From: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
To: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev, ross.philipson@oracle.com,
dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ardb@kernel.org,
mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com,
peterhuewe@gmx.de, jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca,
luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, corbet@lwn.net,
ebiederm@xmission.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
baolu.lu@linux.intel.com, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch
Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2024 04:09:17 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202408280656.66ZxoOOL-lkp@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240826223835.3928819-21-ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Hi Ross,
kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:
[auto build test WARNING on tip/x86/core]
[also build test WARNING on char-misc/char-misc-testing char-misc/char-misc-next char-misc/char-misc-linus herbert-cryptodev-2.6/master efi/next linus/master v6.11-rc5]
[cannot apply to herbert-crypto-2.6/master next-20240827]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Ross-Philipson/Documentation-x86-Secure-Launch-kernel-documentation/20240827-065225
base: tip/x86/core
patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240826223835.3928819-21-ross.philipson%40oracle.com
patch subject: [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch
config: i386-allmodconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240828/202408280656.66ZxoOOL-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-12 (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240828/202408280656.66ZxoOOL-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202408280656.66ZxoOOL-lkp@intel.com/
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c: In function 'efi_secure_launch_update_boot_params':
>> drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c:941:40: warning: cast to pointer from integer of different size [-Wint-to-pointer-cast]
941 | os_mle = txt_os_mle_data_start((void *)txt_info->txt_heap);
| ^
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c:945:36: warning: cast from pointer to integer of different size [-Wpointer-to-int-cast]
945 | os_mle->boot_params_addr = (u64)boot_params;
| ^
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c:953:60: warning: cast from pointer to integer of different size [-Wpointer-to-int-cast]
953 | policy->policy_entries[i].entity = (u64)boot_params;
| ^
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c:980:56: warning: cast to pointer from integer of different size [-Wint-to-pointer-cast]
980 | boot_params->hdr.cmdline_size = strlen((const char *)cmdline_ptr);
| ^
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c: In function 'efi_secure_launch':
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c:1014:28: warning: cast to pointer from integer of different size [-Wint-to-pointer-cast]
1014 | handler_callback = (dl_handler_func)dlinfo->dl_handler;
| ^
vim +941 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
927
928 static bool efi_secure_launch_update_boot_params(struct slr_table *slrt,
929 struct boot_params *boot_params)
930 {
931 struct slr_entry_intel_info *txt_info;
932 struct slr_entry_policy *policy;
933 struct txt_os_mle_data *os_mle;
934 bool updated = false;
935 int i;
936
937 txt_info = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_INTEL_INFO);
938 if (!txt_info)
939 return false;
940
> 941 os_mle = txt_os_mle_data_start((void *)txt_info->txt_heap);
942 if (!os_mle)
943 return false;
944
945 os_mle->boot_params_addr = (u64)boot_params;
946
947 policy = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_ENTRY_POLICY);
948 if (!policy)
949 return false;
950
951 for (i = 0; i < policy->nr_entries; i++) {
952 if (policy->policy_entries[i].entity_type == SLR_ET_BOOT_PARAMS) {
953 policy->policy_entries[i].entity = (u64)boot_params;
954 updated = true;
955 break;
956 }
957 }
958
959 /*
960 * If this is a PE entry into EFI stub the mocked up boot params will
961 * be missing some of the setup header data needed for the second stage
962 * of the Secure Launch boot.
963 */
964 if (image) {
965 struct setup_header *hdr = (struct setup_header *)((u8 *)image->image_base +
966 offsetof(struct boot_params, hdr));
967 u64 cmdline_ptr;
968
969 boot_params->hdr.setup_sects = hdr->setup_sects;
970 boot_params->hdr.syssize = hdr->syssize;
971 boot_params->hdr.version = hdr->version;
972 boot_params->hdr.loadflags = hdr->loadflags;
973 boot_params->hdr.kernel_alignment = hdr->kernel_alignment;
974 boot_params->hdr.min_alignment = hdr->min_alignment;
975 boot_params->hdr.xloadflags = hdr->xloadflags;
976 boot_params->hdr.init_size = hdr->init_size;
977 boot_params->hdr.kernel_info_offset = hdr->kernel_info_offset;
978 efi_set_u64_form(boot_params->hdr.cmd_line_ptr, boot_params->ext_cmd_line_ptr,
979 &cmdline_ptr);
980 boot_params->hdr.cmdline_size = strlen((const char *)cmdline_ptr);
981 }
982
983 return updated;
984 }
985
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-27 20:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-26 22:38 [PATCH v10 00/20] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 01/20] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 02/20] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 03/20] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 04/20] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 05/20] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 06/20] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 07/20] x86/msr: Add variable MTRR base/mask and x2apic ID registers Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 08/20] x86/boot: Place TXT MLE header in the kernel_info section Ross Philipson
2024-08-27 10:29 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 09/20] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 10/20] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 11/20] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 12/20] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 13/20] x86/reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 14/20] tpm: Protect against locality counter underflow Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 15/20] tpm: Ensure tpm is in known state at startup Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 16/20] tpm: Make locality requests return consistent values Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 17/20] tpm: Add ability to set the default locality the TPM chip uses Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 18/20] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the default locality Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 19/20] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2024-08-27 10:28 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-08-27 17:19 ` ross.philipson
2024-08-27 20:09 ` kernel test robot [this message]
2024-08-28 17:09 ` kernel test robot
2024-08-28 17:14 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-08-28 20:19 ` ross.philipson
2024-08-29 13:23 ` Jonathan McDowell
2024-08-29 13:28 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-08-29 15:13 ` ross.philipson
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