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From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V . Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	joao.moreira@intel.com, John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
	kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com
Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 25/35] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
Date: Sun, 30 Jan 2022 13:18:28 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220130211838.8382-26-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220130211838.8382-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>

From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

Introduce basic shadow stack enabling/disabling/allocation routines.
A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHADOW_STACK flag
and has a fixed size of min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4GB).

Add the user shadow stack MSRs to the xsave helpers, so they can be used
to implement the functionality.

Keep the task's shadow stack address and size in thread_struct. This will
be copied when cloning new threads, but needs to be cleared during exec,
so add a function to do this.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---

v1:
 - Switch to xsave helpers.
 - Expand commit log.

Yu-cheng v30:
 - Remove superfluous comments for struct thread_shstk.
 - Replace 'populate' with 'unused'.

Yu-cheng v28:
 - Update shstk_setup() with wrmsrl_safe(), returns success when shadow
   stack feature is not present (since this is a setup function).

Yu-cheng v27:
 - Change 'struct cet_status' to 'struct thread_shstk', and change member
   types from unsigned long to u64.
 - Re-order local variables in reverse order of length.
 - WARN_ON_ONCE() when vm_munmap() fails.

 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h       |  29 ++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h |   5 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile         |   1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c     |   5 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c     |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c          | 149 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..de90e4ae083a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_CET_H
+#define _ASM_X86_CET_H
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+struct task_struct;
+
+struct thread_shstk {
+	u64	base;
+	u64	size;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+int shstk_setup(void);
+void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
+int shstk_disable(void);
+void reset_thread_shstk(void);
+#else
+static inline void shstk_setup(void) {}
+static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
+static inline void shstk_disable(void) {}
+static inline void reset_thread_shstk(void) {}
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK */
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_CET_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 2c5f12ae7d04..a9f4e9c4ca81 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ struct vm86;
 #include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
 #include <asm/vmxfeatures.h>
 #include <asm/vdso/processor.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
 
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/cache.h>
@@ -528,6 +529,10 @@ struct thread_struct {
 	 */
 	u32			pkru;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+	struct thread_shstk	shstk;
+#endif
+
 	/* Floating point and extended processor state */
 	struct fpu		fpu;
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 6aef9ee28a39..d60ae6c365c7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)		+= sev.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM)	+= cc_platform.o
 
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK)		+= shstk.o
 ###
 # 64 bit specific files
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
index c5e20e0d0725..25b1b0c417fd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -1871,7 +1871,10 @@ int proc_pid_arch_status(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
 static u64 *__get_xsave_member(void *xstate, u32 msr)
 {
 	switch (msr) {
-	/* Currently there are no MSR's supported */
+	case MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
+		return &((struct cet_user_state *)xstate)->user_ssp;
+	case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
+		return &((struct cet_user_state *)xstate)->user_cet;
 	default:
 		WARN_ONCE(1, "x86/fpu: unsupported xstate msr (%u)\n", msr);
 		return NULL;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index 3402edec236c..f05fe27d4967 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -514,6 +514,8 @@ start_thread_common(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long new_ip,
 		load_gs_index(__USER_DS);
 	}
 
+	reset_thread_shstk();
+
 	loadsegment(fs, 0);
 	loadsegment(es, _ds);
 	loadsegment(ds, _ds);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4e8686ed885f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * shstk.c - Intel shadow stack support
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2021, Intel Corporation.
+ * Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/sizes.h>
+#include <linux/user.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
+#include <asm/special_insns.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
+
+static unsigned long alloc_shstk(unsigned long size)
+{
+	int flags = MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE;
+	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	unsigned long addr, unused;
+
+	mmap_write_lock(mm);
+	addr = do_mmap(NULL, 0, size, PROT_READ, flags, VM_SHADOW_STACK, 0,
+		       &unused, NULL);
+	mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+
+	return addr;
+}
+
+static void unmap_shadow_stack(u64 base, u64 size)
+{
+	while (1) {
+		int r;
+
+		r = vm_munmap(base, size);
+
+		/*
+		 * vm_munmap() returns -EINTR when mmap_lock is held by
+		 * something else, and that lock should not be held for a
+		 * long time.  Retry it for the case.
+		 */
+		if (r == -EINTR) {
+			cond_resched();
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * For all other types of vm_munmap() failure, either the
+		 * system is out of memory or there is bug.
+		 */
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(r);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+int shstk_setup(void)
+{
+	struct thread_shstk *shstk = &current->thread.shstk;
+	unsigned long addr, size;
+	void *xstate;
+	int err;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
+	    shstk->size ||
+	    shstk->base)
+		return 1;
+
+	size = PAGE_ALIGN(min_t(unsigned long long, rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK), SZ_4G));
+	addr = alloc_shstk(size);
+	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
+		return 1;
+
+	xstate = start_update_xsave_msrs(XFEATURE_CET_USER);
+	err = xsave_wrmsrl(xstate, MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr + size);
+	if (!err)
+		err = xsave_wrmsrl(xstate, MSR_IA32_U_CET, CET_SHSTK_EN);
+	end_update_xsave_msrs();
+
+	if (err) {
+		/*
+		 * Don't leak shadow stack if something went wrong with writing the
+		 * msrs. Warn about it because things may be in a weird state.
+		 */
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		unmap_shadow_stack(addr, size);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	shstk->base = addr;
+	shstk->size = size;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void reset_thread_shstk(void)
+{
+	memset(&current->thread.shstk, 0, sizeof(struct thread_shstk));
+}
+
+void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	struct thread_shstk *shstk = &tsk->thread.shstk;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
+	    !shstk->size ||
+	    !shstk->base)
+		return;
+
+	if (!tsk->mm)
+		return;
+
+	unmap_shadow_stack(shstk->base, shstk->size);
+
+	shstk->base = 0;
+	shstk->size = 0;
+}
+
+int shstk_disable(void)
+{
+	struct thread_shstk *shstk = &current->thread.shstk;
+	void *xstate;
+	int err;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
+	    !shstk->size ||
+	    !shstk->base)
+		return 1;
+
+	xstate = start_update_xsave_msrs(XFEATURE_CET_USER);
+	err = xsave_set_clear_bits_msrl(xstate, MSR_IA32_U_CET, 0, CET_SHSTK_EN);
+	if (!err)
+		err = xsave_wrmsrl(xstate, MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0);
+	end_update_xsave_msrs();
+
+	if (err)
+		return 1;
+
+	shstk_free(current);
+	return 0;
+}
-- 
2.17.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-01-30 21:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 152+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-01-30 21:18 [PATCH 00/35] Shadow stacks for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 01/35] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 02/35] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-07 22:39   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-08  8:41     ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-02-08 20:20       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-08  8:39   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 03/35] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-07 22:45   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-08 20:23     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-09  1:10   ` Kees Cook
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 04/35] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce CPU setup and option parsing for CET Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-07 22:49   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-08 20:29     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 05/35] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-07 23:28   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-08 21:36     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 06/35] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-07 23:56   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-08 22:23     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 07/35] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-08  0:13   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-08 22:52     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 08/35] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 09/35] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-08  1:05   ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 10/35] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-09 16:58   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-11  1:39     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-11  7:13       ` Wang, Zhi A
2022-02-12  1:45         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 11/35] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-09 18:00   ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 12/35] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-09 18:30   ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 13/35] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 14/35] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-09 21:55   ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 15/35] x86/mm: Check Shadow Stack page fault errors Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-09 19:06   ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 16/35] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-09 21:16   ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 17/35] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-09 21:51   ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 18/35] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-09 22:23   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-10 22:38     ` David Laight
2022-02-10 23:42       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-11  9:08         ` David Laight
2022-02-10 22:43   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-10 23:07     ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-10 23:40       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-11 17:54         ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-12  0:10           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 19/35] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-09 22:27   ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 20/35] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-09 22:50   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-09 22:52   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-10 22:45     ` David Laight
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 21/35] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-10 19:27   ` Dave Hansen
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 22/35] x86/mm: Prevent VM_WRITE shadow stacks Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-11 22:19   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-12  1:44     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 23/35] x86/fpu: Add helpers for modifying supervisor xstate Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-08  8:51   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-02-09 19:55     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-12  0:27   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-12  2:31     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 24/35] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-30 21:18 ` Rick Edgecombe [this message]
2022-02-11 23:37   ` [PATCH 25/35] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Dave Hansen
2022-02-12  0:07     ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-12  0:11       ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-12  0:12     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 26/35] x86/process: Change copy_thread() argument 'arg' to 'stack_size' Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-08  8:38   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-02-11  2:09     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-14 12:33   ` Jann Horn
2022-02-15  1:22     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-15  8:49       ` Christian Brauner
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 27/35] x86/fpu: Add unsafe xsave buffer helpers Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 28/35] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 29/35] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce shadow stack token setup/verify routines Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 30/35] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 31/35] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl elf feature functions Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 32/35] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 33/35] selftests/x86: Add map_shadow_stack syscall test Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-03 22:42   ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-04  1:22     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 34/35] x86/cet/shstk: Support wrss for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-01-31  7:56   ` Florian Weimer
2022-01-31 18:26     ` H.J. Lu
2022-01-31 18:45       ` Florian Weimer
2022-01-30 21:18 ` [PATCH 35/35] x86/cpufeatures: Limit shadow stack to Intel CPUs Rick Edgecombe
2022-02-03 21:58   ` John Allen
2022-02-03 22:23     ` H.J. Lu
2022-02-04 22:21       ` John Allen
2022-02-03 21:07 ` [PATCH 00/35] Shadow stacks for userspace Thomas Gleixner
2022-02-04  1:08   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-04  5:20     ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-04 20:23       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-05 13:26     ` David Laight
2022-02-05 13:29       ` H.J. Lu
2022-02-05 20:15         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-05 20:21           ` H.J. Lu
2022-02-06 13:19             ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-02-06 13:42           ` David Laight
2022-02-06 13:55             ` H.J. Lu
2022-02-07 10:22             ` Florian Weimer
2022-02-08  1:46             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-08  1:31           ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-08  9:31             ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-02-08 16:15               ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-06 13:06     ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-02-06 18:42 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-02-07  7:20   ` Adrian Reber
2022-02-07 16:30     ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-08  9:16       ` Mike Rapoport
2022-02-08  9:29         ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2022-02-08 16:21           ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-08 17:02             ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2022-02-09  2:18               ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-02-09  6:43                 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2022-02-09 10:53                 ` Mike Rapoport
2022-02-10  2:37                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-10  2:53                   ` H.J. Lu
2022-02-10 13:52                     ` Willgerodt, Felix
2022-02-11  7:41                   ` avagin
2022-02-11  8:04                     ` Mike Rapoport
2022-02-28 20:27                   ` Mike Rapoport
2022-02-28 20:30                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-28 21:30                       ` Mike Rapoport
2022-02-28 22:55                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-03-03 19:40                           ` Mike Rapoport
2022-03-03 23:00                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-03-04  1:30                               ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-03-04 19:13                                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-03-07 18:56                                   ` Mike Rapoport
2022-03-07 19:07                                     ` H.J. Lu
2022-05-31 11:59                                       ` Mike Rapoport
2022-05-31 16:25                                         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-05-31 16:36                                           ` Mike Rapoport
2022-05-31 17:34                                             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-05-31 18:00                                               ` H.J. Lu
2022-06-01 17:27                                                 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-06-01 19:27                                                   ` H.J. Lu
2022-06-01  8:06                                               ` Mike Rapoport
2022-06-01 17:24                                                 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-06-09 18:04                                                   ` Mike Rapoport
2022-03-07 22:21                                     ` David Laight

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