linux-doc.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
	kys@microsoft.com, haiyangz@microsoft.com, wei.liu@kernel.org,
	decui@microsoft.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
	bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
	hpa@zytor.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org,
	ravi.v.shankar@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v1 13/23] KVM: VMX: Handle VMX nested exception for FRED
Date: Wed,  8 Nov 2023 10:29:53 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231108183003.5981-14-xin3.li@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231108183003.5981-1-xin3.li@intel.com>

Set VMX nested exception bit in the VM-entry interruption information
VMCS field when injecting a nested exception using FRED event delivery
to ensure:
  1) The nested exception is injected on a correct stack level.
  2) The nested bit defined in FRED stack frame is set.

The event stack level used by FRED event delivery depends on whether the
event was a nested exception encountered during delivery of another event,
because a nested exception is "regarded" as happening on ring 0.  E.g.,
when #PF is configured to use stack level 1 in IA32_FRED_STKLVLS MSR:
  - nested #PF will be delivered on stack level 1 when triggered from
    user level.
  - normal #PF will be delivered on stack level 0 when triggered from
    user level.

The VMX nested-exception support ensures the correct event stack level is
chosen when a VM entry injects a nested exception.

Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  6 ++++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h      |  4 +++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c          |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c          | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              | 22 +++++++++++++---------
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.h              |  1 +
 6 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 1e5a6d9439f8..2ae8cc83dbb3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -721,6 +721,7 @@ struct kvm_queued_exception {
 	u32 error_code;
 	unsigned long payload;
 	bool has_payload;
+	bool nested;
 };
 
 struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
@@ -2015,8 +2016,9 @@ int kvm_emulate_rdpmc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void kvm_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr);
 void kvm_queue_exception_e(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, u32 error_code);
 void kvm_queue_exception_p(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, unsigned long payload);
-void kvm_requeue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr);
-void kvm_requeue_exception_e(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, u32 error_code);
+void kvm_requeue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, bool nested);
+void kvm_requeue_exception_e(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr,
+			     u32 error_code, bool nested);
 void kvm_inject_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct x86_exception *fault);
 void kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				    struct x86_exception *fault);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index 97729248e844..020dfd3f6b44 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@
 /* VMX_BASIC bits and bitmasks */
 #define VMX_BASIC_32BIT_PHYS_ADDR_ONLY		BIT_ULL(48)
 #define VMX_BASIC_INOUT				BIT_ULL(54)
+#define VMX_BASIC_NESTED_EXCEPTION		BIT_ULL(58)
 
 /* VMX_MISC bits and bitmasks */
 #define VMX_MISC_INTEL_PT			BIT_ULL(14)
@@ -404,8 +405,9 @@ enum vmcs_field {
 #define INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK        0x700           /* 10:8 */
 #define INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK     0x800           /* 11 */
 #define INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI		0x1000		/* 12 */
+#define INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK	0x2000		/* 13 */
 #define INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK            0x80000000      /* 31 */
-#define INTR_INFO_RESVD_BITS_MASK       0x7ffff000
+#define INTR_INFO_RESVD_BITS_MASK       0x7fffd000
 
 #define VECTORING_INFO_VECTOR_MASK           	INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK
 #define VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK        	INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 712146312358..78a9ff5cfcad 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -4047,10 +4047,10 @@ static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 		if (exitintinfo & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID_ERR) {
 			u32 err = svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info_err;
-			kvm_requeue_exception_e(vcpu, vector, err);
+			kvm_requeue_exception_e(vcpu, vector, err, false);
 
 		} else
-			kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector);
+			kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector, false);
 		break;
 	case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_INTR:
 		kvm_queue_interrupt(vcpu, vector, false);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 67fd4a56d031..518e68ee5a0d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1901,6 +1901,8 @@ static void vmx_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 				event_data = vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err;
 
 			vmcs_write64(INJECTED_EVENT_DATA, event_data);
+
+			intr_info |= ex->nested ? INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK : 0;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -2851,6 +2853,19 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
 	/* IA-32 SDM Vol 3B: 64-bit CPUs always have VMX_BASIC_MSR[48]==0. */
 	if (basic_msr & VMX_BASIC_32BIT_PHYS_ADDR_ONLY)
 		return -EIO;
+
+	/*
+	 * FRED draft Spec 5.0 Section 9.2:
+	 *
+	 * Any processor that enumerates support for FRED transitions
+	 * will also enumerate VMX nested-exception support.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED) &&
+	    !(basic_msr & VMX_BASIC_NESTED_EXCEPTION)) {
+		pr_warn_once("FRED enabled but no VMX nested-exception support\n");
+		if (error_on_inconsistent_vmcs_config)
+			return -EIO;
+	}
 #endif
 
 	/* Require Write-Back (WB) memory type for VMCS accesses. */
@@ -7313,11 +7328,12 @@ static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 			}
 		}
 
-		if (idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK) {
-			u32 err = vmcs_read32(error_code_field);
-			kvm_requeue_exception_e(vcpu, vector, err);
-		} else
-			kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector);
+		if (idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)
+			kvm_requeue_exception_e(vcpu, vector, vmcs_read32(error_code_field),
+						idt_vectoring_info & INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK);
+		else
+			kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector,
+					      idt_vectoring_info & INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK);
 		break;
 	case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR:
 		vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len = vmcs_read32(instr_len_field);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index d190bfc63fc4..51c07730f1b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -645,7 +645,8 @@ static void kvm_leave_nested(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 static void kvm_multiple_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		unsigned nr, bool has_error, u32 error_code,
-	        bool has_payload, unsigned long payload, bool reinject)
+	        bool has_payload, unsigned long payload,
+		bool reinject, bool nested)
 {
 	u32 prev_nr;
 	int class1, class2;
@@ -678,6 +679,7 @@ static void kvm_multiple_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 			 */
 			WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_is_exception_pending(vcpu));
 			vcpu->arch.exception.injected = true;
+			vcpu->arch.exception.nested = nested;
 			if (WARN_ON_ONCE(has_payload)) {
 				/*
 				 * For a reinjected event, KVM delivers its
@@ -727,6 +729,8 @@ static void kvm_multiple_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 
 		kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, DF_VECTOR, 0);
 	} else {
+		vcpu->arch.exception.nested = true;
+
 		/* replace previous exception with a new one in a hope
 		   that instruction re-execution will regenerate lost
 		   exception */
@@ -736,20 +740,20 @@ static void kvm_multiple_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 
 void kvm_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr)
 {
-	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, false, 0, false, 0, false);
+	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, false, 0, false, 0, false, false);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_queue_exception);
 
-void kvm_requeue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr)
+void kvm_requeue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, bool nested)
 {
-	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, false, 0, false, 0, true);
+	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, false, 0, false, 0, true, nested);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_requeue_exception);
 
 void kvm_queue_exception_p(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr,
 			   unsigned long payload)
 {
-	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, false, 0, true, payload, false);
+	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, false, 0, true, payload, false, false);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_queue_exception_p);
 
@@ -757,7 +761,7 @@ static void kvm_queue_exception_e_p(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr,
 				    u32 error_code, unsigned long payload)
 {
 	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, true, error_code,
-			       true, payload, false);
+			       true, payload, false, false);
 }
 
 int kvm_complete_insn_gp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int err)
@@ -829,13 +833,13 @@ void kvm_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 void kvm_queue_exception_e(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, u32 error_code)
 {
-	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, true, error_code, false, 0, false);
+	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, true, error_code, false, 0, false, false);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_queue_exception_e);
 
-void kvm_requeue_exception_e(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, u32 error_code)
+void kvm_requeue_exception_e(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, u32 error_code, bool nested)
 {
-	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, true, error_code, false, 0, true);
+	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, true, error_code, false, 0, true, nested);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_requeue_exception_e);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 60da8cbe6759..63e543c6834b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ static inline void kvm_clear_exception_queue(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	vcpu->arch.exception.pending = false;
 	vcpu->arch.exception.injected = false;
+	vcpu->arch.exception.nested = false;
 	vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending = false;
 }
 
-- 
2.42.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-11-08 19:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-08 18:29 [PATCH v1 00/23] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 01/23] KVM: VMX: Cleanup VMX basic information defines and usages Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 02/23] KVM: VMX: Cleanup VMX misc " Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 03/23] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 04/23] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 05/23] KVM: VMX: Initialize FRED VM entry/exit controls in vmcs_config Xin Li
2023-11-09  8:53   ` Chao Gao
2023-11-09 15:15     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-10  0:04       ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-10 15:01         ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-14  4:05           ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-13 17:18   ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-11-15  2:39     ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 06/23] KVM: VMX: Defer enabling FRED MSRs save/load until after set CPUID Xin Li
2023-11-09  9:15   ` Chao Gao
2023-11-09 23:50     ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-10  0:18       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-14  2:50         ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-15 21:47           ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 07/23] KVM: VMX: Disable intercepting FRED MSRs Xin Li
2023-11-09  9:21   ` Chao Gao
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 08/23] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li
2023-11-13  3:04   ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14  6:02     ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-14  6:51       ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 09/23] KVM: VMX: Switch FRED RSP0 between host and guest Xin Li
2023-11-13  3:47   ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14  5:17     ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-14  7:47       ` Chao Gao
2023-11-15  3:04         ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 10/23] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li
2023-11-13  5:24   ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14  4:48     ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 11/23] KVM: x86: Add kvm_is_fred_enabled() Xin Li
2023-11-13  7:35   ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14  4:42     ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-14  8:16       ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14 18:57         ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-20  9:04           ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 12/23] KVM: VMX: Handle FRED event data Xin Li
2023-11-13 10:14   ` Chao Gao
2023-11-14  4:34     ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-14  8:58       ` Chao Gao
2023-11-15  2:52         ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-16  2:39           ` Chao Gao
2023-11-20  8:16             ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` Xin Li [this message]
2023-11-14  7:40   ` [PATCH v1 13/23] KVM: VMX: Handle VMX nested exception for FRED Chao Gao
2023-11-15  3:03     ` Li, Xin3
2023-12-06  8:37       ` Li, Xin3
2023-12-07  8:42         ` Chao Gao
2023-12-07 10:09           ` Li, Xin3
2023-12-08  1:56             ` Chao Gao
2023-12-08 23:48               ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 14/23] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li
2023-11-14 14:36   ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-11-15  2:41     ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 15/23] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li
2023-11-09  8:21   ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-11-10  0:12     ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-20 15:52   ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2023-11-20 17:42     ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 16/23] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 17/23] KVM: nVMX: Add support for VMX FRED controls Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 18/23] KVM: nVMX: Add VMCS FRED states checking Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:29 ` [PATCH v1 19/23] KVM: x86: Allow FRED/LKGS/WRMSRNS to be exposed to guests Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:30 ` [PATCH v1 20/23] KVM: selftests: Add FRED VMCS fields to evmcs Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:30 ` [PATCH v1 21/23] KVM: selftests: Run debug_regs test with FRED enabled Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:30 ` [PATCH v1 22/23] KVM: selftests: Add a new VM guest mode to run user level code Xin Li
2023-11-08 18:30 ` [PATCH v1 23/23] KVM: selftests: Add fred exception tests Xin Li

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20231108183003.5981-14-xin3.li@intel.com \
    --to=xin3.li@intel.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=decui@microsoft.com \
    --cc=haiyangz@microsoft.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=kys@microsoft.com \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=ravi.v.shankar@intel.com \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=vkuznets@redhat.com \
    --cc=wei.liu@kernel.org \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).