From: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-team@android.com, Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>,
Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v11 0/4] overlayfs override_creds=off
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2019 08:52:21 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190730155227.41468-1-salyzyn@android.com> (raw)
Patch series:
overlayfs: check CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH before issuing exportfs_decode_fh
fs: __vfs_getxattr nesting paradigm
overlayfs: internal getxattr operations without sepolicy checking
overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred
The first three patches address fundamental security issues that should
be solved regardless of the override_creds=off feature.
on them).
The fourth adds the feature depends on these other fixes.
By default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the
recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are
checked against the caller's credentials.
If the principles of least privilege are applied for sepolicy, the
mounter's credentials might not overlap the credentials of the caller's
when accessing the overlayfs filesystem. For example, a file that a
lower DAC privileged caller can execute, is MAC denied to the
generally higher DAC privileged mounter, to prevent an attack vector.
We add the option to turn off override_creds in the mount options; all
subsequent operations after mount on the filesystem will be only the
caller's credentials. The module boolean parameter and mount option
override_creds is also added as a presence check for this "feature",
existence of /sys/module/overlay/parameters/overlay_creds
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
---
v11:
- Squish out v10 introduced patch 2 and 3 in the series,
then and use per-thread flag instead for nesting.
- Switch name to ovl_do_vds_getxattr for __vds_getxattr wrapper.
- Add sb argument to ovl_revert_creds to match future work.
v10:
- Return NULL on CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
- Add __get xattr method to solve sepolicy logging issue
- Drop unnecessary sys_admin sepolicy checking for administrative
driver internal xattr functions.
v6:
- Drop CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS.
- Do better with the documentation, drop rationalizations.
- pr_warn message adjusted to report consequences.
v5:
- beefed up the caveats in the Documentation
- Is dependent on
"overlayfs: check CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH before issuing exportfs_decode_fh"
"overlayfs: check CAP_MKNOD before issuing vfs_whiteout"
- Added prwarn when override_creds=off
v4:
- spelling and grammar errors in text
v3:
- Change name from caller_credentials / creator_credentials to the
boolean override_creds.
- Changed from creator to mounter credentials.
- Updated and fortified the documentation.
- Added CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS
v2:
- Forward port changed attr to stat, resulting in a build error.
- altered commit message.
next reply other threads:[~2019-07-30 15:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-07-30 15:52 Mark Salyzyn [this message]
2019-07-30 15:52 ` [PATCH v11 1/4] overlayfs: check CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH before issuing exportfs_decode_fh Mark Salyzyn
2019-07-30 15:52 ` [PATCH v11 2/4] fs: __vfs_getxattr nesting paradigm Mark Salyzyn
2019-07-30 15:52 ` [PATCH v11 3/4] overlayfs: internal getxattr operations without sepolicy checking Mark Salyzyn
2019-07-30 15:52 ` [PATCH v11 4/4] overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred Mark Salyzyn
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