From: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
To: <mic@digikod.net>, <paul@paul-moore.com>, <jmorris@namei.org>,
<serge@hallyn.com>, <shuah@kernel.org>, <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH -next v2 4/6] landlock/selftests: add selftests for chmod and chown
Date: Sat, 27 Aug 2022 19:12:13 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220827111215.131442-5-xiujianfeng@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220827111215.131442-1-xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
The following APIs are tested with simple scenarios.
1. chmod/fchmod/fchmodat;
2. chmod/fchmod/lchown/fchownat;
The key point is that set these access rights on a directory but only for
its content, not the directory itself. this scenario is covered.
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 261 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 261 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index f513cd8d9d51..982cb824967c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -3272,6 +3272,267 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, truncate)
EXPECT_EQ(0, test_creat(file_in_dir_w));
}
+/* Invokes chmod(2) and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_chmod(const char *const path, mode_t mode)
+{
+ if (chmod(path, mode) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Invokes fchmod(2) and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_fchmod(int fd, mode_t mode)
+{
+ if (fchmod(fd, mode) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Invokes fchmodat(2) and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_fchmodat(int dirfd, const char *path, mode_t mode, int flags)
+{
+ if (fchmodat(dirfd, path, mode, flags) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Invokes chown(2) and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_chown(const char *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
+{
+ if (chown(path, uid, gid) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Invokes fchown(2) and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_fchown(int fd, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
+{
+ if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Invokes lchown(2) and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_lchown(const char *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
+{
+ if (lchown(path, uid, gid) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Invokes fchownat(2) and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_fchownat(int dirfd, const char *path,
+ uid_t uid, gid_t gid, int flags)
+{
+ if (fchownat(dirfd, path, uid, gid, flags) < 0)
+ return errno;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(layout1, unhandled_chmod)
+{
+ int ruleset_fd, file1_fd;
+ const char *file1 = file1_s1d1;
+ const char *file2 = file2_s1d1;
+ const char *dir1 = dir_s1d1;
+ const struct rule rules[] = {
+ {
+ .path = file1,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = file2,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = dir1,
+ .access = ACCESS_RW,
+ },
+ {},
+ };
+
+ ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ file1_fd = open(file1, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, file1_fd);
+
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_chmod(file1, 0400));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_fchmod(file1_fd, 0400));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, file1, 0400, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_chmod(file2, 0400));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_chmod(dir1, 0700));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(file1_fd));
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(layout1, chmod)
+{
+ int ruleset_fd, file1_fd;
+ const char *file1 = file1_s1d1;
+ const char *file2 = file2_s1d1;
+ const char *file3 = file1_s2d1;
+ const char *dir1 = dir_s1d1;
+ const char *dir2 = dir_s2d1;
+ const struct rule rules[] = {
+ {
+ .path = file1,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CHMOD,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = file2,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = dir1,
+ .access = ACCESS_RW,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = dir2,
+ .access = ACCESS_RW | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CHMOD,
+ },
+ {},
+ };
+
+ ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CHMOD, rules);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ file1_fd = open(file1, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, file1_fd);
+
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_chmod(file1, 0400));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_fchmod(file1_fd, 0400));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, file1, 0400, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_chmod(file2, 0400));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_chmod(dir1, 0700));
+ /* set CHMOD right on dir will only affect its context not dir itself*/
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_chmod(file3, 0400));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, file3, 0400, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_chmod(dir2, 0700));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, dir2, 0700, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(file1_fd));
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(layout1, unhandled_chown)
+{
+ int ruleset_fd, file1_fd;
+ const char *file1 = file1_s1d1;
+ const char *file2 = file2_s1d1;
+ const char *dir1 = dir_s1d1;
+ const struct rule rules[] = {
+ {
+ .path = file1,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = file2,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = dir1,
+ .access = ACCESS_RW,
+ },
+ {},
+ };
+ struct stat st;
+ uid_t uid;
+ gid_t gid;
+
+ ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ file1_fd = open(file1, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, file1_fd);
+ /*
+ * there is no CAP_CHOWN when the testcases framework setup,
+ * and we cannot assume the testcases are run as root, to make
+ * sure {f}chown syscall won't fail, get the original uid/gid and
+ * use them in test_{f}chown.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, stat(dir1, &st));
+ uid = st.st_uid;
+ gid = st.st_gid;
+
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_chown(file1, uid, gid));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_fchown(file1_fd, uid, gid));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_lchown(file1, uid, gid));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_fchownat(AT_FDCWD, file1, uid, gid, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_chown(file2, uid, gid));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_chown(dir1, uid, gid));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(file1_fd));
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(layout1, chown)
+{
+ int ruleset_fd, file1_fd;
+ const char *file1 = file1_s1d1;
+ const char *file2 = file2_s1d1;
+ const char *file3 = file1_s2d1;
+ const char *dir1 = dir_s1d1;
+ const char *dir2 = dir_s2d1;
+ const struct rule rules[] = {
+ {
+ .path = file1,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CHGRP,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = file2,
+ .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = dir1,
+ .access = ACCESS_RW,
+ },
+ {
+ .path = dir2,
+ .access = ACCESS_RW | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CHGRP,
+ },
+ {},
+ };
+ struct stat st;
+ uid_t uid;
+ gid_t gid;
+
+ ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CHGRP, rules);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ file1_fd = open(file1, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, file1_fd);
+ /*
+ * there is no CAP_CHOWN when the testcases framework setup,
+ * and we cannot assume the testcases are run as root, to make
+ * sure {f}chown syscall won't fail, get the original uid/gid and
+ * use them in test_{f}chown.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, stat(dir1, &st));
+ uid = st.st_uid;
+ gid = st.st_gid;
+
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_chown(file1, uid, gid));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_fchown(file1_fd, uid, gid));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_lchown(file1, uid, gid));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_fchownat(AT_FDCWD, file1, uid, gid, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_chown(file2, uid, gid));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_chown(dir1, uid, gid));
+ /* set CHOWN right on dir will only affect its context not dir itself*/
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, test_chown(file3, uid, gid));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, test_chown(dir2, uid, gid));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(file1_fd));
+}
+
/* clang-format off */
FIXTURE(layout1_bind) {};
/* clang-format on */
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-08-27 11:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-08-27 11:12 [PATCH -next v2 0/6] landlock: add chmod and chown support Xiu Jianfeng
2022-08-27 11:12 ` [PATCH -next v2 1/6] landlock: expand access_mask_t to u32 type Xiu Jianfeng
2022-08-27 11:12 ` [PATCH -next v2 2/6] landlock: abstract walk_to_visible_parent() helper Xiu Jianfeng
2022-08-30 11:22 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-08-31 11:56 ` xiujianfeng
2022-08-27 11:12 ` [PATCH -next v2 3/6] landlock: add chmod and chown support Xiu Jianfeng
2022-08-27 19:30 ` Günther Noack
2022-08-29 1:17 ` xiujianfeng
2022-08-29 16:01 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-09-01 13:06 ` xiujianfeng
2022-09-01 17:34 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-29 8:33 ` xiujianfeng
2022-11-14 14:12 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-11-18 9:03 ` xiujianfeng
2022-11-18 12:32 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-11-21 13:48 ` xiujianfeng
2022-08-29 6:30 ` xiujianfeng
2022-08-29 6:35 ` xiujianfeng
2022-08-27 11:12 ` Xiu Jianfeng [this message]
2022-08-27 17:48 ` [PATCH -next v2 4/6] landlock/selftests: add selftests for chmod and chown Günther Noack
2022-08-29 1:49 ` xiujianfeng
2022-08-27 11:12 ` [PATCH -next v2 5/6] landlock/samples: add chmod and chown support Xiu Jianfeng
2022-08-27 11:12 ` [PATCH -next v2 6/6] landlock: update chmod and chown support in document Xiu Jianfeng
2022-08-27 17:28 ` Günther Noack
2022-08-29 1:52 ` xiujianfeng
2022-08-30 11:22 ` [PATCH -next v2 0/6] landlock: add chmod and chown support Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-18 10:53 ` xiujianfeng
2023-04-20 17:40 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-24 8:52 ` xiujianfeng
2023-04-26 13:58 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-05-05 3:50 ` xiujianfeng
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