From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BC251EE6456 for ; Fri, 15 Sep 2023 10:59:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232796AbjIOK7n (ORCPT ); Fri, 15 Sep 2023 06:59:43 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:54142 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S231341AbjIOK7n (ORCPT ); Fri, 15 Sep 2023 06:59:43 -0400 Received: from mail-yb1-xb49.google.com (mail-yb1-xb49.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::b49]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 506C3C1 for ; Fri, 15 Sep 2023 03:59:37 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-yb1-xb49.google.com with SMTP id 3f1490d57ef6-d818e01823aso2119290276.2 for ; Fri, 15 Sep 2023 03:59:37 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20230601; t=1694775576; x=1695380376; darn=vger.kernel.org; h=cc:to:from:subject:message-id:mime-version:date:from:to:cc:subject :date:message-id:reply-to; bh=Q96e0kuVpLqyiXurRtzULT7V48+oh0KsDqb/+UWKHpA=; b=mgh954mDu+rnYiMNpcqUCnwHvsCdynxhQlIIl0NkcZZTdwonts1YFXVdwrTNQCXcYn Uijsw258odlFnL9gBrMHEUxqJItL6ApUdS8LSyVkA4v1x8nikhpTFPvaT4DDnZ53nXUz mP8hOEc4O7t4SxmvX1peVzPT9BzPrNdQCNI0DRlVb963UG8rUSFm0JSm6vMT6TsdCTOA SVg3xRPlS7q+hnLJI+Ayu4A+ZHOWVzeHBMRjU3Ky54t87pUW7GRvbRsPJUSJ9h3UC+8l 0z2c8dHsq3bJvkYAwllxXO1D+gPaLsBiIAUqw8maeGfYbUr/ZXGPZ4urxZbnWCmClLCc 1ASA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1694775576; x=1695380376; h=cc:to:from:subject:message-id:mime-version:date:x-gm-message-state :from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=Q96e0kuVpLqyiXurRtzULT7V48+oh0KsDqb/+UWKHpA=; b=QPJqJz+MRCaaeE4Pe54W2tola88xfKPbkh1dU329qBlQ6eFCgKHpoXadYB34Dw/Q/L HeMiuJ5P/o/JJSD7vhQgt+ws2vYLxomMLLpe7z7MTYSqJlVdAszMhBatnoT232xfLkmz ezz0HVZ3sQkYWKKiE/BKlb4ZvRugwwRNj1erO7qz0BW2TySPniOhx2Um6WOCwFkA92gc IOnCmEiF/iAONiGsNQAmb/KFLWZkP6g/CkWLwGvRz2/EkZqrtGTYVQwadc0onln8ePRC AKF2GzFYyNapbRsB8XF077gIiybNMp+xUk2kbTvAwToEZcAAGSMYOUUUlb8hOoyEDlg6 D7ew== X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YyEDkZp3KhSkhfrwOT1sbVSEBTy3GxXFp5J958ixnVK17YbLhvY XiYZK/NqpAJR4e8QI6fvlksTFxmzqXRDTM6QXg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IHAyZPRW+fz+wnC0QC2qAdXCfzyFvGgBvbmyG39sCaHUeo74IY504gFakd9PexJNIP9aoIzA1MrdwDX3eg0tA== X-Received: from mr-cloudtop2.c.googlers.com ([fda3:e722:ac3:cc00:31:98fb:c0a8:2a6]) (user=matteorizzo job=sendgmr) by 2002:a25:aa6c:0:b0:d7e:a025:2672 with SMTP id s99-20020a25aa6c000000b00d7ea0252672mr23125ybi.9.1694775576481; Fri, 15 Sep 2023 03:59:36 -0700 (PDT) Date: Fri, 15 Sep 2023 10:59:19 +0000 Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.42.0.459.ge4e396fd5e-goog Message-ID: <20230915105933.495735-1-matteorizzo@google.com> Subject: [RFC PATCH 00/14] Prevent cross-cache attacks in the SLUB allocator From: Matteo Rizzo To: cl@linux.com, penberg@kernel.org, rientjes@google.com, iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, vbabka@suse.cz, roman.gushchin@linux.dev, 42.hyeyoo@gmail.com, keescook@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, corbet@lwn.net, luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org Cc: jannh@google.com, matteorizzo@google.com, evn@google.com, poprdi@google.com, jordyzomer@google.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org The goal of this patch series is to deterministically prevent cross-cache attacks in the SLUB allocator. Use-after-free bugs are normally exploited by making the memory allocator reuse the victim object's memory for an object with a different type. This creates a type confusion which is a very powerful attack primitive. There are generally two ways to create such type confusions in the kernel: one way is to make SLUB reuse the freed object's address for another object of a different type which lives in the same slab cache. This only works in slab caches that can contain objects of different types (i.e. the kmalloc caches) and the attacker is limited to objects that belong to the same size class as the victim object. The other way is to use a "cross-cache attack": make SLUB return the page containing the victim object to the page allocator and then make it use the same page for a different slab cache or other objects that contain attacker-controlled data. This gives attackers access to all objects rather than just the ones in the same size class as the target and lets attackers target objects allocated from dedicated caches such as struct file. This patch prevents cross-cache attacks by making sure that once a virtual address is used for a slab cache it's never reused for anything except for other slabs in that cache. Jann Horn (13): mm/slub: add is_slab_addr/is_slab_page helpers mm/slub: move kmem_cache_order_objects to slab.h mm: use virt_to_slab instead of folio_slab mm/slub: create folio_set/clear_slab helpers mm/slub: pass additional args to alloc_slab_page mm/slub: pass slab pointer to the freeptr decode helper security: introduce CONFIG_SLAB_VIRTUAL mm/slub: add the slab freelists to kmem_cache x86: Create virtual memory region for SLUB mm/slub: allocate slabs from virtual memory mm/slub: introduce the deallocated_pages sysfs attribute mm/slub: sanity-check freepointers security: add documentation for SLAB_VIRTUAL Matteo Rizzo (1): mm/slub: don't try to dereference invalid freepointers Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.rst | 4 +- Documentation/security/self-protection.rst | 102 ++++ arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h | 10 + arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h | 21 + arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 19 +- arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c | 9 + arch/x86/mm/mm_internal.h | 4 + arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c | 10 + include/linux/slab.h | 8 + include/linux/slub_def.h | 25 +- init/main.c | 1 + kernel/resource.c | 2 +- lib/slub_kunit.c | 4 + mm/memcontrol.c | 2 +- mm/slab.h | 145 +++++ mm/slab_common.c | 21 +- mm/slub.c | 641 +++++++++++++++++++-- mm/usercopy.c | 12 +- security/Kconfig.hardening | 16 + 19 files changed, 977 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-) base-commit: 46a9ea6681907a3be6b6b0d43776dccc62cad6cf -- 2.42.0.459.ge4e396fd5e-goog