From: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>
To: "Jan Sebastian Götte" <contact@jaseg.de>,
"Jan Sebastian Götte" <linux@jaseg.de>
Cc: devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] mm/secretmem: zeroize secret pages before kdump
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2026 17:14:32 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8bb53d9a-8870-410c-9a41-f8b536ef0780@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <adcafa9f-2365-484b-b31e-19006833efaa@jaseg.de>
On 8/11/26 17:05, Jan Sebastian Götte wrote:
> On 8/11/26 16:53, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote:
>> On 7/31/26 18:27, Jan Sebastian Götte wrote:
>>> Register a CRASH_ZEROIZE notifier that wipes secretmem folios. As a
>>> result, when CONFIG_CRASH_ZEROIZE is set, secretmem areas will be
>>> cleared before the kdump kernel is kexec'ed.
>>
>> Are you actually using secretmem in your use case? I heard some rumors that
>> secretmem isn't used all that much in practice :)
>
> I'm aware nobody is really using secretmem. I decided to build this on top of
> secretmem because it's an existing API that actually kind of fits the use case.
> While I could have added a new API just for this (marking userspace memory as
> wipe-on-crash), making it part of secretmem instead gives some additional
> defense-in-depth protection for both users who only need wiping, and for users
> who only want secretmem's additional protection against kernel memory read
> primitives so I think everyone wins here.
What I was thinking when I looked at patch #3+#4: 50% of the users you add are
irrelevant in practice.
Or are you saying that you are going to start using secretmem for your use case?
--
Cheers,
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-11 15:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-31 16:27 [PATCH 0/4] CRASH_ZEROIZE: Wipe secrets before kdump Jan Sebastian Götte
2026-07-31 16:27 ` [PATCH 1/4] of/kexec: fix typo in comment (usable-memory-range) Jan Sebastian Götte
2026-08-11 13:43 ` Rob Herring
2026-07-31 16:27 ` [PATCH 2/4] kexec: add CRASH_ZEROIZE to wipe secrets before kdump Jan Sebastian Götte
2026-07-31 16:35 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-31 16:27 ` [PATCH 3/4] mm/secretmem: zeroize secret pages " Jan Sebastian Götte
2026-07-31 16:40 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-11 14:53 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-08-11 15:05 ` Jan Sebastian Götte
2026-08-11 15:14 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm) [this message]
2026-08-11 15:18 ` Jan Sebastian Götte
2026-07-31 16:27 ` [PATCH 4/4] security/keys: zeroize key payloads " Jan Sebastian Götte
2026-07-31 16:45 ` sashiko-bot
[not found] <20260731154608.153258-1-linux@jaseg.de>
[not found] ` <20260731154608.153258-4-linux@jaseg.de>
2026-08-05 4:26 ` [PATCH 3/4] mm/secretmem: zeroize secret pages " sashiko-bot
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