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[209.85.218.54]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id ci20sm206514ejc.26.2021.01.12.20.25.40 for (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Tue, 12 Jan 2021 20:25:40 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-ej1-f54.google.com with SMTP id g20so1191687ejb.1 for ; Tue, 12 Jan 2021 20:25:40 -0800 (PST) X-Received: by 2002:adf:fa86:: with SMTP id h6mr380594wrr.103.1610511938864; Tue, 12 Jan 2021 20:25:38 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20210106034124.30560-1-tientzu@chromium.org> <78871151-947d-b085-db03-0d0bd0b55632@gmail.com> <23a09b9a-70fc-a7a8-f3ea-b0bfa60507f0@gmail.com> In-Reply-To: From: Tomasz Figa Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2021 13:25:27 +0900 X-Gmail-Original-Message-ID: Message-ID: Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 0/6] Restricted DMA To: Florian Fainelli Cc: Claire Chang , Rob Herring , mpe@ellerman.id.au, benh@kernel.crashing.org, paulus@samba.org, "list@263.net:IOMMU DRIVERS" , Joerg Roedel , Will Deacon , Frank Rowand , Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com, jgross@suse.com, sstabellini@kernel.org, Christoph Hellwig , Marek Szyprowski , Robin Murphy , grant.likely@arm.com, xypron.glpk@gmx.de, Thierry Reding , mingo@kernel.org, bauerman@linux.ibm.com, peterz@infradead.org, Greg KH , Saravana Kannan , "Rafael J . Wysocki" , heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com, Andy Shevchenko , Randy Dunlap , Dan Williams , Bartosz Golaszewski , linux-devicetree , lkml , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Nicolas Boichat , Jim Quinlan Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: devicetree@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Jan 13, 2021 at 12:56 PM Florian Fainelli wrote: > > > > On 1/12/2021 6:29 PM, Tomasz Figa wrote: > > Hi Florian, > > > > On Wed, Jan 13, 2021 at 3:01 AM Florian Fainelli wrote: > >> > >> On 1/11/21 11:48 PM, Claire Chang wrote: > >>> On Fri, Jan 8, 2021 at 1:59 AM Florian Fainelli wrote: > >>>> > >>>> On 1/7/21 9:42 AM, Claire Chang wrote: > >>>> > >>>>>> Can you explain how ATF gets involved and to what extent it does help, > >>>>>> besides enforcing a secure region from the ARM CPU's perpsective? Does > >>>>>> the PCIe root complex not have an IOMMU but can somehow be denied access > >>>>>> to a region that is marked NS=0 in the ARM CPU's MMU? If so, that is > >>>>>> still some sort of basic protection that the HW enforces, right? > >>>>> > >>>>> We need the ATF support for memory MPU (memory protection unit). > >>>>> Restricted DMA (with reserved-memory in dts) makes sure the predefined memory > >>>>> region is for PCIe DMA only, but we still need MPU to locks down PCIe access to > >>>>> that specific regions. > >>>> > >>>> OK so you do have a protection unit of some sort to enforce which region > >>>> in DRAM the PCIE bridge is allowed to access, that makes sense, > >>>> otherwise the restricted DMA region would only be a hint but nothing you > >>>> can really enforce. This is almost entirely analogous to our systems then. > >>> > >>> Here is the example of setting the MPU: > >>> https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/blob/master/plat/mediatek/mt8183/drivers/emi_mpu/emi_mpu.c#L132 > >>> > >>>> > >>>> There may be some value in standardizing on an ARM SMCCC call then since > >>>> you already support two different SoC vendors. > >>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Broadcom STB SoCs we have had something similar for a while however > >>>>>> and while we don't have an IOMMU for the PCIe bridge, we do have a a > >>>>>> basic protection mechanism whereby we can configure a region in DRAM to > >>>>>> be PCIe read/write and CPU read/write which then gets used as the PCIe > >>>>>> inbound region for the PCIe EP. By default the PCIe bridge is not > >>>>>> allowed access to DRAM so we must call into a security agent to allow > >>>>>> the PCIe bridge to access the designated DRAM region. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> We have done this using a private CMA area region assigned via Device > >>>>>> Tree, assigned with a and requiring the PCIe EP driver to use > >>>>>> dma_alloc_from_contiguous() in order to allocate from this device > >>>>>> private CMA area. The only drawback with that approach is that it > >>>>>> requires knowing how much memory you need up front for buffers and DMA > >>>>>> descriptors that the PCIe EP will need to process. The problem is that > >>>>>> it requires driver modifications and that does not scale over the number > >>>>>> of PCIe EP drivers, some we absolutely do not control, but there is no > >>>>>> need to bounce buffer. Your approach scales better across PCIe EP > >>>>>> drivers however it does require bounce buffering which could be a > >>>>>> performance hit. > >>>>> > >>>>> Only the streaming DMA (map/unmap) needs bounce buffering. > >>>> > >>>> True, and typically only on transmit since you don't really control > >>>> where the sk_buff are allocated from, right? On RX since you need to > >>>> hand buffer addresses to the WLAN chip prior to DMA, you can allocate > >>>> them from a pool that already falls within the restricted DMA region, right? > >>>> > >>> > >>> Right, but applying bounce buffering to RX will make it more secure. > >>> The device won't be able to modify the content after unmap. Just like what > >>> iommu_unmap does. > >> > >> Sure, however the goals of using bounce buffering equally applies to RX > >> and TX in that this is the only layer sitting between a stack (block, > >> networking, USB, etc.) and the underlying device driver that scales well > >> in order to massage a dma_addr_t to be within a particular physical range. > >> > >> There is however room for improvement if the drivers are willing to > >> change their buffer allocation strategy. When you receive Wi-Fi frames > >> you need to allocate buffers for the Wi-Fi device to DMA into, and that > >> happens ahead of the DMA transfers by the Wi-Fi device. At buffer > >> allocation time you could very well allocate these frames from the > >> restricted DMA region without having to bounce buffer them since the > >> host CPU is in control over where and when to DMA into. > >> > > > > That is, however, still a trade-off between saving that one copy and > > protection from the DMA tampering with the packet contents when the > > kernel is reading them. Notice how the copy effectively makes a > > snapshot of the contents, guaranteeing that the kernel has a > > consistent view of the packet, which is not true if the DMA could > > modify the buffer contents in the middle of CPU accesses. > > I would say that the window just became so much narrower for the PCIe > end-point to overwrite contents with the copy because it would have to > happen within the dma_unmap_{page,single} time and before the copy is > finished to the bounce buffer. Not only. Imagine this: a) Without bouncing: - RX interrupt - Pass the packet to the network stack - Network stack validates the packet - DMA overwrites the packet - Network stack goes boom, because the packet changed after validation b) With bouncing: - RX interrupt - Copy the packet to a DMA-inaccessible buffer - Network stack validates the packet - Network stack is happy, because the packet is guaranteed to stay the same after validation Best regards, Tomasz