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From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: "Mehta, Sohil" <sohil.mehta@intel.com>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>, "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "corbet@lwn.net" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"ardb@kernel.org" <ardb@kernel.org>,
	"david.laight.linux@gmail.com" <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>,
	"luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"jpoimboe@kernel.org" <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	"andrew.cooper3@citrix.com" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	"Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	"alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com"
	<alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
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	"peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	"geert@linux-m68k.org" <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 05/15] x86/cpu: Defer CR pinning enforcement until late_initcall()
Date: Tue, 7 Oct 2025 17:23:31 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <171d197d80701224b83e707948ae5e0a33e27b28.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251007065119.148605-6-sohil.mehta@intel.com>

On Mon, 2025-10-06 at 23:51 -0700, Sohil Mehta wrote:
> Problem
> -------
> In order to map the EFI runtime services, set_virtual_address_map()
> needs to be called, which resides in the lower half of the address
> space. This means that LASS needs to be temporarily disabled around this
> call.

Possibly naive EFI question...

efi_runtime_services_32_t has: 
   typedef struct {
   	efi_table_hdr_t hdr;
   	u32 get_time;
   	u32 set_time;
   	u32 get_wakeup_time;
   	u32 set_wakeup_time;
   	u32 set_virtual_address_map;
   	u32 convert_pointer;
   	u32 get_variable;
   	u32 get_next_variable;
   	u32 set_variable;
   	u32 get_next_high_mono_count;
   	u32 reset_system;
   	u32 update_capsule;
   	u32 query_capsule_caps;
   	u32 query_variable_info;
   } efi_runtime_services_32_t;
   

Why is only set_virtual_address_map problematic? Some of the other ones get
called after boot by a bunch of modules by the looks of it.

> 
> Wrapping efi_enter_virtual_mode() with lass_stac()/clac() is not enough,
> because the AC flag only gates data accesses, not instruction fetches.
> Clearing the CR4.LASS bit is required to make this work.
> 
> However, pinned CR4 bits are not expected to be modified after
> boot CPU init, resulting in a kernel warning.
> 
> Solution
> --------
> One option is to move the CR pinning setup immediately after the runtime
> services have been mapped. However, that is a narrow fix that would
> require revisiting if something else needs to modify a pinned CR bit.
> 
> CR pinning mainly prevents exploits from trivially modifying
> security-sensitive CR bits. There is limited benefit to enabling CR
> pinning before userspace comes up. Defer CR pinning enforcement until
> late_initcall() to allow EFI and future users to modify the CR bits
> without any concern for CR pinning.
> 
> Save the pinned bits while initializing the boot CPU because they are
> needed later to program the value on APs when they come up.
> 
> Note
> ----
> This introduces a small window between the boot CPU being initialized
> and CR pinning being enforced, where any in-kernel clearing of the
> pinned bits could go unnoticed. Later, when enforcement begins, a
> warning is triggered as soon as any CR4 bit is modified, such as
> X86_CR4_PGE during a TLB flush.
> 
> Currently, this is a purely theoretical concern. There are multiple ways
> to resolve it [1] if it becomes a problem in practice.
> 
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/c59aa7ac-62a6-45ec-b626-de518b25f7d9@intel.com/ [1]
> Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
> ---
> v10:
>  - Split recording pinned bits and enabling pinning into two functions.
>  - Defer pinning until userspace comes up.
> 
> This patch does not include any changes to harden the CR pinning
> implementation, as that is beyond the scope of this series.
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 19 +++++++++++++------
>  1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> index 61ab332eaf73..57d5824465b0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> @@ -476,8 +476,8 @@ void cr4_init(void)
>  
>  	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID))
>  		cr4 |= X86_CR4_PCIDE;
> -	if (static_branch_likely(&cr_pinning))
> -		cr4 = (cr4 & ~cr4_pinned_mask) | cr4_pinned_bits;
> +
> +	cr4 = (cr4 & ~cr4_pinned_mask) | cr4_pinned_bits;


Can you explain why this change is needed? It relies on cr4_pinned_bits to be
already set, and kind of is "enforcement", but no longer depends on
enable_cr_pinning() being called.


>  
>  	__write_cr4(cr4);
>  
> @@ -487,14 +487,21 @@ void cr4_init(void)
>  
>  /*
>   * Once CPU feature detection is finished (and boot params have been
> - * parsed), record any of the sensitive CR bits that are set, and
> - * enable CR pinning.
> + * parsed), record any of the sensitive CR bits that are set.
>   */
> -static void __init setup_cr_pinning(void)
> +static void __init record_cr_pinned_bits(void)
>  {
>  	cr4_pinned_bits = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4) & cr4_pinned_mask;
> +}
> +
> +/* Enables enforcement of the CR pinned bits */
> +static int __init enable_cr_pinning(void)
> +{
>  	static_key_enable(&cr_pinning.key);
> +
> +	return 0;
>  }
> +late_initcall(enable_cr_pinning);
>  
>  static __init int x86_nofsgsbase_setup(char *arg)
>  {
> @@ -2119,7 +2126,7 @@ static __init void identify_boot_cpu(void)
>  	enable_sep_cpu();
>  #endif
>  	cpu_detect_tlb(&boot_cpu_data);
> -	setup_cr_pinning();
> +	record_cr_pinned_bits();
>  
>  	tsx_init();
>  	tdx_init();


  reply	other threads:[~2025-10-07 17:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-10-07  6:51 [PATCH v10 00/15] x86: Enable Linear Address Space Separation support Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07  6:51 ` [PATCH v10 01/15] x86/cpu: Enumerate the LASS feature bits Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 18:19   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 18:28     ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-07 20:20       ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 20:38         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 20:53           ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-16  3:10         ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-10-07 20:49     ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 23:16       ` Xin Li
2025-10-08 16:00         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-16 15:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-21 18:03     ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07  6:51 ` [PATCH v10 02/15] x86/asm: Introduce inline memcpy and memset Sohil Mehta
2025-10-21 12:47   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-21 13:48     ` David Laight
2025-10-21 18:06     ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07  6:51 ` [PATCH v10 03/15] x86/alternatives: Disable LASS when patching kernel alternatives Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 16:55   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 22:28     ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-08 16:22       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-10 17:10         ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-21 20:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-21 20:55     ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-22  9:56       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-22 19:49         ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-22 20:03           ` Luck, Tony
2025-10-22  8:25     ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-22  9:40       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-22 10:22         ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-22 10:52           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-07  6:51 ` [PATCH v10 04/15] x86/cpu: Set LASS CR4 bit as pinning sensitive Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 18:24   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 23:11     ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-08 16:52       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-10 19:03         ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07  6:51 ` [PATCH v10 05/15] x86/cpu: Defer CR pinning enforcement until late_initcall() Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 17:23   ` Edgecombe, Rick P [this message]
2025-10-07 23:05     ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-08 17:36       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-10 20:45         ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-15 21:17           ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-17 19:28   ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07  6:51 ` [PATCH v10 06/15] x86/efi: Disable LASS while mapping the EFI runtime services Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07  6:51 ` [PATCH v10 07/15] x86/kexec: Disable LASS during relocate kernel Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 17:43   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 22:33     ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07  6:51 ` [PATCH v10 08/15] x86/vsyscall: Reorganize the page fault emulation code Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 18:37   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 18:48     ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-07 19:53       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 22:52         ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-08 17:42           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-30 16:58       ` Andy Lutomirski
2025-10-30 17:22         ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-10-30 17:35           ` Andy Lutomirski
2025-10-30 19:28         ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-30 21:37           ` David Laight
2025-10-07  6:51 ` [PATCH v10 09/15] x86/traps: Consolidate user fixups in exc_general_protection() Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 17:46   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 22:41     ` Sohil Mehta
2025-10-08 17:43       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07  6:51 ` [PATCH v10 10/15] x86/vsyscall: Add vsyscall emulation for #GP Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07  6:51 ` [PATCH v10 11/15] x86/vsyscall: Disable LASS if vsyscall mode is set to EMULATE Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 18:43   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07  6:51 ` [PATCH v10 12/15] x86/traps: Communicate a LASS violation in #GP message Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 18:07   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07  6:51 ` [PATCH v10 13/15] x86/traps: Generalize #GP address decode and hint code Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 18:43   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07  6:51 ` [PATCH v10 14/15] x86/traps: Provide additional hints for a kernel stack segment fault Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07  6:51 ` [PATCH v10 15/15] x86/cpu: Enable LASS by default during CPU initialization Sohil Mehta
2025-10-07 18:42   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-07 16:23 ` [PATCH v10 00/15] x86: Enable Linear Address Space Separation support Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-17 19:52   ` Sohil Mehta

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