From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795017368; b=TwXic+Pr8UuReWtNeNYWYaPdywhrN4UdXxjwMiIH8RHz/NNGk2yCnIY0pUMGsXoSzj7b vqdaEv7kc3vV5cLdmiss00uzelCbXuMrbagwZ+FUgdKd+xIG5krVt1hE1DcnA2qWkAt9n lGa80nOvPV3/64uwMHZ9Z4gUhiv6nOzuJQayiLfH9pGjdP2910l52+DNMVJ22B723IEwz Xn2sUXSp5qnc4xOb0tokJn735ygTJyxexny3wbeRyfSsvLYnmaKvGe9PnZqVH2axkMFMr HXRlweDcyEEw4N7EiEVip0TRRYl80TRzffyqlQd/AX/jwznQP2b62lkUVQVtMs4Omxw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795017368; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Message-ID:From:Subject:Reply-To:To:Cc: In-Reply-To:References:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:Date; bh=fJyS5eA4WoNYZTtkx3UVYJzyNFD1DkUvgnHaNnM4fKI=; b=AKMfL36ixapk7gI0HMlnwmjRvmIf4Mc5BzEOglIlnXQjbg5ZPtHYHqyG+eFxMDeszjOJ q7TA8VgQG8CaVo+sCoKUaQC1Wb7lzYCWhBi75/2WjDimB7svU77q59OSQvDeD4IIxUst/ ezeCBxYmO0TdPWD1MpND2aBsaWH7qWGk2NsNrKAzhjeppMvqIh74XBP7VO/KelfAlVD0y atsDd1CbOKvzpQUePsFV9u8o9yeO/cEQwjmxlZydVx0CLZ/P6E1O0TJASIh/7QXI6Zpl7 tzP6Ha5ZAtf66Lfe1Zsv7KPo9Vs0ImHSccPZ1fd0YTFcrEkAWeBmfT9DDpAiaEHGc1Q== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=jdFp1rbC; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 17307606A320 for ; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:56:07 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=jdFp1rbC Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 692201F000C4; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:56:07 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795017367; bh=fJyS5eA4WoNYZTtkx3UVYJzyNFD1DkUvgnHaNnM4fKI=; h=From:Subject:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Date; b=jdFp1rbCPaoQeQ+kF+VNwp4GS8VGCMlM7bTPudCMoIurx5IyYI+6pALWdEKcK0dML Ulbkslx9AhrcoMpAOE9kK7brVJuxEGsw+DtT8kk+OMP8zfN98AN8AjFlc4+DWk5gsh EJkqg/jL8aXmiVWDymLmpxkbwk944Mn6M6/T4AvRI+gYpdsUePyKYFadtQt3eqyhZP mPpJsLPmvLAu2Z3xUTlvWzwWkRoVKKq1Ty8R9mP64b3UGSk3mK7qTitE485KhxWBFo Ha7SzZax84Uk/KbrqnzG/jfcAyyQ9fKveETLu7j3Pat1LtIr36fqkB1raof46dEeMn b4ZGYjL+wlBcA== Message-ID: From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/4] remoteproc: qcom: pas: Support secondary images Reply-To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev To: "Anvesh Jain P" Cc: devicetree@vger.kernel.org, robh@kernel.org, conor+dt@kernel.org In-Reply-To: <20261118-oob-support-glymur-v3-2-2cbdfe208d56@oss.qualcomm.com> References: <20261118-oob-support-glymur-v3-0-2cbdfe208d56@oss.qualcomm.com> <20261118-oob-support-glymur-v3-2-2cbdfe208d56@oss.qualcomm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:56:07 +0000 X-Mailing-List: devicetree@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issues to consider: - [Medium] remoteproc: qcom: pas: masked secondary shutdown errors in qcom_pas_stop() - [Medium] remoteproc: qcom: pas: unauthenticated PAS shutdown in qcom_pas_start() - [Medium] remoteproc: qcom: pas: firmware leak on boot failure after qcom_pas_load() -- commit f4e5bc32dd6dbd8e248f2fc47b7078b505ef5dfc Author: Anvesh Jain P remoteproc: qcom: pas: Support secondary images This commit adds PAS remoteproc support for loading, authenticating, mapping, shutting down, and releasing a secondary image and its DTB. > diff --git a/drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pas.c b/drivers/remoteproc/qcom= _q6v5_pas.c > index e7dfad27e5263..1c8c0c22c34d1 100644 > --- a/drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pas.c > +++ b/drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pas.c [ ... ] > @@ -252,6 +288,10 @@ static int qcom_pas_unprepare(struct rproc *rproc) > qcom_pas_metadata_release(pas->pas_ctx); > if (pas->dtb_pas_id) > qcom_pas_metadata_release(pas->dtb_pas_ctx); > + if (pas->secondary_pas_id) > + qcom_pas_metadata_release(pas->secondary_pas_ctx); > + if (pas->secondary_dtb_pas_id) > + qcom_pas_metadata_release(pas->secondary_dtb_pas_ctx); > =20 > return 0; > } > @@ -269,19 +309,29 @@ static int qcom_pas_load(struct rproc *rproc, const= struct firmware *fw) > if (pas->lite_dtb_pas_id) > qcom_pas_shutdown(pas->lite_dtb_pas_id); > =20 > - if (pas->dtb_pas_id) { > - ret =3D request_firmware(&pas->dtb_firmware, pas->dtb_firmware_name, p= as->dev); > + if (pas->secondary_dtb_pas_id) { > + ret =3D request_firmware(&pas->secondary_dtb_firmware, > + pas->secondary_dtb_firmware_name, pas->dev); > if (ret) { > - dev_err(pas->dev, "request_firmware failed for %s: %d\n", > - pas->dtb_firmware_name, ret); > + qcom_pas_release_firmware(pas); > return ret; > } > + } > =20 > - ret =3D qcom_mdt_pas_load(pas->dtb_pas_ctx, pas->dtb_firmware, > - pas->dtb_firmware_name, &pas->dtb_mem_reloc); > + if (pas->secondary_pas_id) { > + ret =3D request_firmware(&pas->secondary_firmware, > + pas->secondary_firmware_name, pas->dev); > + if (ret) { > + qcom_pas_release_firmware(pas); > + return ret; > + } > + } > + > + if (pas->dtb_pas_id) { > + ret =3D request_firmware(&pas->dtb_firmware, pas->dtb_firmware_name, > + pas->dev); > if (ret) { > - qcom_pas_metadata_release(pas->dtb_pas_ctx); > - release_firmware(pas->dtb_firmware); > + qcom_pas_release_firmware(pas); > return ret; > } > } [Severity: Medium] Can this leak pas->secondary_dtb_firmware, pas->secondary_firmware, and pas->dtb_firmware if boot fails after qcom_pas_load() succeeds? qcom_pas_release_firmware() is only called in qcom_pas_start() on success or under the disable_irqs error label. If rproc_prepare_subdevices() fails in rproc_start() before rproc->ops->start() is reached, or if qcom_q6v5_prepare() fails at the top of qcom_pas_start() and returns early, none of those firmware objects are released and pas->firmware is not cleared. A later boot or recovery attempt will then overwrite those pointers in qcom_pas_load(). Calling qcom_pas_release_firmware(pas) and clearing pas->firmware in qcom_pas_unprepare() (or jumping to the cleanup path when qcom_q6v5_prepare() fails) would avoid the leak. > @@ -338,10 +388,51 @@ static int qcom_pas_start(struct rproc *rproc) > goto disable_cx_supply; > } > =20 > + if (pas->secondary_dtb_pas_id) { > + ret =3D qcom_mdt_pas_load(pas->secondary_dtb_pas_ctx, > + pas->secondary_dtb_firmware, > + pas->secondary_dtb_firmware_name, > + &pas->secondary_dtb_mem_reloc); > + if (ret) > + goto release_secondary_dtb_metadata; > + > + ret =3D qcom_pas_map_carveout(rproc, pas->secondary_dtb_mem_phys, > + pas->secondary_dtb_mem_size); > + if (ret) > + goto release_secondary_dtb_metadata; > + > + ret =3D qcom_pas_prepare_and_auth_reset(pas->secondary_dtb_pas_ctx); > + if (ret) > + goto unmap_secondary_dtb_carveout; > + } > + > + if (pas->secondary_pas_id) { > + ret =3D qcom_mdt_pas_load(pas->secondary_pas_ctx, > + pas->secondary_firmware, > + pas->secondary_firmware_name, > + &pas->secondary_mem_reloc); > + if (ret) > + goto release_secondary_metadata; > + > + ret =3D qcom_pas_map_carveout(rproc, pas->secondary_mem_phys, > + pas->secondary_mem_size); > + if (ret) > + goto release_secondary_metadata; > + > + ret =3D qcom_pas_prepare_and_auth_reset(pas->secondary_pas_ctx); > + if (ret) > + goto unmap_secondary_carveout; > + } > + > if (pas->dtb_pas_id) { > + ret =3D qcom_mdt_pas_load(pas->dtb_pas_ctx, pas->dtb_firmware, > + pas->dtb_firmware_name, &pas->dtb_mem_reloc); > + if (ret) > + goto release_dtb_metadata; > + > ret =3D qcom_pas_map_carveout(rproc, pas->dtb_mem_phys, pas->dtb_mem_s= ize); > if (ret) > - goto disable_px_supply; > + goto release_dtb_metadata; > =20 > ret =3D qcom_pas_prepare_and_auth_reset(pas->dtb_pas_ctx); > if (ret) { > @@ -372,13 +463,17 @@ static int qcom_pas_start(struct rproc *rproc) > ret =3D qcom_q6v5_wait_for_start(&pas->q6v5, msecs_to_jiffies(5000)); > if (ret =3D=3D -ETIMEDOUT) { > dev_err(pas->dev, "start timed out\n"); > - qcom_pas_shutdown(pas->pas_id); > goto unmap_carveout; > } > =20 > qcom_pas_metadata_release(pas->pas_ctx); > if (pas->dtb_pas_id) > qcom_pas_metadata_release(pas->dtb_pas_ctx); > + if (pas->secondary_pas_id) > + qcom_pas_metadata_release(pas->secondary_pas_ctx); > + if (pas->secondary_dtb_pas_id) > + qcom_pas_metadata_release(pas->secondary_dtb_pas_ctx); > + qcom_pas_release_firmware(pas); > =20 > /* firmware is used to pass reference from qcom_pas_start(), drop it no= w */ > pas->firmware =3D NULL; > @@ -386,16 +481,37 @@ static int qcom_pas_start(struct rproc *rproc) > return 0; > =20 > unmap_carveout: > + qcom_pas_shutdown(pas->pas_id); > qcom_pas_unmap_carveout(rproc, pas->mem_phys, pas->mem_size); > release_pas_metadata: > qcom_pas_metadata_release(pas->pas_ctx); > - if (pas->dtb_pas_id) > - qcom_pas_metadata_release(pas->dtb_pas_ctx); > - > unmap_dtb_carveout: > + if (pas->dtb_pas_id) { > + qcom_pas_shutdown(pas->dtb_pas_id); > + qcom_pas_unmap_carveout(rproc, pas->dtb_mem_phys, > + pas->dtb_mem_size); > + } > +release_dtb_metadata: > if (pas->dtb_pas_id) > - qcom_pas_unmap_carveout(rproc, pas->dtb_mem_phys, pas->dtb_mem_size); > -disable_px_supply: > + qcom_pas_metadata_release(pas->dtb_pas_ctx); > +unmap_secondary_carveout: > + if (pas->secondary_pas_id) { > + qcom_pas_shutdown(pas->secondary_pas_id); > + qcom_pas_unmap_carveout(rproc, pas->secondary_mem_phys, > + pas->secondary_mem_size); > + } > +release_secondary_metadata: > + if (pas->secondary_pas_id) > + qcom_pas_metadata_release(pas->secondary_pas_ctx); > +unmap_secondary_dtb_carveout: > + if (pas->secondary_dtb_pas_id) { > + qcom_pas_shutdown(pas->secondary_dtb_pas_id); > + qcom_pas_unmap_carveout(rproc, pas->secondary_dtb_mem_phys, > + pas->secondary_dtb_mem_size); > + } > +release_secondary_dtb_metadata: > + if (pas->secondary_dtb_pas_id) > + qcom_pas_metadata_release(pas->secondary_dtb_pas_ctx); [Severity: Medium] Does jumping to the unmap_*_carveout labels when qcom_pas_prepare_and_auth_reset() fails call qcom_pas_shutdown() on a PAS context that failed authentication? Each image maps its carveout before calling qcom_pas_prepare_and_auth_reset(), and on failure jumps to its own unmap_*_carveout label, which now executes qcom_pas_shutdown() before qcom_pas_unmap_carveout(). That issues an unbalanced PAS shutdown call to TrustZone for an image that was never authenticated or brought out of reset. Separating the shutdown labels from the unmap_*_carveout labels would ensure qcom_pas_shutdown() is only called for PAS IDs whose qcom_pas_prepare_and_auth_reset() succeeded. > @@ -440,9 +557,30 @@ static int qcom_pas_stop(struct rproc *rproc) > if (ret =3D=3D -ETIMEDOUT) > dev_err(pas->dev, "timed out on wait\n"); > =20 > + if (pas->secondary_pas_id) { > + ret =3D qcom_pas_shutdown(pas->secondary_pas_id); > + if (ret && pas->decrypt_shutdown) > + ret =3D qcom_pas_shutdown_poll_decrypt(pas->secondary_pas_id); > + if (ret) > + dev_err(pas->dev, "failed to shutdown secondary: %d\n", ret); > + > + qcom_pas_unmap_carveout(rproc, pas->secondary_mem_phys, > + pas->secondary_mem_size); > + } > + > + if (pas->secondary_dtb_pas_id) { > + ret =3D qcom_pas_shutdown(pas->secondary_dtb_pas_id); > + if (ret) > + dev_err(pas->dev, > + "failed to shutdown secondary dtb: %d\n", ret); > + > + qcom_pas_unmap_carveout(rproc, pas->secondary_dtb_mem_phys, > + pas->secondary_dtb_mem_size); > + } > + > ret =3D qcom_pas_shutdown(pas->pas_id); > if (ret && pas->decrypt_shutdown) > - ret =3D qcom_pas_shutdown_poll_decrypt(pas); > + ret =3D qcom_pas_shutdown_poll_decrypt(pas->pas_id); > =20 > if (ret) > dev_err(pas->dev, "failed to shutdown: %d\n", ret); [Severity: Medium] Won't `ret =3D qcom_pas_shutdown(pas->pas_id)` overwrite any error returned when shutting down pas->secondary_pas_id or pas->secondary_dtb_pas_id? If secondary PAS shutdown fails in TrustZone while the primary PAS shutdown succeeds, qcom_pas_stop() returns 0 to rproc_stop(). During crash recovery in rproc_boot_recovery(), a zero return from rproc_stop() lets execution proceed to rproc->ops->coredump() while the secondary memory region is still locked by TrustZone, whereas pas->dtb_pas_id below uses a separate variable to preserve earlier shutdown errors. --=20 Sashiko AI review =C2=B7 https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261118-oob-suppor= t-glymur-v3-0-2cbdfe208d56@oss.qualcomm.com?part=3D2