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From: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Cc: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
	shuah@kernel.org, vkuznets@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org,
	ravi.v.shankar@intel.com, xin@zytor.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 13/25] KVM: VMX: Handle VMX nested exception for FRED
Date: Wed,  7 Feb 2024 09:26:33 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240207172646.3981-14-xin3.li@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240207172646.3981-1-xin3.li@intel.com>

Set VMX nested exception bit in the VM-entry interruption information
VMCS field when injecting a nested exception using FRED event delivery
to ensure:
  1) The nested exception is injected on a correct stack level.
  2) The nested bit defined in FRED stack frame is set.

The event stack level used by FRED event delivery depends on whether the
event was a nested exception encountered during delivery of another event,
because a nested exception is "regarded" as happening on ring 0.  E.g.,
when #PF is configured to use stack level 1 in IA32_FRED_STKLVLS MSR:
  - nested #PF will be delivered on stack level 1 when encountered in
    ring 3.
  - normal #PF will be delivered on stack level 0 when encountered in
    ring 3.

The VMX nested-exception support ensures the correct event stack level is
chosen when a VM entry injects a nested exception.

Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
---

Changes since v1:
* Set the nested flag when there is an original interrupt (Chao Gao).
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  6 +++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h      |  5 ++--
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c          |  4 +--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c          |  8 ++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.h              |  1 +
 6 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 0d88873eba63..ef278ee0b6ca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -736,6 +736,7 @@ struct kvm_queued_exception {
 	u32 error_code;
 	unsigned long payload;
 	bool has_payload;
+	bool nested;
 };
 
 struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
@@ -2060,8 +2061,9 @@ int kvm_emulate_rdpmc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void kvm_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr);
 void kvm_queue_exception_e(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, u32 error_code);
 void kvm_queue_exception_p(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, unsigned long payload);
-void kvm_requeue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr);
-void kvm_requeue_exception_e(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, u32 error_code);
+void kvm_requeue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, bool nested);
+void kvm_requeue_exception_e(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr,
+			     u32 error_code, bool nested);
 void kvm_inject_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct x86_exception *fault);
 void kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				    struct x86_exception *fault);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index 6b796c5c9c2b..68af74e48788 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@
 #define VMX_BASIC_DUAL_MONITOR_TREATMENT	BIT_ULL(49)
 #define VMX_BASIC_INOUT				BIT_ULL(54)
 #define VMX_BASIC_TRUE_CTLS			BIT_ULL(55)
-
+#define VMX_BASIC_NESTED_EXCEPTION		BIT_ULL(58)
 
 /* VMX_MISC bits and bitmasks */
 #define VMX_MISC_INTEL_PT			BIT_ULL(14)
@@ -407,8 +407,9 @@ enum vmcs_field {
 #define INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK        0x700           /* 10:8 */
 #define INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK     0x800           /* 11 */
 #define INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI		0x1000		/* 12 */
+#define INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK	0x2000		/* 13 */
 #define INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK            0x80000000      /* 31 */
-#define INTR_INFO_RESVD_BITS_MASK       0x7ffff000
+#define INTR_INFO_RESVD_BITS_MASK       0x7fffd000
 
 #define VECTORING_INFO_VECTOR_MASK           	INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK
 #define VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK        	INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index e90b429c84f1..c220b690a37c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -4057,10 +4057,10 @@ static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 		if (exitintinfo & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID_ERR) {
 			u32 err = svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info_err;
-			kvm_requeue_exception_e(vcpu, vector, err);
+			kvm_requeue_exception_e(vcpu, vector, err, false);
 
 		} else
-			kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector);
+			kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector, false);
 		break;
 	case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_INTR:
 		kvm_queue_interrupt(vcpu, vector, false);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index f622fb90a098..1f265d526daf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1891,6 +1891,8 @@ static void vmx_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 				event_data = to_vmx(vcpu)->fred_xfd_event_data;
 
 			vmcs_write64(INJECTED_EVENT_DATA, event_data);
+
+			intr_info |= ex->nested ? INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK : 0;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -7281,9 +7283,11 @@ static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool vectoring)
 		}
 
 		if (event_id & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)
-			kvm_requeue_exception_e(vcpu, vector, vmcs_read32(error_code_field));
+			kvm_requeue_exception_e(vcpu, vector, vmcs_read32(error_code_field),
+						event_id & INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK);
 		else
-			kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector);
+			kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector,
+					      event_id & INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK);
 		break;
 	case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR:
 		vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len = vmcs_read32(instr_len_field);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 00c0062726ae..725819262085 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -645,7 +645,8 @@ static void kvm_leave_nested(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 static void kvm_multiple_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		unsigned nr, bool has_error, u32 error_code,
-	        bool has_payload, unsigned long payload, bool reinject)
+	        bool has_payload, unsigned long payload,
+		bool reinject, bool nested)
 {
 	u32 prev_nr;
 	int class1, class2;
@@ -696,6 +697,13 @@ static void kvm_multiple_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 			vcpu->arch.exception.pending = true;
 			vcpu->arch.exception.injected = false;
 		}
+
+		vcpu->arch.exception.nested = vcpu->arch.exception.nested ||
+					      (kvm_is_fred_enabled(vcpu) &&
+					       ((reinject && nested) ||
+					        vcpu->arch.nmi_injected ||
+					        vcpu->arch.interrupt.injected));
+
 		vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code = has_error;
 		vcpu->arch.exception.vector = nr;
 		vcpu->arch.exception.error_code = error_code;
@@ -725,8 +733,28 @@ static void kvm_multiple_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		vcpu->arch.exception.injected = false;
 		vcpu->arch.exception.pending = false;
 
+		/*
+		 * A #DF is NOT a nested event per its definition, however per
+		 * FRED spec 5.0 Appendix B, its delivery determines the new
+		 * stack level as is done for events occurring when CPL = 0.
+		 */
+		vcpu->arch.exception.nested = false;
+
 		kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, DF_VECTOR, 0);
 	} else {
+		/*
+		 * FRED spec 5.0 Appendix B: delivery of a nested exception
+		 * determines the new stack level as is done for events
+		 * occurring when CPL = 0.
+		 *
+		 * IOW, FRED event delivery of an event encountered in ring 3
+		 * normally uses stack level 0 unconditionally.  However, if
+		 * the event is an exception nested on any earlier event,
+		 * delivery of the nested exception will consult the FRED MSR
+		 * IA32_FRED_STKLVLS to determine which stack level to use.
+		 */
+		vcpu->arch.exception.nested = kvm_is_fred_enabled(vcpu);
+
 		/* replace previous exception with a new one in a hope
 		   that instruction re-execution will regenerate lost
 		   exception */
@@ -736,20 +764,20 @@ static void kvm_multiple_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 
 void kvm_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr)
 {
-	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, false, 0, false, 0, false);
+	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, false, 0, false, 0, false, false);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_queue_exception);
 
-void kvm_requeue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr)
+void kvm_requeue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, bool nested)
 {
-	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, false, 0, false, 0, true);
+	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, false, 0, false, 0, true, nested);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_requeue_exception);
 
 void kvm_queue_exception_p(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr,
 			   unsigned long payload)
 {
-	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, false, 0, true, payload, false);
+	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, false, 0, true, payload, false, false);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_queue_exception_p);
 
@@ -757,7 +785,7 @@ static void kvm_queue_exception_e_p(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr,
 				    u32 error_code, unsigned long payload)
 {
 	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, true, error_code,
-			       true, payload, false);
+			       true, payload, false, false);
 }
 
 int kvm_complete_insn_gp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int err)
@@ -829,13 +857,13 @@ void kvm_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 void kvm_queue_exception_e(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, u32 error_code)
 {
-	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, true, error_code, false, 0, false);
+	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, true, error_code, false, 0, false, false);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_queue_exception_e);
 
-void kvm_requeue_exception_e(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, u32 error_code)
+void kvm_requeue_exception_e(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, u32 error_code, bool nested)
 {
-	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, true, error_code, false, 0, true);
+	kvm_multiple_exception(vcpu, nr, true, error_code, false, 0, true, nested);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_requeue_exception_e);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 9a52016ebf5a..c1f1d5696080 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ static inline void kvm_clear_exception_queue(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	vcpu->arch.exception.pending = false;
 	vcpu->arch.exception.injected = false;
+	vcpu->arch.exception.nested = false;
 	vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending = false;
 }
 
-- 
2.43.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-02-07 17:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 96+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-07 17:26 [PATCH v2 00/25] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 01/25] KVM: VMX: Cleanup VMX basic information defines and usages Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 02/25] KVM: VMX: Cleanup VMX misc " Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 03/25] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li
2024-04-19 10:21   ` Chao Gao
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 04/25] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li
2024-04-19 10:22   ` Chao Gao
2024-06-12 21:12   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13  3:27     ` Li, Xin3
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 05/25] KVM: VMX: Initialize FRED VM entry/exit controls in vmcs_config Xin Li
2024-04-19 10:24   ` Chao Gao
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 06/25] KVM: VMX: Defer enabling FRED MSRs save/load until after set CPUID Xin Li
2024-04-19 11:02   ` Chao Gao
2024-06-12 21:19   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13  3:31     ` Li, Xin3
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 07/25] KVM: VMX: Set intercept for FRED MSRs Xin Li
2024-04-19 13:35   ` Chao Gao
2024-04-19 17:06     ` Li, Xin3
2024-06-12 21:32     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-05 17:09       ` Xin Li
2024-09-12 20:05         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-18  8:35           ` Xin Li
2024-09-25 14:12             ` Sean Christopherson
2024-09-25 22:13               ` Xin Li
2024-09-27 17:48                 ` Xin Li
2024-09-30 16:56                   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-12 21:20   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 08/25] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li
2024-04-19 14:01   ` Chao Gao
2024-04-19 17:02     ` Li, Xin3
2024-06-12 21:41   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 09/25] KVM: VMX: Switch FRED RSP0 between host and guest Xin Li
2024-04-19 14:23   ` Chao Gao
2024-04-19 16:37     ` Li, Xin3
2024-06-12 21:53   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-10 15:51     ` Li, Xin3
2024-07-12 15:12       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-12 16:15         ` Li, Xin3
2024-07-12 16:27           ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-12 17:17             ` Li, Xin3
2024-07-12 19:30               ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-17 17:31               ` Li, Xin3
2024-07-18 13:59                 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-18 17:44                   ` Li, Xin3
2024-07-18 21:04         ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-07-19 15:59           ` Sean Christopherson
2024-07-21 18:09             ` Li, Xin3
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 10/25] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li
2024-04-29  6:31   ` Chao Gao
2024-06-12 22:09   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 11/25] KVM: x86: Add kvm_is_fred_enabled() Xin Li
2024-04-29  8:24   ` Chao Gao
2024-05-11  1:24     ` Li, Xin3
2024-05-11  1:53       ` Chao Gao
2024-06-12 22:13   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13 16:55   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 12/25] KVM: VMX: Handle FRED event data Xin Li
2024-04-30  3:14   ` Chao Gao
2024-05-10  9:36     ` Li, Xin3
2024-05-11  3:03       ` Chao Gao
2024-06-12 23:31         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13  5:29           ` Chao Gao
2024-06-13 17:57             ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-12 22:52   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13 16:57   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-13 18:02     ` Li, Xin3
2024-02-07 17:26 ` Xin Li [this message]
2024-04-30  7:34   ` [PATCH v2 13/25] KVM: VMX: Handle VMX nested exception for FRED Chao Gao
2024-06-13 17:01   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 14/25] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li
2024-04-30  8:21   ` Chao Gao
2024-06-13 18:00     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 15/25] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li
2024-04-30  9:09   ` Chao Gao
2024-06-12 23:55     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 16/25] KVM: VMX: Invoke vmx_set_cpu_caps() before nested setup Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 17/25] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li
2024-06-13 18:11   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 18/25] KVM: nVMX: Add a prerequisite to SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros Xin Li
2024-06-13 18:16   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 19/25] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields Xin Li
2024-06-13 18:29   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 20/25] KVM: nVMX: Add support for VMX FRED controls Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 21/25] KVM: nVMX: Add VMCS FRED states checking Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 22/25] KVM: x86: Allow FRED/LKGS/WRMSRNS to be exposed to guests Xin Li
2024-06-13 18:31   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 23/25] KVM: selftests: Run debug_regs test with FRED enabled Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 24/25] KVM: selftests: Add a new VM guest mode to run user level code Xin Li
2024-02-07 17:26 ` [PATCH v2 25/25] KVM: selftests: Add fred exception tests Xin Li
2024-03-29 20:18   ` Muhammad Usama Anjum
2024-03-29 20:18     ` Muhammad Usama Anjum
2024-04-24 16:08       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-27  8:08 ` [PATCH v2 00/25] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Kang, Shan
2024-06-13 18:38   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-06-14  0:52     ` Li, Xin3
2024-04-15 17:58 ` Li, Xin3

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