From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
hpa@zytor.com, luto@amacapital.net,
trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 12/12] iommu: Do not allow IOMMU passthrough with Secure Launch
Date: Fri, 18 Jun 2021 12:12:57 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1624032777-7013-13-git-send-email-ross.philipson@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1624032777-7013-1-git-send-email-ross.philipson@oracle.com>
The IOMMU should always be set to default translated type after
the PMRs are disabled to protect the MLE from DMA.
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
---
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 5 +++++
drivers/iommu/iommu.c | 6 +++++-
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
index be35284..4f0256d 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
#include <linux/dma-direct.h>
#include <linux/crash_dump.h>
#include <linux/numa.h>
+#include <linux/slaunch.h>
#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/iommu.h>
@@ -2877,6 +2878,10 @@ static bool device_is_rmrr_locked(struct device *dev)
*/
static int device_def_domain_type(struct device *dev)
{
+ /* Do not allow identity domain when Secure Launch is configured */
+ if (slaunch_get_flags() & SL_FLAG_ACTIVE)
+ return IOMMU_DOMAIN_DMA;
+
if (dev_is_pci(dev)) {
struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(dev);
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
index 808ab70d..d49b7dd 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <linux/property.h>
#include <linux/fsl/mc.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slaunch.h>
#include <trace/events/iommu.h>
static struct kset *iommu_group_kset;
@@ -2761,7 +2762,10 @@ void iommu_set_default_passthrough(bool cmd_line)
{
if (cmd_line)
iommu_cmd_line |= IOMMU_CMD_LINE_DMA_API;
- iommu_def_domain_type = IOMMU_DOMAIN_IDENTITY;
+
+ /* Do not allow identity domain when Secure Launch is configured */
+ if (!(slaunch_get_flags() & SL_FLAG_ACTIVE))
+ iommu_def_domain_type = IOMMU_DOMAIN_IDENTITY;
}
void iommu_set_default_translated(bool cmd_line)
--
1.8.3.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-06-18 16:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-06-18 16:12 [PATCH v2 00/12] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2021-06-18 16:12 ` [PATCH v2 01/12] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2021-06-18 16:12 ` [PATCH v2 02/12] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2021-06-18 16:12 ` [PATCH v2 03/12] x86: Secure Launch main header file Ross Philipson
2021-06-18 16:12 ` [PATCH v2 04/12] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2021-06-18 16:12 ` [PATCH v2 05/12] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2021-06-18 16:12 ` [PATCH v2 06/12] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2021-06-18 16:12 ` [PATCH v2 07/12] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2021-06-18 16:12 ` [PATCH v2 08/12] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2021-06-18 16:12 ` [PATCH v2 09/12] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2021-06-18 16:12 ` [PATCH v2 10/12] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2021-06-18 16:12 ` [PATCH v2 11/12] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2021-06-18 16:12 ` Ross Philipson [this message]
2021-06-18 18:32 ` [PATCH v2 12/12] iommu: Do not allow IOMMU passthrough with " Robin Murphy
2021-06-21 17:51 ` Ross Philipson
2021-06-21 21:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-30 9:50 ` Ross Philipson
2021-08-04 3:05 ` Daniel P. Smith
2021-06-22 11:06 ` Robin Murphy
2021-06-30 9:47 ` Ross Philipson
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