From: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
To: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-edac@vger.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
luto@kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com,
peterz@infradead.org, jgross@suse.com, ravi.v.shankar@intel.com,
mhiramat@kernel.org, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
jiangshanlai@gmail.com, nik.borisov@suse.com,
shan.kang@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v13 20/35] x86/fred: Allow single-step trap and NMI when starting a new task
Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2023 02:50:09 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231205105030.8698-21-xin3.li@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231205105030.8698-1-xin3.li@intel.com>
From: "H. Peter Anvin (Intel)" <hpa@zytor.com>
Entering a new task is logically speaking a return from a system call
(exec, fork, clone, etc.). As such, if ptrace enables single stepping
a single step exception should be allowed to trigger immediately upon
entering user space. This is not optional.
NMI should *never* be disabled in user space. As such, this is an
optional, opportunistic way to catch errors.
Allow single-step trap and NMI when starting a new task, thus once
the new task enters user space, single-step trap and NMI are both
enabled immediately.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
---
Changes since v8:
* Use high-order 48 bits above the lowest 16 bit SS only when FRED
is enabled (Thomas Gleixner).
---
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index 7f66c0b14de6..7062b84dd467 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
#include <asm/resctrl.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include <asm/fsgsbase.h>
+#include <asm/fred.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
/* Not included via unistd.h */
#include <asm/unistd_32_ia32.h>
@@ -528,7 +529,7 @@ void x86_gsbase_write_task(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long gsbase)
static void
start_thread_common(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long new_ip,
unsigned long new_sp,
- unsigned int _cs, unsigned int _ss, unsigned int _ds)
+ u16 _cs, u16 _ss, u16 _ds)
{
WARN_ON_ONCE(regs != current_pt_regs());
@@ -545,11 +546,36 @@ start_thread_common(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long new_ip,
loadsegment(ds, _ds);
load_gs_index(0);
- regs->ip = new_ip;
- regs->sp = new_sp;
- regs->cs = _cs;
- regs->ss = _ss;
- regs->flags = X86_EFLAGS_IF;
+ regs->ip = new_ip;
+ regs->sp = new_sp;
+ regs->csx = _cs;
+ regs->ssx = _ss;
+ /*
+ * Allow single-step trap and NMI when starting a new task, thus
+ * once the new task enters user space, single-step trap and NMI
+ * are both enabled immediately.
+ *
+ * Entering a new task is logically speaking a return from a
+ * system call (exec, fork, clone, etc.). As such, if ptrace
+ * enables single stepping a single step exception should be
+ * allowed to trigger immediately upon entering user space.
+ * This is not optional.
+ *
+ * NMI should *never* be disabled in user space. As such, this
+ * is an optional, opportunistic way to catch errors.
+ *
+ * Paranoia: High-order 48 bits above the lowest 16 bit SS are
+ * discarded by the legacy IRET instruction on all Intel, AMD,
+ * and Cyrix/Centaur/VIA CPUs, thus can be set unconditionally,
+ * even when FRED is not enabled. But we choose the safer side
+ * to use these bits only when FRED is enabled.
+ */
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {
+ regs->fred_ss.swevent = true;
+ regs->fred_ss.nmi = true;
+ }
+
+ regs->flags = X86_EFLAGS_IF | X86_EFLAGS_FIXED;
}
void
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-12-05 11:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-12-05 10:49 [PATCH v13 00/35] x86: enable FRED for x86-64 Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:49 ` [PATCH v13 01/35] x86/cpufeatures,opcode,msr: Add the WRMSRNS instruction support Xin Li
2023-12-11 5:14 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2024-01-02 15:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-02 22:06 ` Li, Xin3
2024-01-03 11:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-05 10:49 ` [PATCH v13 02/35] x86/entry: Remove idtentry_sysvec from entry_{32,64}.S Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:49 ` [PATCH v13 03/35] x86/trapnr: Add event type macros to <asm/trapnr.h> Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:49 ` [PATCH v13 04/35] Documentation/x86/64: Add a documentation for FRED Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:49 ` [PATCH v13 05/35] x86/fred: Add Kconfig option for FRED (CONFIG_X86_FRED) Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:49 ` [PATCH v13 06/35] x86/cpufeatures: Add the CPU feature bit for FRED Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:49 ` [PATCH v13 07/35] x86/fred: Disable FRED support if CONFIG_X86_FRED is disabled Xin Li
2024-01-22 13:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-05 10:49 ` [PATCH v13 08/35] x86/fred: Disable FRED by default in its early stage Xin Li
2024-01-22 13:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-05 10:49 ` [PATCH v13 09/35] x86/opcode: Add ERET[US] instructions to the x86 opcode map Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:49 ` [PATCH v13 10/35] x86/objtool: Teach objtool about ERET[US] Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 11/35] x86/cpu: Add X86_CR4_FRED macro Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 12/35] x86/cpu: Add MSR numbers for FRED configuration Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 13/35] x86/ptrace: Cleanup the definition of the pt_regs structure Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 14/35] x86/ptrace: Add FRED additional information to " Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 15/35] x86/fred: Add a new header file for FRED definitions Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 16/35] x86/fred: Reserve space for the FRED stack frame Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 17/35] x86/fred: Update MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0 during task switch Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 18/35] x86/fred: Disallow the swapgs instruction when FRED is enabled Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 19/35] x86/fred: No ESPFIX needed " Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` Xin Li [this message]
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 21/35] x86/fred: Make exc_page_fault() work for FRED Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 22/35] x86/idtentry: Incorporate definitions/declarations of the FRED entries Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 23/35] x86/fred: Add a debug fault entry stub for FRED Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 24/35] x86/fred: Add a NMI " Xin Li
2023-12-15 1:51 ` H. Peter Anvin
2023-12-15 18:37 ` Li, Xin3
2023-12-16 6:31 ` [PATCH v13A " Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 25/35] x86/fred: Add a machine check " Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 26/35] x86/fred: FRED entry/exit and dispatch code Xin Li
2023-12-05 12:25 ` Andrew Cooper
2023-12-05 19:03 ` Li, Xin3
2023-12-06 7:45 ` Li, Xin3
2023-12-06 14:11 ` Andrew Cooper
2023-12-06 19:19 ` Li, Xin3
2023-12-06 19:26 ` H. Peter Anvin
2023-12-06 19:58 ` Brian Gerst
2023-12-07 9:43 ` Li, Xin3
2023-12-09 21:42 ` [PATCH v13A " Xin Li
2024-01-26 10:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 27/35] x86/traps: Add sysvec_install() to install a system interrupt handler Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 28/35] x86/fred: Let ret_from_fork_asm() jmp to asm_fred_exit_user when FRED is enabled Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 29/35] x86/fred: Fixup fault on ERETU by jumping to fred_entrypoint_user Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 30/35] x86/entry/calling: Allow PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS being used beyond actual entry code Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 31/35] x86/entry: Add fred_entry_from_kvm() for VMX to handle IRQ/NMI Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 32/35] KVM: VMX: Call fred_entry_from_kvm() for IRQ/NMI handling Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 33/35] x86/syscall: Split IDT syscall setup code into idt_syscall_init() Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 34/35] x86/fred: Add FRED initialization functions Xin Li
2023-12-05 10:50 ` [PATCH v13 35/35] x86/fred: Invoke FRED initialization code to enable FRED Xin Li
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