_SZ) in
ele_uapi_allowed_fw_cmd() before the command is sent to firmware. If
the buffer is too small to receive the response carrying the
FW-allocated handle, the command is rejected with -EINVAL up-front
rather than letting the handle be allocated and then lost because
se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status() rejects the truncated response.
se_chk_tx_msg_hdr() / ele_uapi_allowed_fw_cmd() now accept rx_msg_sz
as an additional parameter for this check.
4. [High] Uninitialized stack buffer passed to fw_api_specific_ops().
rx_msg_snap[MAX_NVM_MSG_LEN] in se_if_fops_read() was declared
without initialization. memcpy filled only min(size, rx_msg_sz) bytes;
the remainder contained stack garbage. For ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_EXPORT_REQ
fw_api_specific_ops() reads data[1] as the export-buffer size, which
would be garbage if the caller supplied a short read length, corrupting
the DMA bounds check. Initialize the array to zero so any un-copied
portion is safely zero.
Reported-by: sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260817-imx-se-if-v36-0-45c42847bfd8@oss.nxp.com?part=5
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/se-cdev | 44 +
drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile | 2 +-
drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c | 94 +-
drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h | 19 +
drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c | 333 +++++-
drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h | 77 ++
drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.c | 361 +++++++
drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.h | 100 ++
drivers/firmware/imx/ele_msg_addr_field.c | 654 +++++++++++
drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c | 1682 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h | 90 ++
include/uapi/linux/se_ioctl.h | 97 ++
12 files changed, 3495 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/se-cdev b/Documentation/ABI/testing/se-cdev
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c6b8e16bda78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/se-cdev
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+What: /dev/<se>_mu[0-9]+_ch[0-9]+
+Date: Mar 2025
+KernelVersion: 6.8
+Contact: linux-imx@nxp.com, pankaj.gupta@nxp.com
+Description:
+ NXP offers multiple hardware IP(s) for secure enclaves like EdgeLock-
+ Enclave(ELE), SECO. The character device file descriptors
+ /dev/<se>_mu*_ch* are the interface between userspace NXP's secure-
+ enclave shared library and the kernel driver.
+
+ The ioctl(2)-based ABI is defined and documented in
+ [include]<linux/firmware/imx/ele_mu_ioctl.h>.
+ ioctl(s) are used primarily for:
+
+ - shared memory management
+ - allocation of I/O buffers
+ - getting mu info
+ - setting a dev-ctx as receiver to receive all the commands from FW
+ - getting SoC info
+ - send command and receive command response
+
+ The following file operations are supported:
+
+ open(2)
+ Currently the only useful flags are O_RDWR.
+
+ read(2)
+ Every read() from the opened character device context is waiting on
+ wait_event_interruptible, that gets set by the registered mailbox callback
+ function, indicating a message received from the firmware on message-
+ unit.
+
+ write(2)
+ Every write() to the opened character device context needs to acquire
+ mailbox_lock before sending message on to the message unit.
+
+ close(2)
+ Stops and frees up the I/O contexts that were associated
+ with the file descriptor.
+
+Users: https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-secure-enclave.git,
+ https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-smw.git,
+ crypto/skcipher,
+ drivers/nvmem/imx-ocotp-ele.c
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile
index 4412b15846b1..33f30eaedad5 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile
@@ -4,5 +4,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMX_SCU) += imx-scu.o misc.o imx-scu-irq.o rm.o imx-scu-soc.o
obj-${CONFIG_IMX_SCMI_CPU_DRV} += sm-cpu.o
obj-${CONFIG_IMX_SCMI_MISC_DRV} += sm-misc.o
obj-${CONFIG_IMX_SCMI_LMM_DRV} += sm-lmm.o
-sec_enclave-objs = se_ctrl.o ele_common.o ele_base_msg.o
+sec_enclave-objs = se_ctrl.o ele_common.o ele_base_msg.o ele_fw_api.o ele_msg_addr_field.o
obj-${CONFIG_IMX_SEC_ENCLAVE} += sec_enclave.o
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c
index b70e3ef88a16..78fe40206298 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c
@@ -15,13 +15,67 @@
#define FW_DBG_DUMP_FIXED_STR "ELE"
+int ele_uapi_allowed_base_cmd(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
+ struct se_msg_hdr *header, u32 tx_msg_sz)
+{
+ struct se_api_msg *msg = container_of(header, struct se_api_msg, header);
+ const struct se_cmd_addr_field *fields;
+ size_t count;
+
+ /*
+ * Identify the command first. Only commands in this allow-list may be
+ * issued from userspace; everything else is rejected. Once a command is
+ * known to be supported, decide whether it needs a DMA-address boundary
+ * check and, if so, run it before returning.
+ */
+ switch (header->command) {
+ case ELE_PING_REQ:
+ case ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_REQ:
+ case ELE_OEM_VERIFY_IMAGE_REQ:
+ case ELE_OEM_REL_CONTAINER_REQ:
+ case ELE_FW_LIFE_CYCLE_REQ:
+ case ELE_READ_FUSE_REQ:
+ case ELE_GET_FW_VERS_REQ:
+ case ELE_RETURN_LIFE_CYCLE_REQ:
+ case ELE_GET_EVENT_REQ:
+ case ELE_COMMIT_REQ:
+ case ELE_GET_FW_STATUS_REQ:
+ case ELE_WRITE_FUSE:
+ case ELE_WRITE_SHADOW_FUSE_REQ:
+ case ELE_READ_SHADOW_FUSE_REQ:
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ /* Base commands that embed DMA addresses. */
+ fields = ele_base_cmd_addr_fields(header->command, &count);
+ if (!count)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ return se_val_cmd_addrs(dev_ctx, msg, tx_msg_sz, fields, count);
+ }
+}
+
static void ele_get_info_cleanup(struct se_if_priv *priv, u32 *buf, dma_addr_t d_addr,
size_t size)
{
- if (priv->mem_pool)
- gen_pool_free(priv->mem_pool, (unsigned long)buf, size);
- else
- dma_free_coherent(priv->dev, size, buf, d_addr);
+ /* For the case when priv->mem_pool != NULL:
+ *
+ * If this probe-time transaction timed out, the firmware may
+ * still write into the SRAM buffer after this function returns.
+ * Do not release it back to the pool while the firmware-busy
+ * circuit breaker still marks this context as owning an
+ * outstanding transaction. The buffer is reclaimed with the
+ * device on unbind; leaking this fixed-size probe buffer is
+ * preferable to letting the firmware corrupt reused pool memory.
+ * This mirrors the guard already applied on the shared-memory
+ * cleanup path below.
+ */
+
+ if (priv->mem_pool) {
+ if (se_is_fw_busy_ctx(priv->priv_dev_ctx))
+ return;
+ se_cleanup_mem_pool_buf(priv->priv_dev_ctx, true);
+ } else {
+ se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(priv->priv_dev_ctx);
+ }
}
int ele_get_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct ele_dev_info *s_info)
@@ -34,6 +88,7 @@ int ele_get_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct ele_dev_info *s_info)
if (!priv)
return -EINVAL;
+ guard(mutex)(&priv->priv_dev_ctx->fops_lock);
memset(s_info, 0x0, sizeof(*s_info));
struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) =
@@ -47,24 +102,23 @@ int ele_get_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct ele_dev_info *s_info)
return -ENOMEM;
get_info_len = ELE_GET_INFO_BUFF_SZ;
- if (priv->mem_pool)
- get_info_data = gen_pool_dma_alloc(priv->mem_pool,
- get_info_len,
- &get_info_addr);
- else
- get_info_data = dma_alloc_coherent(priv->dev,
- get_info_len,
- &get_info_addr,
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!get_info_data) {
- dev_err(priv->dev,
- "%s: Failed to allocate get_info_addr.", __func__);
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (priv->mem_pool) {
+ ret = se_get_mem_pool_buf(priv->priv_dev_ctx, &get_info_data,
+ &get_info_addr, get_info_len);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed[0x%x] to alloc from gen_pool.\n", ret);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ret = get_shared_mem_slot(priv->priv_dev_ctx,
+ &get_info_len, &get_info_addr,
+ &get_info_data);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to allocate buffer.\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
}
- /* gen_pool_dma_alloc() does not zero the buffer. */
- memset(get_info_data, 0, get_info_len);
-
se_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(priv, (struct se_msg_hdr *)&tx_msg->header,
ELE_GET_INFO_REQ, ELE_GET_INFO_REQ_MSG_SZ, true);
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h
index 02525d5e2873..50e2a1a75716 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h
@@ -29,6 +29,19 @@
#define ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_REQ_SZ 0x4
#define ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_RSP_SZ 0x5c
+#define ELE_OEM_AUTH_CONTAINER_REQ 0x87
+#define ELE_OEM_VERIFY_IMAGE_REQ 0x88
+#define ELE_OEM_REL_CONTAINER_REQ 0x89
+#define ELE_FW_LIFE_CYCLE_REQ 0x95
+#define ELE_READ_FUSE_REQ 0x97
+#define ELE_GET_FW_VERS_REQ 0x9d
+#define ELE_RETURN_LIFE_CYCLE_REQ 0xa0
+#define ELE_GET_EVENT_REQ 0xa2
+#define ELE_COMMIT_REQ 0xa8
+#define ELE_GEN_KEY_BLOB_REQ 0xaf
+#define ELE_GET_FW_STATUS_REQ 0xc5
+#define ELE_WRITE_FUSE 0xd6
+
#define ELE_GET_INFO_REQ 0xda
#define ELE_GET_INFO_REQ_MSG_SZ 0x10
#define ELE_GET_INFO_RSP_MSG_SZ 0x08
@@ -71,6 +84,10 @@ struct ele_dev_info {
#define ELE_GET_INFO_BUFF_SZ (sizeof(struct ele_dev_info) \
+ ELE_DEV_INFO_EXTRA_SZ)
+#define ELE_DEV_ATTEST_REQ 0xdb
+#define ELE_WRITE_SHADOW_FUSE_REQ 0xf2
+#define ELE_READ_SHADOW_FUSE_REQ 0xf3
+
#define ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_REQ 0xdf
#define ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_REQ_MSG_SZ 0x18
#define ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_RSP_MSG_SZ 0x0c
@@ -97,4 +114,6 @@ int ele_service_swap(struct se_if_priv *priv, dma_addr_t addr,
int ele_fw_authenticate(struct se_if_priv *priv, dma_addr_t contnr_addr,
dma_addr_t img_addr);
int ele_debug_dump(struct se_if_priv *priv);
+int ele_uapi_allowed_base_cmd(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
+ struct se_msg_hdr *header, u32 tx_msg_sz);
#endif
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c
index b662063c3b1c..e1c53b3c7036 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c
@@ -5,6 +5,149 @@
#include "ele_base_msg.h"
#include "ele_common.h"
+#include "ele_fw_api.h"
+#include "se_ctrl.h"
+
+int se_chk_tx_msg_hdr(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_msg_hdr *header,
+ u32 tx_msg_sz, u32 rx_msg_sz)
+{
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+
+ if (!header->size || header->size > MAX_WORD_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (header->tag != priv->if_defs->cmd_tag &&
+ header->tag != priv->if_defs->rsp_tag)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (header->ver == priv->if_defs->base_api_ver)
+ return ele_uapi_allowed_base_cmd(dev_ctx, header, tx_msg_sz);
+ else if (header->ver == priv->if_defs->fw_api_ver)
+ return ele_uapi_allowed_fw_cmd(dev_ctx, header, tx_msg_sz, rx_msg_sz);
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reject a command that embeds a DMA physical address which does not point
+ * inside this context's shared-memory window. The userspace library stages all
+ * command buffers in that coherent region (see get_shared_mem_slot), so any
+ * address outside [dma_addr, dma_addr + size) is not one the driver handed out
+ * and must not be forwarded to firmware. Absent optional buffers are encoded as
+ * a zero address and skipped; polymorphic key words are only range-checked when
+ * their gating flag marks them as a plaintext-key buffer rather than an integer
+ * key identifier. An address may occupy one word (FW-API, low 32 bits only) or
+ * two words (some base-API commands split it into low and high halves).
+ *
+ * When a field also names a size word, the buffer length carried there is
+ * validated too: the whole buffer [addr, addr + len) must fit inside the
+ * window, not just its start address. The check is written as len > end - addr
+ * (addr is already known to be < end) so it cannot overflow.
+ */
+int se_val_cmd_addrs(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_api_msg *msg,
+ u32 tx_msg_sz, const struct se_cmd_addr_field *fields,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ const struct se_shared_mem *mem = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt.non_secure_mem;
+ u32 payload_words;
+ size_t i;
+ u64 base, end;
+
+ if (!fields || !count)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!msg)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Number of complete u32 payload words present after the header. */
+ if (tx_msg_sz < SE_MU_HDR_SZ)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * The caller-supplied byte count must agree with the size the firmware
+ * will act on (header word-size field, in 32-bit words), so a lying
+ * header cannot make us validate fewer words than are actually sent.
+ */
+ if (tx_msg_sz != (u32)msg->header.size * sizeof(u32))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ payload_words = (tx_msg_sz - SE_MU_HDR_SZ) / sizeof(u32);
+
+ base = (u64)mem->dma_addr;
+ end = base + mem->size;
+
+ /* A zero-sized or wrapping window can never contain a valid buffer. */
+ if (end <= base)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ const struct se_cmd_addr_field *f = &fields[i];
+ u64 addr;
+
+ /* Every word the field references must lie within the message. */
+ if (f->lsb_idx >= payload_words)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (f->has_msb && f->msb_idx >= payload_words)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (f->flag_idx != SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS) {
+ bool flag_set;
+
+ if (f->flag_idx >= payload_words)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ flag_set = !!(msg->data[f->flag_idx] & f->flag_mask);
+ /*
+ * When the flag does not select DMA-address mode the
+ * word holds an integer key identifier; leave it alone.
+ */
+ if (flag_set != f->is_addr_when_set)
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ addr = msg->data[f->lsb_idx];
+ if (f->has_msb)
+ addr |= (u64)msg->data[f->msb_idx] << 32;
+
+ /* Zero marks an absent optional buffer. */
+ if (!addr)
+ continue;
+
+ if (addr < base || addr >= end)
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ /*
+ * When the message also carries this buffer's length, the whole
+ * buffer [addr, addr + len) must fit inside the window, not just
+ * its start. addr is already >= base and < end here, so end - addr
+ * is a positive value and the comparison cannot overflow.
+ */
+ if (f->size_idx != SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE) {
+ u64 len;
+
+ if (f->size_idx >= payload_words)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* size_mask == 0 with a valid size_idx is a descriptor bug. */
+ if (!f->size_mask)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Widen to u64 before shifting: size_shift is u8 and
+ * shifting a u32 by >= 32 is undefined behaviour.
+ */
+ len = ((u64)msg->data[f->size_idx] >> f->size_shift) & f->size_mask;
+ if (len > end - addr)
+ return -EACCES;
+ } else if (f->buf_size) {
+ /* buf_size: literal byte count
+ * (FW-defined constant or saved at runtime).
+ */
+ if ((u64)f->buf_size > end - addr)
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
/*
* se_update_msg_chksum() - calculate and update message checksum word.
@@ -46,20 +189,50 @@ int se_update_msg_chksum(u32 *msg, u32 msg_len)
return 0;
}
+static void se_mark_fw_busy(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
+{
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->fw_busy_lock, flags);
+ if (!priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx) {
+ kref_get(&dev_ctx->refcount);
+ priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx = dev_ctx;
+ atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 1);
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->fw_busy_lock, flags);
+}
+
+void set_se_rcv_msg_timeout(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, u32 timeout_ms)
+{
+ dev_ctx->rcv_msg_timeout_jiffies = msecs_to_jiffies(timeout_ms);
+}
+
int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl)
{
struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
bool is_rsp_wait_with_timeout = false;
bool wait_uninterruptible = false;
+ bool wait_killable = false;
unsigned long remaining_jiffies;
unsigned long deadline_jiffies;
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
- remaining_jiffies = msecs_to_jiffies(SE_RCV_MSG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS);
+ remaining_jiffies = dev_ctx->rcv_msg_timeout_jiffies;
if (se_clbk_hdl == &priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl) {
is_rsp_wait_with_timeout = true;
deadline_jiffies = jiffies + remaining_jiffies;
+
+ /*
+ * Internal kernel transactions run on priv_dev_ctx (probe
+ * get_info/ping, FW auth, PM IMEM swap). They are not tied to a
+ * restartable syscall, so wait uninterruptibly: PM freezer fake
+ * signals must not abort them with -ERESTARTSYS. Userspace
+ * waiters stay interruptible via the deferred-signal path below.
+ */
+ if (se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx == priv->priv_dev_ctx)
+ wait_uninterruptible = true;
}
do {
@@ -71,7 +244,7 @@ int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk
spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg = NULL;
if (!completion_done(&se_clbk_hdl->done))
- atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 1);
+ se_mark_fw_busy(dev_ctx);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
break;
@@ -82,23 +255,89 @@ int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk
if (wait_uninterruptible)
ret = wait_for_completion_timeout(&se_clbk_hdl->done,
remaining_jiffies);
+ else if (wait_killable)
+ ret = wait_for_completion_killable_timeout(&se_clbk_hdl->done,
+ remaining_jiffies);
else
ret = wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(&se_clbk_hdl->done,
remaining_jiffies);
if (ret == -ERESTARTSYS) {
/*
- * Record that a signal was observed, then continue waiting non-
- * interruptibly until the response arrives or the timeout
- * expires. The caller can surface the interruption to userspace
- * after the protocol transaction is brought back to a
- * synchronized state.
+ * First, non-fatal signal on the interruptible userspace
+ * path: defer it. Record that a signal was observed and keep
+ * waiting - now only killably - until the response arrives or
+ * the timeout expires. ele_msg_send_rcv() then surfaces the
+ * interruption to userspace as -ERESTARTSYS once the protocol
+ * transaction has resynchronised, so the in-flight command is
+ * neither abandoned nor re-sent.
+ *
+ * Waiting killably rather than fully uninterruptibly is what
+ * keeps a fatal signal (SIGKILL) able to terminate the task:
+ * a non-fatal signal no longer aborts the wait, but the task
+ * can never get stuck for the multi-thousand-second long
+ * timeout and trip the hung-task watchdog.
*/
- if (is_rsp_wait_with_timeout &&
+ if (is_rsp_wait_with_timeout && !wait_killable &&
READ_ONCE(se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg)) {
WRITE_ONCE(se_clbk_hdl->signal_rcvd, true);
- wait_uninterruptible = true;
+ wait_killable = true;
continue;
}
+
+ /*
+ * Reached here either on the command-receiver path (no
+ * response buffer of the caller's to protect) or because a
+ * fatal signal fired on the killable path above. In the
+ * latter case the task is being killed but the enclave may
+ * still DMA into the caller's response buffer, which is about
+ * to be freed. Quarantine it under clbk_rx_lock - drop rx_msg
+ * so a late se_if_rx_callback() cannot copy into freed memory,
+ * and arm the circuit breaker - exactly like the timeout path
+ * below.
+ *
+ * The exception is a genuine response that raced in just
+ * before the fatal signal: se_if_rx_callback() has already
+ * copied it and set rx_delivered under the same lock, so the
+ * enclave is done with the buffer. Report it as a normal
+ * receive (rx_msg_sz) so the handle it carries is still
+ * recorded and later closed, rather than leaked.
+ */
+ if (is_rsp_wait_with_timeout) {
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+ if (se_clbk_hdl->rx_delivered) {
+ /*
+ * A genuine FW response raced in just
+ * before the fatal signal. The enclave
+ * is done with the buffer. Report the
+ * real received size so the handle it
+ * carries is still recorded and closed.
+ */
+ ret = se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg) {
+ /*
+ * The enclave may still DMA into this
+ * buffer (either a normal timeout or
+ * a teardown complete_all() wakeup).
+ * Quarantine the buffer and arm the
+ * circuit breaker unconditionally.
+ *
+ * Do NOT gate se_mark_fw_busy() on
+ * !completion_done(): teardown calls
+ * complete_all() before freeing the
+ * buffer, so completion_done() returns
+ * true in exactly the dangerous case
+ * where the enclave is still writing.
+ * rx_delivered (checked above) is the
+ * correct guard for the safe case.
+ */
+ se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg = NULL;
+ se_mark_fw_busy(dev_ctx);
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+ }
break;
}
@@ -119,7 +358,7 @@ int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk
spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg = NULL;
if (!completion_done(&se_clbk_hdl->done))
- atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 1);
+ se_mark_fw_busy(dev_ctx);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
@@ -128,8 +367,35 @@ int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk
get_se_if_name(priv->if_defs->se_if_type));
break;
}
+
+ /*
+ * A positive wait return normally means a real response. During
+ * teardown, se_if_probe_cleanup() forces this wait to return via
+ * complete_all() with no response, while the enclave may still
+ * DMA into the shared buffer. Treat that as a failed transaction
+ * and arm the circuit breaker so the buffer is quarantined, not
+ * freed.
+ *
+ * rx_delivered tells the two apart: se_if_rx_callback() sets it
+ * under clbk_rx_lock only after copying a real response. This
+ * keeps teardown-time session/storage close responses from being
+ * mistaken for the forced abort, which would fail the close and
+ * leak its DMA buffer.
+ */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+ if (is_rsp_wait_with_timeout && atomic_read(&priv->going_away) &&
+ !se_clbk_hdl->rx_delivered) {
+ se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg = NULL;
+ se_mark_fw_busy(dev_ctx);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ break;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+
ret = se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz;
break;
+
} while (ret < 0);
return ret;
@@ -190,16 +456,42 @@ int ele_msg_send_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, void *tx_msg,
guard(mutex)(&priv->se_if_cmd_lock);
+ /*
+ * Arm the transaction under clbk_rx_lock. se_if_probe_cleanup() sets
+ * going_away under this same lock, then complete_all()s, so checking
+ * going_away and arming (reinit_completion() + publish) together makes
+ * teardown and arming mutually exclusive and closes the lost-wakeup
+ * window. priv_dev_ctx teardown-close commands are still let through.
+ *
+ * Check going_away before fw_busy so a caller racing unbind gets
+ * -ENODEV, not a misleading retryable -EBUSY. fw_busy is only
+ * atomic_read() here, so no fw_busy_lock is taken and there is no
+ * deadlock.
+ */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+ if (atomic_read(&priv->going_away) &&
+ (dev_ctx != priv->priv_dev_ctx ||
+ !is_msg_xchng_for_tdown(tx_msg))) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
if (atomic_read(&priv->fw_busy)) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags);
dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: ELE became unresponsive.\n", dev_ctx->devname);
return -EBUSY;
}
+
reinit_completion(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.done);
- /* Publish rx_msg/rx_msg_sz under the lock read by se_if_rx_callback(). */
- spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags);
priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx = dev_ctx;
priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.rx_msg_sz = exp_rx_msg_sz;
priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.rx_msg = rx_msg;
+ /*
+ * Arm a fresh transaction: clear the delivered flag so a stale value
+ * from a previous response cannot make ele_msg_rcv() mistake a
+ * teardown-forced complete_all() for a genuine firmware response.
+ */
+ priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.rx_delivered = false;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags);
err = ele_msg_send(dev_ctx, tx_msg, tx_msg_sz);
@@ -248,6 +540,7 @@ static bool check_hdr_exception_for_sz(struct se_if_priv *priv,
void se_if_rx_callback(struct mbox_client *mbox_cl, void *msg)
{
struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl;
+ bool schedule_fw_busy_work = false;
struct device *dev = mbox_cl->dev;
const char *devname = NULL;
struct se_msg_hdr *header;
@@ -325,9 +618,13 @@ void se_if_rx_callback(struct mbox_client *mbox_cl, void *msg)
se_clbk_hdl = &priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl;
spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
if (!se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg) {
- /* Close circuit breaker on spinlock race */
- atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 0);
+ if (atomic_read(&priv->fw_busy))
+ schedule_fw_busy_work = true;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+
+ if (schedule_fw_busy_work)
+ schedule_work(&priv->fw_busy_work);
+
dev_info(dev, "ELE responded (late), recovery FW available.");
return;
}
@@ -347,6 +644,12 @@ void se_if_rx_callback(struct mbox_client *mbox_cl, void *msg)
se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz = min(rx_msg_sz, exp_rx_msg_sz);
devname = se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx->devname;
memcpy(se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg, msg, se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz);
+ /*
+ * Mark that a genuine firmware response was delivered. ele_msg_rcv()
+ * reads this under clbk_rx_lock to avoid mistaking this response for
+ * a teardown-forced complete_all() wakeup.
+ */
+ se_clbk_hdl->rx_delivered = true;
complete(&se_clbk_hdl->done);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
@@ -398,7 +701,7 @@ int se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_api_msg *msg,
return -EINVAL;
}
- if (header->size > SE_MU_HDR_WORD_SZ) {
+ if (header->size > SE_MU_HDR_WORD_SZ && (sz >> 2) > SE_MU_HDR_WORD_SZ) {
status = RES_STATUS(msg->data[0]);
if (status != priv->if_defs->success_tag) {
dev_dbg(priv->dev, "Command Id[%x], Response Failure = 0x%x",
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h
index 07e6b6a1bafa..d01767086aeb 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h
@@ -9,11 +9,15 @@
#include "se_ctrl.h"
#define SE_RCV_MSG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS 3000
+#define SE_RCV_MSG_LONG_TIMEOUT_MS 5000000
#define ELE_SUCCESS_IND 0xD6
#define IMX_ELE_FW_DIR "imx/ele/"
+#define MAX_WORD_SIZE 0x20
+
+void set_se_rcv_msg_timeout(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, u32 val);
int se_update_msg_chksum(u32 *msg, u32 msg_len);
int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl);
@@ -28,6 +32,76 @@ void se_if_rx_callback(struct mbox_client *mbox_cl, void *msg);
int se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_api_msg *msg,
u8 msg_id, u8 sz, bool is_base_api);
+/*
+ * A number of ELE commands carry DMA physical addresses inside their message
+ * payload. se_val_cmd_addrs() range-checks each such address against the
+ * calling context's shared-memory window before the message reaches firmware.
+ *
+ * data[] index = message WORD index - 1, because the 4-byte se_msg_hdr is
+ * message WORD 0 and se_api_msg.data[0] is message WORD 1.
+ *
+ * struct se_cmd_addr_field describes one address embedded in the payload:
+ * lsb_idx - data[] index of the low 32 bits of the address
+ * msb_idx - data[] index of the high 32 bits, valid only when
+ * has_msb is set. Some base-API commands split the
+ * address into two words; FW-API commands do not.
+ * has_msb - true when the address occupies two words (lsb + msb)
+ * flag_idx - data[] index of the flag word that selects whether
+ * data[lsb_idx] is a DMA address or an integer key
+ * identifier; SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS when the word is always
+ * a DMA address
+ * flag_mask - the selecting flag bit, already shifted to its position
+ * inside the 32-bit little-endian flag word
+ * is_addr_when_set - true when the word is a DMA address if the flag bit is
+ * set; false when it is an address if the bit is clear
+ * (inverse polarity, e.g. VERIFY_SIGN OPAQUE_KEY)
+ * size_idx - data[] index of the word carrying the length in bytes
+ * of the buffer at this address. se_val_cmd_addrs() uses
+ * it to confirm the whole buffer [addr, addr + len) fits
+ * inside the shared-memory window, not just its start.
+ * SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE when the message carries no length
+ * for this buffer.
+ * size_shift - right shift applied to the size word before masking,
+ * for a length packed into the high half of a word
+ * size_mask - bitmask applied after the shift to extract the length
+ * from the message word (0xFFFFFFFF for a full 32-bit
+ * length, 0xFFFF for a u16, 0xFF for a u8). Used only
+ * when size_idx != SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE; zero otherwise.
+ * buf_size - literal byte count used when size_idx ==
+ * SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE and buf_size != 0: the whole
+ * buffer [addr, addr + buf_size) must fit inside the
+ * shared-memory window. Use this for buffers whose size
+ * is a firmware-defined constant not carried in the
+ * message, or populated at runtime via
+ * ele_set_sz_in_field_addr(). Zero means no end-bound
+ * check (start-address check only; see comments at each
+ * descriptor entry for the accepted exception rationale).
+ */
+struct se_cmd_addr_field {
+ u8 lsb_idx;
+ u8 msb_idx;
+ bool has_msb;
+ u8 flag_idx;
+ u32 flag_mask;
+ bool is_addr_when_set;
+ u8 size_idx;
+ u8 size_shift;
+ u32 size_mask;
+ u32 buf_size;
+};
+
+#define SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS 0xEFu
+#define SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE 0xFFu
+
+int se_val_cmd_addrs(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_api_msg *msg,
+ u32 tx_msg_sz, const struct se_cmd_addr_field *fields,
+ size_t count);
+
+const struct se_cmd_addr_field *ele_fw_cmd_addr_fields(u8 cmd, size_t *count);
+const struct se_cmd_addr_field *ele_fw_rsp_addr_fields(u8 cmd, size_t *count);
+const struct se_cmd_addr_field *ele_base_cmd_addr_fields(u8 cmd, size_t *count);
+void ele_set_sz_in_field_addr(u8 cmd, u32 size);
+
/* Fill a command message header with a given command ID and length in bytes. */
static inline void se_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_msg_hdr *hdr,
u8 cmd, u32 len, bool is_base_api)
@@ -42,4 +116,7 @@ int se_save_imem_state(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_imem_buf *imem);
int se_restore_imem_state(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_imem_buf *imem);
+int se_chk_tx_msg_hdr(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_msg_hdr *header,
+ u32 tx_msg_sz, u32 rx_msg_sz);
+
#endif /*__ELE_COMMON_H__ */
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0c4c6f7de020
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.c
@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2026 NXP
+ */
+
+#include "se_ctrl.h"
+#include "ele_common.h"
+#include "ele_fw_api.h"
+
+static int se_cmd_receiver_allowed_cmd(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
+ struct se_api_msg *msg, u32 tx_msg_sz)
+{
+ u8 cmd = msg->header.command;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ:
+ case ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ:
+ return 0;
+ case ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_IMPORT_REQ:
+ const struct se_cmd_addr_field *fields;
+ size_t count;
+
+ fields = ele_fw_cmd_addr_fields(cmd, &count);
+ return se_val_cmd_addrs(dev_ctx, msg, tx_msg_sz, fields, count);
+ default:
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+}
+
+static int se_cmd_receiver_allowed_rsp(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
+ struct se_api_msg *msg, u32 tx_msg_sz)
+{
+ const struct se_cmd_addr_field *fields;
+ u8 cmd = msg->header.command;
+ size_t count;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case ELE_STORAGE_EXPORT_FINISH_REQ:
+ case ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_GET_DONE_REQ:
+ case ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_DELETE_REQ:
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ /*
+ * These responses supply a kernel buffer address to firmware.
+ * Range-check the embedded DMA address against the calling
+ * context's shared-memory window before the message is sent.
+ */
+ fields = ele_fw_rsp_addr_fields(cmd, &count);
+ if (!count)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ return se_val_cmd_addrs(dev_ctx, msg, tx_msg_sz, fields, count);
+ }
+}
+
+int ele_uapi_allowed_fw_cmd(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_msg_hdr *header,
+ u32 tx_msg_sz, u32 rx_msg_sz)
+{
+ struct se_api_msg *msg = container_of(header, struct se_api_msg, header);
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+ const struct se_cmd_addr_field *fields;
+ bool is_cmd_receiver = false;
+ size_t count;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock)
+ if (dev_ctx == priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx)
+ is_cmd_receiver = true;
+
+ if (is_cmd_receiver) {
+ if (header->tag == priv->if_defs->cmd_tag)
+ return se_cmd_receiver_allowed_cmd(dev_ctx, msg, tx_msg_sz);
+
+ if (header->tag == priv->if_defs->rsp_tag)
+ return se_cmd_receiver_allowed_rsp(dev_ctx, msg, tx_msg_sz);
+ }
+
+ /* Reject any response message with non-command receiver */
+ if (header->tag == priv->if_defs->rsp_tag)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ /* Reject any other tag */
+ if (header->tag != priv->if_defs->cmd_tag)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ /*
+ * Identify the command first. Session/storage commands enforce their
+ * own-handle checks; crypto commands that embed DMA addresses defer to
+ * the shared range check below. Any command not named here is left with
+ * ret == 0 (permitted) as before.
+ */
+ switch (header->command) {
+ case ELE_SESSION_OPEN_REQ:
+ /* Might be cleared as part of tear down. */
+ ret = dev_ctx->sess_hdl ? -EEXIST : 0;
+ if (rx_msg_sz < ELE_SESSION_OPEN_RSP_SZ)
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ:
+ /* Might be cleared as part of tear down. */
+ if (!dev_ctx->sess_hdl) {
+ ret = -ENXIO;
+ break;
+ }
+ /*
+ * A close request must target this context's own session. The
+ * handle to close is carried in the payload (data[0]); reject a
+ * request whose buffer is too short to hold it, or whose handle
+ * does not match this context. Checking the buffer size first
+ * also keeps the data[0] read in bounds. This stops one process
+ * from closing - and leaking - another process's session with a
+ * spoofed handle.
+ */
+ if (tx_msg_sz < ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ_SZ ||
+ msg->data[0] != dev_ctx->sess_hdl)
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case ELE_FW_GET_INFO_REQ:
+ case ELE_KEY_STORE_OPEN_REQ:
+ case ELE_KEY_STORE_CLOSE_REQ:
+ case ELE_KEY_MGMT_OPEN_REQ:
+ case ELE_KEY_MGMT_CLOSE_REQ:
+ case ELE_MANAGE_KEY_GROUP_REQ:
+ case ELE_GET_KEY_ATTR_REQ:
+ case ELE_KEY_DELETE_REQ:
+ case ELE_MAC_OPEN_REQ:
+ case ELE_MAC_CLOSE_REQ:
+ case ELE_CIPHER_OPEN_REQ:
+ case ELE_CIPHER_CLOSE_REQ:
+ case ELE_SIGNATURE_GENERATE_OPEN_REQ:
+ case ELE_SIGNATURE_GENERATE_CLOSE_REQ:
+ case ELE_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_OPEN_REQ:
+ case ELE_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_CLOSE_REQ:
+ case ELE_DATA_STORAGE_OPEN_REQ:
+ case ELE_DATA_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ:
+ case ELE_DATA_DELETE_REQ:
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ case ELE_STORAGE_OPEN_REQ:
+ /* Might be cleared as part of tear down. */
+ if (dev_ctx->strg_hdl) {
+ ret = -EEXIST;
+ break;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Reject the storage-open request when another context is
+ * already registered as the command receiver. If we let the
+ * command through, FW would allocate a new storage handle and
+ * start sending NVM callbacks for it; those callbacks would be
+ * routed to the existing receiver (process A), not to the
+ * caller (process B). This would let process A observe and
+ * tamper with process B's NVM traffic. Reject early, before
+ * the command reaches FW, so no handle is allocated and the
+ * state stays consistent.
+ */
+ scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock)
+ if (priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx &&
+ priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx != dev_ctx)
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ if (rx_msg_sz < ELE_STORAGE_OPEN_RSP_SZ)
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ:
+ /* Might be cleared as part of tear down. */
+ if (!dev_ctx->strg_hdl) {
+ ret = -ENXIO;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Same self-ownership check as the session close above. */
+ if (tx_msg_sz < ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ_SZ ||
+ msg->data[0] != dev_ctx->strg_hdl)
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case ELE_STORAGE_STATUS_REQ:
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* FW commands that embed DMA addresses. */
+ fields = ele_fw_cmd_addr_fields(header->command, &count);
+ if (!count) {
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ret = se_val_cmd_addrs(dev_ctx, msg, tx_msg_sz, fields, count);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void fw_api_specific_ops(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_api_msg *rx_msg)
+{
+ struct se_msg_hdr *header = &rx_msg->header;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+
+ switch (header->command) {
+ case ELE_SESSION_OPEN_REQ:
+ dev_ctx->sess_hdl = rx_msg->data[1];
+ break;
+ case ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ:
+ dev_ctx->sess_hdl = 0;
+ break;
+ case ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ:
+ scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock)
+ unset_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(dev_ctx);
+ dev_ctx->strg_hdl = 0;
+ break;
+ case ELE_STORAGE_OPEN_REQ: {
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Record the storage handle before registering as command
+ * receiver. FW has already allocated the handle; if we assigned
+ * it only after a successful registration, a failing
+ * set_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver() (e.g. -EBUSY) would leave
+ * strg_hdl at 0 while the ioctl still returns success to
+ * userspace. The kernel would then never close the handle on
+ * teardown, leaking it in FW. Storing it first guarantees
+ * cleanup_dev_ctx() closes it regardless of registration.
+ */
+ dev_ctx->strg_hdl = rx_msg->data[1];
+
+ rc = set_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(dev_ctx);
+ if (rc)
+ dev_err(priv->dev,
+ "Failed to register %s as CMD-Receiver: %d\n",
+ dev_ctx->devname, rc);
+ break;
+ }
+ case ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_EXPORT_REQ:
+ /*
+ * FW sent an export-start command with key_store_size at
+ * data[1]. Save it so se_val_cmd_addrs() can range-check the
+ * response buffer when the cmd_receiver sends back the address.
+ */
+ ele_set_sz_in_field_addr(ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_EXPORT_REQ,
+ rx_msg->data[1]);
+ break;
+ case ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_EXPORT_REQ:
+ /*
+ * FW sent a chunk-export command with chunk_size at data[1].
+ * Save it so se_val_cmd_addrs() can range-check the response
+ * buffer when the cmd_receiver sends back the address.
+ */
+ ele_set_sz_in_field_addr(ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_EXPORT_REQ,
+ rx_msg->data[1]);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return true when tx_msg is one of the close requests the driver issues
+ * from its own teardown path (session/storage close). ele_msg_send_rcv()
+ * uses this to let those close messages through even after going_away is
+ * set, so the kernel can still resynchronise session/storage state with FW.
+ */
+bool is_msg_xchng_for_tdown(void *tx_msg)
+{
+ struct se_msg_hdr *header = &((struct se_api_msg *)tx_msg)->header;
+
+ return (header->command == ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ ||
+ header->command == ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ);
+}
+
+int se_close_session(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, u32 session_hdl)
+{
+ struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) = NULL;
+ struct se_api_msg *rx_msg __free(kfree) = NULL;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!dev_ctx || !dev_ctx->priv)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+
+ tx_msg = kzalloc(ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ_SZ, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tx_msg)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rx_msg = kzalloc(ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_RSP_SZ, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rx_msg)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * Session close is a FW-API command; format it with the FW API version
+ * so se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status() below (called with is_base_api = false,
+ * i.e. expecting fw_api_ver) does not reject the matching response and
+ * wrongly report the close as failed, which would leak the handle.
+ */
+ se_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(priv, (struct se_msg_hdr *)&tx_msg->header,
+ ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ, ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ_SZ, false);
+
+ tx_msg->data[0] = session_hdl;
+
+ /*
+ * Transmit on the caller's own context. Using dev_ctx (rather than
+ * hardcoding priv->priv_dev_ctx) keeps a userspace close() subject to
+ * the going_away check in ele_msg_send_rcv(): if unbind has begun and
+ * freed priv->tx_chan, the send is rejected with -ENODEV instead of
+ * touching the freed mailbox channel. The teardown path passes
+ * priv_dev_ctx so its resync closes are still let through.
+ */
+ ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(dev_ctx,
+ tx_msg,
+ ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ_SZ,
+ rx_msg,
+ ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_RSP_SZ);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(priv,
+ rx_msg,
+ ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ,
+ ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_RSP_SZ,
+ false);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int se_close_storage(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, u32 storage_hdl)
+{
+ struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) = NULL;
+ struct se_api_msg *rx_msg __free(kfree) = NULL;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!dev_ctx || !dev_ctx->priv)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+
+ tx_msg = kzalloc(ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ_SZ, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tx_msg)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rx_msg = kzalloc(ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_RSP_SZ, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rx_msg)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Same FW-API version handling as se_close_session() above. */
+ se_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(priv, (struct se_msg_hdr *)&tx_msg->header,
+ ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ, ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ_SZ, false);
+
+ tx_msg->data[0] = storage_hdl;
+
+ /* Transmit on the caller's own context; see se_close_session(). */
+ ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(dev_ctx,
+ tx_msg,
+ ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ_SZ,
+ rx_msg,
+ ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_RSP_SZ);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(priv,
+ rx_msg,
+ ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ,
+ ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_RSP_SZ,
+ false);
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.h b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..438ed3c9ef88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_fw_api.h
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 2026 NXP
+ */
+
+#ifndef ELE_FW_API_H
+#define ELE_FW_API_H
+#include "se_ctrl.h"
+
+#define ELE_SESSION_OPEN_REQ 0x10u
+#define ELE_SESSION_OPEN_RSP_SZ 0x0Cu
+
+#define ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ_SZ 0x08u
+#define ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_RSP_SZ 0x08u
+#define ELE_SESSION_CLOSE_REQ 0x11u
+
+/*
+ * Session-scoped FW-API service, key-management and close command opcodes
+ * (SAB command IDs, PSA_COMPLIANT message layout). These commands do not
+ * embed DMA staging-buffer addresses that require range-checking; they are
+ * defined here for completeness and for use by the command allow-list.
+ * ELE_FW_GET_INFO_REQ is the FW-API get-info opcode and is intentionally
+ * distinct from the base-API ELE_GET_INFO_REQ (0xda) in ele_base_msg.h.
+ */
+#define ELE_FW_GET_INFO_REQ 0x16u
+#define ELE_KEY_STORE_OPEN_REQ 0x30u
+#define ELE_KEY_STORE_CLOSE_REQ 0x31u
+#define ELE_KEY_MGMT_OPEN_REQ 0x40u
+#define ELE_KEY_MGMT_CLOSE_REQ 0x41u
+#define ELE_MANAGE_KEY_GROUP_REQ 0x45u
+#define ELE_GET_KEY_ATTR_REQ 0x4Cu
+#define ELE_KEY_DELETE_REQ 0x4Eu
+#define ELE_MAC_OPEN_REQ 0x50u
+#define ELE_MAC_CLOSE_REQ 0x51u
+#define ELE_CIPHER_OPEN_REQ 0x60u
+#define ELE_CIPHER_CLOSE_REQ 0x61u
+#define ELE_SIGNATURE_GENERATE_OPEN_REQ 0x70u
+#define ELE_SIGNATURE_GENERATE_CLOSE_REQ 0x71u
+#define ELE_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_OPEN_REQ 0x80u
+#define ELE_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_CLOSE_REQ 0x81u
+#define ELE_DATA_STORAGE_OPEN_REQ 0xA0u
+#define ELE_DATA_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ 0xA1u
+#define ELE_DATA_DELETE_REQ 0xA4u
+
+/*
+ * FW-API crypto command opcodes that embed one or more DMA physical addresses
+ * in their message payload. ele_uapi_allowed_fw_cmd() range-checks those
+ * addresses against the calling context's shared-memory window before the
+ * message is handed to firmware. Opcodes match the SAB command IDs emitted by
+ * the userspace library (PSA_COMPLIANT message layout).
+ */
+#define ELE_PUB_KEY_EXPORT_REQ 0x32u
+#define ELE_KEYSTORE_REPROV_ENABLE_REQ 0x3Fu
+#define ELE_KEYGEN_REQ 0x42u
+#define ELE_KEY_EXCHANGE_REQ 0x47u
+#define ELE_KEY_IMPORT_REQ 0x4Fu
+#define ELE_KEY_IMPORT 0x4Fu
+#define ELE_MAC_REQ 0x52u
+#define ELE_CIPHER_REQ 0x62u
+#define ELE_AUTH_ENC_REQ 0x64u
+#define ELE_AUTH_ENC_NEW_REQ 0x65u
+#define ELE_SIGNATURE_GENERATE_REQ 0x72u
+#define ELE_PUB_KEY_ATTEST_REQ 0x74u
+#define ELE_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_REQ 0x82u
+#define ELE_DATA_STORAGE_REQ 0xA2u
+#define ELE_ENC_DATA_STORAGE_REQ 0xA3u
+#define ELE_ASYMMETRIC_ENC_REQ 0x92u
+
+#define ELE_KEY_GENERIC_CRYPTO_REQ 0xC2u
+#define ELE_GC_CIPHER_REQ 0xC8u
+#define ELE_GC_AEAD_REQ 0xC9u
+#define ELE_GC_ACRYPTO_REQ 0xCAu
+#define ELE_GC_AKEY_GEN_REQ 0xCBu
+#define ELE_HASH_ONE_GO_REQ 0xCCu
+#define ELE_RNG_GET_RANDOM_REQ 0xCDu
+
+#define ELE_STORAGE_OPEN_REQ 0xE0u
+#define ELE_STORAGE_OPEN_RSP_SZ 0x0Cu
+
+#define ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ_SZ 0x08u
+#define ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_RSP_SZ 0x08u
+#define ELE_STORAGE_CLOSE_REQ 0xE1u
+
+#define ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_IMPORT_REQ 0xE2u
+#define ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_EXPORT_REQ 0xE3u
+#define ELE_STORAGE_EXPORT_FINISH_REQ 0xE4u
+#define ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_EXPORT_REQ 0xE5u
+#define ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_GET_REQ 0xE6u
+#define ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_GET_DONE_REQ 0xE7u
+#define ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_DELETE_REQ 0xE9u
+#define ELE_STORAGE_STATUS_REQ 0xEAu
+
+int ele_uapi_allowed_fw_cmd(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_msg_hdr *header,
+ u32 tx_msg_sz, u32 rx_msg_sz);
+void fw_api_specific_ops(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_api_msg *rx_msg);
+bool is_msg_xchng_for_tdown(void *tx_msg);
+int se_close_session(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, u32 session_hdl);
+int se_close_storage(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, u32 storage_hdl);
+
+#endif /* ELE_FW_API_H */
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_msg_addr_field.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_msg_addr_field.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1da6583b6c31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_msg_addr_field.c
@@ -0,0 +1,654 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2026 NXP
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#include "ele_common.h"
+#include "ele_base_msg.h"
+#include "ele_fw_api.h"
+
+/*
+ * Base-API commands that embed one or more DMA physical addresses in their
+ * payload. Unlike the FW-API crypto commands, GET_INFO and DEV_ATTEST split
+ * their response-buffer address across two words: the high half is written
+ * first (lower word index) and the low half next, so has_msb is set and the
+ * msb_idx precedes the lsb_idx. GEN_KEY_BLOB uses single-word LSB addresses.
+ * See struct se_cmd_addr_field in ele_common.h for the field semantics.
+ */
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_get_info_addr_fields[] = {
+ /*
+ * rsp_data_addr_hi @ data[0], rsp_data_addr_lo @ data[1];
+ * buf_sz is a u16 in the low half of data[2].
+ */
+ { .lsb_idx = 1, .msb_idx = 0, .has_msb = true, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu },
+};
+
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_dev_attest_addr_fields[] = {
+ /*
+ * rsp_data_addr_hi @ data[0], rsp_data_addr_lo @ data[1];
+ * buf_sz is a u16 in the low half of data[2].
+ */
+ { .lsb_idx = 1, .msb_idx = 0, .has_msb = true, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu },
+};
+
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_oem_auth_cntr_addr_fields[] = {
+ /*
+ * Container Header address: a 64-bit physical address split across two
+ * words. data[0] holds the 32-bit MSB and data[1] holds the 32-bit LSB
+ * (ELE API spec Table 27, word size = 0x3, so the command is header +
+ * MSB + LSB only). The message carries no length word for this buffer;
+ * the container size is variable and not communicated in the MU payload,
+ * and no static firmware-defined maximum is specified. Because this is a
+ * read-only input buffer (the ELE ROM/FW copies the container header
+ * into its internal memory for authentication and does not write back
+ * through this address), enforcing only the start-address range check is
+ * acceptable: a rogue caller can at most cause firmware to read within
+ * the shared-memory window, which is memory the caller already owns.
+ * Output buffers must be fully bounded; input-only buffers are safe with
+ * addr-only checks.
+ */
+ { .lsb_idx = 1, .msb_idx = 0, .has_msb = true, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE }, /* container_hdr_addr */
+};
+
+/*
+ * GENERATE ELE KEY BLOB command (ELE_GEN_KEY_BLOB_REQ, 0xAF).
+ * ELE API spec Table 73, word size = 0x8 (header + 7 data words):
+ * data[0] = key_identifier
+ * data[1] = Reserved
+ * data[2] = load_address (32-bit; must be 64-bit aligned)
+ * data[3] = Reserved
+ * data[4] = store_address (32-bit; must be 64-bit aligned)
+ * data[5] = Reserved[31:16] | max_export_size[15:0]
+ * data[6] = CRC
+ *
+ * load_addr points to the input: a blob header (8 bytes, Table 77) followed
+ * by the plaintext payload. No size word is present in the message for this
+ * input buffer. The maximum input size is determined by the largest supported
+ * payload type: OTFAD key configuration (0x28 bytes per Table 79) plus the
+ * 8-byte header gives 0x30 bytes. That is the literal upper bound used as
+ * buf_size so se_val_cmd_addrs() can verify [load_addr, load_addr+0x30)
+ * lies within the shared-memory window. This is an input-only buffer
+ * (firmware reads it to generate the blob) so start-address-plus-fixed-max
+ * is a safe and sufficient check.
+ */
+#define OP_GEN_ELE_KEY_BLOB_INPUT_MAX_SZ 0x30 /* blob hdr (8) + OTFAD payload (0x28) */
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_gen_key_blob_addr_fields[] = {
+ { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE,
+ .buf_size = OP_GEN_ELE_KEY_BLOB_INPUT_MAX_SZ }, /* load_address */
+ /* store_address @ data[4]; max_export_size is u16 in low half of data[5] */
+ { .lsb_idx = 4, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* store_address */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Return the address-field descriptor table for a base-API command, or NULL
+ * when the command embeds no DMA addresses. count is set to the number of
+ * entries.
+ */
+const struct se_cmd_addr_field *ele_base_cmd_addr_fields(u8 cmd, size_t *count)
+{
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case ELE_OEM_AUTH_CONTAINER_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_oem_auth_cntr_addr_fields);
+ return ele_oem_auth_cntr_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_GEN_KEY_BLOB_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_gen_key_blob_addr_fields);
+ return ele_gen_key_blob_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_GET_INFO_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_get_info_addr_fields);
+ return ele_get_info_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_DEV_ATTEST_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_dev_attest_addr_fields);
+ return ele_dev_attest_addr_fields;
+ default:
+ *count = 0;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * FW-API crypto commands that embed one or more DMA physical addresses in
+ * their payload. On the PSA_COMPLIANT ABI most addresses are written by the
+ * userspace library as a single little-endian 32-bit LSB word (the high half
+ * is always zero), so has_msb is left false for those entries. A few commands
+ * (pub-key-export 0x32, keystore reprov-enable 0x3F) carry an explicit ext/MSB
+ * word ahead of the LSB word, matching the base-API two-word address layout;
+ * their entries set has_msb = true so the MSB word is validated too. See
+ * struct se_cmd_addr_field in ele_common.h for the field semantics.
+ */
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_pub_key_export_addr_fields[] = {
+ /*
+ * out_key_addr: the recovered public key output buffer. Its high half
+ * out_key_addr_ext is data[2] and its low half out_key_addr is data[3];
+ * the library always writes it via set_phy_addr_to_words(), so it is
+ * always a DMA address. Its length is out_key_size, the u16 in the low
+ * half of data[4]. key_identifier (data[1]) is an integer, not an
+ * address.
+ */
+ { .lsb_idx = 3, .msb_idx = 2, .has_msb = true, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* out_key_addr */
+};
+
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_keystore_reprov_en_addr_fields[] = {
+ /*
+ * Signed message address: a 64-bit physical address split across two
+ * words. data[0] holds the 32-bit MSB and data[1] holds the 32-bit LSB
+ * (ELE API spec Table 202, word size = 0x3, so the command is header +
+ * MSB + LSB only). The address points to the start of the complete
+ * signed message block (header + 12-byte payload from Table 204 +
+ * signature); the total block size depends on the signing format and is
+ * not carried anywhere in the MU payload words. No static
+ * firmware-defined maximum for the full block is specified. Because this
+ * is a read-only input buffer (firmware reads and verifies the signed
+ * block, does not write back through this address), enforcing only the
+ * start-address range check is acceptable: a rogue caller can at most
+ * cause firmware to read within the shared-memory window, which is
+ * memory the caller already owns. Output buffers must be fully bounded;
+ * input-only buffers are safe with addr-only checks.
+ */
+ { .lsb_idx = 1, .msb_idx = 0, .has_msb = true, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE }, /* signed_msg_addr */
+};
+
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_keygen_addr_fields[] = {
+ /*
+ * key @ data[1]: a plaintext private-key output buffer only when the
+ * KEY_GENERATION PLAINTEXT_KEY flag (bit 3 of the flags byte in the low
+ * 8 bits of data[8]) is set; otherwise it is an integer key identifier.
+ * Its length is priv_key_sz, the u16 in the high half of data[8].
+ */
+ { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = 8, .flag_mask = 0x00000008u, .is_addr_when_set = true,
+ .size_idx = 8, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* priv_key_addr */
+ /*
+ * pub_key_addr @ data[9]: always a DMA address. Its length is
+ * pub_key_sz, the u16 in the low half of data[2].
+ */
+ { .lsb_idx = 9, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* pub_key_addr */
+};
+
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_key_exchange_addr_fields[] = {
+ /*
+ * PSA_COMPLIANT key-exchange payload. key_management_handle is data[0]
+ * and flags/reserved is data[1]; the four buffer addresses that follow
+ * are each written unconditionally via set_phy_addr_to_words() (single
+ * LSB word, high half always zero), so all are always DMA addresses.
+ * Each address is immediately followed by its full u32 byte length.
+ */
+ { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 3, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* in_content_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 4, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* in_pub_buffer_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 6, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 7, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* user_fixed_info_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 8, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* output_addr */
+};
+
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_key_import_addr_fields[] = {
+ /*
+ * PSA_COMPLIANT key-import payload. key_management_handle is data[0]
+ * and flags/reserved is data[1]; the single input buffer address that
+ * follows is written unconditionally via set_phy_addr_to_words()
+ * (single LSB word, high half always zero), so it is always a DMA
+ * address. Its length is the full u32 input_size in data[3].
+ */
+ { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 3, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* input_address */
+};
+
+/* ELE_MAC_REQ: MAC one-go operation. */
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_mac_addr_fields[] = {
+ /* key: plaintext-key buffer only when the MAC PLAINTEXT_KEY flag is set */
+ { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = 5, .flag_mask = 0x00080000u, .is_addr_when_set = true,
+ .size_idx = 7, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* key_size */
+ { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* payload_address */
+ { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* mac_address */
+ { .lsb_idx = 8, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* context_address */
+};
+
+/* ELE_CIPHER_REQ: symmetric cipher one-go operation. */
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_cipher_addr_fields[] = {
+ /* key: plaintext-key buffer only when the CIPHER PLAINTEXT_KEY flag is set */
+ { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = 3, .flag_mask = 0x00080000u, .is_addr_when_set = true,
+ .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* key_size */
+ { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 3, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* iv_address */
+ { .lsb_idx = 5, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 7, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* input_address */
+ { .lsb_idx = 6, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 8, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* output_address */
+ { .lsb_idx = 10, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 11, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* context_address */
+};
+
+/*
+ * AEAD encrypt/decrypt legacy command (ELE_AUTH_ENC_REQ, 0x64).
+ * ELE API spec Table 287, word size = 0xD (header + 12 data words):
+ * data[0] = cipher_handle
+ * data[1] = key_identifier
+ * data[2] = IV LSB address
+ * data[3] = Reserved[31:24] | Flags[23:16] | IV_size[15:0]
+ * data[4] = algorithm
+ * data[5] = AAD LSB address
+ * data[6] = Reserved[31:16] | AAD_size[15:0]
+ * data[7] = Input LSB address
+ * data[8] = Output LSB address
+ * data[9] = Input size (u32)
+ * data[10] = Output size (u32)
+ * data[11] = CRC
+ * IV size is the 16-bit low half of data[3]; AAD size is the 16-bit low half
+ * of data[6]; input and output sizes are full u32 words.
+ */
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_auth_enc_addr_fields[] = {
+ /* iv_address (size[15:0] @ data[3]) */
+ { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 3, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu },
+ /* aad_address (size[15:0] @ data[6]) */
+ { .lsb_idx = 5, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 6, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu },
+ /* input_address (size[31:0] @ data[9]) */
+ { .lsb_idx = 7, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu },
+ /* output_address (size[31:0] @ data[10]) */
+ { .lsb_idx = 8, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 10, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu },
+};
+
+/* ELE_AUTH_ENC_NEW_REQ: AEAD encrypt/decrypt with internally-generated IV output. */
+#define ELE_AUTH_ENC_IV_OUT_SIZE 12 /* firmware always writes exactly 12 bytes */
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_auth_enc_new_addr_fields[] = {
+ /* iv_address_in length is packed in the high half of the iv-size word */
+ { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 2, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* iv_address_in */
+ /* iv_address_out has a fixed firmware-defined length, not carried in msg */
+ { .lsb_idx = 4, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE,
+ .buf_size = ELE_AUTH_ENC_IV_OUT_SIZE }, /* iv_address_out */
+ /* key: plaintext-key buffer only when the PLAINTEXT_KEY flag is set */
+ { .lsb_idx = 5, .flag_idx = 2, .flag_mask = 0x00000008u, .is_addr_when_set = true,
+ .size_idx = 7, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* key_size */
+ { .lsb_idx = 6, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 7, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* tag_address */
+ { .lsb_idx = 8, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* aad_address */
+ { .lsb_idx = 10, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 11, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* input_address */
+ { .lsb_idx = 12, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 13, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* output_address */
+ { .lsb_idx = 14, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 15, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* context_address */
+};
+
+/* ELE_SIGNATURE_GENERATE_REQ: digital signature generation. */
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_sign_gen_addr_fields[] = {
+ /* key: plaintext-key buffer only when GENERATE_SIGN PLAINTEXT_KEY is set */
+ { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = 5, .flag_mask = 0x00080000u, .is_addr_when_set = true,
+ .size_idx = 8, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* priv_key_size */
+ { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* message_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* signature_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 9, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 11, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* sm2_pub_key_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 10, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 11, .size_shift = 16,
+ .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* sm2_id / ml_dsa_ctx addr */
+};
+
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_pub_key_attest_addr_fields[] = {
+ /*
+ * PSA_COMPLIANT public-key-attestation payload. sig_gen_hdl is data[0],
+ * key_identifier data[1], key_attestation_id data[2], attest_algo
+ * data[3]. The two buffer addresses that follow are each written
+ * unconditionally via set_phy_addr_to_words() (single LSB word, high
+ * half always zero), so both are always DMA addresses. Each address is
+ * immediately followed by its full u32 byte length.
+ */
+ { .lsb_idx = 4, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* auth_challenge_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 6, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 7, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* certificate_addr */
+};
+
+/* ELE_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_REQ: digital signature verification. */
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_verify_sign_addr_fields[] = {
+ /* key: plaintext-key buffer unless the VERIFY_SIGN OPAQUE_KEY flag is set */
+ { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = 7, .flag_mask = 0x00000008u, .is_addr_when_set = false,
+ .size_idx = 5, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* key_size */
+ { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* msg_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* sig_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 10, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 11, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* sm2_id / ml_dsa_ctx addr */
+};
+
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_data_storage_addr_fields[] = {
+ /*
+ * PSA_COMPLIANT data-storage payload. data_storage_handle is data[0],
+ * flags/reserved is data[1], data_id is data[2]. data_address (data[3])
+ * is the plaintext data buffer, written unconditionally via
+ * set_phy_addr_to_words() (single LSB word, high half always zero), so
+ * it is always a DMA address. Its length is the full u32 data_size in
+ * data[4].
+ */
+ { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* data_address */
+};
+
+/* ELE_ASYMMETRIC_ENC_REQ: asymmetric encryption/decryption. */
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_asym_enc_addr_fields[] = {
+ /* key_id_addr: plaintext-key buffer only when the PLAINTEXT_KEY flag is set */
+ { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = 8, .flag_mask = 0x00000008u, .is_addr_when_set = true,
+ .size_idx = 10, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* input_plainkey_size */
+ { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* plaintext_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 6, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* ciphertext_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 4, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 7, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* label_addr */
+};
+
+/* ELE_KEY_GENERIC_CRYPTO_REQ: generic crypto operation with a raw key. */
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_key_generic_crypto_addr_fields[] = {
+ /* key_address length is the u8 key_size in the third byte of the iv-size word */
+ { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 3, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFu }, /* key_address */
+ { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 3, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* iv_address */
+ { .lsb_idx = 4, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* aad_address */
+ { .lsb_idx = 6, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 8, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* input_address */
+ { .lsb_idx = 7, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* output_address */
+};
+
+/* ELE_GC_CIPHER_REQ: GC symmetric cipher operation. */
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_gc_cipher_addr_fields[] = {
+ { .lsb_idx = 0, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* in_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* out_addr (shares data_size) */
+ { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* key_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 5, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 6, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* iv_addr */
+};
+
+/* ELE_GC_AEAD_REQ: GC AEAD operation. */
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_gc_aead_addr_fields[] = {
+ { .lsb_idx = 0, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* in_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* out_addr (shares data_size) */
+ { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* key_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 5, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 6, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* nonce_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 7, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 8, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* aad_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 9, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 10, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* tag_addr */
+};
+
+/* ELE_GC_ACRYPTO_REQ: GC asymmetric crypto operation. */
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_gc_acrypto_addr_fields[] = {
+ { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* data_buff1_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 4, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 6, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* data_buff2_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 7, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* key_buff1_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 8, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 9, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* key_buff2_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 12, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 13, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* rsa_label_addr */
+};
+
+/* ELE_GC_AKEY_GEN_REQ: GC asymmetric key generation. */
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_gc_akey_gen_addr_fields[] = {
+ { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* modulus_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 4, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* priv_buff_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* pub_buff_addr */
+};
+
+/* ELE_HASH_ONE_GO_REQ: hash one-go operation. */
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_hash_one_go_addr_fields[] = {
+ { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 6, .size_shift = 16, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* ctx_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 4, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* input_addr */
+ { .lsb_idx = 3, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 5, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* output_addr */
+};
+
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_enc_data_storage_addr_fields[] = {
+ /*
+ * PSA_COMPLIANT encrypted-data-storage payload. data_storage_handle is
+ * data[0] and data_id is data[1]. data_address (data[2]) is written
+ * unconditionally via set_phy_addr_to_words() (single LSB word, high
+ * half always zero), so it is always a DMA address; its length is the
+ * full u32 data_size in data[3]. iv_address (data[8]) is only written
+ * when an IV is supplied and is left zero otherwise, so it is an
+ * optional always-address handled by the zero-address skip; its length
+ * is the u16 iv_size in the low half of data[9].
+ */
+ { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 3, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* data_address */
+ { .lsb_idx = 8, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 9, .size_mask = 0xFFFFu }, /* iv_address */
+};
+
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_rng_get_random_addr_fields[] = {
+ /*
+ * PSA_COMPLIANT get-random payload. reserved/flags is data[0]; rnd_addr
+ * (data[1]) is the output buffer, written unconditionally via
+ * set_phy_addr_to_words() (single LSB word, high half always zero), so
+ * it is always a DMA address. Its length is the full u32 rnd_size in
+ * data[2].
+ */
+ { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* rnd_addr */
+};
+
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_storage_master_import_addr_fields[] = {
+ /*
+ * Storage master-import command (ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_IMPORT_REQ).
+ * Payload layout (data[] = message word minus header word 0):
+ * data[0] = storage_handle
+ * data[1] = key_store_address (LSB; high half always zero)
+ * data[2] = key_store_size
+ * The address is set unconditionally via set_phy_addr_to_words() and
+ * its length is the full u32 key_store_size.
+ */
+ { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 2, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* key_store_address */
+};
+
+const struct se_cmd_addr_field *ele_fw_cmd_addr_fields(u8 cmd, size_t *count)
+{
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case ELE_PUB_KEY_EXPORT_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_pub_key_export_addr_fields);
+ return ele_pub_key_export_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_KEYSTORE_REPROV_ENABLE_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_keystore_reprov_en_addr_fields);
+ return ele_keystore_reprov_en_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_KEYGEN_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_keygen_addr_fields);
+ return ele_keygen_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_KEY_EXCHANGE_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_key_exchange_addr_fields);
+ return ele_key_exchange_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_KEY_IMPORT_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_key_import_addr_fields);
+ return ele_key_import_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_MAC_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_mac_addr_fields);
+ return ele_mac_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_CIPHER_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_cipher_addr_fields);
+ return ele_cipher_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_AUTH_ENC_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_auth_enc_addr_fields);
+ return ele_auth_enc_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_AUTH_ENC_NEW_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_auth_enc_new_addr_fields);
+ return ele_auth_enc_new_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_SIGNATURE_GENERATE_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_sign_gen_addr_fields);
+ return ele_sign_gen_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_PUB_KEY_ATTEST_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_pub_key_attest_addr_fields);
+ return ele_pub_key_attest_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_verify_sign_addr_fields);
+ return ele_verify_sign_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_DATA_STORAGE_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_data_storage_addr_fields);
+ return ele_data_storage_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_ENC_DATA_STORAGE_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_enc_data_storage_addr_fields);
+ return ele_enc_data_storage_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_ASYMMETRIC_ENC_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_asym_enc_addr_fields);
+ return ele_asym_enc_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_KEY_GENERIC_CRYPTO_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_key_generic_crypto_addr_fields);
+ return ele_key_generic_crypto_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_GC_CIPHER_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_gc_cipher_addr_fields);
+ return ele_gc_cipher_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_GC_AEAD_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_gc_aead_addr_fields);
+ return ele_gc_aead_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_GC_ACRYPTO_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_gc_acrypto_addr_fields);
+ return ele_gc_acrypto_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_GC_AKEY_GEN_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_gc_akey_gen_addr_fields);
+ return ele_gc_akey_gen_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_HASH_ONE_GO_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_hash_one_go_addr_fields);
+ return ele_hash_one_go_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_RNG_GET_RANDOM_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_rng_get_random_addr_fields);
+ return ele_rng_get_random_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_IMPORT_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_storage_master_import_addr_fields);
+ return ele_storage_master_import_addr_fields;
+ default:
+ *count = 0;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * FW API for Command Receiver.
+ *
+ * Storage master-export response (ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_EXPORT_REQ).
+ * The cmd_receiver sends this response to firmware to supply the
+ * output buffer address. Payload layout:
+ * data[0] = storage_handle
+ * data[1] = rsp_code
+ * data[2] = key_store_export_address (LSB; high half always zero)
+ * No length word is present in the response itself; the export size is
+ * taken from the FW command received earlier (key_store_size). The size
+ * is stored in buf_size and used as a literal byte count by
+ * se_val_cmd_addrs() when size_idx == SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE and buf_size
+ * is non-zero. ele_set_sz_in_field_addr() writes it before the response
+ * is validated.
+ */
+static struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_storage_master_export_addr_fields[] = {
+ { .lsb_idx = 2, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE, .buf_size = 0 }, /* key_store_export_address */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Storage chunk-get response (ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_GET_REQ).
+ * The cmd_receiver fills in the chunk buffer address and its size so
+ * firmware can DMA the chunk data into the kernel's coherent buffer.
+ * Payload layout:
+ * data[0] = chunk_size
+ * data[1] = chunk_addr (LSB; high half always zero)
+ * data[2] = rsp_code
+ * The size word precedes the address in the message.
+ */
+static const struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_storage_chunk_get_addr_fields[] = {
+ { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = 0, .size_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFu }, /* chunk_addr */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Storage chunk-export response (ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_EXPORT_REQ).
+ * The cmd_receiver supplies the output buffer address. Payload layout:
+ * data[0] = rsp_code
+ * data[1] = chunk_export_address (LSB; high half always zero)
+ * No length word is present in the response itself; the export size is
+ * taken from the FW command received earlier (chunk_size). The size
+ * is stored in buf_size and used as a literal byte count by
+ * se_val_cmd_addrs() when size_idx == SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE and buf_size
+ * is non-zero. ele_set_sz_in_field_addr() writes it before the response
+ * is validated.
+ */
+static struct se_cmd_addr_field ele_storage_chunk_export_addr_fields[] = {
+ { .lsb_idx = 1, .flag_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_ALWAYS,
+ .size_idx = SE_CMD_ADDR_NO_SIZE, .buf_size = 0 }, /* chunk_export_address */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Record the export buffer size from the FW command into buf_size so
+ * se_val_cmd_addrs() can range-check the full response buffer. Called from
+ * fw_api_specific_ops() when the cmd_receiver reads the FW command.
+ */
+void ele_set_sz_in_field_addr(u8 cmd, u32 size)
+{
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_EXPORT_REQ:
+ ele_storage_master_export_addr_fields[0].buf_size = size;
+ break;
+ case ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_EXPORT_REQ:
+ ele_storage_chunk_export_addr_fields[0].buf_size = size;
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the address-field descriptor table for a cmd_receiver response
+ * message (rsp_tag), or NULL when the response embeds no DMA addresses.
+ * count is set to the number of entries. Only the three storage responses
+ * that supply a kernel buffer address to firmware are covered here;
+ * ELE_STORAGE_EXPORT_FINISH_REQ, ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_GET_DONE_REQ, and
+ * ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_DELETE_REQ carry no DMA addresses and return NULL.
+ */
+const struct se_cmd_addr_field *ele_fw_rsp_addr_fields(u8 cmd, size_t *count)
+{
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case ELE_STORAGE_MASTER_EXPORT_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_storage_master_export_addr_fields);
+ return ele_storage_master_export_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_GET_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_storage_chunk_get_addr_fields);
+ return ele_storage_chunk_get_addr_fields;
+ case ELE_STORAGE_CHUNK_EXPORT_REQ:
+ *count = ARRAY_SIZE(ele_storage_chunk_export_addr_fields);
+ return ele_storage_chunk_export_addr_fields;
+ default:
+ *count = 0;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c
index a8974eef190b..56a4e53be37b 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/bitfield.h>
+#include <linux/cleanup.h>
#include <linux/completion.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/dev_printk.h>
@@ -15,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/genalloc.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/of_platform.h>
@@ -23,22 +25,21 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/sys_soc.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/se_ioctl.h>
#include "ele_base_msg.h"
#include "ele_common.h"
+#include "ele_fw_api.h"
#include "se_ctrl.h"
+/* Maximum response buffer size in bytes for debug-dump replies. */
+#define MAX_ALLOWED_RX_MSG_SZ ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_RSP_SZ
+#define MAX_ALLOWED_TX_MSG_SZ SZ_4K
+
#define MAX_SOC_INFO_DATA_SZ 256
#define MBOX_TX_NAME "tx"
#define MBOX_RX_NAME "rx"
-#define SE_TYPE_STR_DBG "dbg"
-#define SE_TYPE_STR_HSM "hsm"
-
-#define SE_TYPE_ID_DBG 0x1
-
-#define SE_TYPE_ID_HSM 0x2
-
struct se_soc_dev_regn {
bool soc_dev_registered;
struct soc_device *soc_dev;
@@ -133,6 +134,13 @@ char *get_se_if_name(u8 se_if_id)
return "unknown";
}
+static u32 get_se_soc_id(struct se_if_priv *priv)
+{
+ const struct se_if_node *if_node = device_get_match_data(priv->dev);
+
+ return if_node->se_info->soc_id;
+}
+
static struct se_fw_load_info *get_load_fw_instance(struct se_if_priv *priv)
{
return &priv->load_fw;
@@ -284,11 +292,319 @@ static int get_se_soc_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, const struct se_soc_info *se
return 0;
}
+static int load_firmware(struct se_if_priv *priv, const u8 *se_img_file_to_load)
+{
+ const struct firmware *fw = NULL;
+ dma_addr_t se_fw_dma_addr;
+ u32 se_fw_buf_len;
+ void *se_fw_buf;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!se_img_file_to_load) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "FW image is not provided.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ ret = request_firmware(&fw, se_img_file_to_load, priv->dev);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (fw->size > U32_MAX) {
+ ret = -EFBIG;
+ release_firmware(fw);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ dev_info(priv->dev, "loading firmware %s.", se_img_file_to_load);
+
+ /*
+ * Serialize access to priv_dev_ctx shared memory to prevent pos
+ * corruption if two driver-internal callers run concurrently (e.g.
+ * ele_get_info() racing with load_firmware()).
+ */
+ scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->priv_dev_ctx->fops_lock) {
+ se_fw_buf_len = fw->size;
+ ret = get_shared_mem_slot(priv->priv_dev_ctx,
+ &se_fw_buf_len, &se_fw_dma_addr,
+ &se_fw_buf);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to allocate firmware shared buffer: %d\n",
+ ret);
+ release_firmware(fw);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(se_fw_buf, fw->data, fw->size);
+ ret = ele_fw_authenticate(priv, se_fw_dma_addr, se_fw_dma_addr);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev,
+ "Error %pe: Authenticate & load SE firmware %s.",
+ ERR_PTR(ret), se_img_file_to_load);
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ }
+ if (!se_is_fw_busy_ctx(priv->priv_dev_ctx))
+ se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(priv->priv_dev_ctx);
+ }
+
+ release_firmware(fw);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int se_load_firmware(struct se_if_priv *priv)
+{
+ struct se_fw_load_info *load_fw = get_load_fw_instance(priv);
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ guard(mutex)(&load_fw->load_fw_lock);
+ if (!load_fw->is_fw_tobe_loaded)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (load_fw->imem.state == ELE_IMEM_STATE_BAD) {
+ ret = load_firmware(priv, load_fw->se_fw_img_nm->prim_fw_nm_in_rfs);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to load boot firmware.");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = load_firmware(priv, load_fw->se_fw_img_nm->seco_fw_nm_in_rfs);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to load runtime firmware.");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ load_fw->is_fw_tobe_loaded = false;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int init_se_shared_mem(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
+{
+ struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_out);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_in);
+
+ if (priv->mem_pool)
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&se_shared_mem_mgmt->mem_pool_buf_list);
+
+ se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.ptr =
+ dma_alloc_coherent(priv->dev, MAX_DATA_SIZE_PER_USER,
+ &se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.dma_addr,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.ptr)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.size = MAX_DATA_SIZE_PER_USER;
+ se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.pos = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void cleanup_se_shared_mem(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, bool reclaim)
+{
+ struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+ bool free_dma_buf;
+
+ /*
+ * mem_pool_buf_list is only initialised for interfaces that own a
+ * gen_pool (priv->mem_pool != NULL). On interfaces without a pool
+ * (e.g. imx93, which has no pool_name) the list head is left
+ * zero-filled, so se_cleanup_mem_pool_buf() must not walk it here or
+ * list_for_each_entry_safe() would dereference a NULL head and panic
+ * the kernel on close/teardown. Skip the pool cleanup entirely when
+ * there is no pool; there is nothing to reclaim in that case.
+ */
+ if (priv->mem_pool)
+ se_cleanup_mem_pool_buf(dev_ctx, reclaim);
+
+ /* Guard against being called before shared memory was ever allocated
+ * (e.g. probe failure before dma_alloc_coherent succeeded).
+ */
+ if (!se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.ptr)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Decide whether the DMA buffer can be released before touching the
+ * pending lists. se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup() resets
+ * non_secure_mem.pos, so the "nothing staged" test must be sampled
+ * here first. When reclaim is false the buffer is released only if no
+ * data is still staged for the firmware; otherwise the enclave may
+ * still be DMA-ing into it and the buffer is deliberately leaked to
+ * avoid a DMA-after-free.
+ */
+ free_dma_buf = reclaim || !se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.pos;
+
+ /*
+ * Free any se_buf_desc items that were never consumed (e.g. when the
+ * fd is closed while pending I/O buffers are still listed). This must
+ * happen before the DMA backing memory is released to avoid a leak.
+ */
+ se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(dev_ctx);
+
+ if (free_dma_buf) {
+ dma_free_coherent(priv->dev, MAX_DATA_SIZE_PER_USER,
+ se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.ptr,
+ se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.dma_addr);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Drop the host-side tracking unconditionally. On the reclaim path the
+ * buffer has been freed. On the deliberate-leak path the buffer is
+ * abandoned on purpose, so clearing the pointer here guarantees a later
+ * cleanup pass (e.g. se_if_priv_release()) cannot double-free it.
+ */
+ se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.ptr = NULL;
+ se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.dma_addr = 0;
+ se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.size = 0;
+ se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.pos = 0;
+}
+
+static int se_dev_ctx_cpy_out_data(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
+{
+ struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+ struct se_buf_desc *b_desc, *temp;
+ bool do_cpy = true;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(b_desc, temp, &se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_out, link) {
+ if (b_desc->usr_buf_ptr && b_desc->shared_buf_ptr && do_cpy) {
+ dev_dbg(priv->dev, "Copying output data to user.");
+ if (do_cpy && copy_to_user(b_desc->usr_buf_ptr,
+ b_desc->shared_buf_ptr,
+ b_desc->size)) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Failure copying output data to user.");
+ do_cpy = false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (b_desc->shared_buf_ptr)
+ memset(b_desc->shared_buf_ptr, 0, b_desc->size);
+
+ list_del(&b_desc->link);
+ kfree(b_desc);
+ }
+
+ return do_cpy ? 0 : -EFAULT;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clean the used Shared Memory space,
+ * whether its Input Data copied from user buffers, or
+ * Data received from FW.
+ */
+void se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
+{
+ struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt;
+ struct list_head *pending_lists[] = {&se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_in,
+ &se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_out};
+ struct se_buf_desc *b_desc, *temp;
+ bool is_fw_busy_dev_ctx;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * If this context is the one that caused a firmware timeout the shared
+ * DMA buffers may still be actively read/written by the firmware.
+ */
+ is_fw_busy_dev_ctx = se_is_fw_busy_ctx(dev_ctx);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pending_lists); i++) {
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(b_desc, temp, pending_lists[i], link) {
+ if (!is_fw_busy_dev_ctx && b_desc->shared_buf_ptr)
+ memset(b_desc->shared_buf_ptr, 0, b_desc->size);
+
+ list_del(&b_desc->link);
+ kfree(b_desc);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Keep non_secure_mem.pos non-zero while this context still owns an
+ * outstanding firmware transaction. A non-zero pos is the marker that
+ * data is still staged for the enclave, which cleanup_se_shared_mem()
+ * uses to decide the buffer must be leaked rather than freed. Resetting
+ * it here would let a later teardown pass free a buffer the enclave may
+ * still be DMA-ing into.
+ */
+ if (!is_fw_busy_dev_ctx)
+ se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.pos = 0;
+}
+
+static struct se_buf_desc *add_b_desc_to_pending_list(void *shared_ptr_with_pos,
+ struct se_ioctl_setup_iobuf *io,
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
+{
+ struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt;
+ struct se_buf_desc *b_desc = NULL;
+
+ b_desc = kzalloc_obj(*b_desc, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!b_desc)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ b_desc->shared_buf_ptr = shared_ptr_with_pos;
+ b_desc->usr_buf_ptr = u64_to_user_ptr(io->user_buf);
+ b_desc->size = io->length;
+
+ if (io->flags & SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_INPUT) {
+ /*
+ * buffer is input:
+ * add an entry in the "pending input buffers" list so
+ * that copied data can be cleaned from shared memory
+ * later.
+ */
+ list_add_tail(&b_desc->link, &se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_in);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * buffer is output:
+ * add an entry in the "pending out buffers" list so data
+ * can be copied to user space when receiving Secure-Enclave
+ * response.
+ */
+ list_add_tail(&b_desc->link, &se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_out);
+ }
+
+ return b_desc;
+}
+
+static void se_if_open_gate_release(struct kref *kref)
+{
+ struct se_if_open_gate *gate =
+ container_of(kref, struct se_if_open_gate, refcount);
+
+ kfree(gate);
+}
+
+static bool se_if_open_gate_get(struct se_if_open_gate *gate)
+{
+ if (!gate)
+ return false;
+
+ return kref_get_unless_zero(&gate->refcount);
+}
+
+static void se_if_open_gate_put(struct se_if_open_gate *gate)
+{
+ if (gate)
+ kref_put(&gate->refcount, se_if_open_gate_release);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Distinct lockdep class for the internal priv_dev_ctx fops_lock. Taking it
+ * while an open context's fops_lock is held (for example a firmware load
+ * triggered from an ioctl) is valid hierarchical locking, but shares the same
+ * class as the per-open fops_lock and would otherwise be misreported as
+ * recursive locking by lockdep.
+ */
+static struct lock_class_key se_priv_ctx_fops_key;
+
static int init_misc_device_context(struct se_if_priv *priv, int ch_id,
- struct se_if_device_ctx **new_dev_ctx)
+ struct se_if_device_ctx **new_dev_ctx,
+ const struct file_operations *se_if_fops)
{
const char *err_str = "Failed to allocate memory";
struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx;
+ struct se_if_open_gate *gate = NULL;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
dev_ctx = kzalloc_obj(*dev_ctx, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -296,19 +612,57 @@ static int init_misc_device_context(struct se_if_priv *priv, int ch_id,
if (!dev_ctx)
return ret;
+ dev_ctx->priv = priv;
dev_ctx->devname = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s0_ch%d",
get_se_if_name(priv->if_defs->se_if_type),
ch_id);
if (!dev_ctx->devname)
goto exit;
- dev_ctx->priv = priv;
+ mutex_init(&dev_ctx->fops_lock);
+ lockdep_set_class(&dev_ctx->fops_lock, &se_priv_ctx_fops_key);
+
+ kref_init(&dev_ctx->refcount);
+ dev_ctx->cleanup_done = false;
*new_dev_ctx = dev_ctx;
+ set_se_rcv_msg_timeout(dev_ctx, SE_RCV_MSG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS);
+
+ ret = init_se_shared_mem(dev_ctx);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto exit;
+
+ gate = kzalloc_obj(*gate, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!gate) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ mutex_init(&gate->lock);
+ kref_init(&gate->refcount); /* device-owned reference */
+ gate->priv = priv;
+ gate->dying = false;
+ priv->open_gate = gate;
+
+ /*
+ * The miscdevice storage is now owned by the open gate object.
+ * priv->priv_dev_ctx still keeps a pointer to that miscdevice.
+ */
+ dev_ctx->miscdev = &gate->miscdev;
+
+ dev_ctx->miscdev->name = dev_ctx->devname;
+ dev_ctx->miscdev->minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR;
+ dev_ctx->miscdev->fops = se_if_fops;
+ dev_ctx->miscdev->parent = priv->dev;
return 0;
exit:
*new_dev_ctx = NULL;
+ if (gate) {
+ priv->open_gate = NULL;
+ se_if_open_gate_put(gate);
+ }
+ cleanup_se_shared_mem(dev_ctx, true);
kfree(dev_ctx->devname);
kfree(dev_ctx);
return dev_err_probe(priv->dev, ret, "%s", err_str);
@@ -329,9 +683,25 @@ static int se_if_request_channel(struct device *dev, struct mbox_chan **chan,
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Forward declarations. se_if_probe_cleanup() and se_if_probe() are kept
+ * together as the teardown/probe pair, but several helpers, the file
+ * operations table and the firmware-busy work handler they reference are
+ * defined further down in this file.
+ */
+static void dlink_dev_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx);
+static void cleanup_dev_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, bool is_fclose);
+static void se_clear_fw_busy(struct se_if_priv *priv);
+static void se_if_dev_ctx_release(struct kref *kref);
+static void se_if_priv_release(struct kref *kref);
+static int se_if_misc_register(struct se_if_priv *priv);
+static void se_fw_busy_work(struct work_struct *work);
+static const struct file_operations se_if_fops;
+
static void se_if_probe_cleanup(void *plat_dev)
{
struct platform_device *pdev = plat_dev;
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx;
struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
struct se_if_priv *priv;
@@ -339,31 +709,148 @@ static void se_if_probe_cleanup(void *plat_dev)
if (!priv)
return;
+ /*
+ * Announce teardown, then wake any in-flight waiter. going_away makes
+ * ele_msg_send_rcv() bail out instead of arming a new transaction and
+ * lets ele_msg_rcv() tell a teardown-forced completion apart from a
+ * real response; it must be set before complete_all().
+ *
+ * Set it under clbk_rx_lock, not se_if_cmd_lock: se_if_cmd_lock is held
+ * across the whole blocking transaction, so taking it here would stall
+ * unbind for a full receive-timeout. clbk_rx_lock is the short spinlock
+ * ele_msg_send_rcv() holds while arming, so this closes the lost-wakeup
+ * window - the sender either sees going_away and bails before arming, or
+ * armed first and this store (and complete_all()) is ordered after its
+ * reinit_completion() - and supplies the ordering the relaxed atomics do
+ * not.
+ */
+ scoped_guard(spinlock_irqsave, &priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock)
+ atomic_set(&priv->going_away, 1);
+ /*
+ * Wake the waiter before iterating the device-context list. It sleeps on
+ * this completion holding dev_ctx->fops_lock, which cleanup_dev_ctx()
+ * below also takes, so completing first avoids an unbind hang. Runs
+ * outside clbk_rx_lock; the going_away store above already orders it
+ * against the arming path.
+ */
+ complete_all(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.done);
+
+ /*
+ * Mark the private device context as cleanup_done first.
+ * This prevents new device contexts from being created in open().
+ */
+ if (priv->priv_dev_ctx) {
+ /*
+ * Mark cleanup_done under fops_lock so that se_if_fops_open(),
+ * which checks cleanup_done while holding fops_lock, cannot
+ * race past this and add a new device context after teardown.
+ */
+ scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->priv_dev_ctx->fops_lock)
+ priv->priv_dev_ctx->cleanup_done = true;
+
+ if (priv->open_gate) {
+ scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->open_gate->lock) {
+ priv->open_gate->dying = true;
+ priv->open_gate->priv = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * misc_register() is deferred to the end of probe, so the
+ * device may have a miscdev set up but never registered if
+ * probe failed before se_if_misc_register(). Only deregister
+ * when registration actually succeeded.
+ */
+ if (priv->open_gate && priv->open_gate->registered &&
+ priv->priv_dev_ctx->miscdev)
+ misc_deregister(priv->priv_dev_ctx->miscdev);
+ }
+
+ while (true) {
+ dev_ctx = NULL;
+
+ scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock) {
+ if (list_empty(&priv->dev_ctx_list))
+ goto out_done;
+
+ dev_ctx = list_first_entry(&priv->dev_ctx_list,
+ struct se_if_device_ctx, link);
+
+ /* pin this context so close() cannot free it under us */
+ kref_get(&dev_ctx->refcount);
+ dlink_dev_ctx(dev_ctx);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Local cleanup outside the global lock avoids ABBA deadlock
+ * with paths that already take dev_ctx->fops_lock first.
+ */
+ cleanup_dev_ctx(dev_ctx, false);
+ kref_put(&dev_ctx->refcount, se_if_dev_ctx_release);
+ }
+out_done:
+
+ /*
+ * Drain any in-flight synchronous sender before releasing the mailbox
+ * channels. ele_msg_send_rcv() holds se_if_cmd_lock across the entire
+ * transaction, including ele_msg_send()'s mbox_send_message() on
+ * priv->tx_chan. going_away is checked and the transaction armed under
+ * clbk_rx_lock, but the mbox_send_message() itself runs after that
+ * spinlock is dropped, so a sender that passed the going_away check
+ * just before teardown set it could still be about to touch tx_chan
+ * when we free it here - a use-after-free in the mailbox layer.
+ *
+ * Acquire and immediately release se_if_cmd_lock as a barrier: it waits
+ * for such a sender to finish its transaction and drop the lock. This
+ * cannot stall unbind for a full receive timeout - going_away is
+ * already set and complete_all() has already woken any waiter, so an
+ * in-flight transaction only unwinds to -ENODEV before releasing the
+ * lock. It also cannot deadlock: the dev_ctx_list loop above has
+ * finished (teardown holds no se_if_cmd_lock of its own here) and a
+ * racing userspace close, which takes fops_lock then se_if_cmd_lock,
+ * bails out of ele_msg_send_rcv() with -ENODEV without waiting. After
+ * this barrier no sender can enter or remain inside mbox_send_message(),
+ * so freeing the channels below cannot race it.
+ */
+ scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->se_if_cmd_lock) {
+ ;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Free the rx mailbox channel before cancelling fw_busy_work.
+ * se_if_rx_callback() runs from the rx channel and can schedule
+ * fw_busy_work when a late response arrives. If the channel were still
+ * live after cancel_work_sync(), a callback could re-arm the work and
+ * later dereference priv after it has been freed. Releasing the rx
+ * channel first guarantees no further callbacks, so the subsequent
+ * cancel_work_sync() is final.
+ */
if (priv->rx_chan)
mbox_free_channel(priv->rx_chan);
if (priv->tx_chan)
mbox_free_channel(priv->tx_chan);
/*
- * Being device managed buffer, no need to free the buffer allocated
- * in se probe to store encrypted IMEM.
+ * A timed-out synchronous command may have retained a dev_ctx through
+ * priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx even after the fd was closed and the context was
+ * removed from dev_ctx_list. If no late response arrived, release that
+ * retained context during driver teardown.
+ *
+ * se_clear_fw_busy() is idempotent and internally checks
+ * priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx under fw_busy_lock.
*/
+ se_clear_fw_busy(priv);
+ cancel_work_sync(&priv->fw_busy_work);
/*
- * No need to check, if reserved memory is allocated
- * before calling for its release. Or clearing the
- * un-set bit.
+ * Being device managed buffer, no need to free the buffer allocated
+ * in se probe to store encrypted IMEM.
*/
- of_reserved_mem_device_release(dev);
dev_set_drvdata(dev, NULL);
- if (priv->priv_dev_ctx) {
- kfree(priv->priv_dev_ctx->devname);
- kfree(priv->priv_dev_ctx);
- }
-
- kfree(priv);
+ /* Drop the initial reference - priv will be freed when last fd closes */
+ kref_put(&priv->refcount, se_if_priv_release);
}
static int se_if_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
@@ -386,15 +873,30 @@ static int se_if_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
return -ENOMEM;
priv->dev = dev;
+ /*
+ * Pin the parent device for the lifetime of priv. A file descriptor may
+ * stay open after the device is unbound; close() then still passes
+ * priv->dev to dma_free_coherent()/dev_warn(). Without this reference
+ * the struct device could be freed while priv->dev still points at it,
+ * so the reference is dropped in se_if_priv_release() via put_device().
+ */
+ get_device(priv->dev);
+ kref_init(&priv->refcount);
priv->if_defs = &if_node->if_defs;
dev_set_drvdata(dev, priv);
mutex_init(&priv->se_if_cmd_lock);
+ mutex_init(&priv->modify_lock);
spin_lock_init(&priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock);
spin_lock_init(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock);
atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 0);
+ spin_lock_init(&priv->fw_busy_lock);
+ priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx = NULL;
+ INIT_WORK(&priv->fw_busy_work, se_fw_busy_work);
+
init_completion(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.done);
init_completion(&priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.done);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&priv->dev_ctx_list);
ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(dev, se_if_probe_cleanup, pdev);
if (ret)
@@ -460,7 +962,7 @@ static int se_if_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
load_fw->imem_mgmt = true;
}
- ret = init_misc_device_context(priv, 0, &priv->priv_dev_ctx);
+ ret = init_misc_device_context(priv, 0, &priv->priv_dev_ctx, &se_if_fops);
if (ret)
return dev_err_probe(dev, ret,
"Failed[0x%x] to create device contexts.",
@@ -472,12 +974,1148 @@ static int se_if_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
return dev_err_probe(dev, ret, "Failed to fetch SoC Info.");
}
+ /*
+ * All probe-time initialization is complete; expose the
+ * interface to userspace last so that an open()/ioctl cannot
+ * race against a not-yet-initialized device.
+ */
+ ret = se_if_misc_register(priv);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
dev_info(dev, "i.MX secure-enclave: %s0 interface to firmware, configured.",
get_se_if_name(priv->if_defs->se_if_type));
return ret;
}
+/*
+ * Expose the interface to userspace. Deferred until the end of probe so
+ * the device node only becomes openable after SoC info has been fetched
+ * and, on SoCs with IMEM management, the encrypted-IMEM buffer has been
+ * allocated. This prevents userspace from opening the node and issuing
+ * commands against a partially initialized interface.
+ */
+static int se_if_misc_register(struct se_if_priv *priv)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = misc_register(priv->priv_dev_ctx->miscdev);
+ if (ret)
+ return dev_err_probe(priv->dev, ret,
+ "Failed to register misc device.");
+
+ priv->open_gate->registered = true;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void se_if_priv_release(struct kref *kref)
+{
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = container_of(kref, struct se_if_priv, refcount);
+
+ /* Free priv_dev_ctx if it exists */
+ if (priv->priv_dev_ctx) {
+ /*
+ * miscdev storage belongs to open_gate, not directly to
+ * priv_dev_ctx. The gate should already have been detached
+ * from priv during teardown.
+ *
+ * Reclaim the internal context's shared memory directly here
+ * instead of through cleanup_dev_ctx(). Teardown already set
+ * cleanup_done on priv_dev_ctx, so cleanup_dev_ctx() would
+ * short-circuit and leak the host descriptors and the coherent
+ * buffer. By this point the device is fully unbound; if this
+ * context ever armed the firmware-busy breaker, se_clear_fw_busy()
+ * has already run with reclaim=false and freed the host
+ * descriptors, emptied the pool list and cleared
+ * non_secure_mem.ptr. A reclaim=true pass here is therefore both
+ * safe and idempotent: it releases the buffers for a normal
+ * context and is a no-op for the abandoned firmware-busy one.
+ */
+ scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->priv_dev_ctx->fops_lock)
+ cleanup_se_shared_mem(priv->priv_dev_ctx, true);
+
+ kfree(priv->priv_dev_ctx->devname);
+ kfree(priv->priv_dev_ctx);
+ priv->priv_dev_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ /*
+ * No need to check, if reserved memory is allocated
+ * before calling for its release. Or clearing the
+ * un-set bit.
+ */
+ of_reserved_mem_device_release(priv->dev);
+
+ /*
+ * Be defensive: if teardown did not already drop the device-owned
+ * gate reference for some reason, release it here.
+ */
+ if (priv->open_gate) {
+ se_if_open_gate_put(priv->open_gate);
+ priv->open_gate = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Drop the reference on priv->dev taken in se_if_probe(). The device was
+ * pinned so that a file descriptor closed after device unbind can still
+ * safely pass priv->dev to dma_free_coherent()/dev_warn().
+ */
+ put_device(priv->dev);
+
+ /* Free any remaining resources that weren't devm-managed */
+ kfree(priv);
+}
+
+static void se_if_dev_ctx_release(struct kref *kref)
+{
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx =
+ container_of(kref, struct se_if_device_ctx, refcount);
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+
+ kfree(dev_ctx);
+
+ /* drop the priv reference owned by this device context */
+ kref_put(&priv->refcount, se_if_priv_release);
+}
+
+static void se_clear_fw_busy(struct se_if_priv *priv)
+{
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx = NULL;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->fw_busy_lock, flags);
+ dev_ctx = priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx;
+ priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx = NULL;
+ atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 0);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->fw_busy_lock, flags);
+
+ if (!dev_ctx)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * The circuit breaker is cleared from two places, which need opposite
+ * memory-reclaim policies:
+ *
+ * 1. se_fw_busy_work(): a late firmware response actually arrived.
+ * going_away is not set and the enclave has finished with the
+ * buffer, so a full reclaim (reclaim=true) is safe. Only do this
+ * once the owning fd has been closed (cleanup_done); while the fd
+ * is still open the buffer belongs to that context and is released
+ * on its normal close path.
+ *
+ * 2. se_if_probe_cleanup(): teardown. going_away is set and no
+ * response has been confirmed, so the enclave may still be
+ * DMA-writing into the shared buffer. Freeing it here would be a
+ * DMA-after-free. Pass reclaim=false so cleanup_se_shared_mem()
+ * frees only the host-side descriptors and deliberately leaks the
+ * DMA buffer that the enclave might still touch.
+ */
+ scoped_guard(mutex, &dev_ctx->fops_lock) {
+ if (atomic_read(&priv->going_away)) {
+ /*
+ * Fatal, but deliberately non-panic: the enclave is
+ * unresponsive at unbind with a transaction still in
+ * flight. Both the coherent staging buffer and any
+ * gen_pool buffers this context owns are abandoned
+ * (host descriptors freed, DMA-visible memory leaked)
+ * to avoid a DMA-after-free while the enclave may still
+ * be writing. Emit one headline error here rather than
+ * per-buffer so the count of faulted contexts is clear.
+ * Do not use WARN/BUG: this path is recoverable and
+ * panic_on_warn kernels must not be brought down by it.
+ */
+ dev_err(priv->dev,
+ "%s: FATAL: enclave stuck at unbind, DMA leaked.\n",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ cleanup_se_shared_mem(dev_ctx, false);
+ } else if (dev_ctx->cleanup_done) {
+ cleanup_se_shared_mem(dev_ctx, true);
+ }
+ }
+
+ kref_put(&dev_ctx->refcount, se_if_dev_ctx_release);
+}
+
+void unset_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
+{
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+ struct se_api_msg *old_rx_msg = NULL;
+ struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ lockdep_assert_held(&priv->modify_lock);
+
+ se_clbk_hdl = &priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl;
+
+ if (se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx == dev_ctx) {
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+ old_rx_msg = se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg;
+ se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx = NULL;
+ se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg = NULL;
+ se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz = 0;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+
+ kfree(old_rx_msg);
+ complete_all(&se_clbk_hdl->done);
+ }
+}
+
+int set_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
+{
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+ struct se_api_msg *new_rx_msg = NULL;
+ struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ se_clbk_hdl = &priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl;
+ guard(mutex)(&priv->modify_lock);
+ if (se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx == dev_ctx)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ if (!se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg) {
+ new_rx_msg = kzalloc(MAX_NVM_MSG_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!new_rx_msg)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+ if (new_rx_msg)
+ se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg = new_rx_msg;
+ reinit_completion(&se_clbk_hdl->done);
+ se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz = MAX_NVM_MSG_LEN;
+ se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx = dev_ctx;
+ dev_ctx->rcv_msg_timeout_jiffies = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void dlink_dev_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
+{
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+
+ unset_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(dev_ctx);
+
+ if (!list_empty(&dev_ctx->link)) {
+ list_del_init(&dev_ctx->link);
+ priv->active_devctx_count--;
+ }
+}
+
+bool se_is_fw_busy_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
+{
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ bool match;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->fw_busy_lock, flags);
+ match = priv->fw_busy_dev_ctx == dev_ctx;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->fw_busy_lock, flags);
+
+ return match;
+}
+
+static void cleanup_dev_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, bool is_fclose)
+{
+ bool already_done;
+
+ scoped_guard(mutex, &dev_ctx->fops_lock) {
+ already_done = dev_ctx->cleanup_done;
+ if (!already_done) {
+ /*
+ * Ask FW to drop this context's session and storage so
+ * the kernel and FW stay in sync. Done here, under this
+ * context's fops_lock only (not the global modify_lock),
+ * because both close requests block on a firmware
+ * round-trip; issuing them while modify_lock was held
+ * would stall every other context for the FW timeout.
+ *
+ * Skip the round-trips once the FW path is marked busy.
+ * fw_busy is armed when a synchronous transaction times
+ * out; while it is set ele_msg_send_rcv() rejects further
+ * commands with -EBUSY without waiting. It is only cleared
+ * by se_clear_fw_busy(), which during unbind runs once
+ * after this loop (or earlier from fw_busy_work only if a
+ * genuine late FW response arrives). On a hung FW no late
+ * response comes, so the breaker stays set for the rest of
+ * the loop and the remaining closes would just return
+ * -EBUSY and log spurious "failed to close" errors. Skip
+ * them and emit a single warning instead.
+ */
+ if (atomic_read(&dev_ctx->priv->fw_busy)) {
+ if (dev_ctx->strg_hdl || dev_ctx->sess_hdl)
+ dev_warn(dev_ctx->priv->dev,
+ "%s: skipping session/storage close, FW is busy\n",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Pick the context that carries the close messages.
+ *
+ * fclose (is_fclose): a userspace close() may race
+ * driver unbind. Send on the caller's own dev_ctx so
+ * ele_msg_send_rcv()'s going_away check rejects the
+ * transmission with -ENODEV if unbind has begun (and
+ * may have freed priv->tx_chan), instead of touching a
+ * freed mailbox channel.
+ *
+ * Teardown (!is_fclose): going_away is already set, but
+ * priv->tx_chan is still live at this point in
+ * se_if_probe_cleanup(). Send on priv_dev_ctx, the only
+ * context ele_msg_send_rcv() lets through going_away for
+ * teardown-close messages, so the kernel can still
+ * resynchronise session/storage state with FW.
+ */
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *tx_ctx = is_fclose ? dev_ctx :
+ dev_ctx->priv->priv_dev_ctx;
+
+ if (dev_ctx->strg_hdl && se_close_storage(tx_ctx,
+ dev_ctx->strg_hdl))
+ dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "failed to close storage.\n");
+ if (dev_ctx->sess_hdl && se_close_session(tx_ctx,
+ dev_ctx->sess_hdl))
+ dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "failed to close session.\n");
+ }
+ /*
+ * fw_busy is caused by one timed-out synchronous transaction.
+ * Only that transaction's dev_ctx may still have coherent
+ * memory referenced by FW. Do not skip cleanup for unrelated
+ * contexts while fw_busy is set.
+ */
+ if (se_is_fw_busy_ctx(dev_ctx))
+ dev_warn(dev_ctx->priv->dev,
+ "%s: deferring shared memory cleanup while FW is busy\n",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ else
+ cleanup_se_shared_mem(dev_ctx, true);
+
+ kfree(dev_ctx->devname);
+ dev_ctx->devname = NULL;
+ dev_ctx->cleanup_done = true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (is_fclose)
+ kref_put(&dev_ctx->refcount, se_if_dev_ctx_release);
+}
+
+static void dlink_n_cleanup_dev_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, bool is_fclose)
+{
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+
+ if (is_fclose) {
+ scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock)
+ dlink_dev_ctx(dev_ctx);
+ }
+
+ cleanup_dev_ctx(dev_ctx, is_fclose);
+}
+
+static int init_device_context(struct se_if_priv *priv, int ch_id,
+ struct se_if_device_ctx **new_dev_ctx)
+{
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ dev_ctx = kzalloc_obj(*dev_ctx, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (!dev_ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ dev_ctx->devname = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s0_ch%d",
+ get_se_if_name(priv->if_defs->se_if_type),
+ ch_id);
+ if (!dev_ctx->devname) {
+ kfree(dev_ctx);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ mutex_init(&dev_ctx->fops_lock);
+ kref_init(&dev_ctx->refcount);
+ dev_ctx->priv = priv;
+ dev_ctx->cleanup_done = false;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev_ctx->link);
+ set_se_rcv_msg_timeout(dev_ctx, SE_RCV_MSG_LONG_TIMEOUT_MS);
+ *new_dev_ctx = dev_ctx;
+
+ ret = init_se_shared_mem(dev_ctx);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ kfree(dev_ctx->devname);
+ kfree(dev_ctx);
+ *new_dev_ctx = NULL;
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Take a reference to priv for this device context */
+ kref_get(&priv->refcount);
+
+ scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock) {
+ list_add_tail(&dev_ctx->link, &priv->dev_ctx_list);
+ priv->active_devctx_count++;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, void __user *uarg,
+ struct se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info *cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info)
+{
+ /* shared memory is allocated before this IOCTL */
+ se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(dev_ctx);
+
+ if (cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info->rx_buf_sz &&
+ copy_to_user(uarg, cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info, sizeof(*cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info))) {
+ dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Failed to copy cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info to user.",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_handler(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
+ void __user *uarg)
+{
+ struct se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info = {0};
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+ int rsp_status_err = 0;
+ int cleanup_err = 0;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info, uarg,
+ sizeof(cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info))) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev,
+ "%s: Failed to copy cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info from user.",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ if (cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz < SE_MU_HDR_SZ ||
+ cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz > MAX_ALLOWED_TX_MSG_SZ) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "%s: User buffer too small/large(%d < %d)",
+ dev_ctx->devname, cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz,
+ cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz < SE_MU_HDR_SZ ? SE_MU_HDR_SZ :
+ MAX_ALLOWED_TX_MSG_SZ);
+ se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ }
+
+ struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) =
+ memdup_user(u64_to_user_ptr(cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf),
+ cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz);
+ if (IS_ERR(tx_msg)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(tx_msg);
+ se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ err = se_chk_tx_msg_hdr(dev_ctx, &tx_msg->header,
+ cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz,
+ cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz);
+ if (err) {
+ se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ if (cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz < SE_MU_HDR_SZ ||
+ cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz > MAX_ALLOWED_RX_MSG_SZ) {
+ se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (tx_msg->header.tag != priv->if_defs->cmd_tag) {
+ se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (tx_msg->header.ver == priv->if_defs->fw_api_ver &&
+ get_load_fw_instance(priv)->is_fw_tobe_loaded) {
+ err = se_load_firmware(priv);
+ if (err) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Could not send msg as FW is not loaded.");
+ se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ }
+
+ struct se_api_msg *rx_msg __free(kfree) =
+ kzalloc(cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rx_msg) {
+ se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ err = ele_msg_send_rcv(dev_ctx, tx_msg, cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz,
+ rx_msg, cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ /*
+ * -ERESTARTSYS here means the wait was interrupted by a signal
+ * after the command had already been handed to - and executed
+ * by - the firmware, with its response delivered into rx_msg
+ * (ele_msg_send_rcv() converts only a positive, i.e. successfully
+ * received, result to -ERESTARTSYS). If that response carried a
+ * freshly allocated session/storage handle, record it now via
+ * fw_api_specific_ops(): the handle is already live in firmware,
+ * so leaving it untracked would stop cleanup_dev_ctx() from ever
+ * closing it and leak the firmware resource. Validate the
+ * delivered response first, using its own declared length bounded
+ * by the caller's buffer, so a truncated or malformed reply is
+ * not acted upon.
+ */
+ if (err == -ERESTARTSYS) {
+ u32 rsp_sz = rx_msg->header.size << 2;
+
+ if (rsp_sz && rsp_sz <= cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz &&
+ !se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(priv, rx_msg,
+ tx_msg->header.command, rsp_sz,
+ tx_msg->header.ver ==
+ priv->if_defs->base_api_ver)) {
+ se_dev_ctx_cpy_out_data(dev_ctx);
+ fw_api_specific_ops(dev_ctx, rx_msg);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Returning -ERESTARTSYS would let the VFS transparently restart
+ * the ioctl, which would re-run the command with the just
+ * cleaned-up (zeroed) shared input buffers. Report -EINTR instead
+ * so the syscall is not auto-restarted; userspace enters its
+ * signal handler and can decide whether to reissue the command.
+ */
+ err = -EINTR;
+ }
+
+ se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
+
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * ele_msg_send_rcv() returns a positive received-message size on
+ * success. Returning that raw size as the ioctl result would make a
+ * successful transaction look like a positive (non-zero) return value
+ * to userspace. Record the actual received size in rx_buf_sz for the
+ * response copied back to userspace, then normalise err to 0 so the
+ * ioctl reports plain success; the firmware status is conveyed to
+ * userspace inside the response buffer itself.
+ */
+ cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz = err;
+ err = 0;
+
+ dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: %s %s.", dev_ctx->devname, __func__,
+ "message received, start transmit to user");
+
+ rsp_status_err =
+ se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(priv, rx_msg, tx_msg->header.command,
+ cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz,
+ tx_msg->header.ver == priv->if_defs->base_api_ver);
+
+ if (!rsp_status_err) {
+ /*
+ * The response is well formed and fully fits the caller's
+ * buffer, so any FW-allocated session/storage handle it carries
+ * (data[1]) has been delivered. Record it now, before the
+ * copy-out steps below. The FW has already committed the handle;
+ * running fw_api_specific_ops() only after a successful
+ * se_dev_ctx_cpy_out_data()/copy_to_user() would leave the
+ * handle untracked - and so never closed on teardown, leaking it
+ * in FW - whenever the caller supplied a bad output pointer.
+ */
+ fw_api_specific_ops(dev_ctx, rx_msg);
+
+ err = se_dev_ctx_cpy_out_data(dev_ctx);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Copy data from the buffer */
+ print_hex_dump_debug("to user ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 4, 4, rx_msg,
+ cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz, false);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf), rx_msg,
+ cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz)) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "%s: Failed to copy to user.", dev_ctx->devname);
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ cleanup_err = se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
+
+ if (cleanup_err && !err)
+ err = cleanup_err;
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int se_ioctl_get_mu_info(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
+ void __user *uarg)
+{
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+ struct se_ioctl_get_if_info if_info;
+ struct se_if_node *if_node;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if_node = container_of(priv->if_defs, typeof(*if_node), if_defs);
+
+ if_info.se_if_id = 0;
+ if_info.interrupt_idx = 0;
+ if_info.tz = 0;
+ if_info.did = 0;
+ if_info.cmd_tag = priv->if_defs->cmd_tag;
+ if_info.rsp_tag = priv->if_defs->rsp_tag;
+ if_info.success_tag = priv->if_defs->success_tag;
+ if_info.base_api_ver = priv->if_defs->base_api_ver;
+ if_info.fw_api_ver = priv->if_defs->fw_api_ver;
+
+ dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: info [se_if_id: %d, irq_idx: %d, tz: 0x%x, did: 0x%x].",
+ dev_ctx->devname, if_info.se_if_id, if_info.interrupt_idx, if_info.tz,
+ if_info.did);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(uarg, &if_info, sizeof(if_info))) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "%s: Failed to copy mu info to user.",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static void rollback_shared_mem_pos(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, u32 length)
+{
+ struct se_shared_mem *shared_mem = NULL;
+
+ shared_mem = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt.non_secure_mem;
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(length > shared_mem->pos)) {
+ shared_mem->pos = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ shared_mem->pos -= length;
+}
+
+int get_shared_mem_slot(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
+ u32 *length, dma_addr_t *ele_dma_addr, void **ptr)
+{
+ struct se_shared_mem *shared_mem = NULL;
+ bool is_fw_busy_dev_ctx;
+ size_t aligned_len = 0;
+ u32 pos;
+
+ /*
+ * If this context is the one that caused a firmware timeout the shared
+ * DMA buffers may still be actively read/written by the firmware.
+ */
+ is_fw_busy_dev_ctx = se_is_fw_busy_ctx(dev_ctx);
+ if (is_fw_busy_dev_ctx)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ aligned_len = round_up((size_t)*length, 8);
+ if (aligned_len < *length) {
+ dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Invalid buffer length.",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* No specific requirement for this buffer. */
+ shared_mem = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt.non_secure_mem;
+
+ /* Check there is enough space in the shared memory. */
+ dev_dbg(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: req_size = %zd, max_size= %d, curr_pos = %d",
+ dev_ctx->devname, aligned_len, shared_mem->size,
+ shared_mem->pos);
+
+ if (shared_mem->size < shared_mem->pos ||
+ aligned_len > (shared_mem->size - shared_mem->pos)) {
+ dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Not enough space in shared memory.",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate space in shared memory. 8 bytes aligned. */
+ pos = shared_mem->pos;
+ shared_mem->pos += aligned_len;
+ *ele_dma_addr = (u64)shared_mem->dma_addr + pos;
+ *ptr = shared_mem->ptr + pos;
+ *length = aligned_len;
+
+ memset(shared_mem->ptr + pos, 0, aligned_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy a buffer of data to/from the user and return the address to use in
+ * messages
+ */
+static int se_ioctl_setup_iobuf_handler(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
+ void __user *uarg)
+{
+ struct se_ioctl_setup_iobuf io = {0};
+ struct se_buf_desc *b_desc = NULL;
+ void *dma_buf_ptr = NULL;
+ dma_addr_t ele_dma_addr;
+ u32 aligned_len = 0;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&io, uarg, sizeof(io))) {
+ dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Failed copy iobuf config from user.",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ dev_dbg(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: io [buf: %p(%d) flag: %x].", dev_ctx->devname,
+ u64_to_user_ptr(io.user_buf), io.length, io.flags);
+
+ if (io.length == 0 || !io.user_buf) {
+ /*
+ * Accept NULL pointers since some buffers are optional
+ * in FW commands. In this case we should return 0 as
+ * pointer to be embedded into the message.
+ * Skip all data copy part of code below.
+ */
+ io.ele_addr = 0;
+ goto copy;
+ }
+
+ aligned_len = io.length;
+ err = get_shared_mem_slot(dev_ctx, &aligned_len, &ele_dma_addr, &dma_buf_ptr);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ io.ele_addr = ele_dma_addr;
+ if ((io.flags & SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_INPUT) ||
+ (io.flags & SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_IN_OUT)) {
+ /*
+ * buffer is input:
+ * copy data from user space to this allocated buffer.
+ */
+ if (copy_from_user(dma_buf_ptr, u64_to_user_ptr(io.user_buf),
+ io.length)) {
+ dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev,
+ "%s: Failed copy data to shared memory.",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ goto rollback;
+ }
+ }
+
+ b_desc = add_b_desc_to_pending_list(dma_buf_ptr, &io, dev_ctx);
+ if (IS_ERR(b_desc)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(b_desc);
+ dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Failed to allocate/link b_desc.",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ goto rollback;
+ }
+
+copy:
+ /* Provide the EdgeLock Enclave address to user space only if success.*/
+ if (copy_to_user(uarg, &io, sizeof(io))) {
+ dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Failed to copy iobuff setup to user.",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ goto rollback;
+ }
+ return err;
+
+rollback:
+ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(b_desc)) {
+ list_del(&b_desc->link);
+ kfree(b_desc);
+ }
+
+ if (dma_buf_ptr && aligned_len) {
+ memset(dma_buf_ptr, 0, aligned_len);
+ rollback_shared_mem_pos(dev_ctx, aligned_len);
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* IOCTL to provide SoC information */
+static int se_ioctl_get_se_soc_info_handler(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
+ void __user *uarg)
+{
+ struct se_ioctl_get_soc_info soc_info;
+ int err = -EINVAL;
+
+ soc_info.soc_id = get_se_soc_id(dev_ctx->priv);
+ soc_info.soc_rev = var_se_info.soc_rev;
+
+ err = copy_to_user(uarg, (u8 *)(&soc_info), sizeof(soc_info));
+ if (err) {
+ dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Failed to copy soc info to user.",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * File operations for user-space
+ */
+
+/* Write a message to the MU. */
+static ssize_t se_if_fops_write(struct file *fp, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx = fp->private_data;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv;
+ int err;
+
+ scoped_cond_guard(mutex_intr, return -ERESTARTSYS, &dev_ctx->fops_lock) {
+ if (dev_ctx->cleanup_done)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+
+ dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: write from buf (%p)%zu, ppos=%lld.", dev_ctx->devname,
+ buf, size, ((ppos) ? *ppos : 0));
+
+ if (dev_ctx != priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx) {
+ se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(dev_ctx);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (size < SE_MU_HDR_SZ || size > MAX_ALLOWED_TX_MSG_SZ) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "%s: User buffer too small/large(%zu < %d)",
+ dev_ctx->devname, size,
+ size < SE_MU_HDR_SZ ? SE_MU_HDR_SZ :
+ MAX_ALLOWED_TX_MSG_SZ);
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ }
+
+ struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) = memdup_user(buf, size);
+ if (IS_ERR(tx_msg))
+ return PTR_ERR(tx_msg);
+
+ err = se_chk_tx_msg_hdr(dev_ctx, &tx_msg->header, size, 0);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ print_hex_dump_debug("from user ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 4, 4,
+ tx_msg, size, false);
+
+ err = ele_msg_send(dev_ctx, tx_msg, size);
+
+ return err;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read a message from the MU.
+ * Blocking until a message is available.
+ */
+static ssize_t se_if_fops_read(struct file *fp, char __user *buf, size_t size,
+ loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx = fp->private_data;
+ u8 rx_msg_snap[MAX_NVM_MSG_LEN] = {};
+ struct se_if_priv *priv;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ size_t copy_len;
+ int err;
+
+ scoped_cond_guard(mutex_intr, return -ERESTARTSYS, &dev_ctx->fops_lock) {
+ priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+
+ if (dev_ctx->cleanup_done)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: read to buf %p(%zu), ppos=%lld.", dev_ctx->devname,
+ buf, size, ((ppos) ? *ppos : 0));
+
+ mutex_lock(&priv->modify_lock);
+ if (dev_ctx != priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx) {
+ mutex_unlock(&priv->modify_lock);
+ se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(dev_ctx);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&priv->modify_lock);
+ }
+
+ err = ele_msg_rcv(dev_ctx, &priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ if (err != -ERESTARTSYS)
+ dev_err(priv->dev,
+ "%s: Er[0x%x]: Signal Interrupted. Current act-dev-ctx count: %d.",
+ dev_ctx->devname, err, dev_ctx->priv->active_devctx_count);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Reacquire fops_lock before touching any dev_ctx state (pending lists,
+ * rx_msg) after the blocking wait. fops_lock was dropped before calling
+ * ele_msg_rcv(). If cleanup_dev_ctx() ran concurrently it could have
+ * freed the DMA buffers and the pending lists, leading to UAF and list
+ * corruption. Re-checking cleanup_done under fops_lock prevents that.
+ */
+ mutex_lock(&dev_ctx->fops_lock);
+
+ if (dev_ctx->cleanup_done) {
+ mutex_unlock(&dev_ctx->fops_lock);
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Snapshot rx_msg pointer under clbk_rx_lock before releasing it.
+ * unset_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver() can acquire the lock, NULL out
+ * rx_msg, and free the buffer at any time after the unlock; using a
+ * stale pointer from the shared field after the unlock is a UAF.
+ */
+ scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock) {
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+ if (priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx != dev_ctx ||
+ !priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg ||
+ !priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg_sz) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+ mutex_unlock(&dev_ctx->fops_lock);
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+ /* Taking snapshot is enough for the one common pre-allocated buffer. */
+ copy_len = min(size, priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg_sz);
+ memcpy(rx_msg_snap, priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg, copy_len);
+ priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg_sz = 0;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+
+ /* We may need to copy the output data to user before
+ * delivering the completion message.
+ */
+ err = se_dev_ctx_cpy_out_data(dev_ctx);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(dev_ctx);
+ mutex_unlock(&dev_ctx->fops_lock);
+ return err;
+ }
+ /* Copy data from the buffer using the snapshot taken under the lock. */
+ print_hex_dump_debug("to user ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 4, 4,
+ rx_msg_snap, copy_len, false);
+
+ fw_api_specific_ops(dev_ctx, (struct se_api_msg *)rx_msg_snap);
+ err = copy_len;
+ if (copy_to_user(buf, rx_msg_snap, copy_len))
+ err = -EFAULT;
+
+ se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(dev_ctx);
+ mutex_unlock(&dev_ctx->fops_lock);
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* Open a character device. */
+static int se_if_fops_open(struct inode *nd, struct file *fp)
+{
+ struct miscdevice *miscdev = fp->private_data;
+ struct se_if_open_gate *gate;
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *misc_dev_ctx;
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ gate = container_of(miscdev, struct se_if_open_gate, miscdev);
+
+ if (!se_if_open_gate_get(gate))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&gate->lock)) {
+ se_if_open_gate_put(gate);
+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
+ }
+
+ if (gate->dying || !gate->priv ||
+ !kref_get_unless_zero(&gate->priv->refcount)) {
+ err = -ENODEV;
+ goto out_unlock_gate;
+ }
+
+ priv = gate->priv;
+ mutex_unlock(&gate->lock);
+
+ misc_dev_ctx = priv->priv_dev_ctx;
+
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&misc_dev_ctx->fops_lock)) {
+ err = -ERESTARTSYS;
+ goto out_put_priv;
+ }
+
+ if (misc_dev_ctx->cleanup_done) {
+ err = -ENODEV;
+ goto out_unlock_misc;
+ }
+
+ priv->dev_ctx_mono_count++;
+ err = init_device_context(priv, priv->dev_ctx_mono_count, &dev_ctx);
+ if (err) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed[0x%x] to create dev-ctx.", err);
+ goto out_unlock_misc;
+ }
+
+ fp->private_data = dev_ctx;
+
+out_unlock_misc:
+ mutex_unlock(&misc_dev_ctx->fops_lock);
+out_put_priv:
+ kref_put(&priv->refcount, se_if_priv_release);
+ se_if_open_gate_put(gate);
+ return err;
+out_unlock_gate:
+ mutex_unlock(&gate->lock);
+ se_if_open_gate_put(gate);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* Close a character device. */
+static int se_if_fops_close(struct inode *nd, struct file *fp)
+{
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx = fp->private_data;
+
+ dlink_n_cleanup_dev_ctx(dev_ctx, true);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* IOCTL entry point of a character device */
+static long se_ioctl(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx = fp->private_data;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv;
+ void __user *uarg = (void __user *)arg;
+ long err;
+
+ /* Prevent race during change of device context */
+ scoped_cond_guard(mutex_intr, return -ERESTARTSYS, &dev_ctx->fops_lock) {
+ if (dev_ctx->cleanup_done)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SE_IOCTL_ENABLE_CMD_RCV: {
+ err = set_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(dev_ctx);
+ if (err)
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to register %s as CMD-Receiver: %ld\n",
+ dev_ctx->devname, err);
+ break;
+ }
+ case SE_IOCTL_GET_MU_INFO:
+ err = se_ioctl_get_mu_info(dev_ctx, uarg);
+ break;
+ case SE_IOCTL_SETUP_IOBUF:
+ err = se_ioctl_setup_iobuf_handler(dev_ctx, uarg);
+ break;
+ case SE_IOCTL_GET_SOC_INFO:
+ err = se_ioctl_get_se_soc_info_handler(dev_ctx, uarg);
+ break;
+ case SE_IOCTL_CMD_SEND_RCV_RSP:
+ err = se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_handler(dev_ctx, uarg);
+ break;
+ default:
+ err = -ENOTTY;
+ dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: IOCTL %.8x not supported.",
+ dev_ctx->devname, cmd);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* Char driver setup */
+static const struct file_operations se_if_fops = {
+ .open = se_if_fops_open,
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .release = se_if_fops_close,
+ .unlocked_ioctl = se_ioctl,
+ .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
+ .read = se_if_fops_read,
+ .write = se_if_fops_write,
+};
+
+int se_get_mem_pool_buf(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, void **buf,
+ dma_addr_t *daddr, u32 len)
+{
+ struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+ struct se_buf_desc *b_desc = NULL;
+
+ lockdep_assert_held(&dev_ctx->fops_lock);
+
+ if (se_is_fw_busy_ctx(dev_ctx))
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ b_desc = kzalloc_obj(*b_desc, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!b_desc)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * gen_pool is internally thread-safe, so contexts may allocate
+ * concurrently. The buffer is tracked on this context's own
+ * mem_pool_buf_list and released on its cleanup path.
+ */
+ *buf = gen_pool_dma_alloc(priv->mem_pool, len, daddr);
+ if (!*buf) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to alloc from gen_pool.\n");
+ kfree(b_desc);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ /* gen_pool_dma_alloc() does not zero the buffer. */
+ memset(*buf, 0, len);
+ b_desc->shared_buf_ptr = *buf;
+ b_desc->size = len;
+
+ list_add_tail(&b_desc->link, &se_shared_mem_mgmt->mem_pool_buf_list);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void se_cleanup_mem_pool_buf(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, bool reclaim)
+{
+ struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+ struct se_buf_desc *b_desc, *temp;
+
+ /*
+ * Free only the buffers this context allocated. A context that never
+ * used the pool has an empty list, so this is a no-op for it.
+ *
+ * Unlike the coherent staging buffer, the pool path needs no
+ * "nothing staged" (pos) gate on the reclaim=false leg. Pool buffers
+ * are ephemeral, per-transaction allocations: se_get_mem_pool_buf()
+ * refuses to allocate once the context is fw_busy, ele_msg_send_rcv()
+ * refuses to start a new command while fw_busy, and the success path
+ * frees the whole list via se_cleanup_mem_pool_buf(reclaim=true)
+ * before returning. se_if_cmd_lock serialises synchronous commands, so
+ * at most one transaction is outstanding. The only way to reach here
+ * with reclaim=false and a non-empty list is the single fw_busy
+ * context still owning the buffer(s) from the one timed-out
+ * transaction. Those buffers are exactly the in-flight ones the
+ * enclave may still be DMA-ing into, so leaving them on the list (no
+ * gen_pool_free) deliberately leaks them to avoid a DMA-after-free -
+ * there are no already-consumed pool buffers to reclaim on this leg.
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(b_desc, temp, &se_shared_mem_mgmt->mem_pool_buf_list, link) {
+ if (reclaim)
+ gen_pool_free(priv->mem_pool,
+ (unsigned long)b_desc->shared_buf_ptr,
+ b_desc->size);
+ list_del(&b_desc->link);
+ kfree(b_desc);
+ }
+}
+
+static void se_fw_busy_work(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct se_if_priv *priv =
+ container_of(work, struct se_if_priv, fw_busy_work);
+
+ se_clear_fw_busy(priv);
+}
+
static int se_suspend(struct device *dev)
{
struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h
index dd4a1ea7e35a..35389095ed1c 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h
@@ -10,20 +10,40 @@
#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
#include <linux/mailbox_client.h>
#include <linux/semaphore.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#define MAX_FW_LOAD_RETRIES 50
#define SE_MSG_WORD_SZ 0x4
#define RES_STATUS(x) FIELD_GET(0x000000ff, x)
+#define MAX_DATA_SIZE_PER_USER (128 * 1024)
#define MAX_NVM_MSG_LEN (256)
#define MESSAGING_VERSION_6 0x6
#define MESSAGING_VERSION_7 0x7
+struct se_if_open_gate {
+ struct miscdevice miscdev;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv;
+ /* to lock to update the structure */
+ struct mutex lock;
+ struct kref refcount;
+ bool dying;
+ /* set once misc_register() has succeeded (deferred to probe end) */
+ bool registered;
+};
+
struct se_clbk_handle {
struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx;
struct completion done;
bool signal_rcvd;
+ /*
+ * Set under clbk_rx_lock once a real response is copied into rx_msg,
+ * cleared when a new transaction is armed. Lets ele_msg_rcv() tell a
+ * genuine response from a teardown-forced complete_all() with no data.
+ */
+ bool rx_delivered;
u32 rx_msg_sz;
+
/*
* Assignment of the rx_msg buffer to held till the
* received content as part callback function, is copied.
@@ -45,10 +65,46 @@ struct se_imem_buf {
u32 state;
};
+struct se_buf_desc {
+ u8 *shared_buf_ptr;
+ void __user *usr_buf_ptr;
+ u32 size;
+ struct list_head link;
+};
+
+struct se_shared_mem {
+ dma_addr_t dma_addr;
+ u32 size;
+ u32 pos;
+ u8 *ptr;
+};
+
+struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info {
+ struct list_head mem_pool_buf_list;
+ struct list_head pending_in;
+ struct list_head pending_out;
+
+ struct se_shared_mem non_secure_mem;
+};
+
/* Private struct for each char device instance. */
struct se_if_device_ctx {
struct se_if_priv *priv;
+ struct miscdevice *miscdev;
const char *devname;
+ u32 sess_hdl;
+ u32 strg_hdl;
+ bool cleanup_done;
+ unsigned long rcv_msg_timeout_jiffies;
+
+ /* process one file operation at a time. */
+ struct mutex fops_lock;
+
+ struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info se_shared_mem_mgmt;
+ struct list_head link;
+
+ /* Add reference counting */
+ struct kref refcount;
};
/* Header of the messages exchange with the EdgeLock Enclave */
@@ -113,9 +169,43 @@ struct se_if_priv {
struct se_fw_load_info load_fw;
atomic_t fw_busy;
+ /*
+ * Set once teardown begins. New synchronous transactions are rejected
+ * and a teardown-forced completion is not mistaken for a real firmware
+ * response.
+ */
+ atomic_t going_away;
+ /*
+ * Serialise the fw_busy_dev_ctx and fw_busy state updates between the
+ * timeout path, late-response callback/work, and teardown.
+ */
+ spinlock_t fw_busy_lock;
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *fw_busy_dev_ctx;
+ struct work_struct fw_busy_work;
struct se_if_device_ctx *priv_dev_ctx;
+ struct list_head dev_ctx_list;
+
+ /* prevent modifying priv member variable in parallel. */
+ struct mutex modify_lock;
+ u32 active_devctx_count;
+ u32 dev_ctx_mono_count;
+
+ /* Add reference counting */
+ struct kref refcount;
+
+ /* stable gate used by .open() */
+ struct se_if_open_gate *open_gate;
};
char *get_se_if_name(u8 se_if_id);
+void unset_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx);
+int set_dev_ctx_as_command_receiver(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx);
+bool se_is_fw_busy_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx);
+void se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx);
+int get_shared_mem_slot(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
+ u32 *length, dma_addr_t *ele_dma_addr, void **ptr);
+int se_get_mem_pool_buf(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, void **buf,
+ dma_addr_t *daddr, u32 len);
+void se_cleanup_mem_pool_buf(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, bool reclaim);
#endif
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/se_ioctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/se_ioctl.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6302ff66034f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/se_ioctl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause*/
+/*
+ * Copyright 2025 NXP
+ */
+
+#ifndef SE_IOCTL_H
+#define SE_IOCTL_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#define SE_TYPE_STR_DBG "dbg"
+#define SE_TYPE_STR_HSM "hsm"
+#define SE_TYPE_ID_UNKWN 0x0
+#define SE_TYPE_ID_DBG 0x1
+#define SE_TYPE_ID_HSM 0x2
+/* IOCTL definitions. */
+
+struct se_ioctl_setup_iobuf {
+ __u64 user_buf;
+ __u32 length;
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u64 ele_addr;
+};
+
+struct se_ioctl_shared_mem_cfg {
+ __u32 base_offset;
+ __u32 size;
+};
+
+struct se_ioctl_get_if_info {
+ __u8 se_if_id;
+ __u8 interrupt_idx;
+ __u8 tz;
+ __u8 did;
+ __u8 cmd_tag;
+ __u8 rsp_tag;
+ __u8 success_tag;
+ __u8 base_api_ver;
+ __u8 fw_api_ver;
+};
+
+struct se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info {
+ __u64 tx_buf;
+ __u64 rx_buf;
+ __u32 tx_buf_sz;
+ __u32 rx_buf_sz;
+};
+
+struct se_ioctl_get_soc_info {
+ __u16 soc_id;
+ __u16 soc_rev;
+};
+
+/* IO Buffer Flags */
+#define SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_OUTPUT (0x00u)
+#define SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_INPUT (0x01u)
+#define SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_USE_SEC_MEM (0x02u)
+#define SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_USE_SHORT_ADDR (0x04u)
+#define SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_IN_OUT (0x10u)
+
+/* IOCTLS */
+#define SE_IOCTL 0x0A /* like MISC_MAJOR. */
+
+/*
+ * ioctl to designated the current fd as logical-reciever.
+ * This is ioctl is send when the nvm-daemon, a slave to the
+ * firmware is started by the user.
+ */
+#define SE_IOCTL_ENABLE_CMD_RCV _IO(SE_IOCTL, 0x01)
+
+/*
+ * ioctl to get the buffer allocated from the memory, which is shared
+ * between kernel and FW.
+ * Post allocation, the kernel tagged the allocated memory with:
+ * Output
+ * Input
+ * Input-Output
+ * Short address
+ * Secure-memory
+ */
+#define SE_IOCTL_SETUP_IOBUF _IOWR(SE_IOCTL, 0x03, struct se_ioctl_setup_iobuf)
+
+/*
+ * ioctl to get the mu information, that is used to exchange message
+ * with FW, from user-spaced.
+ */
+#define SE_IOCTL_GET_MU_INFO _IOR(SE_IOCTL, 0x04, struct se_ioctl_get_if_info)
+/*
+ * ioctl to get SoC Info from user-space.
+ */
+#define SE_IOCTL_GET_SOC_INFO _IOR(SE_IOCTL, 0x06, struct se_ioctl_get_soc_info)
+
+/*
+ * ioctl to send command and receive response from user-space.
+ */
+#define SE_IOCTL_CMD_SEND_RCV_RSP _IOWR(SE_IOCTL, 0x07, struct se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info)
+#endif
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-19 6:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-19 11:42 [PATCH v37 0/7] firmware: imx: driver for NXP secure-enclave Pankaj Gupta via B4 Relay
2026-08-19 11:42 ` [PATCH v37 1/7] Documentation/firmware: add imx/se to other_interfaces Pankaj Gupta via B4 Relay
2026-08-19 6:16 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-19 11:42 ` [PATCH v37 2/7] dt-bindings: arm: fsl: add imx-se-fw binding doc Pankaj Gupta via B4 Relay
2026-08-19 11:42 ` [PATCH v37 3/7] firmware: imx: add driver for NXP EdgeLock Enclave Pankaj Gupta via B4 Relay
2026-08-19 6:23 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-19 11:42 ` [PATCH v37 4/7] firmware: imx: device context dedicated to priv Pankaj Gupta via B4 Relay
2026-08-19 11:42 ` Pankaj Gupta via B4 Relay [this message]
2026-08-19 6:27 ` [PATCH v37 5/7] firmware: imx: adds miscdev sashiko-bot
2026-08-19 11:49 ` [EXT] " Pankaj Gupta
2026-08-19 11:42 ` [PATCH v37 6/7] arm64: dts: imx8ulp: add secure enclave node Pankaj Gupta via B4 Relay
2026-08-19 6:23 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-19 11:42 ` [PATCH v37 7/7] arm64: dts: imx8ulp: add reserved memory for EdgeLock Enclave Pankaj Gupta via B4 Relay
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