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From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
To: Ahmed Abd El Mawgood <ahmedsoliman0x666@gmail.com>,
	xen-devel@lists.xensource.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	rkrcmar@redhat.com, nathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	hpa@zytor.com, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
	Boris Lukashev <blukashev@sempervictus.com>,
	David Vrabel <david.vrabel@nutanix.com>,
	nigel.edwards@hpe.com, Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Subject: Re: Memory Read Only Enforcement: VMM assisted kernel rootkit mitigation for KVM
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 22:45:33 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180720024533.GA27437@char.US.ORACLE.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180719213802.17161-1-ahmedsoliman0x666@gmail.com>

On Thu, Jul 19, 2018 at 11:37:59PM +0200, Ahmed Abd El Mawgood wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> This is my first set of patches that works as I would expect, and the
> third revision I sent to mailing lists.
> 
> Following up with my previous discussions about kernel rootkit mitigation
> via placing R/O protection on critical data structure, static data,
> privileged registers with static content. These patches present the
> first part where it is only possible to place these protections on
> memory pages. Feature-wise, this set of patches is incomplete in the sense of:
> - They still don't protect privileged registers
> - They don't protect guest TLB from malicious gva -> gpa page mappings.
> But they provide sketches for a basic working design. Note that I am totally
> noob and it took lots of time and effort to get to this point. So sorry in
> advance if I overlooked something.

This reminds me of Xen PV page model. That is the hypervisor is the one
auditing the page tables and the guest's pages are read-only.

Ditto for IDT, GDT, etc. Gosh, did you by chance look at how
Xen PV mechanism is done? It may provide the protection you are looking for?

CC-ing xen-devel.
> 
> [PATCH 1/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Memory ROE documentation
> [PATCH 2/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Adding arbitrary data pointer in kvm memslot itterator functions
> [PATCH 3/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Adding skeleton for Memory ROE
> 
> Summery:
> 
>  Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt |  14 ++++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h          |  11 ++-
>  arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig                     |   7 ++
>  arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c                       | 127 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------
>  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                       |  82 +++++++++++++++++++-
>  include/linux/kvm_host.h                 |   3 +
>  include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h            |   1 +
>  virt/kvm/kvm_main.c                      |  29 ++++++-
>  8 files changed, 232 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
> 
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      parent reply	other threads:[~2018-07-20  2:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-07-19 21:37 Memory Read Only Enforcement: VMM assisted kernel rootkit mitigation for KVM Ahmed Abd El Mawgood
2018-07-19 21:38 ` [PATCH 1/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Memory ROE documentation Ahmed Abd El Mawgood
2018-07-20  1:11   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-07-19 21:38 ` [PATCH 2/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Adding arbitrary data pointer in kvm memslot itterator functions Ahmed Abd El Mawgood
2018-07-19 21:38 ` [PATCH 3/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Adding skeleton for Memory ROE Ahmed Abd El Mawgood
2018-07-19 22:59   ` Jann Horn
2018-07-20  0:26     ` Ahmed Soliman
2018-07-20  1:28       ` Jann Horn
2018-07-20 14:44         ` Ahmed Soliman
2018-07-20  1:07   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-07-20  2:45 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [this message]

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