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[173.164.112.133]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id h132-v6sm22420511pfc.100.2018.10.01.18.04.27 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 bits=256/256); Mon, 01 Oct 2018 18:04:29 -0700 (PDT) From: Kees Cook To: James Morris Cc: Kees Cook , Casey Schaufler , John Johansen , Tetsuo Handa , Paul Moore , Stephen Smalley , "Schaufler, Casey" , LSM , Jonathan Corbet , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH security-next v4 22/32] apparmor: Remove boot parameter Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2018 17:54:55 -0700 Message-Id: <20181002005505.6112-23-keescook@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20181002005505.6112-1-keescook@chromium.org> References: <20181002005505.6112-1-keescook@chromium.org> Sender: linux-doc-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Since LSM enabling is now centralized with CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE and "lsm.enable=...", this removes the LSM-specific enabling logic from AppArmor, though it leaves the existing userspace API visibility into /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled. Co-developed-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 7 ------- security/apparmor/Kconfig | 16 ---------------- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++----- 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index f646cfab5613..cf963febebb0 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -4054,13 +4054,6 @@ If enabled at boot time, /selinux/disable can be used later to disable prior to initial policy load. - apparmor= [APPARMOR] Disable or enable AppArmor at boot time - Format: { "0" | "1" } - See security/apparmor/Kconfig help text - 0 -- disable. - 1 -- enable. - Default value is set via kernel config option. - serialnumber [BUGS=X86-32] shapers= [NET] diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig index b6b68a7750ce..3de21f46c82a 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig +++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig @@ -14,22 +14,6 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. -config SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE - int "AppArmor boot parameter default value" - depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR - range 0 1 - default 1 - help - This option sets the default value for the kernel parameter - 'apparmor', which allows AppArmor to be enabled or disabled - at boot. If this option is set to 0 (zero), the AppArmor - kernel parameter will default to 0, disabling AppArmor at - boot. If this option is set to 1 (one), the AppArmor - kernel parameter will default to 1, enabling AppArmor at - boot. - - If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1. - config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH bool "Enable introspection of sha1 hashes for loaded profiles" depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index bc56b058dc75..4cd96a66ed6f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -1303,15 +1303,12 @@ bool aa_g_paranoid_load = true; module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO); /* Boot time disable flag */ -static int apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; +static int apparmor_enabled __lsm_ro_after_init; module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, int, 0444); static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str) { - unsigned long enabled; - int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled); - if (!error) - apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; + pr_err("Boot param 'apparmor=' ignored. Use 'lsm.disable=apparmor'\n"); return 1; } -- 2.17.1