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From: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
To: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev, ross.philipson@oracle.com,
	dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ardb@kernel.org,
	mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com,
	peterhuewe@gmx.de, jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca,
	luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, corbet@lwn.net,
	ebiederm@xmission.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
	baolu.lu@linux.intel.com, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch
Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2024 01:09:15 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202408290030.FEbUhHbr-lkp@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240826223835.3928819-21-ross.philipson@oracle.com>

Hi Ross,

kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:

[auto build test WARNING on tip/x86/core]
[also build test WARNING on char-misc/char-misc-testing char-misc/char-misc-next char-misc/char-misc-linus herbert-cryptodev-2.6/master efi/next linus/master v6.11-rc5]
[cannot apply to herbert-crypto-2.6/master next-20240828]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Ross-Philipson/Documentation-x86-Secure-Launch-kernel-documentation/20240827-065225
base:   tip/x86/core
patch link:    https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240826223835.3928819-21-ross.philipson%40oracle.com
patch subject: [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch
config: i386-randconfig-062-20240828 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240829/202408290030.FEbUhHbr-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: clang version 18.1.5 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 617a15a9eac96088ae5e9134248d8236e34b91b1)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240829/202408290030.FEbUhHbr-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)

If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202408290030.FEbUhHbr-lkp@intel.com/

sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
>> drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c:945:41: sparse: sparse: non size-preserving pointer to integer cast
   drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c:953:65: sparse: sparse: non size-preserving pointer to integer cast
>> drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c:980:70: sparse: sparse: non size-preserving integer to pointer cast
   drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c:1014:45: sparse: sparse: non size-preserving integer to pointer cast

vim +945 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c

   927	
   928	static bool efi_secure_launch_update_boot_params(struct slr_table *slrt,
   929							 struct boot_params *boot_params)
   930	{
   931		struct slr_entry_intel_info *txt_info;
   932		struct slr_entry_policy *policy;
   933		struct txt_os_mle_data *os_mle;
   934		bool updated = false;
   935		int i;
   936	
   937		txt_info = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_INTEL_INFO);
   938		if (!txt_info)
   939			return false;
   940	
   941		os_mle = txt_os_mle_data_start((void *)txt_info->txt_heap);
   942		if (!os_mle)
   943			return false;
   944	
 > 945		os_mle->boot_params_addr = (u64)boot_params;
   946	
   947		policy = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_ENTRY_POLICY);
   948		if (!policy)
   949			return false;
   950	
   951		for (i = 0; i < policy->nr_entries; i++) {
   952			if (policy->policy_entries[i].entity_type == SLR_ET_BOOT_PARAMS) {
   953				policy->policy_entries[i].entity = (u64)boot_params;
   954				updated = true;
   955				break;
   956			}
   957		}
   958	
   959		/*
   960		 * If this is a PE entry into EFI stub the mocked up boot params will
   961		 * be missing some of the setup header data needed for the second stage
   962		 * of the Secure Launch boot.
   963		 */
   964		if (image) {
   965			struct setup_header *hdr = (struct setup_header *)((u8 *)image->image_base +
   966						    offsetof(struct boot_params, hdr));
   967			u64 cmdline_ptr;
   968	
   969			boot_params->hdr.setup_sects = hdr->setup_sects;
   970			boot_params->hdr.syssize = hdr->syssize;
   971			boot_params->hdr.version = hdr->version;
   972			boot_params->hdr.loadflags = hdr->loadflags;
   973			boot_params->hdr.kernel_alignment = hdr->kernel_alignment;
   974			boot_params->hdr.min_alignment = hdr->min_alignment;
   975			boot_params->hdr.xloadflags = hdr->xloadflags;
   976			boot_params->hdr.init_size = hdr->init_size;
   977			boot_params->hdr.kernel_info_offset = hdr->kernel_info_offset;
   978			efi_set_u64_form(boot_params->hdr.cmd_line_ptr, boot_params->ext_cmd_line_ptr,
   979					 &cmdline_ptr);
 > 980			boot_params->hdr.cmdline_size = strlen((const char *)cmdline_ptr);
   981		}
   982	
   983		return updated;
   984	}
   985	

-- 
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-08-28 17:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-08-26 22:38 [PATCH v10 00/20] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 01/20] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 02/20] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 03/20] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 04/20] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 05/20] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 06/20] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 07/20] x86/msr: Add variable MTRR base/mask and x2apic ID registers Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 08/20] x86/boot: Place TXT MLE header in the kernel_info section Ross Philipson
2024-08-27 10:29   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 09/20] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 10/20] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 11/20] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 12/20] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 13/20] x86/reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 14/20] tpm: Protect against locality counter underflow Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 15/20] tpm: Ensure tpm is in known state at startup Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 16/20] tpm: Make locality requests return consistent values Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 17/20] tpm: Add ability to set the default locality the TPM chip uses Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 18/20] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the default locality Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 19/20] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2024-08-26 22:38 ` [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2024-08-27 10:28   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-08-27 17:19     ` ross.philipson
2024-08-27 20:09   ` kernel test robot
2024-08-28 17:09   ` kernel test robot [this message]
2024-08-28 17:14     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-08-28 20:19       ` ross.philipson
2024-08-29 13:23         ` Jonathan McDowell
2024-08-29 13:28           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-08-29 15:13             ` ross.philipson

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