linux-doc.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	"Gomez Iglesias, Antonio" <antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>,
	Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/bugs/multihit: Fix mitigation reporting when KVM is not in use
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2020 14:04:42 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200714210442.GA10488@guptapadev.amr> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ba442a51-294e-8624-9a69-5613ff050551@intel.com>

On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 12:54:26PM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 7/14/20 12:17 PM, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> > On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 07:57:53AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> >> Let's stick to things which are at least static per reboot.  Checking
> >> for X86_FEATURE_VMX or even CONFIG_KVM_INTEL seems like a good stopping
> >> point.  "Could this kernel run a naughty guest?"  If so, report
> >> "Vulnerable".  It's the same as Meltdown: "Could this kernel run
> >> untrusted code?"  If so, report "Vulnerable".
> > 
> > Thanks, These are good inputs. So what I need to add is a boot time
> > check for VMX feature and report "Vulnerable" or "Not
> > affected(VMX disabled)".
> > 
> > Are you suggesting to not change the reporting when KVM deploys the
> > "Split huge pages" mitigation? Is this because VMX can still be used by
> > other VMMs?
> > 
> > The current mitigation reporting is very specific to KVM:
> > 
> > 	- "KVM: Vulnerable"
> > 	- "KVM: Mitigation: Split huge pages"
> > 
> > As the kernel doesn't know about the mitigation state of out-of-tree
> > VMMs can we add VMX reporting to always say vulnerable when VMX is
> > enabled:
> > 
> > 	- "VMX: Vulnerable, KVM: Vulnerable"
> > 	- "VMX: Vulnerable, KVM: Mitigation: Split huge pages"
> > 
> > And if VMX is disabled report:
> > 
> > 	- "VMX: Not affected(VMX disabled)"
> 
> I see three inputs and four possible states (sorry for the ugly table,
> it was this or a spreadsheet :):
> 
> X86_FEATURE_VMX	CONFIG_KVM_*	hpage split  Result	   Reason
> 	N			x	    x	     Not Affected  No VMX
> 	Y			N	    x	     Not affected  No KVM
> 	Y			Y	    Y	     Mitigated	   hpage split
> 	Y			Y	    N	     Vulnerable

Thank you.

Just a note... for the last 2 cases kernel wont know about "hpage split"
mitigation until KVM is loaded. So for these cases reporting at boot
will be "Vulnerable" and would change to "Mitigated" once KVM is loaded
and deploys the mitigation. This is the current behavior.

Thanks,
Pawan

  reply	other threads:[~2020-07-14 21:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-07-14  1:18 [PATCH] x86/bugs/multihit: Fix mitigation reporting when KVM is not in use Pawan Gupta
2020-07-14  1:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-14 14:57   ` Dave Hansen
2020-07-14 19:17     ` Pawan Gupta
2020-07-14 19:54       ` Dave Hansen
2020-07-14 21:04         ` Pawan Gupta [this message]
2020-07-14 21:20           ` Dave Hansen
2020-07-15  0:51             ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-15 14:28               ` Dave Hansen
2020-07-15 17:18               ` Pawan Gupta
2020-07-15 18:04                 ` Sean Christopherson

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20200714210442.GA10488@guptapadev.amr \
    --to=pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=antonio.gomez.iglesias@intel.com \
    --cc=asteinhauser@google.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=fenghua.yu@intel.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=jmattson@google.com \
    --cc=joro@8bytes.org \
    --cc=jpoimboe@redhat.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=longman@redhat.com \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mgross@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=rppt@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=sean.j.christopherson@intel.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=tony.luck@intel.com \
    --cc=vincenzo.frascino@arm.com \
    --cc=vkuznets@redhat.com \
    --cc=wanpengli@tencent.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).