From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [170.10.129.124]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5D8A517AE11 for ; Fri, 22 Aug 2025 03:33:36 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=170.10.129.124 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1755833619; cv=none; b=AptxHb/kklVZ99n0minyW3gJheNDkou3GdgulM46HnncvUPx3gfJrL54lrOZwnowEvaEcHa7FyneXg0pRqKcQWFDSCBb6Llwm2bXM8bw0yADMlQY6/tMzig+bEkUr96sEGeMO7NjCMasqUuMy+/luDE9mSksxyRwbt9cL+7aEwI= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1755833619; c=relaxed/simple; bh=8ae7BQ/H/X/z4I/Wl0/AJn7VdqEwsqiB6/27yyCXE+A=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=T4lb8J6g4SWbK9Kfo0B7jJ6Jm10kzlqa6mMhdPzR73JfAWQBkIYbfOs1ADYwU06REGNLQOuirzclVZto0ngJyE+V1uSIYkDF7YZOWcXH7UuAKihf9JpZ12q6eiQgQEFmthnmnljhlZKyk9YZjCwrXHFmytrMYr3vCASE8pTfmio= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=quarantine dis=none) header.from=redhat.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=redhat.com; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b=Kbx5ldeO; arc=none smtp.client-ip=170.10.129.124 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=quarantine dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=redhat.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b="Kbx5ldeO" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1755833615; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=vED3sHUD/eaxwLo5XUmcXYQAR0YhiuGg9wbVZx1Y6yI=; b=Kbx5ldeOpZRAf3z8CQNsvgPR/h0bwtPlyceS961nfUtDnVAsLeXGHibIiU87yj1jS4Mbxm 5HhQERTCx1uZxDH0jxt+kKQdD+zo/R30ufTK1d7vFbGPQtCckzXpaxUGP3vn0rzmiHBYDQ tHrJ34Jechif4VOwhEruC6Saa8uFxa0= Received: from mx-prod-mc-01.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (ec2-54-186-198-63.us-west-2.compute.amazonaws.com [54.186.198.63]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.3, cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-689-AuXN_JCMMFm-2Msz8Mk6JQ-1; Thu, 21 Aug 2025 23:33:31 -0400 X-MC-Unique: AuXN_JCMMFm-2Msz8Mk6JQ-1 X-Mimecast-MFC-AGG-ID: AuXN_JCMMFm-2Msz8Mk6JQ_1755833609 Received: from mx-prod-int-08.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (mx-prod-int-08.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com [10.30.177.111]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mx-prod-mc-01.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 999AD195608B; Fri, 22 Aug 2025 03:33:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (unknown [10.72.112.99]) by mx-prod-int-08.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6CE29180029E; Fri, 22 Aug 2025 03:33:25 +0000 (UTC) Date: Fri, 22 Aug 2025 11:33:21 +0800 From: Baoquan He To: Andrew Morton , Alexander Graf , Brian Mak Cc: Dave Young , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , "H. Peter Anvin" , Rob Herring , Saravana Kannan , x86@kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] kexec: Add KEXEC_FILE_NO_CMA as a legal flag Message-ID: References: <20250805211527.122367-1-makb@juniper.net> <20250805211527.122367-2-makb@juniper.net> <20250820214756.5c7b551e4723d9f0b5dd55e3@linux-foundation.org> <20250821045319.72e81f40e021e54e2131ac44@linux-foundation.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: devicetree@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20250821045319.72e81f40e021e54e2131ac44@linux-foundation.org> X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.4.1 on 10.30.177.111 On 08/21/25 at 04:53am, Andrew Morton wrote: > On Thu, 21 Aug 2025 16:33:26 +0800 Baoquan He wrote: > > > On 08/20/25 at 09:47pm, Andrew Morton wrote: > > > On Tue, 5 Aug 2025 14:15:26 -0700 Brian Mak wrote: ......snip..... > --- > > include/linux/kexec.h | 3 ++- > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > --- a/include/linux/kexec.h~kexec-add-kexec_file_no_cma-as-a-legal-flag > +++ a/include/linux/kexec.h > @@ -460,7 +460,8 @@ bool kexec_load_permitted(int kexec_imag > > /* List of defined/legal kexec file flags */ > #define KEXEC_FILE_FLAGS (KEXEC_FILE_UNLOAD | KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH | \ > - KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS | KEXEC_FILE_DEBUG) > + KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS | KEXEC_FILE_DEBUG | \ > + KEXEC_FILE_NO_CMA) > > /* flag to track if kexec reboot is in progress */ > extern bool kexec_in_progress; Yeah, this is a good catch and great fix. Without this fix, kexec_file_load syscall will failed and return '-EINVAL' when KEXEC_FILE_NO_CMA is specified just as below code shows. So, for this patch, Acked-by: Baoquan He And, by the way, has the user space kexec-tools got the change merged to allow KEXEC_FILE_NO_CMA specified? And, Alexander, I am wondering why this is not captured when you test specifying KEXEC_FILE_NO_CMA case. Or you just skip the no_cma case testing? =================================================================== SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, initrd_fd, unsigned long, cmdline_len, const char __user *, cmdline_ptr, unsigned long, flags) { int image_type = (flags & KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH) ? KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH : KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT; struct kimage **dest_image, *image; int ret = 0, i; /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ if (!kexec_load_permitted(image_type)) return -EPERM; /* Make sure we have a legal set of flags */ if (flags != (flags & KEXEC_FILE_FLAGS)) return -EINVAL; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ...... } ===================================================== > _ > > > and the second patch I placed in mm-unstable: > > From: Brian Mak > Subject: x86/kexec: carry forward the boot DTB on kexec > Date: Tue, 5 Aug 2025 14:15:27 -0700 > > Currently, the kexec_file_load syscall on x86 does not support passing a > device tree blob to the new kernel. Some embedded x86 systems use device > trees. On these systems, failing to pass a device tree to the new kernel > causes a boot failure. > > To add support for this, we copy the behavior of ARM64 and PowerPC and > copy the current boot's device tree blob for use in the new kernel. We do > this on x86 by passing the device tree blob as a setup_data entry in > accordance with the x86 boot protocol. > > This behavior is gated behind the KEXEC_FILE_FORCE_DTB flag. > > Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250805211527.122367-3-makb@juniper.net > Signed-off-by: Brian Mak > Cc: Alexander Graf > Cc: Baoquan He > Cc: Borislav Betkov > Cc: Dave Young > Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" > Cc: Ingo Molnar > Cc: Rob Herring > Cc: Saravana Kannan > Cc: Thomas Gleinxer > Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton > --- > > arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > include/linux/kexec.h | 5 ++ > include/uapi/linux/kexec.h | 4 ++ > kernel/kexec_file.c | 1 > 4 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c~x86-kexec-carry-forward-the-boot-dtb-on-kexec > +++ a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c > @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > +#include > #include > #include > > @@ -212,6 +214,28 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *para > } > #endif /* CONFIG_EFI */ > > +#ifdef CONFIG_OF_FLATTREE > +static void setup_dtb(struct boot_params *params, > + unsigned long params_load_addr, > + unsigned int dtb_setup_data_offset) > +{ > + struct setup_data *sd = (void *)params + dtb_setup_data_offset; > + unsigned long setup_data_phys, dtb_len; > + > + dtb_len = fdt_totalsize(initial_boot_params); > + sd->type = SETUP_DTB; > + sd->len = dtb_len; > + > + /* Carry over current boot DTB with setup_data */ > + memcpy(sd->data, initial_boot_params, dtb_len); > + > + /* Add setup data */ > + setup_data_phys = params_load_addr + dtb_setup_data_offset; > + sd->next = params->hdr.setup_data; > + params->hdr.setup_data = setup_data_phys; > +} > +#endif /* CONFIG_OF_FLATTREE */ > + > static void > setup_ima_state(const struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params, > unsigned long params_load_addr, > @@ -336,6 +360,17 @@ setup_boot_parameters(struct kimage *ima > sizeof(struct efi_setup_data); > #endif > > +#ifdef CONFIG_OF_FLATTREE > + if (image->force_dtb && initial_boot_params) { > + setup_dtb(params, params_load_addr, setup_data_offset); > + setup_data_offset += sizeof(struct setup_data) + > + fdt_totalsize(initial_boot_params); > + } else { > + pr_debug("Not carrying over DTB, force_dtb = %d\n", > + image->force_dtb); > + } > +#endif > + > if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC)) { > /* Setup IMA log buffer state */ > setup_ima_state(image, params, params_load_addr, > @@ -529,6 +564,12 @@ static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimag > sizeof(struct setup_data) + > RNG_SEED_LENGTH; > > +#ifdef CONFIG_OF_FLATTREE > + if (image->force_dtb && initial_boot_params) > + kbuf.bufsz += sizeof(struct setup_data) + > + fdt_totalsize(initial_boot_params); > +#endif > + > if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC)) > kbuf.bufsz += sizeof(struct setup_data) + > sizeof(struct ima_setup_data); > @@ -537,7 +578,7 @@ static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimag > kbuf.bufsz += sizeof(struct setup_data) + > sizeof(struct kho_data); > > - params = kzalloc(kbuf.bufsz, GFP_KERNEL); > + params = kvzalloc(kbuf.bufsz, GFP_KERNEL); Wondering how big the dtb blob is, can you explain a little bit about the kvzalloc usage here? Except of this, I have no other concern about this patch. And what's your plan about the user space kexec-tool change? > if (!params) > return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); > efi_map_offset = params_cmdline_sz; > @@ -647,7 +688,7 @@ static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimag > return ldata; > > out_free_params: > - kfree(params); > + kvfree(params); > return ERR_PTR(ret); > } > > @@ -659,7 +700,7 @@ static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loade > if (!ldata) > return 0; > > - kfree(ldata->bootparams_buf); > + kvfree(ldata->bootparams_buf); > ldata->bootparams_buf = NULL; > > return 0; > --- a/include/linux/kexec.h~x86-kexec-carry-forward-the-boot-dtb-on-kexec > +++ a/include/linux/kexec.h > @@ -395,6 +395,9 @@ struct kimage { > > /* Information for loading purgatory */ > struct purgatory_info purgatory_info; > + > + /* Force carrying over the DTB from the current boot */ > + bool force_dtb; > #endif > > #ifdef CONFIG_CRASH_HOTPLUG > @@ -461,7 +464,7 @@ bool kexec_load_permitted(int kexec_imag > /* List of defined/legal kexec file flags */ > #define KEXEC_FILE_FLAGS (KEXEC_FILE_UNLOAD | KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH | \ > KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS | KEXEC_FILE_DEBUG | \ > - KEXEC_FILE_NO_CMA) > + KEXEC_FILE_NO_CMA | KEXEC_FILE_FORCE_DTB) > > /* flag to track if kexec reboot is in progress */ > extern bool kexec_in_progress; > --- a/include/uapi/linux/kexec.h~x86-kexec-carry-forward-the-boot-dtb-on-kexec > +++ a/include/uapi/linux/kexec.h > @@ -22,12 +22,16 @@ > * KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH : Load/unload operation belongs to kdump image. > * KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS : No initramfs is being loaded. Ignore the initrd > * fd field. > + * KEXEC_FILE_FORCE_DTB : Force carrying over the current boot's DTB to the new > + * kernel on x86. This is already the default behavior on > + * some other architectures, like ARM64 and PowerPC. > */ > #define KEXEC_FILE_UNLOAD 0x00000001 > #define KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH 0x00000002 > #define KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS 0x00000004 > #define KEXEC_FILE_DEBUG 0x00000008 > #define KEXEC_FILE_NO_CMA 0x00000010 > +#define KEXEC_FILE_FORCE_DTB 0x00000020 > > /* These values match the ELF architecture values. > * Unless there is a good reason that should continue to be the case. > --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c~x86-kexec-carry-forward-the-boot-dtb-on-kexec > +++ a/kernel/kexec_file.c > @@ -255,6 +255,7 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kima > } > > image->no_cma = !!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_NO_CMA); > + image->force_dtb = flags & KEXEC_FILE_FORCE_DTB; > > if (cmdline_len) { > image->cmdline_buf = memdup_user(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_len); > _ >