linux-doc.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>,
	corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org,
	axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org,
	eparis@redhat.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org,
	dm-devel@redhat.com, audit@vger.kernel.org,
	roberto.sassu@huawei.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>,
	Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v10 4/17] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel  read
Date: Sat, 08 Jul 2023 01:36:57 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <007992aec442cda5d5866e89b0ed5c69.paul@paul-moore.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1687986571-16823-5-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com>

On Jun 28, 2023 Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
> 
> IPE's initial goal is to control both execution and the loading of
> kernel modules based on the system's definition of trust. It
> accomplishes this by plugging into the security hooks for
> bprm_check_security, file_mprotect, mmap_file, kernel_load_data,
> and kernel_read_data.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
> ---
>  security/ipe/eval.c  |  14 ++++
>  security/ipe/eval.h  |   1 +
>  security/ipe/hooks.c | 182 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  security/ipe/hooks.h |  25 ++++++
>  security/ipe/ipe.c   |   6 ++
>  5 files changed, 228 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 security/ipe/hooks.c
>  create mode 100644 security/ipe/hooks.h

Adding the 'hooks.h' header allows for much of code added in the
previous patches to finally compile and there are a number of errors,
too many to include here.  Please fix those and ensure that each
point in the patchset compiles cleanly.

> diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.c b/security/ipe/hooks.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..d896a5a474bc
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/fs.h>
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/binfmts.h>
> +#include <linux/mman.h>
> +
> +#include "ipe.h"
> +#include "hooks.h"
> +#include "eval.h"
> +
> +/**
> + * ipe_bprm_check_security - ipe security hook function for bprm check.
> + * @bprm: Supplies a pointer to a linux_binprm structure to source the file
> + *	  being evaluated.
> + *
> + * This LSM hook is called when a binary is loaded through the exec
> + * family of system calls.
> + * Return:
> + * *0	- OK
> + * *!0	- Error
> + */
> +int ipe_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> +{
> +	struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = { 0 };

It's up to you, but when you have a fequently used initializer like
this it is often wrapped in a macro:

  #define IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT ((struct ipe_eval_ctx){ 0 })

... so that you can write the variable decalaration like this:

  struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT;

It's not a requirement, it just tends to look a little cleaner and
should you ever need to change the initializer it makes your life
a lot easier.

> +	build_eval_ctx(&ctx, bprm->file, __IPE_OP_EXEC);
> +	return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * ipe_mmap_file - ipe security hook function for mmap check.
> + * @f: File being mmap'd. Can be NULL in the case of anonymous memory.
> + * @reqprot: The requested protection on the mmap, passed from usermode.
> + * @prot: The effective protection on the mmap, resolved from reqprot and
> + *	  system configuration.
> + * @flags: Unused.
> + *
> + * This hook is called when a file is loaded through the mmap
> + * family of system calls.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * * 0	- OK
> + * * !0	- Error
> + */
> +int ipe_mmap_file(struct file *f, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
> +		  unsigned long flags)

Since @reqprot is always going to be unused in this function, you
might want to mark it as such to help prevent compiler
warnings/errors, for example:

 unsigned long reqprot __always_unused

> +{
> +	struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = { 0 };
> +
> +	if (prot & PROT_EXEC) {
> +		build_eval_ctx(&ctx, f, __IPE_OP_EXEC);
> +		return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx);
> +	}
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * ipe_file_mprotect - ipe security hook function for mprotect check.
> + * @vma: Existing virtual memory area created by mmap or similar.
> + * @reqprot: The requested protection on the mmap, passed from usermode.
> + * @prot: The effective protection on the mmap, resolved from reqprot and
> + *	  system configuration.
> + *
> + * This LSM hook is called when a mmap'd region of memory is changing
> + * its protections via mprotect.
> + *
> + * Return:
> + * * 0	- OK
> + * * !0	- Error
> + */
> +int ipe_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,

See my comment above about @reqprot.

> +		      unsigned long prot)
> +{
> +	struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = { 0 };
> +
> +	/* Already Executable */
> +	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	if (prot & PROT_EXEC) {
> +		build_eval_ctx(&ctx, vma->vm_file, __IPE_OP_EXEC);
> +		return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx);
> +	}
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}

--
paul-moore.com

  reply	other threads:[~2023-07-08  5:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-06-28 21:09 [RFC PATCH v10 00/17] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 01/17] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2023-07-08  5:36   ` [PATCH RFC v10 1/17] " Paul Moore
     [not found]   ` <ffd5c67f4a9bf45df0ce95a8fe0932a3.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-13 23:31     ` Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 02/17] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2023-07-08  5:36   ` [PATCH RFC v10 2/17] " Paul Moore
     [not found]   ` <b2abfd3883dce682ee911413fea2ec66.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-14  4:18     ` Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 03/17] ipe: add evaluation loop Fan Wu
2023-07-08  5:36   ` [PATCH RFC v10 3/17] " Paul Moore
     [not found]   ` <309cfd62a474a7e93be6a0886a3d5aa8.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-14 20:28     ` Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 04/17] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2023-07-08  5:36   ` Paul Moore [this message]
     [not found]   ` <cbe877b3905033d2b8c7c92e6d0cad4e.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-14 21:47     ` [PATCH RFC v10 4/17] " Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 05/17] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-07-08  5:36   ` [PATCH RFC v10 5/17] " Paul Moore
     [not found]   ` <7b0f16fd49fb3490af1018eba986d0e4.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-14 23:56     ` Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 06/17] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2023-07-08  5:36   ` [PATCH RFC v10 6/17] " Paul Moore
     [not found]   ` <80ae988288d2ac277a4429e85524a9bb.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-14 23:59     ` Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 07/17] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2023-07-08  5:36   ` [PATCH RFC v10 7/17] " Paul Moore
     [not found]   ` <fcc5de3f153eb60b5acf799c159e6ec8.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-15  3:26     ` Fan Wu
2023-08-01 19:29       ` Paul Moore
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 08/17] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2023-07-08  5:37   ` [PATCH RFC v10 8/17] " Paul Moore
     [not found]   ` <ec09144af7c7109d8b457ceccd50ba7a.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-15  3:57     ` Fan Wu
2023-08-01 19:24       ` Paul Moore
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 09/17] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2023-07-08  5:37   ` [PATCH RFC v10 9/17] " Paul Moore
     [not found]   ` <85af33c02638ebb501b40fd0f3785b12.paul@paul-moore.com>
2023-07-15  4:00     ` Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 10/17] block|security: add LSM blob to block_device Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 11/17] dm-verity: consume root hash digest and signature data via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-07-07 14:53   ` Mike Snitzer
2023-07-12  3:43     ` Fan Wu
2023-07-25 20:43       ` Paul Moore
2023-08-08 22:45         ` Fan Wu
2023-08-08 23:40           ` Alasdair G Kergon
2023-08-09 18:02             ` Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 12/17] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-07-08  5:37   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 13/17] fsverity: consume builtin signature via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 14/17] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 15/17] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 16/17] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2023-06-28 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v10 17/17] documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=007992aec442cda5d5866e89b0ed5c69.paul@paul-moore.com \
    --to=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=agk@redhat.com \
    --cc=audit@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=axboe@kernel.dk \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com \
    --cc=dm-devel@redhat.com \
    --cc=ebiggers@kernel.org \
    --cc=eparis@redhat.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=linux-block@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=roberto.sassu@huawei.com \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=snitzer@kernel.org \
    --cc=tytso@mit.edu \
    --cc=wufan@linux.microsoft.com \
    --cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).