From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 060EA2F2D; Tue, 3 Jun 2025 16:54:39 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1748969680; cv=none; b=EeDxvPXNI4mPUX/lMaEcgEqqjpBwgQaHKNMAMulNmZ8GB/WWQ4+vQqROnEXX4mfgjQMLYuAAQaWdYM7cqAKKwSgxwsbVDHLJaabKT/UbRhK5W8qVqP6Z2WUN92LTBqaXn9Q3fSB9y7OEOCxSIKgxEh4oq8BmtoW3SvNxFKYb6Tw= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1748969680; c=relaxed/simple; bh=v1gSOUSa/yuBcyqHMjmBJtV13fLkxndWisCuM7m1CY0=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=IsCLgSQ0lIyjKG88LP41/nXYSVDzj9NLlRfIEflLBbqhNGcUi1EZ8BwQCuYch/PjUapUfb/bnTGBslUnV7nwFUkLr6anYluxiPhxg6fdBAgthWq1v8cMlySfzPBiy9s38Zkx+aPhYVfFLRSd8ypKeWYqVPD1xG89vaIyJjuhCoY= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=FN/1mcWK; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="FN/1mcWK" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 80DD2C4CEED; Tue, 3 Jun 2025 16:54:33 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1748969679; bh=v1gSOUSa/yuBcyqHMjmBJtV13fLkxndWisCuM7m1CY0=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=FN/1mcWK7Q9gz2YciYhXJUD+mkO4RMfAVUp9ry75R7kOt+4xZpQ9BMx2qzAyi86k2 vx4UP92/yUOVNd7nYOwzH8lysobtnL/te7If+sNfnfAc6RLv8KEuuBnbdieBqxvOfG 4t7DqUdcnFD5JDPXmhMFZkM0JXqz0YJw2lvykoboYghhD8RBiaXa0pb5oWxivApyuE 1E0LuCqz0++IgeTwxEELpseM47Nr07RpQm/haDLOQAxVB9fxb2FhGuKtqlfLd9ih+q 6NhrS4AgqbD4ckgqJZBsBPTSEKDCr2lqR00uQbkH5LA6FeJeZVPnYIyfJNsaUC4U5A UZsBUHecxwgHQ== Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2025 18:54:30 +0200 From: Lorenzo Pieralisi To: Peter Maydell Cc: Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Marc Zyngier , Thomas Gleixner , Conor Dooley , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , andre.przywara@arm.com, Arnd Bergmann , Sascha Bischoff , Timothy Hayes , "Liam R. Howlett" , Mark Rutland , Jiri Slaby , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, suzuki.poulose@arm.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 01/26] dt-bindings: interrupt-controller: Add Arm GICv5 Message-ID: References: <20250513-gicv5-host-v4-0-b36e9b15a6c3@kernel.org> <20250513-gicv5-host-v4-1-b36e9b15a6c3@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: devicetree@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: On Tue, Jun 03, 2025 at 05:04:33PM +0100, Peter Maydell wrote: > On Tue, 3 Jun 2025 at 16:53, Lorenzo Pieralisi wrote: > > Specifically, for IRS/ITS frames then - what the current schema does is > > correct, namely, it does _not_ spell out whether the IRS/ITS config > > frame is NS/S/Realm/Root interrupt domain, that's information that the > > client implicitly assumes. > > > > Are we OK with this approach ? This would leave open the possibility > > of having a DT per security-state. > > > > If in the DT schema I define eg reg -> "IRS NS config frame" by > > construction the binding can't be used for anything else. > > > > Please let me know if we are in agreement on this matter. > > This would break the QEMU virt board -> EL3 guest firmware -> > EL1 Linux flow. We need a binding which lets us optionally > specify "oh by the way here is where the other non-NS frames are". Do we "need" a binding ? Or, it is a nice-have to help configure QEmu (and other SW components, eg bootwrapper/TF-A, etc that decided to re-use DT for their own consumption) ? And even so, why can't we have a DT per security state as-per Rob's reply ? Given that only the "status" property is tagged with secure- today, may I ask please how does this work ? What's "EL3 guest firmware" ? Does it use the secure-status property to detect that the respective device is secure/non-secure ? And why does it have to be the same dtb we are passing to the OS client ? > I don't have a strong view on the specific syntax. I do because I don't want to revisit this later ;-) Thanks, Lorenzo