From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.2 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 29429C43603 for ; Wed, 11 Dec 2019 17:24:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0C945206A5 for ; Wed, 11 Dec 2019 17:24:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730974AbfLKRYG (ORCPT ); Wed, 11 Dec 2019 12:24:06 -0500 Received: from mga02.intel.com ([134.134.136.20]:26245 "EHLO mga02.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729447AbfLKRYF (ORCPT ); Wed, 11 Dec 2019 12:24:05 -0500 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga005.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.32]) by orsmga101.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 11 Dec 2019 09:24:04 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.69,302,1571727600"; d="scan'208";a="413579055" Received: from cebrenes-mobl1.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.251.85.152]) by fmsmga005.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 11 Dec 2019 09:24:00 -0800 Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2019 19:23:59 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: James Bottomley Cc: "Zhao, Shirley" , Mimi Zohar , Jonathan Corbet , "linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org" , "keyrings@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , 'Mauro Carvalho Chehab' , "Zhu, Bing" , "Chen, Luhai" Subject: Re: One question about trusted key of keyring in Linux kernel. Message-ID: <20191211172345.GB4516@linux.intel.com> References: <1575260220.4080.17.camel@linux.ibm.com> <1575267453.4080.26.camel@linux.ibm.com> <1575269075.4080.31.camel@linux.ibm.com> <1575312932.24227.13.camel@linux.ibm.com> <20191209194715.GD19243@linux.intel.com> <1575923513.31378.22.camel@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1575923513.31378.22.camel@linux.ibm.com> Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: linux-doc-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Dec 09, 2019 at 12:31:53PM -0800, James Bottomley wrote: > On Mon, 2019-12-09 at 21:47 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > On Mon, Dec 02, 2019 at 10:55:32AM -0800, James Bottomley wrote: > > > blob but it looks like we need to fix the API. I suppose the good > > > news is given this failure that we have the opportunity to rewrite > > > the API since no-one else can have used it for anything because of > > > this. The > > > > I did successfully run this test when I wrote it 5 years ago: > > > > https://github.com/jsakkine-intel/tpm2-scripts/blob/master/keyctl-smo > > ke.sh > > > > Given that there is API a way must be found that backwards > > compatibility > > is not broken. New format is fine but it must co-exist. > > The old API is unsupportable in the combination of policy + auth as I > already explained. The kernel doesn't have access to the nonces to > generate the HMAC because the session was created by the user and the > API has no way to pass them in (plus passing them in would be a huge > security failure if we tried). Given that Shirley appears to be the > first person ever to try this, I don't think the old API has grown any > policy users so its safe to remove it. If we get a complaint, we can > discuss adding it back. It works within limits so it can be definitely be maintained for backwards compatibility. Also, you are making a claim of the users that we cannot verify. Finally, the new feature neither handles sessions. You claim that it could be added later. I have to deny that because until session handling is there we have no ways to be sure about that. I see your point but this needs more consideration. It does not make sense to rush. /Jarkko