Re: [PATCH] of: fdt: parse early params before adding bootloader randomness

["Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>]

On Fri, Nov 18, 2022 at 09:33:53AM +0100, Rasmus Villemoes wrote:
> On 07/11/2022 18.34, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> > On Mon, Nov 07, 2022 at 11:28:20AM -0600, Rob Herring wrote:
> >> On Fri, Nov 4, 2022 at 8:46 PM Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> FDT is examined so early that it's before the first incidental call to
> >>> parse_early_param(). This is similar to EFI, except EFI actually added
> >>> an explicitly call to parse_early_param(). Let's do the same here, so
> >>> that specifying `random.trust_bootloader=0` is not ignored.
> >>>
> >>> Fixes: d97c68d178fb ("random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle")
> >>> Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
> >>> Cc: Frank Rowand <frowand.list@gmail.com>
> >>> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
> >>> ---
> >>>  drivers/of/fdt.c | 3 +++
> >>>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
> >>>
> >>> diff --git a/drivers/of/fdt.c b/drivers/of/fdt.c
> >>> index 7b571a631639..6d959117fd4f 100644
> >>> --- a/drivers/of/fdt.c
> >>> +++ b/drivers/of/fdt.c
> >>> @@ -1195,6 +1195,9 @@ int __init early_init_dt_scan_chosen(char *cmdline)
> >>>
> >>>         rng_seed = of_get_flat_dt_prop(node, "rng-seed", &l);
> >>>         if (rng_seed && l > 0) {
> >>> +               /* Parse random.trust_bootloader if it's in command line. */
> >>> +               parse_early_param();
> >>
> >> I don't think it's good that the timing of calling this is dependent
> >> on "rng-seed" being present or not. So perhaps move it up to after the
> >> cmdline is set.
> >>
> >> Either way, the other issue is the cmdline is not necessarily fixed at
> >> this point with some architectures doing their own
> >> append/prepend/override of the cmdline. We can't seem to get common
> >> implementation there finished. I'm doubtful that corner case would
> >> actually be hit though.
> > 
> > Hm, yea. I'm actually now having second thoughts about this one too for
> > other reasons: FDT isn't the only arch that has this issue. It's also a
> > problem on x86 and m68k. Maybe the random.trust_bootloader toggle should
> > just go away, since already your bootloader can do whatever it wants to
> > the kernel it executes? Not sure; I'll think on it a bit I guess...
> 
> Well, for the FDT case it least one could preserve the ability for the
> bootloader to say "hey, here's a bunch of bytes, but I have reason to
> believe they're not as random as you'd like" by setting a boolean
> "rng-seed-is-crap" [pick a better name] property alongside the rng-seed
> property. Then the kernel logic could be CONFIG_TRUST_BOOT_LOADER &&
> !of_get_bool("rng-seed-is-crap"). Currently, the only thing the
> bootloader could do in that case is to just elide the rng-seed
> completely (or set the not-actually-working cmdline flag).

Yea I don't think we want to introduce that kind of complexity here. No
more knobs :)

Jason