Re: [PATCH] Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones: YAMA SECURITY MODULE

Kees Cook
2020-07-08T08:05:42Z

On Wed, Jul 08, 2020 at 09:33:46AM +0200, Alexander A. Klimov wrote:
> Rationale:
> Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM
> as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate.
>
> Deterministic algorithm:
> For each file:
> If not .svg:
> For each line:
> If doesn't contain `\bxmlns\b`:
> For each link, `\bhttp://[^# \t\r\n]*(?:\w|/)`:
> If neither `\bgnu\.org/license`, nor `\bmozilla\.org/MPL\b`:
> If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions
> return 200 OK and serve the same content:
> Replace HTTP with HTTPS.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov <grandmaster@al2klimov.de>
> ---
> Continuing my work started at 93431e0607e5.
> See also: git log --oneline '--author=Alexander A. Klimov <grandmaster@al2klimov.de>' v5.7..master
> (Actually letting a shell for loop submit all this stuff for me.)
>
> If there are any URLs to be removed completely or at least not HTTPSified:
> Just clearly say so and I'll *undo my change*.
> See also: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/6/27/64
>
> If there are any valid, but yet not changed URLs:
> See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/6/26/837
>
> If you apply the patch, please let me know.
>
>
> Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst
> index d0a060de3973..64fd62507ae5 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst
> @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ of their attack without resorting to user-assisted phishing.
>
> This is not a theoretical problem. SSH session hijacking
> (http://www.storm.net.nz/projects/7) and arbitrary code injection

This link is dead. It is likely best replaced by:
https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-boileau.pdf
(this is the same person, but it seems storm.net.nz is gone)

> -(http://c-skills.blogspot.com/2007/05/injectso.html) attacks already
> +(https://c-skills.blogspot.com/2007/05/injectso.html) attacks already
> exist and remain possible if ptrace is allowed to operate as before.
> Since ptrace is not commonly used by non-developers and non-admins, system
> builders should be allowed the option to disable this debugging system.

With that change:

Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

for the docs tree.

--
Kees Cook