From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
tony.luck@intel.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org,
Alyssa Milburn <alyssa.milburn@linux.intel.com>,
Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
antonio.gomez.iglesias@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 6/6] KVM: VMX: Move VERW closer to VMentry for MDS mitigation
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2024 16:02:06 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240112000206.ur5ub5bf5noesvc3@desk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZaAbGWFEfUt1PX66@google.com>
On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 08:45:13AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > index bdcf2c041e0c..8defba8e417b 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > @@ -387,6 +387,17 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_enable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> >
> > static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> > {
> > + /*
> > + * FB_CLEAR_CTRL is to optimize VERW latency in guests when host is
> > + * affected by MMIO Stale Data, but not by MDS/TAA. When
> > + * X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF is enabled, system is likely affected by
> > + * MDS/TAA. Skip the optimization for such a case.
>
> This is unnecessary speculation (ha!), and it'll also be confusing for many readers
> as the code below explicitly checks for MDS/TAA. We have no idea why the host
> admin forced the mitigation to be enabled, and it doesn't matter. The important
> thing to capture is that the intent is to keep the mitigation enabled when it
> was forcefully enabled, that should be self-explanatory and doesn't require
> speculating on _why_ the mitigation was forced on.
Agree.
> > + */
> > + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF)) {
> > + vmx->disable_fb_clear = false;
> > + return;
> > + }
> > +
> > vmx->disable_fb_clear = (host_arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) &&
> > !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) &&
> > !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
>
> I would rather include the X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF check along with all the
> other checks, and then add a common early return. E.g.
>
> /*
> * Disable VERW's behavior of clearing CPU buffers for the guest if the
> * CPU isn't affected MDS/TAA, and the host hasn't forcefully enabled
> * the mitigation. Disabing the clearing provides a performance boost
> * for guests that aren't aware that manually clearing CPU buffers is
> * unnecessary, at the cost of MSR accesses on VM-Entry and VM-Exit.
> */
> vmx->disable_fb_clear = !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF) &&
> (host_arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) &&
> !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) &&
> !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
>
> if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear)
> return;
This is better. Thanks.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-12 0:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-11 8:56 [PATCH v5 0/6] Delay VERW Pawan Gupta
2024-01-11 8:56 ` [PATCH v5 1/6] x86/bugs: Add asm helpers for executing VERW Pawan Gupta
2024-01-11 8:56 ` [PATCH v5 2/6] x86/entry_64: Add VERW just before userspace transition Pawan Gupta
2024-01-11 8:56 ` [PATCH v5 3/6] x86/entry_32: " Pawan Gupta
2024-01-11 8:56 ` [PATCH v5 4/6] x86/bugs: Use ALTERNATIVE() instead of mds_user_clear static key Pawan Gupta
2024-01-11 8:56 ` [PATCH v5 5/6] KVM: VMX: Use BT+JNC, i.e. EFLAGS.CF to select VMRESUME vs. VMLAUNCH Pawan Gupta
2024-01-11 8:56 ` [PATCH v5 6/6] KVM: VMX: Move VERW closer to VMentry for MDS mitigation Pawan Gupta
2024-01-11 16:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-01-12 0:02 ` Pawan Gupta [this message]
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